### Capitalism Kritik Notes

#### General Explanation of the Capitalism/Neoliberalism Kritik

“Neoliberalism” is a term with disputed meaning, but in broad strokes it describes what our current state of capitalist development is. Neoliberalism, therefore, is a kind or type of capitalism characterized by: few (if any) restrictions on the movement of capital (money), harsh labor competition, and widespread privatization.

The part that most relates to this topic is labor competition — in the 1970s/80s western governments adopted policies to weaken labor (specifically unions) like outsourcing, reduced minimum wages, relaxed capital regulation etc. Immigration in the 21st century is viewed suspiciously by many as an effort to lower labor prices (through supply and demand) and therefore benefit capital. Immigrants are brought in to do the jobs currently done by domestic workers but for a lower price. There are plenty of people in the US with the skills to write computer code as an example, but they generally want high wages for that work that companies in Silicon Valley don’t want to pay.

#### Versus Open Borders Affirmative

As might be obvious given most of the evidence on the economy advantage is from right leaning/libertarian authors, the open borders aff embraces quite a few economic concepts that critics of neoliberalism find objectionable. Free mobility is an individual/liberal right that is often justified through a property lens- you own yourself/therefore you can do with it what you will. The economy advantage also makes several claims like workers are “wasted” in the third world and should move to where they can be “more useful”- these value judgements are based on economic productivity rather than social justice or other metrics.

#### Versus High-Skilled Immigration Affirmative

This affirmative says the US is engaged in a “global war for talent” that we can only “win” by attracting the best and brightest from around the world. This is essentially a form of economic nationalism- it argues the US must compete for slice of a finite economic pie with other countries like China. This view of the world is often characterized as “competitiveness”- the idea that nations compete like corporations (think Coke vs Pepsi) for market share and therefore should organize immigration policy around economics. This rhetoric is criticized as being too focused on “good” immigrants to the exclusion of “bad” immigrants (low skilled workers).

#### Versus Refugees

The refugee/asylum process is criticized for not being a “structural” analysis. Instead of asking questions about why people are displaced and how US policy plays a role, instead we adopt feel-good measures like letting in a handful of refugees into the US. Often the image of the refugee is then re-deployed to justify the sort of aggressive foreign policy that contributed to the problem in the first place.

#### The Alternative

The alternative draws a distinction between migration management and promoting human dignity. Migration management views all global problems through the lens of how can we change policy to best benefit the US? Human dignity lenses ask how we can attempt to tackle the root cause of migration in a more humane fashion. While the HIS aff would say we need to attract the best talent, the alternative would ask how we can make sure global innovation and its benefits are more evenly distributed. While the refugee aff asks how we can remove people from instances of domestic violence, the alternative would ask how we can tackle structures that make domestic violence possible. While the open borders aff says people should be free to move, the alternative would ask why are conditions such that they would want to move in the first place.

A crucial issue in these debates will be how is immigration debate framed- i.e. what arguments/rhetorical strategies do we use in these debates and how can they be problematic? While it may seem good to counter the Trump rhetoric that immigrants are all criminals, justifying immigration through a list of the miraculous deeds of immigrants can be just as dehumanizing by viewing people as only worth saving if they have something meaningful to contribute to our society. While the alternative will seek to foreground different questions it doesn’t necessarily agree with border restriction.

# Negative

## 1NC Materials

### 1NC — Capitalism Kritik

#### The [first/next] off is the Capitalism Kritik.

#### First, capitalism is a protection racket — it’s the root cause of every impact. Left unaddressed, it causes extinction. Only a revolution solves.

Robinson 16 — (William I, professor of sociology, global studies and Latin American studies at the University of California at Santa Barbara http://www.truth-out.org/opinion/item/35596-sadistic-capitalism-six-urgent-matters-for-humanity-in-global-crisis)

In these mean streets of globalized capitalism in crisis, it has become profitable to turn poverty and inequality into a tourist attraction. The South African Emoya Luxury Hotel and Spa company has made a glamorized spectacle of it. The resort recently advertised an opportunity for tourists to stay "in our unique Shanty Town ... and experience traditional township living within a safe private game reserve environment." A cluster of simulated shanties outside of Bloemfontein that the company has constructed "is ideal for team building, braais, bachelors [parties], theme parties and an experience of a lifetime," read the ad. The luxury accommodations, made to appear from the outside as shacks, featured paraffin lamps, candles, a battery-operated radio, an outside toilet, a drum and fireplace for cooking, as well as under-floor heating, air conditioning and wireless internet access. A well-dressed, young white couple is pictured embracing in a field with the corrugated tin shanties in the background. The only thing missing in this fantasy world of sanitized space and glamorized poverty was the people themselves living in poverty. Escalating inequalities fuel capitalism's chronic problem of over-accumulation. The "luxury shanty town" in South Africa is a fitting metaphor for global capitalism as a whole. Faced with a stagnant global economy, elites have managed to turn war, structural violence and inequality into opportunities for capital, pleasure and entertainment. It is hard not to conclude that unchecked capitalism has become what I term "sadistic capitalism," in which the suffering and deprivation generated by capitalism become a source of aesthetic pleasure, leisure and entertainment for others. I recently had the opportunity to travel through several countries in Latin America, the Middle East, North Africa, East Asia and throughout North America. I was on sabbatical to research what the global crisis looks like on the ground around the world. Everywhere I went, social polarization and political tensions have reached explosive dimensions. Where is the crisis headed, what are the possible outcomes and what does it tell us about global capitalism and resistance? This crisis is not like earlier structural crises of world capitalism, such as in the 1930s or 1970s. This one is fast becoming systemic. The crisis of humanity shares aspects of earlier structural crises of world capitalism, but there are six novel, interrelated dimensions to the current moment that I highlight here, in broad strokes, as the "big picture" context in which countries and peoples around the world are experiencing a descent into chaos and uncertainty. 1) The level of global social polarization and inequality is unprecedented in the face of out-of-control, over-accumulated capital. In January 2016, the development agency Oxfam published a follow-up to its report on global inequality that had been released the previous year. According to the new report, now just 62 billionaires -- down from 80 identified by the agency in its January 2015 report -- control as much wealth as one half of the world's population, and the top 1% owns more wealth than the other 99% combined. Beyond the transnational capitalist class and the upper echelons of the global power bloc, the richest 20 percent of humanity owns some 95 percent of the world's wealth, while the bottom 80 percent has to make do with just 5 percent. This 20-80 divide of global society into haves and the have-nots is the new global social apartheid. It is evident not just between rich and poor countries, but within each country, North and South, with the rise of new affluent high-consumption sectors alongside the downward mobility, "precariatization," destabilization and expulsion of majorities. Escalating inequalities fuel capitalism's chronic problem of over-accumulation: The transnational capitalist class cannot find productive outlets to unload the enormous amounts of surplus it has accumulated, leading to stagnation in the world economy. The signs of an impending depression are everywhere. The front page of the February 20 issue of The Economist read, "The World Economy: Out of Ammo?" Extreme levels of social polarization present a challenge to dominant groups. They strive to purchase the loyalty of that 20 percent, while at the same time dividing the 80 percent, co-opting some into a hegemonic bloc and repressing the rest. Alongside the spread of frightening new systems of social control and repression is heightened dissemination through the culture industries and corporate marketing strategies that depoliticize through consumerist fantasies and the manipulation of desire. As "Trumpism" in the United States so well illustrates, another strategy of co-optation is the manipulation of fear and insecurity among the downwardly mobile so that social anxiety is channeled toward scapegoated communities. This psychosocial mechanism of displacing mass anxieties is not new, but it appears to be increasing around the world in the face of the structural destabilization of capitalist globalization. Scapegoated communities are under siege, such as the Rohingya in Myanmar, the Muslim minority in India, the Kurds in Turkey, southern African immigrants in South Africa, and Syrian and Iraqi refugees and other immigrants in Europe. As with its 20th century predecessor, 21st century fascism hinges on such manipulation of social anxiety at a time of acute capitalist crisis. Extreme inequality requires extreme violence and repression that lend to projects of 21st century fascism. 2) The system is fast reaching the ecological limits to its reproduction. We have reached several tipping points in what environmental scientists refer to as nine crucial "planetary boundaries." We have already exceeded these boundaries in three areas -- climate change, the nitrogen cycle and diversity loss. There have been five previous mass extinctions in earth's history. While all these were due to natural causes, for the first time ever, human conduct is intersecting with and fundamentally altering the earth system. We have entered what Paul Crutzen, the Dutch environmental scientist and Nobel Prize winner, termed the Anthropocene -- a new age in which humans have transformed up to half of the world's surface. We are altering the composition of the atmosphere and acidifying the oceans at a rate that undermines the conditions for life. The ecological dimensions of global crisis cannot be understated. "We are deciding, without quite meaning to, which evolutionary pathways will remain open and which will forever be closed," observes Elizabeth Kolbert in her best seller, The Sixth Extinction. "No other creature has ever managed this ... The Sixth Extinction will continue to determine the course of life long after everything people have written and painted and built has been ground into dust." Capitalism cannot be held solely responsible. The human-nature contradiction has deep roots in civilization itself. The ancient Sumerian empires, for example, collapsed after the population over-salinated their crop soil. The Mayan city-state network collapsed about AD 900 due to deforestation. And the former Soviet Union wrecked havoc on the environment. However, given capital's implacable impulse to accumulate profit and its accelerated commodification of nature, it is difficult to imagine that the environmental catastrophe can be resolved within the capitalist system. "Green capitalism" appears as an oxymoron, as sadistic capitalism's attempt to turn the ecological crisis into a profit-making opportunity, along with the conversion of poverty into a tourist attraction. 3) The sheer magnitude of the means of violence is unprecedented, as is the concentrated control over the means of global communications and the production and circulation of knowledge, symbols and images. We have seen the spread of frightening new systems of social control and repression that have brought us into the panoptical surveillance society and the age of thought control. This real-life Orwellian world is in a sense more perturbing than that described by George Orwell in his iconic novel 1984. In that fictional world, people were compelled to give their obedience to the state ("Big Brother") in exchange for a quiet existence with guarantees of employment, housing and other social necessities. Now, however, the corporate and political powers that be force obedience even as the means of survival are denied to the vast majority. Global apartheid involves the creation of "green zones" that are cordoned off in each locale around the world where elites are insulated through new systems of spatial reorganization, social control and policing. "Green zone" refers to the nearly impenetrable area in central Baghdad that US occupation forces established in the wake of the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The command center of the occupation and select Iraqi elite inside that green zone were protected from the violence and chaos that engulfed the country. Urban areas around the world are now green zoned through gentrification, gated communities, surveillance systems, and state and private violence. Inside the world's green zones, privileged strata avail themselves of privatized social services, consumption and entertainment. They can work and communicate through internet and satellite sealed off under the protection of armies of soldiers, police and private security forces. Green zoning takes on distinct forms in each locality. In Palestine, I witnessed such zoning in the form of Israeli military checkpoints, Jewish settler-only roads and the apartheid wall. In Mexico City, the most exclusive residential areas in the upscale Santa Fe District are accessible only by helicopter and private gated roads. In Johannesburg, a surreal drive through the exclusive Sandton City area reveals rows of mansions that appear as military compounds, with private armed towers and electrical and barbed-wire fences. In Cairo, I toured satellite cities ringing the impoverished center and inner suburbs where the country's elite could live out their aspirations and fantasies. They sport gated residential complexes with spotless green lawns, private leisure and shopping centers and English-language international schools under the protection of military checkpoints and private security police. In other cities, green zoning is subtler but no less effective. In Los Angeles, where I live, the freeway system now has an express lane reserved for those that can pay an exorbitant toll. On this lane, the privileged speed by, while the rest remain one lane over, stuck in the city's notorious bumper-to-bumper traffic -- or even worse, in notoriously underfunded and underdeveloped public transportation, where it may take half a day to get to and from work. There is no barrier separating this express lane from the others. However, a near-invisible closed surveillance system monitors every movement. If a vehicle without authorization shifts into the exclusive lane, it is instantly recorded by this surveillance system and a heavy fine is imposed on the driver, under threat of impoundment, while freeway police patrols are ubiquitous. Outside of the global green zones, warfare and police containment have become normalized and sanitized for those not directly at the receiving end of armed aggression. "Militainment" -- portraying and even glamorizing war and violence as entertaining spectacles through Hollywood films and television police shows, computer games and corporate "news" channels -- may be the epitome of sadistic capitalism. It desensitizes, bringing about complacency and indifference. In between the green zones and outright warfare are prison industrial complexes, immigrant and refugee repression and control systems, the criminalization of outcast communities and capitalist schooling. The omnipresent media and cultural apparatuses of the corporate economy, in particular, aim to colonize the mind -- to undermine the ability to think critically and outside the dominant worldview. A neofascist culture emerges through militarism, extreme masculinization, racism and racist mobilizations against scapegoats. 4) We are reaching limits to the extensive expansion of capitalism. Capitalism is like riding a bicycle: When you stop pedaling the bicycle, you fall over. If the capitalist system stops expanding outward, it enters crisis and faces collapse. In each earlier structural crisis, the system went through a new round of extensive expansion -- from waves of colonial conquest in earlier centuries, to the integration in the late 20th and early 21st centuries of the former socialist countries, China, India and other areas that had been marginally outside the system. There are no longer any new territories to integrate into world capitalism. Meanwhile, the privatization of education, health care, utilities, basic services and public land are turning those spaces in global society that were outside of capital's control into "spaces of capital." Even poverty has been turned into a commodity. What is there left to commodify? Where can the system now expand? With the limits to expansion comes a turn toward militarized accumulation -- making wars of endless destruction and reconstruction and expanding the militarization of social and political institutions so as to continue to generate new opportunities for accumulation in the face of stagnation. 5) There is the rise of a vast surplus population inhabiting a "planet of slums," alienated from the productive economy, thrown into the margins and subject to these sophisticated systems of social control and destruction. Global capitalism has no direct use for surplus humanity. But indirectly, it holds wages down everywhere and makes new systems of 21st century slavery possible. These systems include prison labor, the forced recruitment of miners at gunpoint by warlords contracted by global corporations to dig up valuable minerals in the Congo, sweatshops and exploited immigrant communities (including the rising tide of immigrant female caregivers for affluent populations). Furthermore, the global working class is experiencing accelerated "precariatization." The "new precariat" refers to the proletariat that faces capital under today's unstable and precarious labor relations -- informalization, casualization, part-time, temp, immigrant and contract labor. As communities are uprooted everywhere, there is a rising reserve army of immigrant labor. The global working class is becoming divided into citizen and immigrant workers. The latter are particularly attractive to transnational capital, as the lack of citizenship rights makes them particularly vulnerable, and therefore, exploitable. The challenge for dominant groups is how to contain the real and potential rebellion of surplus humanity, the immigrant workforce and the precariat. How can they contain the explosive contradictions of this system? The 21st century megacities become the battlegrounds between mass resistance movements and the new systems of mass repression. Some populations in these cities (and also in abandoned countryside) are at risk of genocide, such as those in Gaza, zones in Somalia and Congo, and swaths of Iraq and Syria. 6) There is a disjuncture between a globalizing economy and a nation-state-based system of political authority. Transnational state apparatuses are incipient and do not wield enough power and authority to organize and stabilize the system, much less to impose regulations on runaway transnational capital. In the wake of the 2008 financial collapse, for instance, the governments of the G-8 and G-20 were unable to impose transnational regulation on the global financial system, despite a series of emergency summits to discuss such regulation. Elites historically have attempted to resolve the problems of over-accumulation by state policies that can regulate the anarchy of the market. However, in recent decades, transnational capital has broken free from the constraints imposed by the nation-state. The more "enlightened" elite representatives of the transnational capitalist class are now clamoring for transnational mechanisms of regulation that would allow the global ruling class to reign in the anarchy of the system in the interests of saving global capitalism from itself and from radical challenges from below. At the same time, the division of the world into some 200 competing nation-states is not the most propitious of circumstances for the global working class. Victories in popular struggles from below in any one country or region can (and often do) become diverted and even undone by the structural power of transnational capital and the direct political and military domination that this structural power affords the dominant groups. In Greece, for instance, the leftist Syriza party came to power in 2015 on the heels of militant worker struggles and a mass uprising. But the party abandoned its radical program as a result of the enormous pressure exerted on it from the European Central Bank and private international creditors. The Systemic Critique of Global Capitalism A growing number of transnational elites themselves now recognize that any resolution to the global crisis must involve redistribution downward of income. However, in the viewpoint of those from below, a neo-Keynesian redistribution within the prevailing corporate power structure is not enough. What is required is a redistribution of power downward and transformation toward a system in which social need trumps private profit. A global rebellion against the transnational capitalist class has spread since the financial collapse of 2008. Wherever one looks, there is popular, grassroots and leftist struggle, and the rise of new cultures of resistance: the Arab Spring; the resurgence of leftist politics in Greece, Spain and elsewhere in Europe; the tenacious resistance of Mexican social movements following the Ayotzinapa massacre of 2014; the favela uprising in Brazil against the government's World Cup and Olympic expulsion policies; the student strikes in Chile; the remarkable surge in the Chinese workers' movement; the shack dwellers and other poor people's campaigns in South Africa; Occupy Wall Street, the immigrant rights movement, Black Lives Matter, fast food workers' struggle and the mobilization around the Bernie Sanders presidential campaign in the United States. This global revolt is spread unevenly and faces many challenges. A number of these struggles, moreover, have suffered setbacks, such as the Greek working-class movement and, tragically, the Arab Spring. What type of a transformation is viable, and how do we achieve it? How we interpret the global crisis is itself a matter of vital importance as politics polarize worldwide between a neofascist and a popular response. The systemic critique of global capitalism must strive to influence, from this vantage point, the discourse and practice of movements for a more just distribution of wealth and power. Our survival may depend on it.

