# File Explanation

### Lesson Plan Note

The Saudi Arabia and Yemen War reading list and recommendations for further study are in the Saudi Arabia Affirmative file. It would be very beneficial for students to review that material even if they are reading a different affirmative.

### File Explanation

This file includes answers to the Saudi Arabia affirmative case.

It includes answers to both advantages (Humanitarian Crisis and Middle East Stability) and solvency.

Both affirmative advantages are based on the affirmative’s attempt to end the Saudi bombing and genocide in Yemen:

1. Humanitarian Crisis — this advantage focuses on the humanitarian benefits of ending the war.
2. Middle East Stability — this advantage focuses on the potential of broader escalation of the war.

# Evidence

## Humanitarian Crisis Advantage Answers

### 1NC — Humanitarian Crisis Advantage Answers

#### 1. The plan is immoral because it empowers the Houthis and Iranians — the Saudis are the lesser evil.

Tobin 19 — Jonathan S. Tobin, Editor in Chief of the *Jewish News Syndicate*, Contributing Writer at the *National Review*, Columnist at the *New York Post*, former Executive Editor of *Commentary*, 2019 (“Don’t Hand Iran a Victory in Yemen,” *National Review*, February 15th, Available Online at <https://www.nationalreview.com/2019/02/yemen-war-iran-shouldnt-be-handed-victory/>, Accessed 06-24-2019)

Khashoggi’s death has been a rallying point for the defense of journalists against repressive regimes such as that of the Saudis. This issue is also an extension of the mainstream media’s complaints about Trump’s war on the press. But while MBS is a tyrant and Trump engages in overkill against his press critics, the notion that helping a government that is even more despotic than the Saudis’ gain an advantage in a geostrategic struggle will somehow protect the freedom of the press or the cause of human rights is absurd.

The war in Yemen has been a human-rights catastrophe, causing the deaths of thousands and a famine. The Saudis bear part of the responsibility for these horrors. That is particularly true with respect to their indiscriminate bombing campaign against Houthi targets, which has caused massive civilian casualties. American support for this effort and the fact that the Saudis are largely using U.S. weapons is troubling.

But while the Saudis’ record is difficult to defend, Congress’s invoking the War Powers Act in order to eliminate the U.S. role in the conflict will not lessen the suffering of the people of Yemen. To the contrary, doing so would merely give the Houthis — a force whose human-rights record is probably even worse than that of the Saudis — a leg up in their efforts to topple the government of Yemen. Just as dangerous, it would be widely interpreted as one more victory for Iran in a region that is still reeling from Tehran’s successful intervention in Syria.

Tehran’s role in aiding the Houthi war effort is an example of just how misplaced President Obama’s hopes that Iran would use the nuclear deal to “get right with the world” were. Iran has continued to push for regional hegemony, rightly scaring moderate Arab regimes as well as fueling the fears of Israelis.

President Trump spent the days after news of the Khashoggi murder broke making ill-advised statements about wanting to keep America selling arms to the Saudis. But as much as that was a mistake, the president wasn’t wrong to point out that the alliance with the Saudi government was in the interests of the United States. As unpopular as the Saudis might be, they are still the lesser of two evils when compared with an Iranian regime that is both a human-rights offender and seeking to spread violence and instability throughout the Middle East.

The Saudis have earned American distrust dating back to 9/11, and as the Khashoggi murder demonstrated, MBS is a loose cannon who can’t be trusted to behave responsibly. Yet MBS is also reformer who seeks to modernize the Saudi state and pull back on some repression; he even largely eliminated the kingdom’s dangerous policy of funding radical Islamic educational institutions around the world (a role in which the Saudis have been replaced by Qatar).

The desire of Congress to rebuke MBS and Trump — who has undermined Republican confidence in his foreign policy with attacks on NATO — is understandable. But as frustrating and morally ambiguous as it might be, a Cold War mentality in which America backs a bad actor to stop an even worse one remains the only sensible U.S. policy in the Arabian Peninsula. A vote to end American involvement in Yemen won’t advance peace or the principles of human rights. All it will do is give an undeserved and dangerous victory to Iran.

#### 2. Scaling back U.S. involvement increases civilian casualties from both coalition *and* Houthi attacks.

Alasrar 18 — Fatima Alasrar, Senior Analyst at the Arabia Foundation, former Research Associate at the Arab Gulf States Institute, former Mason Fellow at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, holds an M.A. in Public Administration from Harvard University and an M.A. in International Relations from Johns Hopkins University, 2018 (“Yemen Is Bad but It Would Be Worse Without U.S. Involvement,” *The National Interest*, July 25th, Available Online at <https://nationalinterest.org/print/blog/middle-east-watch/yemen-bad-it-would-be-worse-without-us-involvement-26801>, Accessed 06-14-2019)

In addition, the U.S. military plays a critical role in safeguarding Yemeni civilians by identifying nonmilitary and civilian facilities for the coalition so that these are not accidentally targeted by air strikes. This intelligence support has not prevented civilian casualties altogether, but it has almost certainly reduced their number. Also, American-produced Patriot missile defense systems have allowed the coalition to intercept dozens of Houthi ballistic missiles fired against Saudi, Emirati, and Yemeni civilian population centers. American involvement also bolsters ties between the U.S. military and the militaries of its Arab allies and these relationships are a key tool of U.S. power and influence if America is to remain globally relevant.

#### 3. Civilian Casualties Minimal — the coalition has multilayered safeguards, but preventing all collateral damage is impossible.

Nazer 18 — Fahad Nazer, Fellow at the National Council on U.S.-Arab Relations, Columnist for *Arab News*—a daily newspaper in Saudi Arabia, Political Consultant to the Embassy of Saudi Arabia in Washington, former Non-Resident Fellow at the Arab Gulf States Institute, 2018 (“What Is at Stake in Yemen,” The Hoover Institution, December 20th, Available Online at <https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/nazer_whatisatstakeinyemen_webreadypdf.pdf>, Accessed 06-24-2019, p. 4)

US and UK Assistance Sought and Received

In addition, the Saudi-led coalition has also sought and received the assistance of both the United States and the United Kingdom to improve the accuracy of its targeting.11 I have personally listened to a lengthy presentation by a representative of the coalition detailing the multilayered safeguards put in place to minimize civilian casualties. Despite the coalition’s best efforts, civilian casualties in modern warfare, especially when a party to the conflict considers cities and urban centers to be part of the battlefield, appear to be virtually impossible to avoid completely. It is also worth noting that even the most advanced military in the world, that of the United States, has not been able to avoid civilian casualties in its air campaign in Syria. However, there is a patent difference between mistakes and the intentional targeting of civilians. Unfortunately, we have a contemporary example that highlights the scale of the devastation when civilians are targeted as a matter of policy. That is in fact what the regime of Bashar al-Assad and its Iranian and Hezbollah allies have been doing in Syria. The devastation has been catastrophic.12

**—— Footnotes ——**

11. Dion Nissenbaum, “U.S. Deepens Role in Yemen Fight, Offers Gulf Allies Airstrike-Target Assistance,” Wall Street Journal, June 12, 2018, accessed December 6, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-deepens-role-in-yemen-fight-offers-gulf-allies-airstrike-target-assistance-1528830371.

12. “Syria Conflict: Aleppo in ‘Catastrophic’ State Says UN,” BBC, April 28, 2016, accessed December 6, 2018, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-36162701>.

#### 4. No Moral Obligation — in this context, ignoring consequences causes greater injustice. DAs are morally relevant.

Heinrichs 18 — Rebeccah L. Heinrichs, Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute, Adjunct Professor at the Institute of World Politics, holds an M.A. in National Security and Strategic Studies from the U.S. Naval War College, 2018 (“Why Breaking With Saudi Arabia Over Khashoggi Would Hurt America,” *The Federalist*, October 23rd, Available Online at <https://www.hudson.org/research/14636-why-breaking-with-saudi-arabia-over-khashoggi-would-hurt-america>, Accessed 06-25-2019)

Because of these two extreme characterizations — “a ghoulish assassination squad of barbaric Saudis torturing and murdering a Washington Post journalist who was a champion of free press” — emotions are whipped into a frenzy. Congressmen, journalists, and other media personalities demand justice and feel righteous in their anger, and their anger is fueling their insistence that the United States take drastic measures against the Saudi government.

If justice is to be had, if the moral decision is to be made about how the United States ought to respond, cooler heads must prevail. Insisting that one must belong to a school of thought that prioritizes either morality or realism is a false choice. It is a false choice in the individual lives of human beings and it’s a false choice in matters of foreign policy. There is no foreign policy action or inaction void of a moral decision or without moral consequence. None.

Every action the United States takes is based on a complex set of considerations about what is right and good. So those analysts who argue that we must take a colder, more transactional, amoral approach to foreign policy are arguing in favor of actions that have moral consequence, or more likely, are immoral. Likewise, those banging their fists on the table and shouting “Justice for Khashoggi!” could be rushing headlong into catastrophe that only creates greater injustice.