[Insert Specific Link.]

#### Third, the alternative is to adopt a human development lens rather than a migration management lens. Intellectuals should contemplate structural analysis that changes the material conditions of forced migration.

Wise 13 — (Raúl Delgado, Ph.D., president of the International Network on Migration and Development; UNESCO Chair on Migration, Development and Human Rights; and Professor of the Doctoral Programme in Development Studies at the Autonomous University of Zacatecas, Mexico. https://monthlyreview.org/2013/02/01/the-migration-and-labor-question-today-imperialism-unequal-development-and-forced-migration/)

The relationship between migration, development, and human rights is a topic of growing interest among international organizations, academics, and civil society organizations. To varying degrees, international organizations such as the World Bank and the International Organization for Migration see remittances from migrants back to their families as an essential tool in the development of migrant-sending, underdeveloped countries. They also envisage international migration management as a core element in the design and implementation of migration policies that are apparently beneficial for all parties. This perspective, which has dominated both academic and policy agendas, has multiple flaws. It is essentially one-sided, decontextualized, and misleading. It overlooks the neoliberal globalization and unequal development in which contemporary migration is embedded. It also disregards human and labor rights as central and intrinsic elements of coherent migration and development policies, as well as the exploitation, social exclusion, human insecurity, and criminalization suffered by international migrants. In addition, it masks most of the fundamental contributions made by migrants to the destination countries and ignores the costs of migration for the countries of origin, costs that greatly outweigh the overemphasized “positive” impact of remittances. Despite the insistence of international bodies and governments regarding the alleged positive effects of migration and remittances as detonators of development in countries of origin, there is no empirical evidence to warrant this assumption. Among the cardinal elements of the dominant discourse, we can mention remittances, microfinance, human capital (a term that reflects a narrow economistic view), and, perhaps more importantly, the pretention to govern or manage migration without changing or even mentioning its root causes. It is worth adding that the practices and discourses under the label of migration management advocated by the International Organization for Migration and other multilateral agencies, have been promoted through new narratives that distort reality, depoliticize migration, negate the existence of divergent interests or asymmetries of power and conflicts, and promote an unsustainable and incoherent triple-win scenario in favor of the interests of the migrant-receiving countries, and more specifically, the large multinational corporations rooted in such countries. In this view a “good migrant,” regardless of his or her status and condition, is respectful of law, flexible to market needs, and eager to contribute to the development of his or her country of origin.22 The development of social alternatives must address two fundamental aspects. The first one has to do with deconstructing the power of capital and the state—a constituent, structural power that acts as a hegemonic force that must be confronted. Not doing so will nullify any attempt to develop alternatives and justify illusory, naïve, and irrelevant positions. The second consideration involves detecting points of weakness or rupture, or spaces from which subordinate social segments may generate social development alternatives. This challenge is at the center of the debate between those who attempt to achieve social change without seizing power (for example, by limiting change to institutional reform or developing non-capitalist economic forms of organization within capitalism) and those who propose the need for a thorough change: another world, a different economy and society, and a development that is more equitable and socially inclusive, and sustainable in terms of both the environment and livelihoods. Without going into details, it must be stressed that, from a South-based perspective, the current social order (or disorder) is perceived as an unfair, inhumane, and predatory system: there is a need for alternatives that contemplate genuine development. From a critical perspective (that is to say, one that questions the institutional structure of neoliberalism and, more fundamentally, the structural dynamics of capitalism in order to promote development alternatives that benefit the majority of the population), sustainable human development is understood as a process of social construction that starts by creating awareness: the need for change, organization, and social participation in order to generate a popular power that can then strive for social emancipation. This involves eschewing socially alienated relations that deprive people of their merits, destroy the environment, and damage social coexistence. There are several essential characteristics of sustainable human development. First, it must be centered on human life and conceived in opposition to capital and its demand for the highest possible profits. The realization of this first element is necessary but not sufficient, since it can remain in the realm of abstract humanism. Real human development requires social conditions that can enable equity and social justice on all social and spatial levels. Sustainability requires, in turn, that the strategy of development be feasible, realistic, and long-lasting, with solid social, political, economic, cultural, and environmental foundations. Second, human development cannot be defined ex ante as a globally applicable model; it is not a prefabricated, one-size-fits-all design. It requires proposing and specifying concrete strategies, having initially addressed structural barriers, institutional restraints, local peculiarities, regional cultures, and the practices of involved social actors. Third, building a strategic platform for social transformation capable of fuelling a counter-hegemonic social power demands the confluence of collective knowledge and intelligentsia at the service of the working class in alliance with social organizations and social movements. This project has already seen important advances, as evidenced by initiatives from within civil society such as the People’s Global Action on Migration, Development and Human Rights, the Global Coalition on Migration, and the World Social Forum on Migrations, among others. We need academics that reject being imprisoned in an ivory tower and are willing to work, hand-in-hand, with civil society organizations. For this crucial task much more networking through the development of alternative research agendas is needed. This implies the education of new generations of working class intellectuals or organic intellectuals. To round-up our argument, the following theses set forth a series of strategic elements for advancing towards sustainable human development: The current model of world accumulation and its power system cannot be dismantled nor shifted without the development of an autonomous and independent social power. There is currently no collective agent that can confront the power of big business (that is, the major multinational corporations, imperialist governments and their armies, international financial organizations, and the associated actors that provide them with ideological, diplomatic, and political support). There have been, however, major local, domestic, and international efforts to organize social groups and movements that have defended their rights from the neoliberal onslaught and proposed some alternative ideas and projects. Strategies for real human development will result from social construction processes carried out by organized groups, civil society, and progressive academia on the local, national and, above all, international level. The project for a counter-hegemonic social power cannot be postponed; it requires free, autonomous, and independent civilian organization. This project has already seen important advances, as evidenced by initiatives such as the International Peasant Movement Vía Campesina, the World Social Forum, the People’s Global Action on Migration, Development and Human Rights, and the World Social Forum on Migrations, among others. The neoliberal state, guarantor of corporate profitability, should be replaced by the social state, promoter of human development. The resources of territories, nations, and populations are offered as low-priced (“competitive” in neoliberal jargon) raw materials in order to guarantee high profit margins, while institutions and public policies act as guarantors of corporate demands. This is why the reconstruction of the state is a fundamental requirement for true human development. Democratizing access to power through legitimate, legal, and transparent means and promoting a parliamentary agenda and a legal framework related to popular interests must be the first steps toward responsible state-based social development (e.g., a network of social protection that can guarantee that social efforts meant to generate surplus can be channeled toward redistribution mechanisms that aim for equality). The social state must safeguard the peasant economy, as well as universal public education, social security, decent employment, and the satisfaction of social needs such as food, education, and health. The social state bears social responsibility for power, capital (now redefined socially and not as an agent of class oppression), and the protection of labor and nature. Elite democracy must be transformed into a truly representative and participatory democracy. The formal democracy embedded in many countries that have embraced neoliberalism has been confined to elections. Citizens, reduced to their minimal expression, are ritually called to deposit a ballot for a member of the political class that has been previously selected to represent the economic and political elites in the areas of government or parliamentary power. Encouraging the larger population actively to participate in public issues is an unavoidable requirement of alternative development. In addition to access to reliable information, said participation requires spaces for public reflection and decision-making. The system must encourage social organization and participation, and promote instruments of participation inherent to direct democracy (for example, affirmative action, plebiscites, referendums, and citizen initiatives). The neoliberal strategy of global expansion must be replaced by a social transformation strategy centered on social sustainability. In the dominant accumulation model, labor and nature have been blindly overexploited to the point of unsustainability, with a complete disregard of the social and environmental costs. In contrast, social sustainability must fully guarantee human reproduction. This is not possible without encouraging a symbiotic relationship between the human population and nature—one that goes beyond radical conservationism. A strategy for sustainable human development also requires shifting the state’s developmental management so that it can control foreign investment, establish equitable and complementary commercial treaties, produce its own infrastructure for scientific and technological development, and, in general, fight all forms of unequal exchange and surplus transfer. New modes of integration and regional cooperation must be undertaken to exercise sovereignty. Against the dominant trend towards structural unemployment, job insecurity, and superexploitation, a decent work agenda should be promoted. Driven by the compulsive quest for profit, private capital resorts to flexibilization, subcontracting, and unemployment to lower labor costs. Additionally, technological innovation tends to make workers dispensable. Extremely precarious categories have emerged in the labor market. We must disassemble the strategies behind labor instability and insecurity by demanding labor rights that will include access to a decent job, restitution of the social security system, and the advancement of human development in both the peripheral and core nations. Labor sovereignty is essential; we need state policies that guarantee full and decent forms of employment and working conditions. Given the climate of structural violence and human insecurity, the defense of human rights should involve civil society as well as the state. The rights of big business openly surpass those of the population and the environment. A radical change in the system of values is needed to grant precedence to human rights across economic, labor, social, political, and cultural realms. Furthermore, we should consider the right to human development as a way of guaranteeing the fulfillment of basic needs; access to a decent, safe and well-paid jobs; the nurturing of analytic, creative, and artistic abilities; and access to participatory decision-making spaces. The problem of forced migration demands that we address the rights of migrants and their families in places of origin, destination, transit, and return. The right not to emigrate should be in place in the countries of origin. This implies creating a material and subjective infrastructure that allows the population to settle in an environment of generalized human development and common welfare capable of transforming migration into an option rather than a necessity. The conclusion that we draw from the analysis is that the capitalist system in the current conjuncture is in crisis and given that every crisis weakens the social and institutional structure of the system, generating forces of change, it is important that the global working class not take a purely defensive position against the current imperialist offensive, but go on mobilizing the forces of resistance. It is also important that in this counteroffensive the global labor movement be strategic and form alliances with other forces of resistance that share its vision of a world beyond neoliberalism, imperialism, and, ultimately, capitalism.

#### Finally, the way immigration is framed and debated is as important as policy choice.

Cook 10 — MARIA LORENA COOK Department of International and Comparative Labor, School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University , The Advocate’s Dilemma: Framing Migrant Rights in National Settings Studies in Social Justice Volume 4, Issue 2, 145-164, 2010

As noted above, most immigration debates in the US in the 2000s are centered on three dominant discourses: economics, security, and law. All three begin and end with the nation as the primary reference point, and all three are employed by opponents of unauthorized migration. Migrant advocates are drawn into these dominant ways of framing migration in their efforts to correct, counter, or challenge opponents’ arguments. This has the advantage of using language that is intelligible to the majority of citizens, but it also poses several fundamental disadvantages for advocates. First, all three discourses limit one’s ability to draw on universal (not national citizenship-based) frames, including human rights. Engaging with these discourses, even when positing an inclusive national frame against the exclusionary framing of nativists**,** weakens advocates’ ability to pose more lasting and far-reaching alternatives to contemporary approaches to illegal migration, because these would require breaking with the “nationalist commonsense” (De Genova, 2005). Second, the source of power in nativist arguments lies in their ability to stir citizens’ feelings of fear and insecurity (Lakoff & Ferguson, 2006). When advocates diminish those concerns or set them aside, they are less likely to succeed in re-framing the way the public views the issues. This presents a dilemma for migrant advocates: they either talk past the majority of citizens, or else they are forced to accept the nationally bounded terms of the debates, putting them in a weaker position vis-à-vis their critics. Advocates’ message needs to resonate: it needs to speak to the values, concerns, and fears of the majority without succumbing to the same terms of reference as the dominant anti-migration frames. The difficulties of this task can be seen in the following examples. Much of the debate in the United States has focused on costs that undocumented migrants impose on public services, or on their impact on wage levels in low-skilled jobs. Migrant advocates may take on these arguments via myth-combating or truth strategies, in which they point to studies and facts that counter the claims of immigration opponents. For instance, the Mexican-American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, MALDEF, has set up a website called “Truth in Immigration,” whose mission is to rebut legal and factual inaccuracies about immigrants and Latinos.13 To rebut myths with facts is an essential task. However, advocates risk getting pulled into point-by-point disputations of restrictionists’ claims or “cost arguments” (Bosniak, 1997), where the relative merits of the pro-migrant position hinge on the costs “balancing out.” If it then turns out that undocumented immigrants “cost” more than they “contribute,” advocates are forced to abandon their main line of defence. Moreover**,** a disbelief of facts or “fact resistance” tends to operate in the securitized setting of immigration. Dauvergne notes (2008, pp. 99-100), “[F]act resistance is important because there is no obvious way to counter it ...”. An advocacy based on correcting the facts, she continues, “cannot be the entire strategy” (Dauvergne, 2008, p. 100). Another difficulty is that assertions that “immigrants take American jobs” or that they lower wages often require complex economic counter-arguments. These may focus on macro-economic or industry studies that show a limited cost burden or impact on wages, or a dynamic effect on employment. Yet such studies are frequently posed against anecdotal “evidence,” intuitive “folk economics,” and oft repeated claims in the media, which prove powerful despite their limited reliance on facts. Moreover, existing economic studies lend support to different sides of the immigration debate (Lowenstein, 2006). Indeed, immigration opponents mobilize their own reports, studies, polls, and “facts” to sustain their positions (Barry, 2008b). For example, in 2007 a report written by staffers at the conservative Heritage Foundation made headlines and was widely cited for stating that the total “tax burden” for the U.S. taxpayer of “low-skilled” immigrant households was a whopping US$2.2 trillion over the lifetime of those households (Rector, Kim, & Watkins, 2007). Countering these claims often means that advocates risk coming off as elitist. They can appear to condone cheap labour and, in this way, share the pro-business or pro-employer position (Barry, 2005). To be sure, many labour union advocates present a more sophisticated position that both supports working immigrants and calls for better enforcement of labour laws, including the right to join unions, to the benefit of all workers. But this is not a simple argument that lends itself to sound bites, nor is it widely understood or accepted, especially as labour rights claims face their own obstacles in gaining broader acceptance in U.S. society and politics (Compa, 2010). One common response to the problem of appearing to side with employers has been to assert that employers should be punished for hiring undocumented immigrant workers. This position also serves to highlight the hypocrisy of U.S. policy, where employers continue to hire undocumented workers while little is done to enforce this component of U.S. immigration law. The problem with this position for immigrant advocates, however, is that once worksite enforcement is adopted more systematically (as in recent years), advocates are left with little grounds on which to claim that undocumented migrants still deserve to migrate for work, regardless of whether or not reasonable and practical legal pathways have yet been adopted. In other words, this is not a position that allows one to make a broader claim based on the rights of migrants to mobility in search of work. Tom Barry writes incisively about the difficult position that immigrant advocates find themselves in because their support for immigrants in the labour market reads as hostile to the American worker. He urges advocates to engage the economics debate: ... [A]dvocates will need to start explaining how [a pathway to citizenship] will serve the common good. Whenever they call for reform, they must tell us how immigrants boost the economy, don’t lower the net number of jobs available to citizens, and will increase their contributions to economy and society once legalized. (Barry, 2008a) Similarly, Lakoff and Ferguson (2006) argue that a “frame not taken” by progressives in the immigration debate is to highlight the benefits of immigrants. But they are referring to a U.S. consumer lifestyle that has come to rely on low-wage labour: “Cheap labour increases ‘productivity’ and profits for employers, and it permits a cheap lifestyle for consumers who get low prices because of cheap labour. But these are not seen as ‘problems.’ They are benefits” (Lakoff & Ferguson, 2006, p. 6). These two positions, both held out by analysts who are sympathetic to immigration advocates, illustrate the divergent views within this camp and signal the counter-framing challenges posed by the economic arguments of immigration restrictionists. Moreover, they also highlight another shortcoming of many national-frame debates which is that advocates are often compelled to show immigrants’ “contributions” and “worthiness” to the national economy or society. This discourse of worth and deservedness is a long way from a universal human rights framing, which presumably would not distinguish among immigrants to determine whether some were more or less deserving of human rights. Immigration reform proposals in the U.S. Congress are full of just such distinctions. For instance, the Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act (DREAM Act) that would provide legalization and a conditional path toward citizenship for a subset of young people, states as one of its conditions that eligible minors show “good moral character” and worthiness either through attendance at an institution of higher education or military service. Most advocates and immigrant groups support the DREAM Act and many work to ensure its passage. However, few discuss how the Act would fail to help those unauthorized youth who satisfy the threshold requirement of entering the US as minors but commit crimes or minor offenses, drop out of school, refuse to join the military, or simply go to work after graduating from high school (Batalova & McHugh, 2010). This example highlights the problem of national frames that are built on conditions and exclusions. Immigrants’ basic rights –to security, education, and work—are recognized based on national assessments of value, worthiness, and contributions, not on the basis of their condition as human beings. Immigrant advocates are at a similar disadvantage in taking on the security-migration nexus. In the years following September 11, 2001, it has become more difficult to dismiss security as a rationale for policies aimed at hardening and thickening borders or at monitoring and restricting movement of non-citizens (Fernandes, 2007; Nguyen, 2005). There is broad acceptance of the idea that “border security” is a useful way to monitor terrorist threats, even as scepticism about the effectiveness of a border fence is also widespread. This concern with security permits advocates to argue in favour of legalization programs for the undocumented that would provide security checks and move people “out of the shadows.” What is striking, however, is how unpersuasive those arguments have been in the national public debate and in the recent immigration reform discussions in Congress. This is due in large part to a third powerful way of framing the undocumented immigration issue in the US, which is to focus on its illegality. Proposals to legalize undocumented immigrants are often met with the argument that legalization rewards illegal behaviour and will only beget more illegal activity by encouraging unauthorized migration. Advocates who wish to respond to this point must diminish, if not dismiss, the importance of the illegality claim. For instance, advocates can point out that unauthorized border crossing is a misdemeanour and that unlawful presence is a civil violation (Garcia, 2006). In other words, these are not the serious crimes that restrictionists claim are perpetuated by migrants. Alternatively, advocates can highlight the hypocrisy of the immigration policy, pointing to the lack of enforcement on the demand side, as noted above. Or they can stress the contingency of the law and especially, of borders, and discuss how U.S. policies themselves have “manufactured illegality” (De Genova, 2005; Nevins, 2002). But these are complex and difficult arguments, hard to make and harder to diffuse as a popular message. (155-8)

### 1NC — High Skilled Link

#### Second, their “brain gain” rhetoric sanitizes imperialism and structural violence. Their impact should be ignored because of its ethnocentric logic.