Consider that the United States’ strategic partnership with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has arguably never been more productive. The young prince bin Salman has committed to helping the Muslim nation that contains both Mecca and Medina move towards a more just society and has already implemented modest but meaningful reforms. Moreover, he has aided in Saudi’s recent softening of its stance towards Israel, stating that he believes the Jewish people have a “right to their own land.”

None of this should be overstated, and hopefulness for the young prince to make good on his commitments should be tempered. But if the prince can be encouraged to make reforms incrementally and with greater prudence and consistency, it could portend positive developments not only for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, but also for the larger Muslim world.

Saudi Arabia is famously the largest customer of American foreign military sales. Unfortunately, this relationship is frequently disparaged as based on greed and nothing more. No doubt American companies and therefore plenty of Americans benefit directly from selling expensive military equipment and weapons to other nations. But the primary reason that the United States invests so heavily in Saudi Arabia is because of its strategic importance.

Saudi Arabia is a crucial counterweight to the Islamic Republic of Iran. Iran is a sworn enemy of the United States and Israel. It is responsible for the deaths of hundreds of American soldiers in Iraq, and for maiming countless other American warfighters in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Iran regime oppresses its own people and fails to invest in its own economy, because it has prioritized funding Bashar al Assad’s brutal civil war in Syria, enabling him to repeatedly use chemical weapons on his own people.

Iran is a constant destabilizing force, seeking to undermine the governments of sovereign nations like Iraq and Yemen. Although Saudi rightly receives flak for its atrocious (and in many cases, avoidable) civilian casualties in Yemen, that war only exists because Iran is funding and arming the Houthi rebels. It is a proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia, in which Iran is the aggressor and Saudi is the defender. Last, and certainly not least, Iran continues to fund and export terrorism in the Middle East and Europe.

It is not too strong to say Saudi Arabia is our most important strategic partner in mitigating and rolling back Iran’s power and malign activities. While true that the United States is becoming energy independent, it is still inextricably tied to the global market and our Asian allies remain reliant on Golf petroleum. The stability and diversification of the energy market is a critical factor in matters of war and peace. Iran has repeatedly brandished its ability to affect the energy market by, for example, threatening to close the Strait of Hormuz.

Saudi Arabia leads the Gulf coalition in maritime security to keep critical shipping lanes open. And should the United States and allies like Saudi Arabia lose control of the security of those shipping lanes, countries like Iran and its increasingly bold partners — large nuclear powers China and Russia — would be greatly empowered to more effectively blackmail and coerce the United States and our allies.

Every government of every sovereign nation is primarily responsible for the care of its own people. The United States government must weigh all of the above in order to determine what is the just thing to do for its own citizens first, and also what effect its actions will have on its allies, and even the impact on humanity in general.

Damaging the U.S.-Saudi alliance will not decrease human suffering, and will not increase justice or peace and stability for Americans or for our allies. Heavy sanctions on the Saudi government, ending arms sales and military cooperation with Saudi, or demanding the House of Saud remove bin Salman would play right into the hands of America’s enemies. Doing the moral thing does not require the United States to advantage those who seek to harm us.

Instead, once as many facts can be concluded as possible (which will be quite difficult if Turkey can’t or won’t provide evidence that contradicts the Saudi version of what happened), the United States should publicly condemn the extrajudicial killing of the Saudi dissident in the Saudi consulate. This should, ideally, happen at the highest levels. President Trump or Secretary of State Mike Pompeo should make clear that the United States encourages all nations to make room for political dissent, to work towards more just judicial proceedings, and to respect the dignity of its citizens. Perhaps the United States can impose targeted sanctions against specific Saudi officials if they are found to have ordered Khashoggi’s murder.

Then, the United States should be much more intentional about privately encouraging and supporting reforms inside Saudi Arabia and the way they fight wars abroad. Partnering with Saudi Arabia is not “choosing among lesser evils.” Partnering with Saudi Arabia is about doing the most good, and the unjust killing of a Saudi national does not change that.

### Extend: “Plan Increases Casualties”

#### Extend 1NC # \_\_\_ — Plan Increases Civilian Casualties. US guidance and arms are essential to prevent accidental targeting of civilians and intercept Houthi attacks. That’s Alasrar.

#### They say:

[Write out what the 2AC said and your answers to it here. Then read more evidence.]

#### Cutting off U.S. PGMs will increase civilian casualties.

Heistein 17 — Ari Heistein, Special Assistant to the Director of the Institute for National Security Studies at Tel Aviv University (Israel), former Research Associate in the Middle East Program at the Council on Foreign Relations, holds an M.A. in Near and Middle Eastern Studies from Tel Aviv University, 2017 (“America's Hands Are Tied in Yemen,” *The National Interest*, March 23rd, Available Online at https://nationalinterest.org/print/feature/americas-hands-are-tied-yemen-19882, Accessed 06-24-2019)

On the humanitarian level, the argument against the United States providing precision-guided munitions rings hollow, because of the reality that the Saudis will continue in what they see as an existential struggle against the Houthis whether or not they have U.S.-supplied precision munitions, the choice in Washington is not whether or not a Saudi campaign should or will take place, but rather whether it is conducted with precision-guided weapons or dumb bombs. It does not take a munitions specialist to figure out which of those would have a higher civilian death toll.

#### U.S. withdrawal will make the carnage worse.

Carafano 18 — James Jay Carafano, Vice President of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy and E. W. Richardson Fellow at The Heritage Foundation, Adjunct Professor at Georgetown University, former Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, former Lieutenant Colonel in the U.S. Army, holds a Ph.D. in Diplomatic History from Georgetown University, 2018 (“Chaos Will Erupt in the Middle East If U.S. Leaves Yemen,” The Heritage Foundation Commentary, March 7th, Available Online at <https://www.heritage.org/middle-east/commentary/chaos-will-erupt-the-middle-east-if-us-leaves-yemen>, Accessed 06-24-2018)

Legal scholars debate the constitutionality of the War Powers Act. Still, even if the Hill could tell the president to pull out of Yemen, it should not. If America walks away, it will only bring more war, not peace.

America is there for a reason: to keep the region from falling apart. The collapse of any friendly regime there is bad for us.

The greatest threats to Middle East stability and security are Iran and transnational Islamist terrorists groups, principally ISIS and al-Qaida. And it is precisely these forces that are fueling the Yemen war.

If Congress forces the administration to abandon our allies, Tehran, ISIS, and al-Qaida would feel emboldened and likely double-down on expanding the war.

Meanwhile, Washington would lose its ability to influence how Saudi Arabia and the UAE conduct coalition operations. Without our mitigating presence, the carnage of this vicious war would only increase.

#### Plan Worsens Civilian Casualties — it removes U.S. constraints on civilian targeting and U.S. leverage for a ceasefire.

Rogan 18 — Tom Rogan, Foreign Policy Commentary Writer at *The Washington Examiner*, holds an M.Sc. in Middle East Politics from SOAS University of London (UK), 2018 (“Ending US support for Saudi Arabia would make things much worse in Yemen,” *The Washington Examiner*, November 28th, Available Online at <https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/ending-us-support-for-saudi-arabia-would-make-things-much-worse-in-yemen>, Accessed 06-14-2019)

The Senate is now leaning toward ending U.S. participation in the Saudi-United-Arab-Emirates-led war in Yemen. I believe that the Senate has the authority to do this, but I also believe that course of action would be a terrible mistake, doing more harm than good to the civilians who have been suffering through the conflict.

I know that sounds odd. After all, tens of thousands have starved to death or died in the fighting since 2015. So it's understandable that senators want to end to the Saudi campaign against Iranian-supported Houthi rebels in Yemen. They believe that pulling American support will put immense pressure on Riyadh to accept a rapid cease fire.

But the problem is that the senators are wrong. If the U.S. pulls its functional support for the Saudi alliance, two negative consequences will immediately follow. First, the Saudis will lose all the inhibitions about accurate targeting of Houthi formations that American intervention has forced. Second, Riyadh will lose interest in energetic efforts by Washington to reach a durable cease fire.

Both of those developments will be disastrous for Yemeni civilians. For a start, the only reason the Saudis are now moving toward a cease fire is the Trump administration's pressure. Trump has earned Saudi trust and their corresponding deference on issues negatively affecting America: in this case, the human suffering of the Yemeni civil war.

The Saudis have not suddenly woken up and realized that the war is causing too much suffering without adequate prospect of strategic gain. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman sees Yemen as a defining battleground in an existential fight against Iran. With Iran repeatedly firing ballistic missiles at Riyadh and helping assassinate erstwhile Saudi allies, it is ludicrous to think the prince would cease his war effort absent the present mix of major U.S. pressure and resolute U.S. support.

And if you want to understand how a U.S. withdrawal of military support would affect the Saudi war effort, look no further than President Bashar Assad's Syria. The Saudi coalition has far more advanced weapons platforms than the Syrians, but it lacks the integrated command and control, intelligence, targeting, communications, and logistical skill to employ its military effectively. The U.S. has been absolutely critical in filling in the gaps in these areas.