Tannock 7 — Stuart Tannock, Interdisciplinary PhD in social sciences and humanities from Stanford, Researcher @ Univ. of Cardiff , To Keep America number 1: confronting the deep nationalism of US higher education, Globalisation, Societies and Education Vol 5 No 2, July 2007

Education—and higher education, in particular—is now commonly described as being pivotal ‘to national strategies for securing shares of global markets’, increasing a nation’s ‘position in the global marketplace’, ‘enhancing national competitiveness’ and ‘creating national wealth’ (Slaughter & Leslie, 1997, p. 15; Slaughter, 1998, p. 45; Vidovich & Currie, 1998, p. 195; Naidoo, 2003, p. 250). In fact, with the declining effectiveness and legitimacy of other central planks of the welfare state (under conditions of neoliberal globalisation), national Governments have ‘come to regard education as one of the most effective remaining instruments of national policy’ (Green, 1997, p. 4). Robert Reich’s (1991) vision in The work of nations is the new orthodoxy. ‘All that will remain rooted within national borders are the people who comprise the nation’ (p. 3), Reich writes. ‘Each nation’s primary assets will be its citizens’ skills and insights. … The nation’s task is to maximise the number of its citizens who can sell [skilled] services on the global market and reap the reward for them’ (p. 8). Today in America, this worldwide, market-driven competition—a kind of global arms race in education—is exactly what the purveyors of Sputnik fever ask us to embrace and perpetuate. How might we step out **of this global arms race**, this nationalist conspiracy of teaching and learning, and **truly globalise** or internationalise the structure and practice of higher education? Making unilateral declarations of a commitment to ‘internationalism’, ‘cosmopolitanism’, human rights or the ‘global good’ **will not necessarily change anything.** US **imperialists** have long claimed to act in the name of a ‘**global good’,** **on the** assumption that what is good for America is good for everyone else in the world. Sidney Lens (1970) describes this as ‘the myth of morality’ that has enveloped American Empire from its very beginnings, and more recently, Michael Ignatieff (2003) has promoted this as ‘empire lite’. ‘Cosmopolitanism,’ notes Ray Kiely (2005), ‘can be linked to the extension of “market forces” … or “humanitarian” military intervention; equally, however, it could be tied to Marxist conceptions of international labor solidarity or anti-war politics’ (p. 157). Academics in America like to point to the presence of foreign students and scholars in their classrooms, departments and labs, and to collaborations with colleagues overseas **as incontrovertible evidence of their own high-minded internationalism** and ‘multiculturalism’. Yet such presence could be the sign of any number of things: the incorporation and **exploitation of foreign and immigrant knowledge** and labor in the service of US nationalism; the training and nurturing of dependent elites in and from other nations in the service of US imperialism (Ahmad, 2004); the staffing and supporting of a global system of contemporary capitalism, through the reproduction of what Leslie Sklair (2001) refers to as a ‘transnational capitalist class’ or Robert Reich (2005) identifies as an emergent elite of ‘global symbolic analysts’; or quite simply, the business-minded profiteering in lucrative international student tuition fees that can be had in a booming ‘export’ business in higher education around the world. The presence of international studies programs on college campuses does not necessarily signal the presence of progressive internationalism, as the history in the US of the National Defense Education Act should alert us. Laura Nader’s (1972) warning, ‘don’t study the poor and powerless, because everything you say about them will be used against them’ (p. 295), can be expanded for those working in the American university system today: ‘don’t study anybody or anything anywhere, because what you say and write about them will be deployed against them in the **interests of an imperialist US nation state’**. Finally, the **privileging of international** over national, regional or local concerns in academia is no necessary sign of progress either. There is sometimes a tension, in fact, in American universities between research-minded faculty whose work orients to a national or international stage, and the students they are hired to teach, whose entrance into higher education is motivated and shaped by experiences lived on a predominantly local and regional stage. If an argument can be made that American college students should be less focused on ‘getting ahead’ in their own lives and more attuned to issues of AIDS in Africa, global warming in the Arctic or occupation in Palestine, then so too can another argument be made that American college faculty need, if they are to transform US higher education to better serve the interests of the public both nationally and worldwide, to be **less focused on their own research careers** and agendas and more attuned to the local and regional political economies in which their students—and their own paid work—remain firmly embedded. No simple politics of international representation or presence will suffice here. All of these things—internationalism, consideration of the global good, immigrant participation, overseas collaboration, international studies and cross-border perspectives— to be given meaningful political and social content**, need to be tied to a close critical analysis of the nature and impact of US nationalism** (and US imperialism and global capitalism), both in the academy itself and in the rest of the country and world beyond. The fetish of ‘competitiveness’, which has come to define so much of the basic raison d’être for higher education in America (as elsewhere), and which divides the peoples of the world against one another, needs to be dethroned and demystified. As Sam Gindin (2004) suggests, though the issue of competitiveness has to be treated seriously as a ‘real-world constraint … that we must deal with in the short run’, in the longer term, our goal should be ‘to limit and eventually eradicate its dominance over our lives’ (p. 7). One thing we can be assured. Sputnik fever, in seeking to rally Americans around the flag to keep their nation ‘Number 1’ in the world (Pelosi, 2005), and in pushing universities **to participate centrally in building the intellectual, economic and military walls, bombs and armies of a new Fortress America, leads academics and the rest of the country in the wrong direction altogether.** In a globalised world, education, good, interest and security can no longer—if they ever could—be conceptualised and practiced only or even principally at the level of the nation. **Americans need desperately to be learning how to learn and work beyond the borders of their own limited but overpowering country, with and not against the rest of the world.** (268-70)

### 1NC — Open Borders Link

#### Second, opening borders strengthens capitalist control without helping the poor.

MacroBusiness 14 — (Author listed as “Rumplestatskin” cited as “a professional economist with a background in property development, environmental economics research and economic regulation”, card previously cited as “Yves Smith” but that is just the poster, https://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2014/02/open-borders-morality-play-1.html and https://www.macrobusiness.com.au/2014/02/open-borders-a-morality-play-by-the-1/)

Alex Tabarrok, who I rarely agree with, has recently argued his moral position on open borders here. There is no doubt that most moral frameworks also support his position. As do I in the mere theoretical sense. As Tabarrok argues How can it be moral that through the mere accident of birth some people are imprisoned in countries where their political or geographic institutions prevent them from making a living? I have argued before that redistribution of wealth from the world’s richest to the world’s poorest should be at the top of the policy agenda for any economist who believes in the utilitarian foundations of their discipline. Open borders is an indirect method for pursuing similar goals of increasing wellbeing for the poorest, and usually promoted by those who fall on Mankiw’s side of the political spectrum; by those who typically argue that the rich ‘deserve’ their wealth (counterargument here). Open borders is merely the logical outcome of any type of ‘natural rights’ moral reasoning. People should have the opportunity to flourish irrespective of the patch of Earth they were born. Yet the idea boils down to being the policy you support when you want to help the world’s poor but don’t support actually giving them money. Tabarrok’s argument equally applies within borders between the rich and poor, and I paraphrase his comment to make this point. “How can it be moral that through the mere accident of birth some people are imprisoned in towns and suburbs where their financial and geographic constraints prevent them from making a living?”. That open borders within countries does not automatically eliminate poverty reminds us be skeptical of claims that opening borders between them will reduce poverty automatically. It helps to identify the potential winners and losers from opening borders in order to better understand the motivations it its proponents. If open borders works, and large scale migration occurs, the net effect is that the poorest in the world’s richest countries would have their wages reduced due to competition for unskilled jobs. By contrast, the richest individuals in rich countries, whose incomes are derived mostly from owning capital, would increase due to the greater demand for their domestic assets (such as land) following high levels of immigration. Even the wildest proponents of open borders agree that …open borders could not on its own eliminate poverty and that international migration could only help the relatively better off among the global poor The rich get richer; that we know with some degree of confidence. The poor get, well, we don’t know. Probably poorer in relative terms, maybe richer in absolute terms. We just don’t know. But we can be fairly certain that the poorest in the world are unlikely to walk away from their homes and straight into the most exclusive enclaves of New York and London. Indeed, one suspects that the most highly educated from the poorest countries will be the first to leave (as they often are now). Open borders in a global sense is therefore likely to be a game that benefits the richest from the poorest countries and still leaves the poorest with few options to improve their economic fortunes. Putting this raw economic analysis to one side for a moment, one question seems completely overlooked by proponents of open borders. Why do borders exist in the first place? If we can’t satisfactorily answer that question we won’t get far understanding the many important social issues that would accompany open borders. A very brief and abstract story of borders is as follows. National borders typically exist as a result of previous wars, or the negotiations that took place between competing interests under the threat of war. These borders now serve as moral boundaries, whereby we see those within our border as part of our tribe. Tribes reinforce their internal cohesion through social signals, customs and rituals which foster stability. This process, however, can distance them from other tribes (countries). It is these tribal and moral values of borders that make integrating tribes quite difficult. Immigration is always contentious not because of the existence of a line on a map, but because of these deeper social customs, norms and rituals are often in conflict. It takes a mighty will for immigrants to adapt to their new countries, and for citizens of destination countries to patiently accept new people with often conflicting customs and beliefs in their towns and suburbs. I generalise here probably a little too much, but the point I hope to make is that social integration is not automatic and is an extremely complex issue that needs to be properly considered in arguments for open borders. While I don’t have a disagreement with open borders on moral principles, I disagree on practical grounds they should be promoted as a first-best way to improve the lives of the world’s poorest. Any economic success from such a fantastical global open borders policy would come at cost of social challenges arising from what I’ve described as ‘tribal integration’. The greater the economic benefits to the, the higher the social costs at both source and destination countries. In many ways open borders is the type of policy you support to display street cred in the company of the economically rational, particularly when discussions turn to inequality and, god forbid, redistribution. Making the poor richer is as simple as giving them money and therefore access to resources, whether they are fellow citizens of your country, or your planet.

### 1NC — Refugees Link

#### Second, even well-intentioned refugee advocacy sanitizes neoliberal power structures.

Dykstra-DeVette 18 — (Tiffany A., Ph.D, Comm@WV, Resettlement Rhetoric: Challenging Neoliberalism in Refugee Empowerment Initiatives SOUTHERN COMMUNICATION JOURNAL https://doi.org/10.1080/1041794X.2018.1437925)

Historically, the plight of refugees has resonated with deeply held American values, drawing comparisons to the European pilgrims who colonized North America while they escaped religious persecution. Beloved figures of the state such as Albert Einstein, Henry Kissinger, and Madeline Albright are retold as founders and supporters of resettlement institutions. The partnerships with state programs and non-governmental resettlement and aid organizations built a legacy of collabora- tion. Prior to World War II, social work services attempted to distinguish between immigrants and refugees, so as to demonstrate the “desirability for entry and fitness for integration” of those individuals who were fleeing conflict and not migrating by choice (Park, 2008, p. 776). Throughout the first half of the 21st century, discourse regarding refugees of Irish, German, and Scandinavian descent began reconciling what was previously constructed as undesirable bodies, transforming them into “Americans,” while excluding other nationalities (Park, 2008). Similarly, refugee resettlement today valorizes entrepreneurialism and economic independence as benchmarks of good citizenship. According to the US State Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (2015), “the U.S. refugee resettlement program reflects the core values of the United States and our strong tradition of providing a safe haven for the oppressed” (p. 1). Social mobility and economic independence are American narratives that interpret and convey values reflected in the refugee resettlement programs. Nguyen (2012) names “transnational multiculturalism” as conjoined forms of racial discourse predicated on ownership of the self as a condition for freedom and the representation of global imperial interests as neutral common goods (p. 142). Certain refugee bodies are not rendered sufficient citizens by the state and these standards are used as the basis of selective exclusion and inclusion (McKinnon, 2011). In this way, well intentioned resettlement rhetoric can participate in global power structures that perpetuate inequality. Refugees still experience poverty despite the focus on their contribution to society and their ethic of hard work. They may be safe from imminent violence for the most part, but they are not free from the precarity of exclusion and dispossession. According to a US Department of Health and Human Services report (Halpern, 2008), 70 to 86 percent of refugees reported some degree of employment but still had relatively low family income ($21,000 to $23,000). Ray Bush (2007) concludes that resistance to imperial global capital has “not objected simply to the principles of globalization per se but to the kind of globalization that has emerged: a world where 20 percent of the richest people account for more than 85 percent of global consumption and where those consumption patterns attack the world’s environment, challenge any autonomous activity, and seek to universally spread commodity production” (p. 180). Refugees are integrated into the economic order by emphasizing their primary role as consumers in the world’s largest economy. At the GRA, staff both participated in and altered these roles to meet culturally specific needs and achieve financial incentives. McKinnon (2011) contends that refugees are rhetorically situated in the national imaginary in ways that benefit the state, necessitating analyses that take into consideration the history and geopolitical role of resettlement. For instance, refugees were permitted to resettle when their displacement was positioned in a way that did not challenge the complicity of the state in root- cause conflicts and did not conflict with gendered and racial stereotypes (McKinnon, 2011). The rhetorical treatment of refugees plays a role in what Mbembe (1999) calls the “management of the multitudes” which mobilizes or disperses individuals through camps, regulations, and bureaucracy. In this way, neocolonialism exceeds military and settler tactics, operating through the privileging and rationalizing of Western control over cultural others (Svirsky & Bignall, 2012). While research suggests that rhetorical constructions of refugees by the state perpetuate neocolonial interests, it is equally important to investigate the rhetorics of resettlement within humanitarian organizations that assist refugees.(2-3)

## 2NC/1NR

### They Say: “Framework” (Epistemology)

#### “Real world” arguments deny neoliberal epistemology — they’re consistently wrong.

Jacques 16 — (Martin, PhD Cambridge, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/aug/21/death-of-neoliberalism-crisis-in-western-politics?CMP=share\_btn\_fb, 8-21)

The western financial crisis of 2007-8 was the worst since 1931, yet its immediate repercussions were surprisingly modest. The crisis challenged the foundation stones of the long-dominant neoliberal ideology but it seemed to emerge largely unscathed. The banks were bailed out; hardly any bankers on either side of the Atlantic were prosecuted for their crimes; and the price of their behaviour was duly paid by the taxpayer. Subsequent economic policy, especially in the Anglo-Saxon world, has relied overwhelmingly on monetary policy, especially quantitative easing. It has failed. The western economy has stagnated and is now approaching its lost decade, with no end in sight. After almost nine years, we are finally beginning to reap the political whirlwind of the financial crisis. But how did neoliberalism manage to survive virtually unscathed for so long? Although it failed the test of the real world, bequeathing the worst economic disaster for seven decades, politically and intellectually it remained the only show in town. Parties of the right, centre and left had all bought into its philosophy, New Labour a classic in point. They knew no other way of thinking or doing: it had become the common sense. It was, as Antonio Gramsci put it, hegemonic. But that hegemony cannot and will not survive the test of the real world. The first inkling of the wider political consequences was evident in the turn in public opinion against the banks, bankers and business leaders. For decades, they could do no wrong: they were feted as the role models of our age, the default troubleshooters of choice in education, health and seemingly everything else. Now, though, their star was in steep descent, along with that of the political class. The effect of the financial crisis was to undermine faith and trust in the competence of the governing elites. It marked the beginnings of a wider political crisis. But the causes of this political crisis, glaringly evident on both sides of the Atlantic, are much deeper than simply the financial crisis and the virtually stillborn recovery of the last decade. They go to the heart of the neoliberal project that dates from the late 70s and the political rise of Reagan and Thatcher, and embraced at its core the idea of a global free market in goods, services and capital. The depression-era system of bank regulation was dismantled, in the US in the 1990s and in Britain in 1986, thereby creating the conditions for the 2008 crisis. Equality was scorned, the idea of trickle-down economics lauded, government condemned as a fetter on the market and duly downsized, immigration encouraged, regulation cut to a minimum, taxes reduced and a blind eye turned to corporate evasion. It should be noted that, by historical standards, the neoliberal era has not had a particularly good track record. The most dynamic period of postwar western growth was that between the end of the war and the early 70s, the era of welfare capitalism and Keynesianism, when the growth rate was double that of the neoliberal period from 1980 to the present. But by far the most disastrous feature of the neoliberal period has been the huge growth in inequality. Until very recently, this had been virtually ignored. With extraordinary speed, however, it has emerged as one of, if not the most important political issue on both sides of the Atlantic, most dramatically in the US. It is, bar none, the issue that is driving the political discontent that is now engulfing the west. Given the statistical evidence, it is puzzling, shocking even, that it has been disregarded for so long; the explanation can only lie in the sheer extent of the hegemony of neoliberalism and its values. But now reality has upset the doctrinal apple cart. In the period 1948-1972, every section of the American population experienced very similar and sizable increases in their standard of living; between 1972-2013, the bottom 10% experienced falling real income while the top 10% did far better than everyone else. In the US, the median real income for full-time male workers is now lower than it was four decades ago: the income of the bottom 90% of the population has stagnated for over 30 years.