And although the Saudis are still too capricious with their use of force, American guidance has helped them target Houthi formations rather than entire city blocks with a few Houthis somewhere inside those blocks. Again, motivated by their historic, cultural, and theological blood feud with Iran, the Saudis would care little about killing thousands more civilians if they believed it might win the war. America is the only check on them at this moment. And, as demonstrated by the Saudi suspension of operations around the port of Hodeidah, that check has held.

None of this is palatable for a democracy like ours. We want our world to be without wars. But reality sometimes sucks. And the simple reality of the Yemeni civil war is that it would be, as Secretary of State Mike Pompeo put it on Wednesday, "a hell of a lot worse" were the U.S. disengaged from it. Yes, Pompeo exaggerates the degree to which Saudi Arabia is a constructive, stable partner for the U.S. in the broader Middle East. Still, he is right on the fundamental issue: that the U.S. needs a Saudi Arabia that is modernizing and stable.

If we want a cease-fire that restrains Iran as well as serving the Yemeni people, we need to stay engaged with the Saudis. In the end, the Senate's looming action would only decorate Yemen with more civilian blood.

### Extend: “Civilian Casualties Minimal”

#### Extend 1NC # \_\_\_ — Civilian Casualties Minimal. It’s impossible to prevent all casualties in war, but the Saudi Coalition is making efforts to prevent them. That’s Nazer.

#### They say:

[Write out what the 2AC said and your answers to it here. Then read more evidence.]

#### The coalition is making serious efforts to minimize civilian casualties.

Almarzoqi 16 — Mansour Almarzoqi, Researcher on Saudi Politics at Sciences Po de Lyon (France), Assistant Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for Strategic Studies at the Prince Saud al-Faisal Institute for Diplomatic Studies (Saudi Arabia), 2016 (“Why Saudi Efforts in Yemen Advance U.S. Interests,” *The National Interest*, October 2nd, Available Online at <https://nationalinterest.org/print/feature/why-saudi-efforts-yemen-advance-us-interests-17901>, Accessed 06-24-2019)

I will argue here for three points. First, Saudi Arabia is not given enough credit for its commitment to the protection of civilians as well as for the humanitarian aid it provides to Yemen. Second, the bill neglects the strategic context that dictated the formation of the Arab coalition under Riyadh’s leadership and its intervention in Yemen. Third, it is of fundamental importance to American national security that Yemen has a strong central government and a stable as well as a functioning state structure. These are the objectives of the Arab coalition in Yemen.

Although it is important to call on the Saudis to respect humanitarian standards, Saudi Arabia is in fact making serious efforts to reduce civilian casualties and provide aid to Yemen. The U.S. military can attest to this given that it has a front seat in the command center of the Arab coalition forces in Riyadh. One major reason for the slow advance of Yemeni government’s forces is that the Arab coalition wants to avoid civilian casualties. That is why many operations against Iran-backed Houthi militia and Saleh forces have not been carried out.

#### It is impossible to completely eliminate civilian casualties — U.S. strikes in Syria prove.

Nazer 18 — Fahad Nazer, Fellow at the National Council on U.S.-Arab Relations, Columnist for *Arab News*—a daily newspaper in Saudi Arabia, Political Consultant to the Embassy of Saudi Arabia in Washington, former Non-Resident Fellow at the Arab Gulf States Institute, 2018 (“What Is at Stake in Yemen,” The Hoover Institution, December 20th, Available Online at <https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/nazer_whatisatstakeinyemen_webreadypdf.pdf>, Accessed 06-24-2019, p. 12-13)

A Stark Difference between Mistakes and Intentional Targeting of Civilians

As already mentioned in this report, the toll on the civilian population of Yemen has been steep. However, modern warfare by definition is devastating, and the risk to civilians increases significantly when combatants use civilian centers to store ammunition and weapons or to hide troops. The Houthis have a legacy of doing all of the above, not only during the current conflict, but also during its six wars with the government of the late president Ali Abdullah Saleh between 2004 and 2010. In fact, Saleh had long ago accused the Houthis of using civilian centers including schools, [end page 12] hospitals, and mosques for military purposes.50 Saudi and Yemeni government officials have made similar arguments, adding that it is the Houthis’ irresponsible policies that have put civilians in harm’s way.51 In a television interview in 2017, Saudi Defense Minister and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman suggested that the Saudi military has exercised restraint to minimize collateral damage and civilian casualties.52 But it is abundantly clear that despite the best precautions and the best military practices, civilian casualties are practically impossible to avoid in modern wars.53

For example, the US-led coalition against the Islamic State has also been accused of killing civilians in its campaign to eliminate the last remaining territories controlled by the terrorist group that once occupied large swaths of territory along the Syrian-Iraqi border.54 In fact, representatives for the US coalition in Syria have made nearly identical arguments to those of the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen. As an example, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, a group that documents casualties of the war in Syria, reported that airstrikes killed forty-one people, including ten children, in al-Sousa village and its environs in eastern Syria during military airstrikes over a two-day period in late October. The US coalition acknowledged that it struck a mosque that was being used by the terror group as a base. However, a spokesman added, “Such Daesh misuse of the mosque is another example of their violation of the law of war and made the mosque a valid military target.” (Daesh is the Arabic acronym for the Islamic State.)55 Interestingly enough, as is the case in Yemen, the United States disputes the actual number of civilian casualties during its four-year campaign in Syria. While the coalition puts the number of civilian casualties at just over 1,000, the aforementioned Syrian Observatory maintains that the campaign had actually killed 3,331 civilians by the end of September 2018.56

**—— Footnotes ——**

50. Ellen Francis, “U.S. Coalition Says It Hit Islamic State Fighters in Syria Mosque after Reports of Civilian Deaths,” Reuters, October 21, 2018, accessed December 7, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-strikes/us-coalition-says-it-hit-islamic-state-fighters-in-syria-mosque-after-reports-of-civilian-deaths-idUSKCN1MV0MM.

51. “Yemen’s Government to UN: Houthi Militia Uses Civilians as Human Shields,” Al Arabiya, November 9, 2018, accessed December 7, 2018, https://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/gulf/2018/11/09/Yemen-s-government-Houthi-militia-uses-civilians-as-human-shields-.html.

52. YouTube, May 2, 2017, accessed December 7, 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AZXSa6WZ-dA.

53. Reuters, “Saudi Coalition Admits Error in Yemen Airstrike That Killed Dozens,” New York Times, September 2, 2018, accessed December 7, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/02/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-yemen-strike.html.

54. David Brennan, “U.S.-Led Coalition Accused of War Crimes in Syria, May Have Killed Hundreds of Raqqa Civilians,” Newsweek, June 5, 2018, accessed December 7, 2018, https://www.newsweek.com/us-led-coalition-accused-war-crimes-syria-may-have-killed-hundreds-raqqa-957846.

55. Ellen Francis, “U.S. Coalition Says It Hit Islamic State Fighters in Syria Mosque after Reports of Civilian Deaths,” Reuters, October 21, 2018, accessed December 17, 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-strikes/us-coalition-says-it-hit-islamic-state-fighters-in-syria-mosque-after-reports-of-civilian-deaths-idUSKCN1MV0MM>.

56. Agence France-Presse, “Four Years of U.S.-Led Coalition Strikes on Syria Have Produced 3,300 Civilian Deaths, Monitor Says,” Japan Times, September 24, 2018, accessed December 7, 2018, https://www.japantimes.co. jp/news/2018/09/24/world/four-years-u-s-led-coalition-strikes-syria-produced-3300-civilian-deaths-monitor-says/ #.W81Ga2hKhPY.

#### The coalition has implemented significant initiatives to address the humanitarian crisis.

Nazer 18 — Fahad Nazer, Fellow at the National Council on U.S.-Arab Relations, Columnist for *Arab News*—a daily newspaper in Saudi Arabia, Political Consultant to the Embassy of Saudi Arabia in Washington, former Non-Resident Fellow at the Arab Gulf States Institute, 2018 (“What Is at Stake in Yemen,” The Hoover Institution, December 20th, Available Online at <https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/nazer_whatisatstakeinyemen_webreadypdf.pdf>, Accessed 06-24-2019, p. 8-9)

Saudi Initiatives to Alleviate the Humanitarian Crisis

Contrary to the erroneous allegation that Saudi Arabia is blockading Yemen and that it is intentionally starving the people of Yemen, as some members of Congress and opinion-makers have repeatedly maintained in recent months, the kingdom appears keenly aware of the gravity of the humanitarian crisis. It has taken several initiatives to help address the direst needs in terms of shortages in food and medicine and maintains that it has in fact been the biggest provider of aid to Yemen in the past three years.38 [end page 8]

In early 2018, the Saudi-led coalition launched the Yemen Comprehensive Humanitarian Operations (YCHO), whose stated objective is “to improve the Yemeni humanitarian situation by addressing immediate aid shortfalls while simultaneously building capacity for long-term improvement of humanitarian aid and commercial goods imports to Yemen.” The plan is meant to complement and work in conjunction with the 2018 United Nations Yemen Humanitarian Response Plan. Some of the more specific goals include “increasing imports to 1.4 million metric tons per month up from 1.1 million metric tons per month while enhancing capabilities in Yemen to import 500,000 metric tons of fuel derivatives per month up from 250,000 metric tons per month at its peak in 2017.”