### They Say: “Framework” (Argument Exclusion)

#### Argument exclusion feeds the security state by making students unable to question inbred molds of thinking.

Tannock 7 — Stuart Tannock, Interdisciplinary PhD in social sciences and humanities from Stanford, Researcher @ Univ. of Cardiff, To Keep America number 1: confronting the deep nationalism of US higher education, Globalisation, Societies and Educaton Vol 5 No 2, July 2007

Piece-by-piece, the work of re-crafting the American university into an integral component of an enlarged security state was begun by an administration committed to a doctrine of permanent war with the world. The controlled flow of Government dollars obviously has a major impact on which issues are worked on and perspectives embraced within the US academy—an impact that is magnified in a system of higher education starved of public funds for decades. But other shifts have been occurring too. State control of universities is increasingly up-front and hands-on. As David Price (2005a, b) points out, for example, attaching employment payback obligations to student fellowship money is not new, but PRISP and ICSP go a step further by tying students to intelligence employers before they enter rather than after they graduate college. Such programs thereby make it less likely that students will reshape intelligence communities by bringing in new and different perspectives from their university studies, and more likely that intelligence communities will use universities to reshape students into their own old and ‘inbred’ molds of thinking from the very beginning. There is also an increasing climate on campuses of secrecy, subterfuge and surveillance. To use Price’s example of PRISP and ICSP again, students in these programs will study in universities as undisclosed intelligence agency operatives, their identity and true purpose unknown to their peers or the faculty who are expected to educate them. (262)

### They Say: “Permutation”

#### The perm fails — accepting the framing of market logic taints the whole project and turns the case.

Spaulding 97 — (Norman W, JD Candidate, Commodification and Its Discontents: Environmentalism and the Promise of Market Incentives, 16 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 293 May)

Total bans may be less popular, and hence more difficult to enact, but from a strategic standpoint they better express the environmentalist's non-commodified goal of ensuring that economic activity does not compromise ecological values. Adopting commodified means to achieve environmental ends may also radically alter those ends in the process. From this perspective nothing could be more pernicious than accepting the sort of "when in Rome" logic of market-based approaches (i.e., when working as an environmentalist in an irremediably capitalist context, use market means). Moreover, not only our perception of environmental problems but the means for solving them shift with the practices we adopt and the rationales we use to justify them. Uncritical acceptance of market-based incentives would minimize incentives to develop means of pollution elimination that arise under the total bans. Second, while market-based incentive programs manifest some of the best qualities of free markets and government regulation, they have the potential to represent the worst aspects of these regimes as well. Environmental values are subordinated to the marketplace in pollution trading, thus where compliance is not cost-effective, cheating may still occur. Moreover, tradable permits may bear disturbing aspects of subordination insofar as the markets they entail are likely to produce inequitable demographic distributions of pollution. n95 As one commentator has shown, the national market in solid waste has concentrated distribution of solid waste in less wealthy states with more existing pollution problems, mirroring the intra-state tendency to concentrate hazardous waste disposal facilities in local communities where residents are predominantly poor and of color. n96 The dominance of market interests in politics may also produce suspect regulations, i.e., either in the form of lenient emission/discharge goals or in the form of weak monitoring compliance with permit levels. n97 Finally, pollution trading may place the goals of environmental quality on a slippery slope toward the fully commodified regime of free market environmentalism. Once the logic of free market incentives is accepted for the implementation of politically determined quality standards, arguments that the free market can better determine quality goals will inevitably seem more compelling.

#### Theoretical starting points are key — if their plan emerged from bad methodological process you shouldn’t endorse it.

Holleman 12 — assistant professor of sociology at Amherst, PhD in sociology from the University of Oregon (June, Hannah, sociology dissertation, University of Oregon, “Energy justice and foundations for a sustainable sociology of energy”, https://scholarsbank.uoregon.edu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/1794/12419/Holleman\_oregon\_0171A\_10410.pdf?sequence=1,)

Problems associated with our energy regime are especially dramatic and represent one of the most formidable obstacles to realizing a society that functions within ecological limits and free of oppression. Energy studies thus provide an avenue in which the problems of the system may be viewed through the lens of one of the limiting factors of social and ecological change: our energy regime. This makes the critical sociology of energy a perfect site for more inclusive theory that shines light on the workings of the system as a whole and the relationship of its parts. Recap: Energy justice and a sociology of energy for survival In 1988, Rosa, Machlis, and Keating called for renewed attention to energy by sociologists given “that energy plays a crucial role, perhaps the crucial role, in the link between societies and their biophysical environments” (155). They noted that energy is a persistent predicament for all societies, a “chronic problem that requires continuous attention and that, if there is a sustained lapse in attention, can turn into a crisis” (168). Climate change, representing precisely the kind of crisis scholars have anticipated for over 100 years, though they were treated as so many Cassandras for saying so, indeed has renewed scholarly attention to energy. However, sociology as a discipline still pays little attention to energy. Several explanations for this were offered throughout this study. These include persistent disciplinary boundaries, specialization within sociology, and the lack of penetration of ecological concerns into the discipline as a whole. Other reasons are related to the blinders imposed by capitalist ideology, including the pervasiveness of modernization perspectives in social science, economic reductionism, and the related denial of social inequality and ecological degradation as inherent and functional aspects of the capitalist system. Moreover, as many critical scholars have pointed out, the experiences and insights of too many people are left out of our theoretical developments. Our “analytical tools carry sociological bias, that is to say, as long as its constructs are formulated in the absence of inputs by class, race, and sex-gendered others” (Salleh 2010, 215). Perspectives are too often missing from people of the global South, poor people, people of color, women, lgbt people, and other historically oppressed and disenfranchised social groups. The experience of other countries, like Cuba, which has defied capitalist logic in so many ways, especially while experiencing its own version of peak oil, is rarely treated seriously in the mainstream literature (Hernández 2002). This reflects that fact that social science has a long way to go toward becoming a people’s science with a basis in ecology (Lewontin and Levins 2007, 98). Without theoretical starting points that make the invisible visible, it is difficult for empirical work to proceed that is focused on the interface between social inequalities and ecological depredations, or energy injustices, of the current energy regime. Therefore, much contemporary work on energy, especially that beholden to the dominate ideology, such as modernization perspectives, is neither truly sociological nor ecological. It therefore does not offer a good starting point for energy studies. The theoretical perspective offered here builds on the work of environmental sociologists such as feminist ecologists, environmental justice scholars, and energy scholars, suggesting these have much to offer energy scholars by way of theoretical starting points. It also builds on ecological theory through the case study of Ecuador and includes insights from my own research in Cuba. The point in this thesis is to put these developments in a context in which they may complement one another so that they may inform the further development of the sociology of energy. This context is the ecological rift theory of environmental sociology. This approach to the sociology of energy thus begins with the general recognition that the social system inevitably “confronts natural systems and affects their ability to sustain life” (Clark and York 2005, 395-96). The global patterns of ecological destruction, which threaten entire biospheric systems, and have resulted in species and cultural extinction at unprecedented rates, “can be attributed in each and every case to a primary cause: the current pattern of global socioeconomic development, that is the capitalist mode of production and its expansionary tendencies” (Foster, Clark, and York 2010, 18). The ecohistorical period of capitalism is defined by these depredations. “The whole problem can be called ‘the global ecological rift,’ referring to the overall break in the human relation to nature arising from an alienated system of capital accumulation without end” (18). The modern energy regime is foundational to capitalist development, as the classical theorists already understood. Indeed, no energy regime in history can be understood outside of the broader social contexts that drive energy developments and structure their outcomes. Energy regimes reflect the social and ecological priorities of any society. And, in a dialectical manner, “key features of social structure and change are conditioned by the availability of energy, the technical means for converting energy into usable forms, and the ways energy is ultimately used” (Rosa, Machlis, and Keating 1988, 149). Moreover, from this perspective, it is understood that “the ecological rift is, at bottom, the product of a social rift: the domination of human being by human being. The driving force is a society based on class, inequality, and acquisition without end. At the global level it is represented by…the imperial division between…North and South, rich and poor countries” (Foster, Clark, and York 2010, 47). This interface identified between ecological degradation, oppression, and inequality, indicate the centrality of environmental justice within the broader ecological rift theory in environmental sociology. The further development of the ecological rift framework, as presented in this study, illustrates the way in which the ecological rift is inherently bound with the development of the modern race, gender, class, and colonial order of capitalism. Developed in this way, it both complements and draws extensively on the work of feminist ecologists and other environmental justice scholars. Feminist ecologists have called for such further theoretical integration in environmental sociology, citing the ecological rift framework as a basis for such a synthesis (Salleh 2010). This study explicates the links between the ecological and social rift. On this basis, energy injustice, as the interface between social inequalities and ecological depredations of the modern energy regime are made clear and the social limitations to facing energy crises, such as climate change, are more recognizable. A sociology of energy concerned with energy justice works toward exposing the inequalities embedded in the modern energy regime, and better explaining historical trends. For example, with an energy justice perspective it is much easier to see why it is not the type of energy that is the problem, it is the role of energy in capitalist development that drives the abuses we associate with oil, for example. Lacking an energy justice perspective, it took a long time for environmentalists and academics in wealthy countries to see the social and ecological tragedies of biofuel developments, a popular ‘alternative’ energy. By the time reports emerged documenting the routine ecological and social abuses in the biofuel industry, it already had received enough policy support to entrench its growth as a fuel sector for the foreseeable future (Holleman 2012). Moreover, as York (2012) has made clear, ‘alternative energy’ does not displace fossil fuel demand, and therefore cannot address climate change, but only adds to an ever-growing energy throughput with major ecological and social consequences. The case of biofuel, as an example of this, proves that it is impossible to understand social energy choices without linking critical ecology and social thought. It also is impossible to solve ecological crises, like global climate change, without addressing social inequality. As Anderson (1976) wrote, “the fact is that environmental degradation and social inequality are interrelated in numerous ways and neither can be reversed without fundamentally altering the course of the other” (139). Feminist ecologists and Marxist scholars, among others, have linked ecological and social degradation to the immorality of capitalism, “which unabashedly celebrates wealth while commonly ignoring poverty and environmental destruction generated in its wake” (Foster 2002, 88; see also Waring 1999 and Salleh 2010). This immorality “is in fact so institutionalized in society that it hardly appears immoral at all. Nevertheless all other moral standards and bases of community are forced to give way before it” (88): If land—is turned into mere real estate to be bought and sold by the highest bidder, if the commons are enclosed and then exploited outside of any collective restraints, it is due to this reduction of everything to mere economic value…In a society of this kind, people are forced to regard everything about them—the land, the rivers, the natural resources of the earth, as well as their own labor power—as mere commodities, to be exploited for greater gain. (Foster 2002, 88) These scholars have emphasized the need to transcend this system of institutionalized immorality, which treats the reproductive work of humans and nature as value-less. This is in spite of the fact that capitalism is in the end dependent upon these labors. As noted above, the immorality of capitalism is reflected in its economic reductionism wherein the bottom line is always the primary basis for assessing the worth any activity, person, or the environment. Transcending this economic reductionism requires methods of assessment based on completely different theoretical and methodological tools, reflecting an alternative morality. This requires replacing the focus on economic efficiency, with what Salleh (2010) calls “eco-sufficiency,” which emphasizes the long-term provisioning of social and ecological reproduction and has nothing to do with exchange value, prices, or the bottom line of capital. Salleh proposes the concept of metabolic value as new criteria for assessment. Metabolic value refers to the “intrinsic capacity for organic reproduction” of ecosystems and the regenerative labor done off capitalism’s accounting books especially by women, peasants, etc. “in supporting ecological integrity and the social metabolism” (210, 212). Howard T. Odum’s work in systems ecology reflects just such a system of assessment in terms of metabolic value, or what Odum calls emergy. Odum developed emergy analysis as a framework for understanding the economy in ecological accounting terms focused on the long-term provisioning necessary for the reproduction of ecosystems and egalitarian social development. Emergy analysis provides a basis for understanding economic processes, such as trade, individual commodities, and entire societies, in terms of their ecological and social costs. This is accomplished by bringing the reproductive work of humans and ecosystems under a common ecological, non-exchange oriented accounting framework, making this invisible embodied energy visible. In this study emergy analysis is brought into social science as an alternative methodology and theoretical framework for understanding ecological exchange and sustainability. Odum’s work provides a material basis for a wider conception of sustainability, and its violation in the form of unequal exchange, connecting social and ecological injustice. Emergy helps make sense, in ecological terms, of the magnitude of the accumulated debts associated with the ecological rift of capitalism and the modern energy regime. Emergy analysis thus provides further empirical evidence of the enormity of the ecological debt owed by the North to the South, and between extractive regions within countries and the wealthier areas they supply. Odum’s work on Ecuador illustrates the strength of emergy analysis as an approach to making sense of energy flows and inequalities within the modern energy regime. Emergy can help us evaluate and develop real energy alternatives, with ecology and equality as the criteria.

### They Say: “Permutation” (HSI)

[Additional answers above — this is a supplement.]

#### Failure to directly confront educational nationalism renders it invisible — their scholarship naturalizes imperialism.

Tannock 7 — Stuart Tannock, Interdisciplinary PhD in social sciences and humanities from Stanford, Researcher @ Univ. of Cardiff, To Keep America number 1: confronting the deep nationalism of US higher education, Globalisation, Societies and Education Vol 5 No 2, July 2007

Second, Sputnik fever throws into stark relief a basic fact about the nature of higher (and indeed all) education in America: its deep nationalism. American universities have not been passive recipients of outside pressure to tie their work more closely to national security agendas, but among the most active advocates for such linkage. The AAU and Council of Graduate Schools, both of which represent the nation’s elite research universities, have been at the forefront of current Sputnik talk—and prominent university presidents and chancellors have been highly willing to speak out on the matter as well. In part, such acts are driven by a combination of self-interest, resource dependency and political opportunism. But more fundamentally, they arise naturally out of the American university’s core mission: higher education in the US is structurally and culturally committed to promoting the interests of Americans. Its nationalism, moreover, like that of most other major social institutions in the US, has tended to be both militarist and imperialist. In direct parallel with their peers at the Pentagon, ‘full spectrum dominance’ in higher education by America over all other nations is commonly viewed by the country’s academic leaders as being both a natural and desirable state of affairs in the world. Claiming that higher education in America, like in all other countries, is nationalist may seem to be doing no more than stating the obvious. Indeed, it is so self-evident and taken for granted that, in what has been called ‘methodological nationalism’ (Dale, 2005), it is often not remarked upon at all and therefore made effectively invisible. My third argument is that unless we confront directly the deep nationalism upon which our system of higher education is founded, not only will we find ourselves hamstrung in resisting effectively the current military and security retrenchment of the American college campus, but we are also liable to misunderstand the nature of the work we do as scholars within the US academy, and further, be unable to challenge a global market economy that seeks constantly to pit the teaching, learning and research we do in our respective national systems of higher education against one another—despite high-minded international academic collaborations we might pursue to the contrary. (259-60)

#### Voting negative recognizes the symbolic functions of immigration debates. Negation does not endorse border crackdowns, instead it questions the hegemonic logic of the global trawl for knowledge as one piece of a broader anti-imperial politics.