The plans’ highlights include the following: contributing $1.5 billion in new donations to international organizations and depositing $2 billion in Yemen’s central bank (in addition to a $1 billion deposit that Saudi Arabia contributed in 2014); expanding additional Yemeni ports; establishing “air bridges” from coalition countries to Marib; and creating up to seventeen safe passage corridors “originating from six points to ensure safe overland transportation of aid to NGOs operating in the interior of Yemen.”

In addition, the Saudi-based King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Center maintains that from May 2015 to the end of August 2018 it has implemented 277 projects with eighty partners in Yemen at a total cost of more than $1.64 billion. The projects span a wide array of sectors including providing food and medicine, treating the injured, creating medical facilities, providing clean water, and clearing mines. The effort includes a $66 million donation to the World Health Organization (WHO) in June 2017 to combat the spread of cholera.39 By the end of 2017, there were clear indications that the cases of cholera and deaths resulting from the disease had dropped so significantly that the health organization Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders) announced that it would close the majority of its cholera treatment centers or reduce their capacity. Although there was an increase in cases by August 2018, it is difficult to attribute that increase directly to the conflict. Due to its underdeveloped health care sector and inadequate water sanitation, Yemen has experienced widespread water- and food-borne illnesses, including cholera outbreaks, in the past.40

**—— Footnotes ——**

38. Jon B. Alterman, “Aid and Conflict: Pitfalls in Yemen,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 16, 2018, accessed December 7, 2018, https://www.csis.org/analysis/aid-and-conflict-pitfalls-yemen.

39. Charlotte Beale, “Saudi Arabia Donates $67 Million to Tackle Cholera Epidemic in Yemen,” Independent, June 25, 2017, accessed December 7, 2018, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/saudi-arabia-donates-67-million-to-tackle-cholera-epidemic-in-yemen-a7807006.html.

40. Reuters, “Death Toll from Cholera Rising in South Yemen City Hit by War,” New York Times, July 24, 1994, accessed December 7, 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/1994/07/24/world/death-toll-from-cholera-rising-in-south-yemen-city-hit-by-war.html>.

### Extend: “No Moral Obligation”

#### Extend 1NC # \_\_\_ — No Moral Obligation. Ignoring consequences of action toward Saudi Arabia creates worse atrocities. That’s Heinrichs.

#### They say:

[Write out what the 2AC said and your answers to it here. Then read more evidence.]

#### The government’s first obligation is to protect national security — moral considerations are irrelevant.

Kennan 86 — George F. Kennan, Professor Emeritus at the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton University, served as U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union (1952) and Yugoslavia (1961-1963), 1985 (“Morality and Foreign Policy,” *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1985/1986, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via JSTOR, p. 216)

Second, let us recognize that the functions, commitments and moral obligations of governments are not the same as those [end page 205] of the individual. Government is an agent, not a principal. Its primary obligation is to the interests of the national society it represents, not to the moral impulses that individual elements of that society may experience. No more than the attorney vis-a-vis the client, nor the doctor vis-a-vis the patient, can government attempt to insert itself into the consciences of those whose interests it represents.

Let me explain. The interests of the national society for which government has to concern itself are basically those of its military security, the integrity of its political life and the well-being of its people. These needs have no moral quality. They arise from the very existence of the national state in question and from the status of national sovereignty it enjoys. They are the unavoidable necessities of a national existence and therefore not subject to classification as either "good" or "bad." They may be questioned from a detached philosophic point of view. But the government of the sovereign state cannot make such judgments. When it accepts the responsibilities of governing, implicit in that acceptance is the assumption that it is right that the state should be sovereign, that the integrity of its political life should be assured, that its people should enjoy the blessings of military security, material prosperity and a reasonable opportunity for, as the Declaration of Independence puts it, the pursuit of happiness. For these assumptions the government needs no moral justification, nor need it accept any moral reproach for acting on the basis of them.

## Middle East Stability Advantage Answers

### 1NC — Middle East Stability Advantage

#### 1. No Middle East war — external actors will limit damage, not intervene.

Stepanova 16 [Ekaterina researcher at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Summer 2016, “Russia in the Middle East: Back to a “Grand Strategy” – or Enforcing Multilateralism?,” http://www.cairn-int.info/article-E\_PE\_162\_0023--russia-in-the-middle-east.htm]

In contrast to the 20th century and the early years of the 21st century, the regional crisis in the 2010s developed at a time when, overall, the role and leverage of major powers external to the Middle East, as either active meddlers or security guarantors in the region, or both, actually declined rather than increased. The United States serves as the most evident case in point: the “post-interventionist” US administration has clearly become “tired of the Middle East”, struggling and often failing to keep pace with the dynamically changing situation and unable to alter or decisively affect the course of events. The same even more strongly applies to the European powers. In terms of activity and impact, regional actors (Iran, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE and Turkey) increasingly appeared to outplay external powers and influence. For external powers, however, that did not remove a number of risks and threats connected to, or emanating from, the Middle East. The increase and diversification of global energy supply and the latest crisis in energy prices made the region less central to the global economy than it had been in the past. At the same time, the fundamental socio-political, statehood and security crisis in the Middle East brought with it new security concerns and implications. They mostly stemmed from reinforced perceptions about the long-term nature of regional instability, the continuing potential for further destabilization, and the related consequences and implications beyond the region, ranging from terrorist connections to migration flows. These challenges affect external powers unevenly. For instance, the role of the Iraq-Syria area as the main focal point for global terrorism activity and magnet for transnational flows of violent extremists in the mid-2010s poses a threat to everyone (but mostly to the countries of the region itself, as well as to those in Europe and Eurasia). In contrast, the avalanche of refugee and migrant flows from the Middle East primarily targets Europe (rather than North America, Eurasia, or other regions). Until recently, the main type of response by key (Western) external powers to turbulent developments in the Middle East, while not amounting to a hands-off approach, boils down to limited containment. Examples range from limited air strikes against “Islamic State” positions in Iraq and Syria, carried out by the US-led coalition since 2014, to the 2013 deal on Syria’s chemical disarmament co-brokered by the United States and Russia. Not surprisingly, this limited-containment approach has had equally limited results for Syria, Iraq and the region – as well as for the West itself (as shown, e.g., by the persistent migrant flows and accelerating terrorist attacks in Europe). Despite the growing centrality of the Middle East to global politics and security, and its more direct impact on and ties to the West, this damage limitation course taken by key external actors has not been very different from, e.g., the approach taken by the United States and its Western allies (and also by Russia and China) to the Afghanistan.

#### 2. No Escalation — multilateral institutions, nuclear deterrence, and political weariness all check.

Lubin 14 [Gus worked here from 2009 to 2017. In that time he was a senior correspondent, editor-in-chief of Tech Insider, executive editor of Business Insider, and more. 7/26. "Why Today Is Different From The 1914 Outbreak Of World War I." https://www.businessinsider.com/differences-between-now-and-1914-outbreak-of-wwi-2014-7]

With the world caught in a series of potential proxy wars from Ukraine to the Middle East and tensions ratcheting in East Asia and elsewhere, many have compared the present to 1914, when a trigger event in Sarajevo activated military alliances and led to a devastating global war. Especially on the 100-year anniversary of the start of World War I, the similarities come to mind easily, but is history really repeating? Richard Evans, the Regius Professor of History at Cambridge, identified key difference between now and then in a January article in the New Statesman. These include balancing tendencies of the multipolar world we live in now as well as the emergence of "institutions of collective security" like the United Nations, which makes a big difference even if they may seem ineffective. Above all, he believes people have learned from history, as he said in an interview with the New Republic: I think the major difference now is that we've had two World Wars, and we've had the nuclear age. Whereas in 1914, states, and for that matter most of the public in most nations, had what we now think of as a very irresponsible attitude toward war. They went into it in a gung-ho way. Now I think we are much more afraid of a major war, and we are much more cautious about it. I think the attitude of politicians today is very different from what it was in 1914. As for WWI not preventing WWII, many see the latter as an extension of the former, and anyway WWII had a greater effect. Writes Evans: The destruction caused by the Second World War, with its 50 million or more dead, its ruined cities, its genocides, its widespread negation of civilised values, had a far more powerful effect than the deaths caused by the First World War, which were (with exceptions, notably the genocide of a million or more Armenian civilians, killed by the Turks in 1915) largely confined to troops on active service. In 1945, Hiroshima and Nagasaki provided an additional, ter­rible warning of what would happen if the world went to war again. Harvard Professor Joseph S. Nye, Jr. similarly commented on changing attitudes toward war in a January article: Today's world is different from the world of 1914 in several important ways. One is that nuclear weapons give political leaders the equivalent of a crystal ball that shows what their world would look like after escalation. Perhaps if the Emperor, the Kaiser, and the Czar had had a crystal ball showing their empires destroyed and their thrones lost in 1918, they would have been more prudent in 1914. Certainly, the crystal-ball effect had a strong influence on US and Soviet leaders during the Cuban missile crisis. It would likely have a similar influence on US and Chinese leaders today. Another difference is that the ideology of war is much weaker nowadays. In 1914, war really was thought to be inevitable, a fatalistic view reinforced by the Social Darwinist argument that war should be welcomed, because it would "clear the air" like a good summer storm.