Tannock 9 — Stuart Tannock, Interdisciplinary PhD in social sciences and humanities from Stanford, Researcher @ Univ. of Cardiff, White Collar Imperialisms: the H-1B debate in America, Social Semiotics Vol 19 No. 3 2009

In the wake of 11 September 2001, renewed attention has been given to the matter of American imperialism, from all sides of the political spectrum (Foster 2005). Much of this attention, however, has focused on the brutal and devastating forms of US military engagement and occupation overseas in Iraq and Afghanistan; little has been said of the more mundane, enduring and embedded forms of imperialism that continue to shape the everyday common-sense of American citizens and leaders alike. Imperial language, as Young (2005) notes, has two faces and shows up not just in the ugly and overtly racist ideologies of American national supremacy and infallibility, but in apparently more ‘‘benign,’’ ‘‘nurturing’’ and ‘‘reassuring’’ rhetoric as well the political rhetoric of welcoming and embracing immigrants to America, promoting and supporting skill, education and the growth of the knowledge economy**,** and the attractively clean, new economy fantasies of a comfortable and secure white-collar future for all Americans. The H-1B debate takes on its symbolic importance because it crystallizes conflicts and concerns within America about preserving and extending US power, privilege and prerogative. It is true, as H-1B critics argue, that there are many local reforms that could be made in the H-1B program that would better protect immigrant and labor rights. But the core issues at the heart of the H-1B debate can only be resolved by stepping back to examine critically the underlying and shared imperialist assumptions and agendas of H-1B combatants, in order to build a globally progressive, equitable and anti-imperialist labor and education politics in America today. On the pro-side of the H-1B debate, it is essential to recognize that it is not just those who espouse an anti-immigrant stance, but also those embracing an ostensibly pro-immigrant position, who may be promoting an inequitable and reactionary domestic and global political agenda. Challenging the imperialism of those in America who are happy to cream the world’s ‘‘best and brightest’’ in order to perpetuate US global hegemony should not lead to a demand for a closed-border immigration policy. It should, however, lead to an open critique of the grotesque inequality in control over global wealth that underlies the global flows of migration to the United States, and a refusal of any politics that seeks to perpetuate this inequality. It should lead to critique and rejection of the kinds of work that many high-skilled immigrants are asked to perform in America to help it maintain and extend its neo-liberal form of empire. America’s massive military industrial complex, for example, has long been heavily staffed by skilled immigrant labor. As immigrant rights advocates in the United States argue, it should lead to a critique of US military and economic interventions overseas that displace millions off their land, out of their jobs and homes, and into the rapidly expanding migration streams to the United States and other countries (Bacon 2008). It should lead to a discussion of how best to resolve the growing problem of a global brain-drain of which the United States remains the primary beneficiary and an insistence that national immigration policy be based not just on domestic but global considerations and responsibilities. Perhaps, too, it should lead to a critique of discrimination between high-skilled and low-skilled migrants in immigration policy: for not only can such education-based discrimination be argued to be unjust in its own right; it also provides a key mechanism through which the United States is able to engage in its selfish and selective global trawl for talent (Tannock 2009b, 2008).

### They Say: “Perm Double Bind”

#### No perm double bind — combining strategies has strategic costs.

Post 18 — (Charlie, PhD, Sociology@CityNY, https://www.jacobinmag.com/2018/02/socialist-organization-strategy-electoral-politics)

Any decisive break with the logic of capitalism requires the “expropriation of the expropriators.” No matter what the possible balance between planning and markets in a socialist society, private ownership of the means of production must be abolished — and this requires democratic, working-class political power. Whatever the process that builds working-class capacity to the point where taking power is possible, the expropriation of capital will certainly be a political rupture of historic proportions. This cannot be achieved piecemeal — the need to take political power and rapidly consolidate democratic, working-class power flows from the need to expropriate the expropriators and break the logic of capital. Evoking mass mobilizations outside of the existing state as a compliment to gaining power within the state will not resolve this dilemma. As we will see, even in the struggle for reforms, the logics of building mass movements and winning office through elections are often in conflict. The logic of building mass struggles and new organizations of working-class power (councils in workplaces and communities) and that of administering the capitalist state are even more incongruous. Ultimately, socialists will have to choose between one or the other as the dominant method of struggle when faced with capitalist resistance to any left government. Put simply, these governments will have to choose between “playing by the rules” of the capitalist state (respecting “constitutional legality,” etc.) or mobilizing working people and building a counterpower to the existing state. Finally, Chibber argues that the capitalist state today not only has reservoirs of political legitimacy, but has become more institutionally powerful and coherent since the crisis of the 1930s. This fact alone would make a “ruptural” strategy illusory. However, if the state has become so powerful and stable, a strategy of “multiple ruptures” is also rendered utopian. How would an organized socialist left gain power within such a state and turn it against the logic of capital, even in a piecemeal fashion?

### They Say: “Competition Inevitable”

#### Nation state “competition” isn't inevitable, but the aff’s belief in it causes structural violence.

Brown and Tannock 9 — Phillip Brown, Prof of Social Sciences @ Univ of Cardiff, AND Stuart Tannock, Interdisciplinary PhD in social sciences and humanities from Stanford, Researcher @ Univ. of Cardiff, Education, Meritocracy and the Global War for Talent, Journal of Education Policy Vol. 24, No. 4, July 2009

Over the past two decades, the discourse of the global war for talent has been picked up by nation-states. In large part, this is derived **directly and explicitly from the corporate human resources literature.** The same global talent ideologues (Richard Florida, Thomas Friedman, McKinsey, etc.) are invoked. The same rhetoric, arguments and assumptions are made. ‘We are in competition for the brightest and best talents – the entrepreneurs, the scientists, the high technology specialists who make the global economy tick’, announced British Immigration Minister Barbara Roche in 2000 (quoted in Rollason 2001, 338). Alastair Darling, while UK Secretary of Trade, used the well-known example of foreign all-star talent in Britain’s premier football league to state that ‘attracting the Cantonas and Bergkamps of science to the UK can only help take our world-class domestic research to the next level …. To be the best you have to work with the best’ (quoted in Jha 2006). The corporate and nation-state global wars for talent are also driven by much the same set of interests. Indeed, to a great extent, the latter is carried out to enable multinational corporations to source talent globally, and thus attract and/or retain corporate investments on national soil. Arguments about why nation-states are now compelled to launch into a global war for talent with each other start with, but go beyond, corporate human resources rhetoric. The basic story goes as follows: the path to national prosperity lies in maximising global competitiveness; to be competitive globally, nations (rich nations, in particular) need to maximise their share of the world’s high tech, high skill, knowledge economy jobs; to help create and fill these jobs, nations need to recruit the world’s most skilled and talented individuals, from wherever they come; since other nations are competing for these same workers (and indeed, for one’s own set of domestic workers), nations need to adjust their immigration, education, economic and social policy in order to attract and retain them; the global war for talent thus puts into play a game of neverending one-upmanship, and reinforces the **hegemonic development model of the competition state** (Abella 2006; Lavenex 2007; Shachar 2006). Underlying this basic storyline, however, is a further set of claims about current and/or impending shortages of skilled labour in OECD countries that threaten growth, prosperity and the overall standard of living. These labour shortages are (or soon will be) caused by: demographic shifts, namely the ageing of the population; quick production cycles in the high tech sector that demand skilled workers instantly; failures of the public education system; the unwillingness of the native-born skilled to work in certain jobs given current conditions; and the personal failures of the native-born unskilled to acquire the skills needed to work in the contemporary knowledge economy (Kapur and McHale 2005; Kuptsch and Fong 2006; OECD 2006). Because of these alleged labour shortages, because talent has never been more globally mobile or sought after, and because previous cycles of liberalisation of global capital and trade have created global supply chains and production systems which require internationally mobile professional and managerial workforces in order to operate effectively, political elites around the w**orld argue that they have** no choicebut to enter into the global war for talent. For nation-states, competing in the global war for talent entails making what are sometimes radical changes in national immigration policy. Over the past two decades, OECD countries, virtually without exception, have opened their borders to high skilled immigrants, actively recruited top workers from around the world, and transformed education, employment, tax and investment policy to make themselves more competitive and attractive to high level professional and managerial workers (Kuptsch and Fong 2006; OECD 2006). In Britain, the election of the New Labour government in 1997 ushered in a radically new era in immigration policy, that saw the country move from a goal of zero immigration to the active recruitment of the ‘most skilled and most enterprising people from abroad’ (Flynn 2005; Rollason 2001, 333). Over the next decade, new legislation and programmes to attract high skilled immigrants were introduced quite literally on a yearly basis; and in 2006, the government overhauled its immigration system entirely, in order to install an Australian-style ‘points system’ that heavily favours the entrance, to the country, of the highly skilled (Tannock forthcoming). Even traditional immigration countries such as Canada saw a series of fundamental reforms to its immigration policy and practice in the late 1980s and early 1990s that both expanded overall immigration numbers and skewed these numbers more heavily towards the highly skilled (Arat-Koc 1999; Hiebert 2006). The flipside to this global liberalisation of skilled immigration has been the worldwide effort to crackdown on and strictly limit and control low skilled immigration, as well as refugee and family reunification migration streams. The impact of these shifts in immigration policy (in conjunction with other shifts in the world economy) has been enormous. Globally, high skilled migration increased at a rate of two and a half times faster than low skilled migration between 1990 and 2000. By 2000, the college-educated made up 34.6% of immigrants to OECD countries, up from 29.8% in 1990, and far out of proportion to the 11.3% of the world’s overall labour force that they represent (Docquier and Marfouk 2005, 167–8). Small and poor countries in the Caribbean, Pacific and Africa have been hit hardest by these global migrations of the highly educated. Over 50% of college-educated individuals from Sierra Leone, it is estimated, have left their home country to work elsewhere, as have over 60% of the college-educated from Cape Verde and the Gambia, over 70% from Tonga and Samoa, and over 80% from Haiti and Jamaica (Docquier and Marfouk 2005, 175). Large and wealthy countries, too, are losing some of their highly skilled – Britain, for example, has lost a greater number of its college-educated citizens overseas than any other country in the world (Docquier and Marfouk 2005, 175). But they also have seen their labour forces mushroom with high skill immigration. Over a 12-year period (1986–1997), Canada saw its flow of immigrant computer scientists increase 15-fold, the flow of engineers increase 10-fold, the flow of natural scientists increase eight-fold, and the flow of managerial workers increase four-fold (Bambrah 2005, 40). In Britain, it is estimated that 80% of all new doctors and 73% of all new nurses registered between 1997 and 2003 were foreign-born (Pond and McPake 2006), while 22% of all new graduate recruits hired in the financial and business services sector are now foreigners (Financial Services Skills Council 2006). Between 1992 and 2000, there was a 110% increase in the number of foreign-born computer analysts and programmers working in the UK, a 60% increase in the number of foreign-born financial and office managers, and a 48% increase in the number of foreign-born teaching professionals (Dobson, Koser, McLaughlan, and Salt 2001). The global war for talent between nation-states, then, has ushered in two new facts of life on the ground: first, highly skilled and educated individuals have the potential to be more globally mobile than ever; and second, immigrants make up a large and growing proportion not just of the lower echelons of the labour market, where they have long toiled, but the high skill, upper-most levels as well. (380-2)

#### Competitiveness is a hegemonic discourse — its power comes from belief, not truth or accuracy.

Bristow 5 — Dr. Gillian Bristow, Senior Lecturer in Economic Geography @ Cardiff University, ‘5 (Journal of Economic Geography 5.3: 285-304, “Everyone’s a ‘winner’”)

Since the 1990s, in response to the work of authors such as Michael Porter (1990), the concept of regional competitiveness has become a **‘hegemonic discourse**’ (Schoenberger, 1998) within public policy circles in developed countries. Indeed, regional competitiveness has been enthusiastically adopted as a policy goal by the European Commission and by national governments across Europe and North America (ACOA, 1996; De Vol, 1999; Commission of the European Communities, 2000). It has risen to particular prominence in the UK where the national government has explicitly tasked Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) with the responsibility for making their regions ‘more competitive’ and akin to benchmark competitive places such as Silicon Valley (DETR, 1999; House of Commons, 2000; HM Treasury, 2001a). The competitiveness hegemony is such that according to certain analysts, ‘the critical issue for regional economic development practitioners to grasp is that the creation of competitive advantage is the most important activity they can pursue’ (Barclays, 2002, 10). Current policy documents extolling the language of ‘competitiveness’ tend to present it as an entirely unproblematic term and, moreover, as an unambiguously beneficial attribute of an economy. Competitiveness is portrayed as the means by which regional economies are externally validated in an era of globalisation, such that there can be no principled objection **to policies and strategies deemed to be competitiveness enhancing,** whatever their indirect consequences. For example, the European Commission (2004, viii) states that ‘strengthening regional competitiveness throughout the Union and helping people fulfil their capabilities will boost the growth potential of the EU economy as a whole to the common benefit of all’. Similarly, theUKgovernment sees its regional policy objective as being one of ‘widening the circle of winners in all regions and communities’ (DTI, 2001, 4), a sentiment clearly absorbed by the devolved administration in Wales which has entitled its National Economic Development Strategy, ‘A Winning Wales’ (Welsh Assembly Government, 2002). The emergence of regional competitiveness as a discrete and important policy goal has spawned the development of indicators by which policy-makers and practitioners can measure, analyse and compare **relative competitive performance**, or find out who is ‘winning’. Various attempts have been made to measure and model competitiveness for European regions (e.g. IFO, 1990; Pompili, 1994; Pinelli et al., 1998; Gardiner, 2003). Furthermore, the European Commission has placed the analysis of regional competitiveness at the heart of its ongoing assessment of regional economic performance (Commission, 1999; 2000). In the UK, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) has published sets of regional competitiveness indicators since 1995 (e.g. DTI, 2003, 2004). More recently, efforts have also been made to develop composite indices of regional competitiveness, following similar trends in the evolution of national competitiveness indicators (e.g. World Economic Forum, 2003; see Lall, 2001). These combine relevant indicators into one overarching measure, the results of which can be reported in the form of a ‘league table’ (Huggins, 2000; 2003). This preoccupation with competitiveness and the predilection for its measurement is premised on certain **pervasive beliefs**, most notably that globalisation has created a world of intense competition between regions (Raco, 2002).However, there is some confusion as to what the concept actually means and how it can be effectively operationalised. Indeed, in a manner cognate with debates surrounding clusters (see Martin and Sunley, 2003), **policy acceptance** of the existence and importance of regional competitiveness and its measurement appears to have **run ahead of a number of fundamental theoretical and empirical questions**. The purpose of this paper is to **problematise the dominant policy discourse** around regional competitiveness with reference to theory, to explore how and why a discourse with ostensibly thin and ill-defined content has assumed such significance in policy circles, and to consider the potential policy consequences. It is argued that the answer lies within the political economy of economic policy and the **rhetorical power and usefulness of the prevailing competitiveness discourse**. The paper begins by examining the polysemous yet overlapping meanings of regional competitiveness in academic debates. (285-6)

### They Say: “Pragmatism”

#### Pragmatic goals are useless and cause error replication.

Cook 10 — MARIA LORENA COOK Department of International and Comparative Labor, School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University, The Advocate’s Dilemma: Framing Migrant Rights in National Settings Studies in Social Justice Volume 4, Issue 2, 145-164, 2010

Finally, I take a normative position on the ultimate goal of international migrant advocacy, which is that the right to free movement should be recognized and protected. This “ideal” is clearly not practical in the foreseeable future, nor does it necessarily represent the ideal endpoint for many advocates, who may not want to jettison immigration controls. Yet in making this normative claim I am also posing the question of what it would take to move toward public acceptance of this ideal over the long term. I argue that the most commonly used discourses among advocates are limited precisely because they do not break with the premise that states have a “right” to exclude people from their territories. I recognize that advocates will have more pragmatic goals that, if achieved, can improve the situation of unauthorized migrants significantly. However, my point is that anything short of free movement will eventually reproduce the exclusions that diminish human dignity. (147-8)

#### Perm fails — pragmatic politics directly tradeoff with the alternative.

Cook 10 — MARIA LORENA COOK Department of International and Comparative Labor, School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University, The Advocate’s Dilemma: Framing Migrant Rights in National Settings Studies in Social Justice Volume 4, Issue 2, 145-164, 2010

I have argued here that given the global occurrence of migration and its links to globalization, it makes sense for migrant advocates to base their campaigns and actions on a “global frame”: human rights and international law and standards applied to migrants. Yet because national legislation, national judicial systems, and national sovereignty still play a central role in determining immigration policy, international human rights law is a limited instrument for use in seeking rights for unauthorized migrants. In most restrictive immigration policy environments, moreover, arguments about economics, security, and law articulated within a national framework tend to prevail. Advocates employing a global frame may find themselves talking past the mass publics they want to influence and unable to counter their opponents effectively. Yet the advocates’ dilemma is that those who tackle these arguments head on may find themselves trapped within a national paradigm and unable to lay the discursive groundwork for a significant shift in the way the public views unauthorized migrants**.** How have advocacy groups handled this dilemma? In the United States international human rights as a basis for policy-making has had little resonance either among policymakers or the public. Advocates have mostly tried to argue within nationally bounded frames to pursue rights claims and to address restrictive arguments about migration based on economics, security, and legality. However, these approaches have failed to produce the kind of mobilization and political pressure that change policy and move public opinion. More importantly, they are based upon notions of national community that rely on distinctions that invariably exclude (some) migrants and support immigration controls**.** In this way, these nationally based approaches fall short of what is needed to advance toward widespread acceptance of migration itself as a right. (160)

### They Say: “Capitalist Peace Theory (CPT)”

#### Capitalist Peace Theory is wrong — capital entanglements promote conflict and exacerbate inequality.

Nagle 10 — (John, PhD Nostrum or Palliative? Contesting the Capitalist Peace in Violently Divided Societies Civil Wars, Vol.12, No.3 (September 2010), pp.218–236)

The central thesis here is that ‘domestic institutions associated with capitalism, namely private property and competitive market structures, have promoted peace between states over the past two centuries’.84 The reason for this, it is claimed, is that states tightly bound together by mutually beneficial trade tend to look to settle conflicts peacefully as high levels of international commerce between states raised ‘the costs of military conflict to unacceptable levels for modern economies’.85 According to Bussmann, ‘[i]t is not in a country’s interest to go to war with a state with which its private economic agents maintain an extensive exchange of goods and capital’.86 There is a similar claim concerning how levels of foreign investment can contribute to pacific relations between states and even within states. Again, the idea here is that states will try to avoid violent conflict so as not to deter foreign investors. The threat or onset of violent conflict, on the other hand, disrupts not only trade but FDI flows. The decision of foreign investors to locate their capital is influenced not only by the economic policy of the host country, but also by the risk of violent conflict in that state. War deters investors because it creates insecurity leading even to the total loss of investments as factories are closed, raw materials are in short supply and employees are killed or are drafted into service.87 One example of how the lure of FDI can help provide a context for stability between formerly warring neighbours concerns Bosnia and Serbia. Although relations between the two states have remained volatile since the end of the war in the mid-1990s, in 2010 an attempt was made to ameliorate relations between these neighbours in order to lure FDI stock to the region. After a meeting between the two states to discuss a joint approach toward international markets, a member of Bosnia’s tripartite rotating presidency stated that ‘[b]adly needed investments will come only if there is security and stability’.88 There are some critiques that can be directed at the above proposition. First, while interdependent trade and the lure of FDI may make states highly wary of engaging in war due to its exorbitant cost, ironically it may encourage insurgents to mobilise. Calculating that the state may do anything, short of military action, to protect economic stability, insurgents may provoke violence in the reasonable hope that the state may give in to their demands to expedite a quick peace. For example, the British government’s fear of the IRA bombing the financial City of London led it to provide concessions to Irish republicans after one bomb cost damage estimated as £350 million.89 Second, it is not always the case that states will avoid war at all costs to protect FDI; far from it, they may resort to extremely coercive anti-insurgency methods precisely to guarantee the security of foreign investors. The region of Aceh in Indonesia provides a case in point here. In the early 1970s an abundance of oil and natural liquefied gas was discovered in the region by Mobile. In response, an industrial zone was created to allow the inflow of heavy foreign investment. As part of the development of the industrial zone the local Acehnese experienced severe disruption, including forced evictions and some loss of indigenous industry; moreover, the Acehnese received only a small percentage of the profits. Due in part to the disruptive impact of the industrial zone, an Acehnese secessionist movement emerged – the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) – and some of their attacks were targeted at Exxon Mobil facilities and migrant Javanese workers. In direct response to the attacks by GAM, Exxon Mobil threatened to suspend production in Aceh until security could be guaranteed. Taking action, the Indonesian government responded to the GAM campaign by initiating Operation ‘Red Net’: a brutal counter-insurgency initiative, which led to the deaths of up to 5,000 people. The counter-insurgency campaign did little to convince Exxon that their investment and employees were safe and the corporation cancelled operations in Aceh in 2001, which cost the Indonesian government an estimated $100 million per month in lost revenue. Later on that year, the International Labor Rights Fund, acting behalf of Acehnese villagers, filed a lawsuit against Exxon, accusing them of human rights abuses, including murder and torture, when they hired army units to protect natural gas fields.90 Third, and related to the last point, in regions characterised by extreme security problems due to the threat of violence, the carrot waved to attract foreign investors must be so great that it threatens to offset the potential balance between the local and international ownership of post-war reconstruction. This problem can be witnessed in Iraq. In the aftermath of the occupation, the US-run CPA decreed the privatisation of 200 state-owned Iraqi firms, the reduction of corporate tax from 40 to 15 per cent, and permission for foreign companies to own 100 per cent of privatised Iraqi assets, including the right to ‘transfer abroad without delay all funds associated with its foreign investment, including shares or profits and dividends’.91 All of this was passed without seeking consent from the Iraqi people, thus acting to ignite grievances and filling the ranks of a growing insurgency seeking to exploit ethnic conflict, especially since little was done by the CPA to deal with basic problems, like water sanitation, unemployment, security and electricity. Many Iraqis viewed the privatisation of the nation’s industry into the hands of foreign contractors as little less than colonisation, especially as oil contracts became the focus of bribery, price-fixing and embezzlement. Over $12 billion of oil revenue went unaccounted for and the CPA granted immunity from prosecution to US personnel.92 According to Whyte, the scale of the appropriation of Iraq’s oil revenue, in particular, was a ‘neo-liberal strategy of economic colonization’ carried out by the CPA, especially since the authority dismissed the universal principles of international law enshrined in the Hague and Geneva treaties, so that they could ‘privilege the primacy and autonomy of market actors over laws intended to enshrine universal protections for civilian populations in war and conflict’.93 Another problem here is that there is often an expectation that neoliberal processes will expedite a relatively speedy and tangible improvement in people’s everyday life. This is rarely so. Free-market economics largely relies on trickledown economics, with the profits garnered by the vanguard entrepreneurs eventually arriving to those located at the lower levels of society. The anticipation of immediate results may thus act to raise hopes only for them to be dashed when little seems to change. In fact, the situation in the short term may actually worsen as public workers are laid off as state spending declines and existing welfare systems are rolled back. This is a potentially inflammatory scenario, as protest mobilisation is most likely when expectations of improvement are generated but are ultimately deflated.94 In his analysis of peace building initiatives Roland Paris notes that in order to pave the way for divided societies to become fully functioning peaceful market economies, the IMF and World Bank typically initiate structural-adjustment programmes. In exchange for loans, states are required to instigate sweeping economic and institutional reform, including privatising strategies, deregulation, decreases in corporation tax, and austerity measures involving severe cutbacks in public spending to ensure budgetary balance.95 Rather than delivering any peace divided, in the short term the population of divided societies undergoing structural adjustment policies are subject to what is tantamount to a ‘peace penalty’ as public sectorworkers are laid off and public services are underresourced.96 This situation can exacerbate the ethnic security dilemma mentioned earlier in regard to rapid democratisation. If a particular ethnic group are overrepresented in the public sector (such as Serbs in Croatia) they will be obviously fearful for their future security and may resort to militant means to protect their interests. More broadly, the decrease in security wrought by rapid market reform may exacerbate social and ethnic tensions. Ironically, attempts to stimulate future prosperity may create a new ‘conflict trap’, reducing the recruitment costs for spoilers of the peace process. For instance, in the early 1990s the Rwandan government had implemented internationally mandated austerity measures (government spending cuts, reductions in price subsidies, and deregulation of the domestic economy) to help engender a market economy. These measures, Paris argues, ‘fostered an atmosphere of economic insecurity that strained intergroup relations in the vital period leading up to the genocide’.97 A related problem occurs when market reforms act to intensify socio-economic inequalities in a divided society, especially when such disparities have been a focus for violent ethnic mobilisation before. After years of civil war, during the 1990s the Chammoro government in Nicaragua initiated sweeping economic reforms (public sector lay-offs, privatisation policies, the liberalisation of the banking sector and a reduction of public spending) under the auspices of the World Bank and IMF. These reforms resulted in an absolute decline in living standards and exacerbated distributional inequalities between the rural, largely indigenous peasantry and the wealthy urban elite. Since these inequalities were at the root of previous periods of violence in Nicaragua, the transition to economic liberalism ‘worked against the goal of promoting a stable and lasting peace’.98 (229-32)

#### No offense — the current economic model is unsustainable. A new model is necessary to avoid collapse.

Reich 15 — (Robert, PhD, one of the nation’s leading experts on work and the economy, is Chancellor’s Professor of Public Policy at the Goldman School of Public Policy at the University of California at Berkeley. He has served in three national administrations, most recently as secretary of labor under President Bill Clinton. Time Magazine has named him one of the ten most effective cabinet secretaries of the last century, 3-15 http://www.salon.com/2015/03/17/robert\_reich\_economic\_redistribution\_is\_our\_only\_hope\_partner/)

The same year Kodak went under, Instagram, the world’s newest photo company, had 13 employees serving 30 million customers. The ratio of producers to customers continues to plummet. When Facebook purchased “WhatsApp” (the messaging app) for $19 billion last year, WhatsApp had 55 employees serving 450 million customers. A friend, operating from his home in Tucson, recently invented a machine that can find particles of certain elements in the air. He’s already sold hundreds of these machines over the Internet to customers all over the world. He’s manufacturing them in his garage with a 3D printer. So far, his entire business depends on just one person — himself. New technologies aren’t just labor-replacing. They’re also knowledge-replacing. The combination of advanced sensors, voice recognition, artificial intelligence, big data, text-mining, and pattern-recognition algorithms, is generating smart robots capable of quickly learning human actions, and even learning from one another. If you think being a “professional” makes your job safe, think again. The two sectors of the economy harboring the most professionals — health care and education – are under increasing pressure to cut costs. And expert machines are poised to take over. We’re on the verge of a wave of mobile health apps for measuring everything from your cholesterol to your blood pressure, along with diagnostic software that tells you what it means and what to do about it. In coming years, software apps will be doing many of the things physicians, nurses, and technicians now do (think ultrasound, CT scans, and electrocardiograms). Meanwhile, the jobs of many teachers and university professorswill disappear, replaced by online courses and interactive online textbooks. Where will this end? Imagine a small box – let’s call it an “iEverything” – capable of producing everything you could possibly desire, a modern day Aladdin’s lamp. You simply tell it what you want, and – presto – the object of your desire arrives at your feet. The iEverything also does whatever you want. It gives you a massage, fetches you your slippers, does your laundry and folds and irons it. The iEverything will be the best machine ever invented. The only problem is no one will be able to buy it. That’s because no one will have any means of earning money, since the iEverything will do it all. This is obviously fanciful, but **when more and more can be done by fewer and fewer people, the profits go to an ever-smaller circle of executives and owner-investors.** One of the young founders of WhatsApp, CEO Jan Koum, had a 45 percent equity stake in the company when Facebook purchased it, which yielded him $6.8 billion. Cofounder Brian Acton got $3 billion for his 20 percent stake. Each of the early employees reportedly had a 1 percent stake, which presumably netted them $160 million each. Meanwhile, the rest of us will be left providing the only things technology can’t provide – person-to-person attention, human touch, and care. But these sorts of person-to-person jobs pay very little. That means most of us will have less and less money to buy the dazzling array of products and services spawned by blockbuster technologies – because those same technologies will be supplanting our jobs and driving down our pay. **We need a new economic model.** The economic model that dominated most of the twentieth century was mass production by the many, for mass consumption by the many. Workers were consumers; consumers were workers. As paychecks rose, people had more money to buy all the things they and others produced — like Kodak cameras. That resulted in more jobs and even higher pay. That virtuous cycle is now falling apart. A future of almost unlimited production by a handful, for consumption by whoever can afford it, is a recipe for **economic and social collapse.** Our underlying problem won’t be the number of jobs. It will be – **it already is — the allocation of income and wealth**. What to do? “Redistribution” has become a bad word. But the economy toward which we’re hurtling — in which more and more is generated by fewer and fewer people who reap almost all the rewards, leaving the rest of us without enough purchasing power – **can’t function**. It may be that a redistribution of income and wealth from the rich owners of breakthrough technologies to the rest of us becomes the **only means of making the future economy work.**

#### Affirmative evidence is theoretical — empirics disproves the liberalization/growth connection.

Stiglitz 6 — (Joseph, PhD Nobel Prize Winner, Social Justice and Global Trade Far Eastern Economic Review 169:2, March)

The history of recent trade meetings—from Seattle to Doha to Cancun to Hong Kong— shows that something is wrong with the global trading system. Behind the discontent are some facts and theories. The facts: Current economic arrangements disadvantage the poor. Tariff levels by the advanced industrial countries against the developing countries are four times higher than against the developed countries. The last round of trade negotiations, the Uruguay Round, actually left the poorest countries worse off. While the developing countries were forced to open up their markets and eliminate subsidies, the advanced developed countries continued to subsidize agriculture and kept trade barriers against those products which are central to the economies of the developing world. Indeed, the tariff structures are designed to make it more difficult for developing countries to move up the value-added chain—to transition, for instance, from producing raw agricultural produce to processed foods. As tariffs have come down, America has increasingly resorted to the use of nontariff barriers as the new forms of protectionism. Trade agreements do not eliminate protectionist sentiments or the willingness of governments to attempt to protect producer and worker interests. The theories: Trade liberalization leads to economic growth, benefiting all. This is the prevalent mantra. Political leaders champion liberalization. Those who oppose it are cast as behind the times, trying to roll back history. Yet the fact that so many seem to have been hurt so much by globalization seems to belie their claims. Or more accurately, it has shown that the process of “liberalization”— the details of the trade agreements— make a great deal of difference. That Mexico has done so poorly under n a f t a has not helped the case for liberalization. If there ever was a free trade agreement that should have promoted growth, that was it, for it opened up to Mexico the largest market of the world. But growth in the decade since has been slower than in the decades before 1980, and the poorest in the country, the corn farmers, have been particularly hurt by subsidized American corn. The fact of the matter is that the economics of trade liberalization are far more complicated than political leaders have portrayed them. There are some circumstances in which trade liberalization brings enormous benefits—when there are good risk markets, when there is full employment, when an economy is mature. But none of these conditions are satisfied in developing countries. With full employment, a worker who loses his job to new imports quickly finds another; and the movement from low-productivity protected sectors to high-productivity export sectors leads to growth and increased wages. But if there is high unemployment, a worker who loses his job may remain unemployed. A move from a low-productivity, protected sector to the unemployment pool does not increase growth, but it does increase poverty. Liberalization can expose countries to enormous risks, and poor countries—and especially the poor people in those countries—are ill equipped to cope with those risks. Perhaps most importantly, successful development means going stagnant tradi- [ tional sectors with low productivity to more modern sectors with faster increases in productivity. But without protection, developing countries cannot compete in the modern sector. They are condemned to remain in the low growth part of the global economy. South Korea understood this. Thirty-five years ago, those who advocated free trade essentially told Korea to stick with rice farming. But Korea knew that even if it were successful in improving productivity in rice farming, it would be a poor country. It had to industrialize. What are we to make of the oft-quoted studies that show that countries that have liberalized more have grown faster? Put aside the numerous statistical problems that plague almost all such “cross-country” studies. Most of the studies that claim that liberalization leads to growth do no such thing. They show that countries that have traded more have grown more. Studies that focus directly on liberalization— that is, what happens when countries take away trade barriers—present a less convincing picture that liberalization is good for growth. But we know which countries around the world have grown the fastest: they are the countries of East Asia, and their growth was based on export-driven trade. They did not pursue policies of unfettered liberalization. Indeed, they actively intervened in markets to encourage exports, and only took away trade barriers as their exports grew. They avoided the pitfall described earlier of individuals moving from low-productivity sectors into zero productivity unemployment by maintaining their economies at close to full employment. The point is that no country approaches liberalization as an abstract concept that it might or might not buy in to for the good of the world. Every country wants to know: For a country with its unemployment rate, with its characteristics, with its financial markets, will liberalization lead to faster growth? (18-20)

#### Multilateral trade and foreign direct investment have gutted any peace dividend from trade.

Rosecrance 10 — (Richard, PhD Capitalist Influences and Peace, International Interactions: Empirical and Theoretical Research in International Relations 36:2, 192-198)

The connections among markets are now very different from nineteenth century or early twentieth century counterparts. Trade was then the salient way of tying markets and production together. If trade were cut, countries would have to switch to autarchy and perhaps develop ersatz products or substitutes. That is why conflict is in these periods is linked to tariffs and financial restrictions on trade. By military expansion, one country seeks to substitute control for a failing access to markets. In the twenty first century such strategies are anachronistic. This is because, as Robert Mundell proved, one can substitute the movement of factors of production for any deficiency in the movement of trade. If goods do not flow between markets, capital can (Mundell 1957). This permits a country to produce within the target market area the very products that it had originally sought to export to that market. In this way foreign direct investment—the ownership of 10–20 or more percent of a company (within the tariff area)—substitutes for the failure of trade. There were no such high FDI investments between Britain and Germany, Germany and France, or Austria and Russia in 1914. Such FDI as existed was largely devoted to ownership of firms in the colonies or agricultural countries overseas—Australian and Canadian railways or Argentine grain or cattle ranches. These FDI ties did not prevent World War I. Such ties were even weaker before World War II (Rosecrance and Thompson 2003). Where such ties exist reciprocally, however, recent data show that conflict among the parties significantly declines. It is important to note that there are many areas of the world that are presently linked together by such ties, making tariffs less worrisome: the U.S. and Europe; Japan and U.S.; U.S. and China: Japan and China: Japan and Europe. Thus the current Great Recession, even though it may raise tariffs, will not prevent one country from producing its goods inside the borders of another. The essential exchange and interdependence will not be measurably reduced or affected. (194)

### They Say: “Cap Solves Environment”

#### Even if neoliberalism isn’t the sole cause of environmental crisis, it exacerbates all other causes.

Monbiot 16 — (George, MA Zoology, http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/35668-george-monbiot-never-ending-growth-cannot-be-sustained-on-a-finite-planet 4-17)

Mark Karlin: You're compilation of essays is so compelling in offering insight on how we have come to such a crisis point in civilization. First, however, I wanted to ask you a cross-Atlantic question. To what extent have the US and UK neoliberal policies and their political alliance helped "get [us] into this mess"? George Monbiot: It would be wrong to blame only neoliberalism (sometimes described in the US as market fundamentalism) for every element of the mess we're in. It would be wrong to blame only capitalism. For example, a profound shift in the relationship between humans and the living world began with the widespread use of coal, particularly at the beginning of the English Industrial Revolution (which became the template for industrialization in many other countries). It permitted the continuous economic growth that eventually improved the living standards of many people, while simultaneously enabling the conquest and repression of others. But it also set in train an environmental conflagration -- in both capitalist and communist nations -- that continues to rage today. I see coal as a more important determinant of human history than either capitalism or communism. However, neoliberal ideology has greatly exacerbated the predicament of both people and planet. By ripping holes in the social safety net, shutting down organized labor, privatizing and degrading public services and deregulating predatory capitalism, it has reversed many of the gains in human welfare that took place between 1945 and the 1970s, spread precariousness and financial crises, and enriched the ultra-wealthy at the expense of the rest. One result is that inequality, which declined steeply in the mid- to late 20th century, has now risen so swiftly that in the US and UK it is heading toward the extreme levels of the 1920s. At the same time, by insisting that corporations should regulate themselves and that governments should not intervene on behalf of the public interest, it has accelerated the environmental crisis and constrained the options for responding to it.