#### 3. No draw in to Middle East conflict — countries have mutual interests in containing instability.

Mead 14 [Walter Russell Mead Professor of Foreign Affairs and Humanities at Bard College; Editor-at-Large of The American Interest magazine. 7/7. "Have We Gone From a Post-War to a Pre-War World?" https://www.huffingtonpost.com/walter-russell-mead/new-global-war\_b\_5562664.html]

The Middle East today bears an ominous resemblance to the Balkans of that period. The contemporary Middle East has an unstable blend of ethnicities and religions uneasily coexisting within boundaries arbitrarily marked off by external empires. Ninety-five years after the French and the British first parceled out the lands of the fallen Ottoman caliphate, that arrangement is now coming to an end. Events in Iraq and Syria suggest that the Middle East could be in for carnage and upheaval as great as anything the Balkans saw. The great powers are losing the ability to hold their clients in check; the Middle East today is at least as explosive as the Balkan region was a century ago. GERMANS THEN, CHINESE NOW What blew the Archduke's murder up into a catastrophic world war, though, was not the tribal struggle in southeastern Europe. It took the hegemonic ambitions of the German Empire to turn a local conflict into a universal conflagration. Having eclipsed France as the dominant military power in Europe, Germany aimed to surpass Britain on the seas and to recast the emerging world order along lines that better suited it. Yet the rising power was also insecure, fearing that worried neighbors would gang up against it. In the crisis in the Balkans, Germany both felt a need to back its weak ally Austria and saw a chance to deal with its opponents on favorable terms. Could something like that happen again? China today is both rising and turning to the sea in ways that Kaiser Wilhelm would understand. Like Germany in 1914, China has emerged in the last 30 years as a major economic power, and it has chosen to invest a growing share of its growing wealth in military spending. But here the analogy begins to get complicated and even breaks down a bit. Neither China nor any Chinese ally is competing directly with the United States and its allies in the Middle East. China isn't (yet) taking a side in the Sunni-Shia dispute, and all it really wants in the Middle East is quiet; China wants that oil to flow as peacefully and cheaply as possible. AMERICA HAS ALL THE ALLIES And there's another difference: alliance systems. The Great Powers of 1914 were divided into two roughly equal military blocs: Austria, Germany, Italy and potentially the Ottoman Empire confronted Russia, France and potentially Britain. Today the global U.S. alliance system has no rival or peer; while China, Russia and a handful of lesser powers are disengaged from, and in some cases even hostile to, the U.S. system, the military balance isn't even close.

### Extend: “No Middle East War”

#### Extend 1NC # \_\_\_ — No Middle East War. External powers are committed to non-intervention — Afghanistan conflict proves. That’s Stepanova.

#### They say:

[Write out what the 2AC said and your answers to it here. Then read more evidence.]

#### No Middle East war — states are too weak and nobody will risk it.

Glaser 17 [John, associate director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, Master of Arts in International Security at the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University. "Withdrawing from Overseas Bases: Why a Forward-Deployed Military Posture Is Unnecessary, Outdated, and Dangerous," *Cato Institute*, https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/withdrawing-overseas-bases-why-forward-deployed-military-posture]

Regionally, the circumstances are similarly advantageous. According to Rovner, “the chance that a regional hegemon will emerge in the Persian Gulf during the next twenty years is slim to none. This is true even if the United States withdraws completely.” 134 There are only three potential major powers in the region: Iraq, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. None of them possesses the capabilities necessary to conquer neighboring territories or gain a controlling influence over Persian Gulf oil resources. In addition to being too weak to make a bid for regional dominance, all three are bogged down and distracted by internal problems. Overall, the region is in a state of defense dominance: the major states are too weak to project power beyond their borders, but they do have the capability to deter their neighbors. Deterrence works well in this environment because the costs of offensive action remain prohibitively high. 135

### Extend: “No Escalation”

#### Extend 1NC # \_\_\_ — No Escalation. Aff evidence relies on outdated political science theories — deterrence and international organizations keep proxy conflicts from escalating. That’s Lubin.

#### Prefer Our Evidence — we cite history and poli sci professors at Harvard and Cambridge who’ve done long-term studies on the causes of conflict.

#### They say:

[Write out what the 2AC said and your answers to it here. Then read more evidence.]

#### No escalation — Middle East wars are contained.

Evans 14 [Richard J. Evans is Regius Professor of History and President of Wolfson College, University of Cambridge. 1/25. "What Can 1914 Tell Us About 2014?" https://newrepublic.com/article/116347/what-pre-world-war-i-europe-can-tell-us-about-today]

The Balkan states, much like nations of the Middle East today, to a degree stood proxy for larger powers, notably tsarist Russia, Germany and Austria-Hungary. They had come close to the brink during the first Balkan war in 1912-13, when Montenegro in alliance with Serbia attacked northern Albania, where there were virtually no Serbs or Montenegrins among the inhabitants. Austria-Hungary demanded Serbia’s with­drawal, Russia began to mobilise in support of the Serbs, and France declared its support for the Russians. The situation was defused only by a British intervention, resulting in an international conference that guaranteed independence for Albania. The whole episode was an ominous foretaste of what happened in August 1914. With the break-up of the alliance of the Balkan states in 1913, Bulgaria went over to the patronage of the Germans, while Russia’s only client left in the region was Serbia. Serbian ambitions had already prompted Austria-Hungary to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina, with their substantial population of Serbs, in 1908. It would be just as wrong to dismiss all of this as irrelevant to the ambitions and rivalries of the Great Powers, as Boris Johnson has done recently, as it would be to dismiss the violent antagonisms in today’s Middle East as unimportant to international relations on a wider scale. And yet the Balkan nations in the late 19th and early 20th centuries were no more mere puppets of Germany or Russia than the Middle Eastern states of today are puppets of America, Russia or China. As President Obama has discovered, trying to control Israeli governments is no easy task; he might tell the Israelis not to build any new Jewish settlements on the occupied West Bank but they carry on regardless. China and Russia might block western attempts to impose sanctions on the Assad regime in Syria and may continue supplying it with arms, but they have not been able to control it or stop its opponents, so they have become willing to explore ways of ending the conflict peaceably; their co-operation in the removal of chemical weapons signals their refusal to back the regime all the way. China supplies Iran with weapons and with nuclear technology but can do little to mediate its policy in the Middle East, and its approach is tempered by the need to keep up good relations with the United States. Not least because of the growing importance of economic ties with the west, Russia has bowed to international pressure for sanctions on Iran and has curbed its arms supplies to the country. In all of this, there are few indications that the world’s great powers today are being drawn into regional conflicts as closely as they were in 1914. One important reason for this lies in our changed attitudes to war. In Europe, the wars of the 19th century were limited in duration and scope, and seldom involved more than a handful of combatant nations. All told, deaths in battle between 1815 and 1914 were seven times fewer than combat deaths in the previous century. The wars of German unification in the 1860s, the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78 and similar conflicts were swiftly resolved by decisive victories for one side or the other. Even the Crimean war of 1854-56 did not move much beyond the hinterland of the Black Sea. In the 19th century fear of the upheaval and destruction caused by the French revolutionary and Napoleonic wars brought the leading European states together time and again in what was known as the Concert of Europe to resolve potential conflicts through international conferences. Though it was severely damaged in the 1850s and 1860s, the Concert was patched together again in the 1870s, when the Congress of Berlin redrew the map of the Balkans, while another Berlin conference sorted out colonial rivalries (without, needless to say, consulting any of the millions of people about to be colonised) in 1884. These institutions, like the United Nations of today, provided a forum in which diplomats and statesmen could work together to avoid war, and they largely succeeded. If there is no sign that the UN, for all its inadequacies, is about to collapse, it is not least because the postwar settlement of 1945 rested on a general recognition that international co-operation in all fields had to be stronger than it was under the League of Nations, the UN’s ill-fated predecessor. The destruction caused by the Second World War, with its 50 million or more dead, its ruined cities, its genocides, its widespread negation of civilised values, had a far more powerful effect than the deaths caused by the First World War, which were (with exceptions, notably the genocide of a million or more Armenian civilians, killed by the Turks in 1915) largely confined to troops on active service. In 1945, Hiroshima and Nagasaki provided an additional, ter­rible warning of what would happen if the world went to war again.

## Solvency Answers

### 1NC — Solvency

#### 1. Plan Won’t End War — the coalition can continue without U.S. support.

Katulis and Korb 18 — Brian Katulis, Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress, holds an M.A. in Public and International Affairs from Princeton University, and Lawrence J. Korb, Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress, Senior Adviser to the Center for Defense Information, former Director of National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, Adjunct Professor at Georgetown University, former U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the State University of New York at Albany, (“Five Lessons from the Iraq War for What the U.S. Should Do in Yemen,” *The National Interest*, December 28th, Available Online at <https://nationalinterest.org/print/feature/five-lessons-iraq-war-what-us-should-do-yemen-39977>, Accessed 06-24-2019)

1. There is a difference between ending America’s involvement and moral complicity in a war versus actually ending a war.

Advocacy groups can often ignore the complicated realities driving conflicts—and in the case of Yemen, there are multiple conflicts, alongside Saudi bombing and Iranian meddling. Those conflicts and the resulting suffering of millions of Yemenis are not likely to end simply because Congress legislates an end to U.S. military involvement.

#### 2. Humanitarian Crisis Unsolvable — it predates the coalition’s involvement.

Nazer 18 — Fahad Nazer, Fellow at the National Council on U.S.-Arab Relations, Columnist for *Arab News*—a daily newspaper in Saudi Arabia, Political Consultant to the Embassy of Saudi Arabia in Washington, former Non-Resident Fellow at the Arab Gulf States Institute, 2018 (“What Is at Stake in Yemen,” The Hoover Institution, December 20th, Available Online at <https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/nazer_whatisatstakeinyemen_webreadypdf.pdf>, Accessed 06-24-2019, p. 3)

Violent Militia and Endemic Problems Overlooked

Critics of the manner in which the Saudi-led coalition has conducted its military campaign seldom mention the fact that it was the Houthi rebels who began this war. It is also rarely mentioned that the Houthis have a long legacy of resorting to violence as a means to redress their perceived grievances or that they have a well-documented reputation for attacking civilian centers, using human shields, and recruiting child soldiers. Just as important, numerous detractors rarely acknowledge that many of the issues underlying the humanitarian crisis that have been aggravated by the conflict—including food scarcity, famine-like conditions, and the spread of diseases like cholera—had long been challenges in Yemen.

In fact, a report published by the US Agency for International Development (USAID) in July 2014—a full six months before the Saudi-led coalition entered the conflict, but a few months after the Houthis took up arms—described the situation this way: “The Republic of Yemen is one of the driest, poorest and least developed countries in the world. It ranks 154 of 182 countries on the UNDP Human Development Index. An estimated 50 percent of the people are poor, and one in three is malnourished. Poverty is endemic, particularly in more remote and less accessible areas.” The report added, “Extreme poverty, chronic food insecurity, limited resources, poor education and low skills, growing economic uncertainty, and ongoing security threats (along with the lack of support systems and coping strategies) combine to make a large portion of the population life-threateningly vulnerable to acute crises. Threats include displacement due to insecurity and conflict, unmanageable food prices, and malnutrition.”7

It is also important to note that there is ample evidence suggesting that—contrary to the prevailing perception among Western critics of Saudi Arabia—the Houthis have employed tactics and policies that could account for the majority of the most acute cases of food shortages, famine, and the spread of diseases.8

**—— Footnotes ——**

7. US Agency for International Development, “Yemen: Country Development Cooperation Strategy 2014–2016,” July 2014, accessed December 6, 2018. https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1860/CDCS\_Yemen\_Public%20Version.pdf.

8. Ahmed Awad Binmubarak, “How the Houthis Have Provoked a Human Disaster in Yemen,” Newsweek, March 20, 2017, accessed December 6, 2018, https://www.newsweek.com/how-houthis-have-provoked-human-disaster-yemen-570957.

#### 3. Peace Treaty will be circumvented — disregard for ceasefire proves.

Maritime Executive 19, 6-27-2019, "Renewed Clashes in Hodeidah as Peace Talks Continue," Maritime Executive, <https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/renewed-clashes-in-hodeidah-as-peace-talks-continue>

Despite a U.N.-backed ceasefire agreement, fighting between Houthi rebels and government forces has resumed on the south side of the port city of Hodeidah, Yemen. Pro-government militia leaders told Xinhua that Houthi units had shelled several neighborhoods, damaging homes and destroying part of a hospital. Under the terms of an agreement negotiated in Stockholm last December, Iranian-backed Houthi rebels were to withdraw from the port, and Saudi- and UAE-backed Yemeni government forces were to pull back from their positions surrounding the city. Houthi security units at the port have transferred control to the Yemeni Coast Guard, but the head of the UN mission in Hodeidah, Lt. Gen. Michael Lollesgaard, said last month that considerable work remains to demilitarize the port complex. The port is essential to aid agencies' efforts to provide food and medical care for the Yemeni population, as the country's long-running civil war has created shortages of many basic necessities. U.N. aid officials have repeatedly warned that a fight for control of Hodeidah could plunge portions of the country into famine. An estimated 24 million people - about eighty percent of the population - needs some form of assistance, according to Mark Lowcock, UN under-secretary-general for humanitarian affairs. Progress on orchestrating the combatants' withdrawals from in and around Hodeidah has been slow, and it has been marked by periodic clashes between the two sides. Tensions have risen further after a series of cross-border Houthi attacks on Saudi facilities, including a missile strike on a civilian airport in southwestern Saudi Arabia, which wounded 26 people on June 12. UN Special Envoy Martin Griffith and Yemeni Vice President Ali Mohsen Saleh al-Ahmar met in Riyadh Wednesday to discuss progress on the Stockholm agreement. "I am encouraged by the openness, flexibility and continued commitment of the Government of Yemen to resolve the peace process, based on the results of the national dialogue, the GCC initiative and relevant Security Council resolutions and the resumption of consultations with the parties," Griffith said in a statement.

#### 4. Plan Fails — Saudi Arabia buys from Russia in scenario of a cut of US arms sales. Connections are already in place. Turak 18 (Natasha, correspondent for CNBC, “Threats of US sanctions could accelerate a Saudi shift eastward”, October 23, 2018, <https://www.cnbc.com/2018/10/23/threats-of-us-sanctions-could-accelerate-a-saudi-shift-eastward.html>)

As the fallout over the killing of Saudi journalist and U.S. resident [Jamal Khashoggi](https://www.cnbc.com/2018/10/21/trump-europe-call-saudi-account-of-khashoggi-death-incomplete.html) continues, age-old alliances are being tested. In contradiction to President [Donald Trump,](https://www.cnbc.com/donald-trump/) who has voiced opposition to any interference in U.S. weapons sales to [Saudi Arabia,](https://www.cnbc.com/saudi-arabia/) members of Congress are openly [calling for sanctions](https://www.cnbc.com/video/2018/10/15/us-could-put-sanctions-on-saudi-arabia-over-khashoggi-case-says-rbcs-helima-croft.html) on America’s number one arms customer. German Chancellor Angela Merkel on Sunday announced a hold on arms sales to the kingdom for the time being, a move lauded by many in the international community. But some now fear that severing arms sales to the Saudis will simply push them to turn eastward. “If the U.S. and West in general move toward some meaningful sanctions of Saudi Arabia, we would be joking to imagine that the Saudis would just sit down and accept it,” Ayham Kamel, head of Eurasia Group’s Middle East and North Africa practice, told CNBC’s “Squawk Box Europe” Monday. “The Saudis I think will begin to tilt — they were already doing that beforehand — they’ll be doing more business with China and Russia. I doubt Mr. Putin would’ve given the Saudis much trouble with this crisis as Mr. Trump has.” Saudi Arabia has already been increasing business with the Russians and the Chinese. In June, [Vladimir Putin](https://www.cnbc.com/vladimir-putin/) hosted Saudi Crown Prince at the Kremlin, where the two agreed to “expand cooperation in oil and gas matters” after working together on output deals to stabilize markets amid fluctuating global crude prices. And October of last year saw the first-ever visit of a Saudi monarch — King Salman — to [Russia,](https://www.cnbc.com/russia/) during which a $1 billion joint investment fund was created and 15 cooperation agreements were signed in the areas of technology, defense and agriculture, including Moscow’s readiness to sell Riyadh its S-400 missile defense system.

### Extend: “Plan Won’t End War”

#### Extend 1NC # \_\_\_ — Plan Won’t End the War. The conflict is complicated, and ending US support doesn’t stop Saudi and Houthi participation. That’s Katulis and Korb.

#### They say:

[Write out what the 2AC said and your answers to it here. Then read more evidence.]

#### The coalition can keep bombing for years even after the U.S. cuts off sales.

Knights 18 — Michael Knights, Senior Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, holds a D.Phil. from the Department of War Studies at King's College London (UK), 2018 (“U.S.-Saudi Security Cooperation (Part 1): Conditioning Arms Sales to Build Leverage,” The Washington Institute, November 5th, Available Online at <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/u.s.-saudi-security-cooperation-part-1-conditioning-arms-sales-to-build-lev>, Accessed 06-25-2019)

Precision-Guided Munitions

Sales of air-delivered precision-guided munitions (PGMs) are another lightning rod issue in the bilateral security relationship. Following the 2009-2010 round of hostilities with the Houthis, the kingdom sought to refresh its stock of antipersonnel bombs with a large order of 1,300 U.S.-built CBU-105 sensor-fused weapons (a higher-reliability submunition that manufacturers say does not qualify as a cluster bomb due to its low malfunction rate). Yet by November 2015, eight months into the current war, the Saudis had used up nearly 2,600 PGMs, according to strike metrics compiled by The Washington Institute.