#### Markets can’t fix the unending need for capital expansion. This destroys the environment.

Bohm 12 — (Steffen, Prof Univ. of Essex, PhD, et al, Maria Ceci Misoczky Prof. of Federal univ. of Rio Grande do Sul Brazil, Sandra Moog, Prof. Univ. of Essex, Greening Capitalism? A Marxist Critique of Carbon Markets Organization Studies 0(0) 1-22)

Contemporary neoliberal approaches to the management of environmental problems posit that problems like the excessive production and emission of greenhouse gases can be addressed by assessing ‘natural limits,’ and constructing market mechanisms to rationally distribute access to environmental goods, rights to pollute, and rights to make use of ‘ecosystem services,’ such as carbon sinks (e.g. Tietenberg, 2006; Michaelowa & Dutschke, 2000; Stowell, 2005; Yamin, 2005). Efforts by Foster and his colleagues (Foster, 1999; Foster & Clark, 2009; Foster et al., 2010), however, emphasize the inherently unpredictable and dialectical nature of the way in which human productive activities impact upon the non-human natural environment, and how natural systems respond by shaping human productive systems in unforeseen ways. These theorists argue that, due to the pace of commodification and extraction of raw materials under conditions of capitalist expansion, and due to the great distances which raw materials, food resources and waste travel in the ever-expanding circuits of capitalist economic organization, human interchange with the natural environment under the conditions of capitalism results in significant disruptions to natural ecosystems systems and biogeochemical cycles. This is a dynamic which Marx himself theorized, most significantly in his writings on nutrient loss and soil exhaustion in Europe in the mid-1880s (Foster, 1999). As Foster explains, Marx conceptualized continuities and disruptions in the interchange between human modes of production and natural systems through his adoption of the concept of ‘metabolism’ (Stoffwechsel), originally developed by the German agro-chemist Liebig in 1840. Marx appropriated Liebig’s concept in his writings in Capital in order to describe the rise of ‘an irreparable rift in the interdependent process of social metabolism’ under conditions of capitalist production and urban-rural organization (Marx, 1981, p. 949). Using this concept, Marx identified the rift brought about by urbanization, and by agricultural and trade practices that despoil the earth without replenishing its resources, thereby robbing whole regions of their natural conditions of (re)production (Gimenez, 2001). Recently, studies have begun to apply Marx’s theory of metabolic rift to contemporary environmental problems, such as the fertilizer treadmill, ocean acidification and climate change (Clark & York, 2005; Clausen & Clark, 2005; Mancus, 2007; Clark & Foster, 2009). Foster and Clark (2009) and Foster et al. (2010) reject the supposition that the preservation of nature can go hand in hand with the unlimited accumulation of capital, the ‘sustained economic growth’ (UNCED, 2012, p. 9) that is at the heart of contemporary commitment to ‘sustainable development’ and the development of a ‘green’ capitalist economy. Foster and his colleagues maintain that such approaches present a distorted account, advocating economic growth, but seeing wealth entirely in terms of value generated through exchange. As Foster and Clark (2009) and Foster et al. (2010) point out, new ‘green’ fixes must create new profit opportunities in order to work. The main aim of market-based approaches to climate change is to ‘internalize’ more and more climate change costs, in an attempt to ‘get prices right’. But, because scarcity increases exchange value on the market, the destruction of the environment and the commodification of new natural ‘goods’ (like carbon sinks) will inevitably increase profit opportunities for some at the expense of others. Foster and his colleagues argue that such attempted fixes always entail negative environmental ‘externalities’: unintended problems and spillover effects caused by the economic activity they allow or promote (Foster, 2012). While proponents of ‘sustainable development’ and ‘green economy’ approaches maintain that profit-making itself should not be seen as a problem, the argument put forward by Foster and his colleagues is that this profit making is always dependent on externalizing costs and ‘dumping’ these onto nature and weaker members of society, as Gilbertson’s (2009) example of a CDM biomass power generation project in Thailand, briefly discussed above, illustrates. While ecological crises may precipitate hardship and suffering for some populations, they will afford opportunities for profit-making for those with the strategic resources and foresight to turn moments of crisis to their own advantage. In summary, the metabolic rift approach enables us to see the fundamental conflicts between capitalism and environment sustainability. As Magdoff and Foster (2010) outline, capitalism is a system that must continually expand, in constant search for new sources of raw materials, cheaper labor, and new markets. But a system, they argue (ibid.), that, by its very nature, must grow and expand will eventually come up against the reality of finite natural resources. Inevitably, this expansionist strategy results in winners and losers, with clear implications for global social and environmental justice.(9-10)

#### Collapse of consumer lifestyle inevitable due to environmental constraints — it’s better to have a managed transition away from capitalism.

Hickel 15 — (Jason, PhD Prof Anthropology @LSE https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2015/sep/23/developing-poor-countries-de-develop-rich-countries-sdgs, 9-23)

This week, heads of state are gathering in New York to sign the UN’s new sustainable development goals (SDGs). The main objective is to eradicate poverty by 2030. Beyoncé, One Direction and Malala are on board. It’s set to be a monumental international celebration. Given all the fanfare, one might think the SDGs are about to offer a fresh plan for how to save the world, but beneath all the hype, it’s business as usual. The main strategy for eradicating poverty is the same: growth. Growth has been the main object of development for the past 70 years, despite the fact that it’s not working. Since 1980, the global economy has grown by 380%, but the number of people living in poverty on less than $5 (£3.20) a day has increased by more than 1.1 billion. That’s 17 times the population of Britain. So much for the trickle-down effect. Orthodox economists insist that all we need is yet more growth. More progressive types tell us that we need to shift some of the yields of growth from the richer segments of the population to the poorer ones, evening things out a bit. Neither approach is adequate. Why? Because even at current levels of average global consumption, we’re overshooting our planet’s bio-capacity by more than 50% each year. In other words, growth isn’t an option any more – we’ve already grown too much. Scientists are now telling us that we’re blowing past planetary boundaries at breakneck speed. And the hard truth is that this global crisis is due almost entirely to overconsumption in rich countries. Right now, our planet only has enough resources for each of us to consume 1.8 “global hectares” annually – a standardised unit that measures resource use and waste. This figure is roughly what the average person in Ghana or Guatemala consumes. By contrast, people in the US and Canada consume about 8 hectares per person, while Europeans consume 4.7 hectares – many times their fair share. What does this mean for our theory of development? Economist Peter Edward argues that instead of pushing poorer countries to “catch up” with rich ones, we should be thinking of ways to get rich countries to “catch down” to more appropriate levels of development. We should look at societies where people live long and happy lives at relatively low levels of income and consumption not as basket cases that need to be developed towards western models, but as exemplars of efficient living. How much do we really need to live long and happy lives? In the US, life expectancy is 79 years and GDP per capita is $53,000. But many countries have achieved similar life expectancy with a mere fraction of this income. Cuba has a comparable life expectancy to the US and one of the highest literacy rates in the world with GDP per capita of only $6,000 and consumption of only 1.9 hectares – right at the threshold of ecological sustainability. Similar claims can be made of Peru, Ecuador, Honduras, Nicaragua and Tunisia. Yes, some of the excess income and consumption we see in the rich world yields improvements in quality of life that are not captured by life expectancy, or even literacy rates. But even if we look at measures of overall happiness and wellbeing in addition to life expectancy, a number of low- and middle-income countries rank highly. Costa Rica manages to sustain one of the highest happiness indicators and life expectancies in the world with a per capita income one-fourth that of the US. In light of this, perhaps we should regard such countries not as underdeveloped, but rather as appropriately developed. And maybe we need to start calling on rich countries to justify their excesses. The idea of “de-developing” rich countries might prove to be a strong rallying cry in the global south, but it will be tricky to sell to westerners. Tricky, but not impossible. According to recent consumer research, 70% of people in middle- and high-income countries believe overconsumption is putting our planet and society at risk. A similar majority also believe we should strive to buy and own less, and that doing so would not compromise our happiness. People sense there is something wrong with the dominant model of economic progress and they are hungry for an alternative narrative. The problem is that the pundits promoting this kind of transition are using the wrong language. They use terms such as de-growth, zero growth or – worst of all – de-development, which are technically accurate but off-putting for anyone who’s not already on board. Such terms are repulsive because they run against the deepest frames we use to think about human progress, and, indeed, the purpose of life itself. It’s like asking people to stop moving positively thorough life, to stop learning, improving, growing. Negative formulations won’t get us anywhere. The idea of “steady-state” economics is a step in the right direction and is growing in popularity, but it still doesn’t get the framing right. We need to reorient ourselves toward a positive future, a truer form of progress. One that is geared toward quality instead of quantity. One that is more sophisticated than just accumulating ever increasing amounts of stuff, which doesn’t make anyone happier anyway. What is certain is that GDP as a measure is not going to get us there and we need to get rid of it. Perhaps we might take a cue from Latin Americans, who are organising alternative visions around the indigenous concept of buen vivir, or good living. The west has its own tradition of reflection on the good life and it’s time we revive it. Robert and Edward Skidelsky take us down this road in his book How Much is Enough? where they lay out the possibility of interventions such as banning advertising, a shorter working week and a basic income, all of which would improve our lives while reducing consumption. Either we slow down voluntarily or climate change will do it for us. We can’t go on ignoring the laws of nature. But rethinking our theory of progress is not only an ecological imperative, it is also a development one. If we do not act soon, all our hard-won gains against poverty will evaporate, as food systems collapse and mass famine re-emerges to an extent not seen since the 19th century. This is not about giving anything up. And it’s certainly not about living a life of voluntary misery or imposing harsh limits on human potential. On the contrary, it’s about reaching a higher level of understanding and consciousness about what we’re doing here and why.

### They Say: “Cap is Sustainable”

#### Structural factors mean the next recession will devastate capitalism — oil, overproduction, inflation.

Di Muzio 18 — Tim, PhD, IR/IPE @Wollongong, January 17th, https://urpe.wordpress.com/2018/01/17/are-we-heading-for-another-economic-crash/

The short answer is yes. However, the big question has to do with timing and how the crash will be experienced and by whom. Typically, an economic crash means that the value of owned income-generating assets like stocks (shares in companies) are radically devalued. For instance, at the height of the Global Financial Crisis, the market capitalization of all listed firms stood just above US$60 trillion and within a few months that was cut roughly in half. The crisis was of course related to the housing market in the United States as everyone knows, but it was far broader in its reach since it led investors to suspect that the banks would freeze credit in a time of record high oil prices. And in a capitalist economy, where the money supply increases by the extension of credit/debt to businesses and individuals, lack of faith in the expansion of credit is a real killer of expected future earnings. There will likely be another stock market devaluation in the future caused by a fear of lesser future expected earnings, but the upcoming crisis that will shake capitalism to its core relates to three factors. First, we have about 50 years of oil left at current production rates according to BP. So we can expect oil prices to eventually go through the roof, and since oil goes into everything from computers to gasoline, we can expect an unprecedented inflation. Second, capitalism is a cost-plus accounting system (as long noticed by C.H. Douglas) which means there is never enough purchasing power in the economy for the outstanding prices of goods and services — hence the need for credit. This gap is structural and mathematical and cannot be overcome internally. Third, in an uncertain inflationary environment, the extension of credit (new money) will be frozen or come at ever increasing interest rates, only serving to exacerbate inflation. Predictions are notoriously wrong but I care less about the exact timing of the next crisis and choose to focus on the three factors that will lead to the clusterfuck ahead: the price of oil, the nature of capitalist accounting, and the way in which new money is produced.

#### Crash coming now — secular stagnation, debt, legitimacy.

Chen 18 — (Ying, PhD, Economics@NewSchool, January 17th, https://urpe.wordpress.com/2018/01/17/are-we-heading-for-another-economic-crash/)

Actually, we have hardly walked out of the last recession completely yet. In Europe, growth since last year was only experienced by the strongest economies such as Germany and the Netherlands. People in hard-hit countries such as Greece and Italy are still suffering from unemployment and austerity measures in the aftermath of the last crisis. In the USA, where the financial crisis started, the labour force participation rate remains 4 percentage points below the pre-crisis level. This suggests a dismal picture of more working-age people who either cannot find jobs or are discouraged from looking for jobs. On the other hand, China, the country whose growth accounts for more than 30% of global economic growth, is now experiencing a declining profit rate and soaring debt-GDP ratio. The former could lead to slow investment and economic crisis while the latter could lead to a financial crisis. Either way, China’s crisis will have tremendous world economy implications given its almost 20% share of world GDP. The recovery has not only been uneven but is also hardly sustainable if private investment remains so sluggish. This is what economists have been worried about: that despite some temporary stimulus-driven recovery, the advanced capitalist countries are indeed entering secular stagnation. When growth stagnates, the growing population and productivity, if any, will not be absorbed into the economy, resulting in unemployment and aggravating inequality. Capitalism was more progressive than feudalism because capitalists invest out of capital which leads to economic growth. It will lose its legitimacy as a system if investment stops. And to make it worse, central bankers are expressing concerns that monetary policy would be of very limited effectiveness and fiscal policy of little political feasibility for the next economic downturn. The next round of economic crisis in capitalist countries will breed a much more severe political crisis.

#### Crash coming soon — debt.

Streeck 18 — (Wolfgang, Ph.D., emeritus director of the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies in Cologne, JHanuary 17th, https://urpe.wordpress.com/2018/01/17/are-we-heading-for-another-economic-crash/)

I’m not a prophet. But there is no capitalism without the occasional crash, so if you will we are always heading for one. Inflation in the 1970s was ended by a return to “sound money” in 1980, which begot deindustrialization and high unemployment, which together with tax cuts for the rich begot high public debt. When public debt became too high, fiscal consolidation in the 1990s had to be compensated, for macro-economic as well as political reasons, by capital market deregulation and private household debt, which begot the crash of 2008. Now, almost a decade later, public debt is higher than ever, so is private debt; the global money volume has been steadily increasing for decades now; and the central banks are producing money as though there was no tomorrow, by buying up all sorts of debt with cash made ‘out of thin air’, which is called Quantitative Easing. While everybody knows that this cannot go on forever, nobody knows how to end it — same with public and private debt, same with the money supply. Something is going to happen, presumably soon, and it is not going to be pleasant.

#### Finance capital is unsustainable and will collapse soon — worse than 2008.

Durand 18 — (Cedric, Ph.D. Economics@Paris, January 17th, https://urpe.wordpress.com/2018/01/17/are-we-heading-for-another-economic-crash/)

The illusion that financial assets can create value “as it is the property of pear-trees to bear pears” is nowadays much more vivid than in Marx’s times. This fetishisation of finance and its empowerment are the reasons why, after 2008, the main avenue to roll back the danger of a debt-deflation spiral was a huge monetary stimulus. As acknowledged by Claudio Borio, a prominent figure at the Bank of International Settlement, rich economies became addicted to low interest rates and central bankers have dramatically increased the dose in the past few years with near zero or even below zero key interest rates and assets purchase programs. The outcome of this sequence is an outrageously unsustainable dynamic: on the one hand, financial fragility is on the rise again, in particular with excessive corporate debt in the US, persistent bank fragility in Europe, and overvalued stock markets. In the real economy, this monetary stimulus has not delivered much: growth rates are anaemic, underemployment endemic, productivity sluggish and investment hardly sufficient to prevent a productive involution throughout the developed world. It seems, then, that there is no recovery but only a renewed financial assertiveness backed by highly biased policies. The elementary forms of finance capital — stock-market capitalization, credit to the private non-financial sector, and public debt — now represent more than 350% of GDP on average in the major high-income countries compared to 150% in the early eighties, and 330% before the crisis. In order to be sustained, the value of these financial claims require that the expected financial incomes fall in due time: debt must be honoured, interests paid, dividends disbursed. But how can that be in stagnating economies? The first possibility is just ponziying further: as more debt floods in, everything moves smoothly. But this puts central banks in a deadlock. If they move back to more usual monetary policies, they will trigger a recession and increasing financial distress. The fact that long-term interest rates in the US are still trending downward in spite of recent Federal Reserve rises indicate that markets do not believe in a normalisation of monetary policy. However, if central bankers do not move forward, financial imbalances will continue to build up, favouring misallocation of resources and increasing the amplitude of the next crash. Financial hegemony was able to survive a few additional years in intensive care — but now is the time to say farewell. The next crash won’t be a repetition of 2008: this time the credibility of central banks will be at stake, with the risk of a full blown monetary crisis. In preparation of this predictable unfolding of events, it should already be clear that private finance ought not be saved again, that delirious financial claims of the wealthiest over the work of the rest of us won’t be validated anymore by government intervention. Instead, it’s time to bring to the front of the agenda the socialization of the banks, debt jubilee, universal pension, education and healthcare systems, ecological investment planning and open data. Freeing our societies from the financial time-bond will require a new ability to engineer the future.