In response, the Saudis requested a $1.29 billion package comprising around 19,000 air-delivered PGMs, an order that began delivery in July 2017. In addition to that package, the Senate narrowly approved a new $500 million commercial sale of PGMs to Riyadh in June 2017—the first installment in a mammoth $4.46 billion series of air-launched munition deals that would provide the Saudis with 104,000 U.S. PGMs in the next half decade. Riyadh may be accelerating its purchases in anticipation of a prolonged war in Yemen and the potential loss of U.S. sales down the road.

According to Washington Institute data collected in Saudi Arabia and Yemen, the kingdom’s forces have used around 14,500 munitions since March 2015, almost all PGMs, with the average rate gradually declining from 333 PGMs per month in 2015 to 270 per month this year. The U.S. munitions currently arriving in Saudi Arabia were ordered in November 2015, when Riyadh recognized it might need new PGMs by 2019, but the intervening years have seen few signs of a PGM shortfall.

Based on a rough sense of prewar stocks and a constant dribble of replacements, Riyadh could probably keep bombing at its current rate for several years even if all new U.S. PGM deals were rejected. Thus, while cutting off such sales may be a good way to signal U.S. displeasure or publicly distance Washington from the war, the data indicates that it would not meaningfully slow the air campaign anytime soon.

### Extend: “Humanitarian Crisis Unsolveable”

#### Extend 1NC # \_\_\_ — Humanitarian Crisis Unsolvable. Famine and disease pre-date the conflict — ending the bombing doesn’t get anyone food or clean water. Most disease spread is from Houthi actions, not the Saudis. That’s Nazer.

#### They say:

[Write out what the 2AC said and your answers to it here. Then read more evidence.]

#### Even if the coalition withdraws, the humanitarian crisis will continue indefinitely.

Byman 18 — Daniel Byman, Professor and Senior Associate Dean at the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, Senior Fellow at the Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, former Director of the Center for Security Studies and Security Studies Program at Georgetown University, former Research Director of the Center for Middle East Public Policy at the RAND Corporation, former Professional Staff Member on the 9/11 Commission and the Joint 9/11 Inquiry Staff of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2018 (“Yemen After a Saudi Withdrawal: How Much Would Change?,” *Lawfare*, December 5th, Available Online at https://www.lawfareblog.com/yemen-after-saudi-withdrawal-how-much-would-change, Accessed 06-25-2019)

An end to the Saudi intervention is long overdue—but even if it occurs, don’t expect Yemen’s nightmare to draw to a close. For a change in Saudi policy to have the most impact, it must be coupled with a broader pullout of foreign powers and a ceasefire among Yemen’s many warring factions.

By itself, an end to the Saudi bombing campaign and blockade would be a milestone. The air strikes have killed thousands of Yemenis, including many children. The bombing also destroyed much of Yemen’s already-tottering infrastructure, making medical care and food distribution even more difficult. Less visibly, but more deadly, the Saudi blockade of many of Yemen’s ports and airport—done in the name of stopping Iranian arms from entering Yemen— has prevented food and humanitarian aid from entering the country as well. This has contributed to the massive famine.

Strategically, a close to the Saudi intervention would also benefit a key U.S. ally in the region—Saudi Arabia. Riyadh justified its intervention as a way to counter Iran, fight terrorism and restore a stable government in Yemen. But terrorists remain active in Yemen, and stability is farther off than ever. The Saudi-backed president of Yemen, Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, has no power base and little popular support. Perhaps most important from Riyadh’s point of view, Iran’s position in Yemen is stronger than ever. The war has increased the Houthis’ dependence on Iran for arms and financial support. In addition, the court of world opinion has come to see Saudi Arabia, not Iran, as the aggressor in the conflict, and it is Saudi Arabia whose reputation is damaged by the ongoing disaster there.

Yet even if Saudi Arabia comes to its senses or is compelled to do so, an end to the intervention would only be the beginning of what is needed. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) would still be militarily involved in the fighting against the Houthis, and it is a much more active player than Saudi Arabia on the ground in Yemen. Local actors would continue to fight: The country is highly divided, and the main factions themselves are further divided. Yemen today is a failed state, and there is no accepted political leadership to pick up the pieces. The Houthis, Iran’s ally, would be the strongest of the factions, and they are brutal and authoritarian as well as tied to Tehran. Terrorist groups like al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula would remain active, trying to establish themselves in any areas that lack a strong rival. Perhaps most important from Riyadh’s point of view, Tehran can claim a victory over its long-time rival. Although Houthi reliance on Iran would decrease as well, the alliance is likely to endure, and Iran will have influence on yet another of Saudi Arabia’s borders. Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman, who championed the Yemen war, would be admitting his intervention failed.

To improve both the strategic and humanitarian situation, any decrease in the Saudi military campaign must become the impetus for broader measures to end the war and decrease the suffering. Most important, Iran and the UAE should also be pressed to end their involvement. Yemen’s fires won’t be extinguished if outsiders no longer fuel them, but they will diminish. Hoping to seize the moment, U.N. envoy Martin Griffiths is currently trying to arrange a ceasefire and ensure the key Yemeni port of Hodeidah is open for international aid to enter the country. Griffiths is also fostering a broader dialogue, and key parties to the conflict are expressing a willingness to negotiate— a willingness that might grow if Riyadh moves to end its bombing campaign and other forms of intervention.

The United States should continue to offer Saudi Arabia assistance with its territorial defense from any Houthi missiles. In addition, the Saudis are more credibly able to hold Iran responsible for Houthi missile attacks on the Kingdom after a withdrawal if Washington is behind them, so U.S. support for deterrence is vital. Because terrorist groups remain a concern, the United States must also continue counterterrorism operations in Yemen. All this must be supplemented by a rapid and massive humanitarian effort to move Yemenis away from the brink of starvation. An end to the Saudi intervention is a good first step to ending this suffering, but by itself it will not be enough.

#### Aff can’t solve — Yemen is a failed state and Saudi presence is key to redevelopment projects.

Baron 19 (Adam Baron is a visiting fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations and a fellow in the International Security Program at New America. “Peace in Yemen Requires Far More Than What’s on the Table in Fragile Talks”. January 17th, 2019. World Politics Review. <https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/27218/peace-in-yemen-requires-far-more-than-what-s-on-the-table-in-fragile-talks>. Lowell-KY)

It has been more than four years since the Houthis, a Zaidi Shiite-led rebel group, took over Sanaa and forced Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi into exile, spurring Saudi Arabia to lead a military intervention to oust the Houthis and restore Hadi to power. Long-stagnant diplomacy to end the conflict, which has torn the already impoverished country apart and created what has been called the world’s worst humanitarian crisis, finally gave way to a breakthrough of sorts in December. After three rounds of unsuccessful talks in Switzerland and Kuwait, twin delegations affiliated with Houthi rebels and the internationally recognized government agreed to a tripartite deal in Sweden on Dec. 13 after over a week of consultations. The agreement struck in Stockholm may have been far from conclusive, but international diplomats cast it as a clear step in the right direction. The deal has three key components. It aims to prevent a looming military offensive by the Saudi-led coalition on the Houthi-held port of Hodeida, a key outlet for humanitarian aid into Yemen. The parties also committed to jumpstart talks to de-escalate the fighting over Taiz, Yemen’s third-largest city, which remains under siege by the Houthis and their allies. And, in a prisoner exchange, both parties pledged to release thousands of detainees, some of whom had been held for more than four years. In the weeks since then, though, there’s been little concrete progress on any front. The outcome of the prisoner exchange deal remains dependent on a follow-up meeting in Amman this week. And while a retired Dutch general, Patrick Caemmart, was dispatched to head the United Nations’ cease-fire monitoring mechanism in Hodeida, both sides have continued to bicker, failing to make significant progress toward a prospective pullout. The Houthis, meant to redeploy from Hodeida, have instead reinforced their positions and built trenches, while accusing coalition-backed forces of continuing to launch attacks. Escalation outside of the parameters of the cease-fire has continued, most of all in the form of a brazen Houthi drone attack targeting a key Yemeni military base near Aden that killed senior Yemeni officials. While Saudi, Emirati and other coalition officials have grown increasingly open in their impatience, expressing anxiety that the Houthis are simply using the Stockholm agreement to buy time, U.N. leaders and Western diplomats have remained cautiously optimistic. The implementation has been, as many expected, quite rocky, but the “spirit of the deal,” they say, has continued to hold. In some sense, there’s truth to this—neither side appears eager to toss the deal out just yet, if only to avoid shouldering the blame. Yet tensions have continued to build, even if the current situation does allow space for diplomacy and mediation efforts. This has only grown all the more difficult following the surprise resignation of U.S. Secretary of Defense James Mattis, who played a key role in behind-the-scenes efforts to broker the Stockholm agreement. Pompeo, for his part, is widely viewed as a hard-liner, which was underlined by his remarks during his Middle East trip effectively backing the coalition’s current position in Yemen. If the Stockholm agreement collapses, a near comprehensive rollback of any diplomatic progress on Yemen seems inevitable. If the Stockholm agreement collapses, a coalition offensive on the city of Hodeida—and a near comprehensive rollback of any diplomatic progress—seems more or less inevitable. And even if it holds, the hard work of resolving Yemen’s conflict has only just begun. As diplomats working on Yemen privately acknowledge, the current process only represents a tentative start. Crucial factions and stakeholders have yet to be fully brought into the process. And many of the key questions that any accord would need to tackle—ranging from the fate of the Houthis’ weapons, the future status of coalition troops, and the shape of a future Yemeni government—remain undecided. This is all to say nothing of the current state of Yemen itself. Even if the conflict ends tomorrow, Yemen faces devastating fallout from years of bombardment and blockade. Fighting has left the country’s infrastructure in shambles, set back decades of development efforts, ruptured the country’s social fabric, robbed a generation of young Yemenis of peace and education, and decimated the capacity of currently divided state institutions. In short, ending the war is only a small part of the battle. Yemen needs full-scale rebuilding. Some efforts, largely headed by the Saudi-led coalition, have already started. Both Saudi and Emirati officials have pointed to their increasing humanitarian and redevelopment efforts. It’s more than simply a cynical ploy to distract from the ongoing devastation wrought by the conflict, though it’s also more than altruism. Gulf officials have stressed that they view their role in Yemen as longer-term, noting the need for redevelopment and their anxieties over a potential power vacuum. In some sense, it’s an acknowledgement of the need to win the peace. Even in the event of a comprehensive peace settlement, Yemen remains at high risk of falling back into conflict without wide-ranging reforms, a functional transitional process, widescale reconciliation efforts, and significant foreign aid and investment. In some sense, all of this underlines the wider irony of the moment. The peace process, as it stands, largely hinges on Hodeida. But lasting peace will require something far more far-reaching.

### Extend: “Shift to Russia”

#### Extend 1NC # \_\_\_ — Shift to Russia. Saudi Arabia wouldn’t stop fighting — they’d just get their weapons elsewhere. That means the aff solves zero of the advantages. That’s Turak.

#### They say:

[Write out what the 2AC said and your answers to it here. Then read more evidence.]

#### Saudi Arabia will shift to Russia out of desperation — kills more civilians.

Flatley 19 – MBA @ NU (Daniel, “Saudi Arms Deal Languishes as a Rebuke of Trump and the Kingdom,” *Bloomberg*, [https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-04-24/saudi-arms-deal-languishes-as-a-rebuke-of-trump-and-the-kingdom)//BB](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-04-24/saudi-arms-deal-languishes-as-a-rebuke-of-trump-and-the-kingdom%29//BB)

Some experts, however, warn that suspending arms sales to Saudi Arabia could push the kingdom toward more pliant suppliers such as Russia or China. The Saudis see the Yemen conflict in "existential terms," Stroul said, and will turn to other countries in violation of existing U.S. agreements if it means they can continue operations in Yemen. "Withholding arms sales to Saudi Arabia is not going to change their behavior," said Ilan Goldenberg, a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security. "Eventually they will go to China and Russia." There are also concerns that suspending the sale of precision-guided munitions kits could actually cause more civilian casualties. "The Saudis depend hugely on precision-guided missile imports from the U.S.," said Paul Sullivan, a Middle East expert at Georgetown University’s Center for Security Studies. "Without the U.S. PGMs, Saudi Arabia will have to take a different tactic. Sadly, that will likely mean using ‘dumb’ missiles that can have much larger impacts on unintended civilian and non-combatant targets. Simply put, more people die unintentionally from dumb bombs than from PGMs."

#### Saudi shifts to Russia if America won’t sell.

CRS 17 (Congressional Research Service, “Arms Sales in the Middle East: Trends and Analytical Perspectives for U.S. Policy”, 10-11, https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20171011\_R44984\_9c5999ba29006bc29d0363590f5e21d9c3183668.pdf)

Saudi Arabia has tried to diversify its arms sources, including through a concerted effort in recent years to expand its own defense industrial base. In May 2017, shortly before President Trump’s visit, Deputy Crown Prince (and now Crown Prince) Mohammed bin Salman announced the creation of a government-owned company called Saudi Arabian Military Industries (SAMI) to manage production of air and land systems, weapons and missiles, and defense electronics (perhaps in imitation of the UAE’s much more established state arms conglomerate, the Emirates Defense Industries Company or EDIC; more below). The establishment of SAMI represents a step toward the government’s goal that 50% of Saudi military procurement spending be domestic by 2030.46 Several parts of a potentially high-value package of arms sales announced during the President’s May visit include arrangements for the actual production of certain items to be carried out in Saudi Arabia. For example, a $6 billion agreement between Lockheed Martin and the Saudi Technology Development and Investment Company (known by its Arabic acronym, TAQNIA) includes plans for the assembly of 150 Blackhawk helicopters in Saudi Arabia.47 U.S. reluctance or inability to share sensitive military technology, particularly in the field of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs, or drones), has periodically opened opportunities for other suppliers like Russia. Top military officials from the two nations had a meeting in Moscow in April 2017 at which Saudi Arabia, according to a Russian government account, provided a list of possible arms procurement requests.48 That was followed by a state visit by King Salman to Moscow in October 2017, the first ever by a Saudi monarch, during which Saudi Arabia reportedly agreed to a number of arms procurements, including S- 400 missile defenses.49 China has also contemplated greater arms sales to Saudi Arabia, partly a legacy of its reported covert ballistic missile sales to Saudi Arabia in the 1980s.50 On a state visit to Beijing in March 2017, King Salman and President Xi Jinping signed a series of agreements worth $60 billion, including a deal to construct a Chinese factory in the kingdom that will manufacture military UAVs for Saudi Arabia’s expanding drone fleet.51 Canada signed a $15 billion deal for armored vehicles with Riyadh in 2014.52

### They Say: “Interoperability”

#### Purchasers will choose to sacrifice interoperability with the US after the plan.

Benard 18 - visiting fellow at Stanford’s Hoover Institution, is managing partner of an American private equity firm focused on Asia and Africa (Alexander, “US needs to sell more weapons as Russia and China fill the breach,” *The Australian*, Press Reader)//BB

The US government blocks weapons sales to foreign countries for various reasons. Congress is often wary of selling arms to countries that could use them to undermine civil liberties. The Defence Department often worries the purchasing country could allow sensitive US technology to fall into the wrong hands. The State Department arms-control bureau has a general aversion to any weapons proliferation on grounds that it could trigger an arms race. These are valid concerns. But as Russia and China actively pursue weapons sales as part of an aggressive strategy to expand their spheres of influence, US strategic interests must be given more weight. Over the past decade, Russia has easily maintained its position as the world’s second-largest weapons supplier, comprising 22 per cent of global sales from 2013-17. Chinese arms exports increased by nearly 40 per cent from 2013-17 compared with the previous four years, the largest increase for any large exporter country except Israel, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Neither Russia nor China has qualms about selling weapons to even brazen human-rights violators. In fact they often provide the technologies authoritarian governments use to surveil and repress their citizens. And they are especially eager to peel off countries the US has declined to arm. Russia sells aircraft, submarines, anti-aircraft systems and missiles. China has made strides in advanced missile systems as well as unmanned aerial vehicles. The sale of these sophisticated weapons poses a direct threat to US security interests. It also creates challenges around interoperability. Technologies developed by the Russians and Chinese — such as advanced radars, sonars, sensors and communications platforms — cannot integrate effectively with US technologies. The more a country purchases from Russia or China, the less able it is to purchase from the US in the future, pushing a country further out of America’s security orbit. The lack of interoperability would also present major obstacles if the US needed to fight a war alongside an ally whose advanced military equipment had been sourced from Russia or China. Countries cut off by the US will still be able to purchase advanced systems. Worse, they will be able to do so without depending on the US for maintenance, ammunition or spare parts. This eliminates a key lever for US influence in the event that human-rights abuses occur, for instance. Take Turkey. In 2016 and 2017 it had been attempting to purchase helicopters and other technology from US manufacturers, but was turned down due to concerns around deteriorating governance. Then late last year it acquired a sophisticated missile-defence system from Russia for $US2.5 billion, an unprecedented move for a member of NATO. Vietnam’s relations with the US have been pleasantly thawing, partly because of a common concern around China’s aggressiveness in the Indo-Pacific region. The US lifted its arms embargo on Vietnam in 2016, but residual concerns about human rights have largely limited sales to sonars and radars. In addition the US has not provided meaningful military assistance to Vietnam to help offset costs. As a result, Vietnam continues to purchase much of its military equipment from Russia, which often subsidises the transactions. Or consider Thailand, traditionally one of America’s closest security partners in Asia. A 2014 coup caused concern about the country’s trajectory and led the US to limit some weapons sales. China took immediate advantage, signing a deal to sell over $US1bn of submarines to the Thai navy. Late last year Bangkok announced plans to establish a joint naval centre with Beijing to service those submarines, as well as a joint arms factory to produce and maintain other military equipment. There are more examples around the world. As the US moves into a phase of more intense competition with Russia and especially China, its approach to arms transfers must change. If not, its global security partnerships will be steadily eroded by more assertive and less scrupulous rivals.