#### Capitalist based climate change and resource extraction have doomed the planet.

Klein 15 — social activist known for her political analyses and criticism of corporate globalization, (Naomi, “It is our great collective misfortune that the scientific community made its decisive diagnosis of the climate threat at the precise moment when an elite minority was enjoying more unfettered political, cultural, and intellectual power than at any point since the 1920s”, March 8, 2015, The Guardian http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/mar/08/how-will-everything-change-under-climate-change)

The three policy pillars of this new era are familiar to us all: privatisation of the public sphere, deregulation of the corporate sector, and lower corporate taxation, paid for with cuts to public spending. Much has been written about the real-world costs of these policies – the instability of financial markets, the excesses of the super-rich, and the desperation of the increasingly disposable poor, as well as the failing state of public infrastructure and services. Very little, however, has been written about how market fundamentalism has, from the very first moments, systematically sabotaged our collective response to climate change. The core problem was that the stranglehold that market logic secured over public life in this period made the most direct and obvious climate responses seem politically heretical. How, for instance, could societies invest massively in zero-carbon public services and infrastructure at a time when the public sphere was being systematically dismantled and auctioned off? How could governments heavily regulate, tax, and penalise fossil fuel companies when all such measures were being dismissed as relics of “command and control” communism? And how could the renewable energy sector receive the supports and protections it needed to replace fossil fuels when “protectionism” had been made a dirty word? Even more directly, the policies that so successfully freed multinational corporations from virtually all constraints also contributed significantly to the underlying cause of global warming – rising greenhouse gas emissions. The numbers are striking: In the 1990s, as the market integration project ramped up, global emissions were going up an average of one percent a year; by the 2000s, with “emerging markets” like China now fully integrated into the world economy, emissions growth had sped up disastrously, with the annual rate of increase reaching 3.4% a year for much of the decade. That rapid growth rate continues to this day, interrupted only briefly in 2009 by the world financial crisis. Emissions rebounded with a vengeance in 2010, which saw the largest absolute increase since the Industrial Revolution. With hindsight, it’s hard to see how it could have turned out otherwise. The twin signatures of this era have been the mass export of products across vast distances (relentlessly burning carbon all the way), and the import of a uniquely wasteful model of production, consumption, and agriculture to every corner of the world (also based on the profligate burning of fossil fuels). Put differently, the liberation of world markets, a process powered by the liberation of unprecedented amounts of fossil fuels from the earth, has dramatically sped up the same process that is liberating Arctic ice from existence. As a result, we now find ourselves in a very difficult and slightly ironic position. Because of those decades of hardcore emitting, exactly when we were supposed to be cutting back, the things we must do to avoid catastrophic warming are no longer just in conflict with the particular strain of deregulated capitalism that triumphed in the 1980s. They are now in conflict with the fundamental imperative at the heart of our economic model: grow or die. Once carbon has been emitted into the atmosphere, it sticks around for hundreds of years, some of it even longer, trapping heat. The effects are cumulative, growing more severe with time. And according to emissions specialists like the Tyndall Centre’s Kevin Anderson (as well as others), so much carbon has been allowed to accumulate in the atmosphere over the past two decades that now our only hope of keeping warming below the internationally agreed-upon target of 2C is for wealthy countries to cut their emissions by somewhere in the neighbourhood of eight to 10% a year. The “free” market simply cannot accomplish this task. Indeed, this level of emission reduction has happened only in the context of economic collapse or deep depressions. What those numbers mean is that our economic system and our planetary system are now at war. Or, more accurately, our economy is at war with many forms of life on earth, including human life. What the climate needs to avoid collapse is a contraction in humanity’s use of resources; what our economic model demands to avoid collapse is unfettered expansion. Only one of these sets of rules can be changed, and it’s not the laws of nature. Fortunately, it is eminently possible to transform our economy so that it is less resource-intensive, and to do it in ways that are equitable, with the most vulnerable protected and the most responsible bearing the bulk of the burden. Low-carbon sectors of our economies can be encouraged to expand and create jobs, while high-carbon sectors are encouraged to contract. The problem, however, is that this scale of economic planning and management is entirely outside the boundaries of our reigning ideology. The only kind of contraction our current system can manage is a brutal crash, in which the most vulnerable will suffer most of all. So we are left with a stark choice: allow climate disruption to change everything about our world, or change pretty much everything about our economy to avoid that fate. But we need to be very clear: because of our decades of collective denial, no gradual, incremental options are now available to us. Gentle tweaks to the status quo stopped being a climate option when we supersized the American Dream in the 1990s, and then proceeded to take it global. And it’s no longer just radicals who see the need for radical change. In 2012, 21 past winners of the prestigious Blue Planet Prize – a group that includes James Hansen, former director of Nasa’s Goddard Institute for Space Studies, and Gro Harlem Brundtland, former prime minister of Norway – authored a landmark report. It stated that, “in the face of an absolutely unprecedented emergency, society has no choice but to take dramatic action to avert a collapse of civilization. Either we will change our ways and build an entirely new kind of global society, or they will be changed for us.” That’s tough for a lot of people in important positions to accept, since it challenges something that might be even more powerful than capitalism, and that is the fetish of centrism – of reasonableness, seriousness, splitting the difference, and generally not getting overly excited about anything. This is the habit of thought that truly rules our era, far more among the liberals who concern themselves with matters of climate policy than among conservatives, many of whom simply deny the existence of the crisis. Climate change presents a profound challenge to this cautious centrism because half measures won’t cut it: “all of the above energy” program, as US president Barack Obama describes his approach, has about as much chance of success as an all-of-the-above diet, and the firm deadlines imposed by science require that we get very worked up indeed. The challenge, then, is not simply that we need to spend a lot of money and change a lot of policies; it’s that we need to think differently, radically differently, for those changes to be remotely possible. A worldview will need to rise to the fore that sees nature, other nations, and our own neighbours not as adversaries, but rather as partners in a grand project of mutual reinvention. That’s a big ask. But it gets bigger. Because of our endless procrastination, we also have to pull off this massive transformation without delay. The International Energy Agency (IEA) warns that if we do not get our emissions under control by a rather terrifying 2017, our fossil fuel economy will “lock-in” extremely dangerous warming. “The energy-related infrastructure then in place will generate all the CO2 emissions allowed” in our carbon budget for limiting warming to 2C – “leaving no room for additional power plants, factories and other infrastructure unless they are zero-carbon, which would be extremely costly”. This assumes, probably accurately, that governments would be unwilling to force the closure of still profitable power plants and factories. As Fatih Birol, the IEA’s chief economist, bluntly put it: “The door to reach two degrees is about to close. In 2017 it will be closed forever.” In short, we have reached what some activists have started calling “Decade Zero” of the climate crisis: we either change now or we lose our chance. All this means that the usual free market assurances – A techno-fix is around the corner! Dirty development is just a phase on the way to a clean environment, look at 19th-century London! – simply don’t add up. We don’t have a century to spare for China and India to move past their Dickensian phases. Because of our lost decades, it is time to turn this around now. Is it possible? Absolutely. Is it possible without challenging the fundamental logic of deregulated capitalism? Not a chance. I was struck recently by a mea culpa of sorts, written by Gary Stix, a senior editor of Scientific American. Back in 2006, he edited a special issue on responses to climate change and, like most such efforts, the articles were narrowly focused on showcasing exciting low-carbon technologies. But in 2012 Stix wrote that he had overlooked a much larger and more important part of the story – the need to create the social and political context in which these technological shifts stand a chance of displacing the all too profitable status quo. “If we are ever to cope with climate change in any fundamental way, radical solutions on the social side are where we must focus, though. The relative efficiency of the next generation of solar cells is trivial by comparison.” In other words, our problem has a lot less to do with the mechanics of solar power than the politics of human power – specifically whether there can be a shift in who wields it, a shift away from corporations and toward communities, which in turn depends on whether or not the great many people who are getting a rotten deal under our current system can build a determined and diverse enough social force to change the balance of power. Such a shift would require rethinking the very nature of humanity’s power – our right to extract ever more without facing consequences, our capacity to bend complex natural systems to our will. This is a shift that challenges not only capitalism, but also the building blocks of materialism that preceded modern capitalism, a mentality some call “extractivism”. Because, underneath all of this is the real truth we have been avoiding: climate change isn’t an “issue” to add to the list of things to worry about, next to healthcare and taxes. It is a civilisational wake-up call. A powerful message – spoken in the language of fires, floods, droughts, and extinctions – telling us that we need an entirely new economic model and a new way of sharing this planet. Telling us that we need to evolve. Some say there is no time for this transformation; the crisis is too pressing and the clock is ticking. I agree that it would be reckless to claim that the only solution to this crisis is to revolutionise our economy and revamp our worldview from the bottom up – and anything short of that is not worth doing. There are all kinds of measures that would lower emissions substantively that could and should be done right now. But we aren’t taking those measures, are we? The reason is that by failing to fight these big battles that stand to shift our ideological direction and change the balance of who holds power in our societies, a context has been slowly created in which any muscular response to climate change seems politically impossible, especially during times of economic crisis. On the other hand, if we can shift the cultural context even a little, then there will be some breathing room for those sensible reformist policies that will at least get the atmospheric carbon numbers moving in the right direction. And winning is contagious so, who knows? For a quarter of a century, we have tried the approach of polite incremental change, attempting to bend the physical needs of the planet to our economic model’s need for constant growth and new profit-making opportunities. The results have been disastrous, leaving us all in a great deal more danger than when the experiment began. Looking for a Moose is one of my two-year-old son’s favourite books. It’s about a bunch of kids that really, really, really want to see a moose. They search high and low – through a forest, a swamp, in brambly bushes and up a mountain, for “a long legged, bulgy nosed, branchy antlered moose”. The joke is that there are moose hiding on each page. In the end, the animals all come out of hiding and the ecstatic kids proclaim: “We’ve never ever seen so many moose!” On about the 75th reading, it suddenly hit me: he might never see a moose. I tried to hold it together. I went back to my computer and began to write about my time in northern Alberta, tar sands country, where members of the Beaver Lake Cree Nation told me about how the moose had changed – one woman described killing a moose on a hunting trip only to find that the flesh had already turned green. I heard a lot about strange tumors too, which locals assumed had to do with the animals drinking water contaminated by tar sands toxins. But mostly I heard about how the moose were simply gone. And not just in Alberta. “Rapid Climate Changes Turn North Woods into Moose Graveyard,” reads a May 2012 headline in Scientific American. A year and a half later, The New York Times was reporting that one of Minnesota’s two moose populations had declined from four thousand in the 1990s to just one hundred today. Will he ever see a moose? Then, the other day, I was slain by a miniature board book called Snuggle Wuggle. It involves different animals cuddling, with each posture given a ridiculously silly name: “How does a bat hug?” it asks. “Topsy turvy, topsy turvy.” For some reason my son reliably cracks up at this page. I explain that it means upside down, because that’s the way bats sleep. But all I could think about was the report of some 100,000 dead and dying bats raining down from the sky in the midst of record-breaking heat across part of Queensland, Australia. Whole colonies devastated. Will he ever see a bat? When fear like that used to creep through my armour of climate change denial, I would do my utmost to stuff it away, change the channel, click past it. Now I try to feel it. It seems to me that I owe it to my son, just as we all owe it to ourselves and one another. But what should we do with this fear that comes from living on a planet that is dying, made less alive every day? First, accept that it won’t go away. That it is a fully rational response to the unbearable reality that we are living in a dying world, a world that a great many of us are helping to kill, by doing things like making tea and driving to the grocery store and yes, okay, having kids. Next, use it. Fear is a survival response. Fear makes us run, it makes us leap, it can make us act superhuman. But we need somewhere to run to. Without that, the fear is only paralysing. So the real trick, the only hope, really, is to allow the terror of an unlivable future to be balanced and soothed by the prospect of building something much better than many of us have previously dared hope. Yes, there will be things we will lose, luxuries some of us will have to give up, whole industries that will disappear. Climate change is already here, and increasingly brutal disasters are headed our way no matter what we do. But it’s not too late to avert the worst, and there is still time to change ourselves so that we are far less brutal to one another when those disasters strike. And that, it seems to me, is worth a great deal. Because the thing about a crisis this big, this all-encompassing, is that it changes everything. It changes what we can do, what we can hope for, what we can demand from ourselves and our leaders. It means there is a whole lot of stuff that we have been told is inevitable that simply cannot stand. And it means that a whole lot of stuff we have been told is impossible has to start happening right away.

### They Say: “Adaptation/Self-Correcting”

#### Even if neoliberalism could fix global inequality it would require destroying the planet — alternative systems are essential.

Maslin 14 — (Mark, Prof. at University College London, December 26th, http://geographical.co.uk/opinion/item/490-neoliberal-nightmare)

I was recently asked by an incredulous colleague why I was working in a Geography department. I answered that geography was the study of ‘the who, the where, and the how, of the past, present and future’ I followed this up suggesting our subject has a profound role to play in both understanding and solving the great challenges of the 21st century. Of which I would suggest global inequality, global poverty, global security, environmental degradation and climate change are the most pressing. I hope this gave them a new appreciation of geography because in my opinion, by combining natural and social sciences, geographers are building a body of work that suggests the rules governing our society are not fit for purpose and new governance systems are required to deal with these immense challenges. Let us investigate the state of our planet, starting with human health. Every year, seven million children die due to preventable disease and starvation. 700 million people go to bed every night feeling hungry and one billion people still do not have access to clean, safe drinking water. This is despite the fact that we have enough food and water for all seven billion people, but our political-economic system means that many people simply cannot afford them. If we look at the Earth’s major biogeochemical cycles, all have been profoundly altered by humanity. For example, the invention of the Haber-Bosch process allowing the conversion of atmospheric nitrogen to ammonia for use as fertiliser has altered the global nitrogen cycle so radically that the nearest suggested geological comparison was ~2.5 billion years ago. Human actions have increased atmospheric CO2 by 40 per cent to a level not seen for at least 800,000 years, and may have even delayed the next ice age. This has increased the acidity of the ocean faster than anytime in the last 50 million years. Human action also impacts on non-human life. Global productivity appears relatively constant; however, the appropriation of a third of it for human use reduces that availability for millions of other species. Land use conversion for food, fuel, fibre and fodder, combined with targeted hunting and harvesting, has resulted in species extinctions 100 to 1,000 times higher than background rates, and likely constitutes the beginning of the sixth mass extinction in Earth’s history. We have also moved crops and domesticated animals and pathogens around the world, leading to a unique global homogenisation of Earth’s biota. Considering the huge influence humanity is having on the planet, it would be reasonable to assume that there should be some attempt to manage and distribute fairly the Earth’s resources. However this contradicts the dominant geopolitical and economic philosophy of the West, namely neoliberalism. Neoliberalism encapsulates a set of beliefs which include: the need for markets to be free, State intervention being as small as possible, strong private property rights, low taxation, and individualism. Underlying neoliberalism is the seductive view that it provides market-based solutions to all our ills, and enables everyone to become more wealthy. This trickle down effect has been the central mantra of neoliberals for the last 35 years. Currently there are 3.5 billion people who live on less than $3.25 per day. In fact, according to Oxfam, the 85 richest people in the world currently own the same wealth as the 3.5 billion poorest people. If we want to eradicate extreme poverty and bring the very poorest people in the world up to $1.25 per day, at current rates of trickle down it would require global GDP to increase by 15 times, taking over 100 years. Under the current economic system, this would require a huge increase in consumption levels. So the neoliberal nightmare is that to lift people out of poverty, we need to make and consume more stuff. This all requires cheap energy, which will mainly come from fossil fuels, which accelerates climate change driving deforestation and environmental degradation, making those poorest of people more vulnerable. So the geographic understanding of the world’s current and future social and environmental challenges suggests the very economic theories that have dominated global economics for the last 35 years are not fit for purpose. What is required is proactive and aggressive redistribution of wealth, both within and between countries. This could be via provisioning of free essential services, such as access to clean water, health care and education. Progressive taxation is essential to rebalance inequalities and this in turn reduces costs, as it has been shown that small social divisions within a country lower the health care costs and raise longevity. Outdated institutions, such as the World Trade Organisation, need to be dismantled and governance structures fit for the 21st century created to accelerate sustainable development. This is where ‘geography’ can make a difference by envisioning new political systems of governance, enabling collective action and with more equal distribution of wealth, resources and opportunities.

#### Capitalism has already reached the limit of its adaptive capacity.

Blyth 16 — (Mark, Prof IPE @ Brown, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/review-essay/2016-06-13/capitalism-crisis?cid=nlc-fatoday-20160628&sp\_mid=51711253&sp\_rid=c2NvdHR5cDQzMUBnbWFpbC5jb20S1&spMailingID=51711253&spUserID=MTg3NTEzOTE5Njk2S0&spJobID=944053781&spReportId=OTQ0MDUzNzgxS0, July/August)

For the British journalist Paul Mason, that question is closed: capitalism’s current condition is terminal. In Postcapitalism, Mason writes that capitalism is “a complex, adaptive system which has reached the limits of its capacity to adapt.” The roots of capitalism’s demise, Mason argues, lie in the 1980s (also when Kocka saw problems arise), when capi­talism was taken over by neoliberalism: an ideology and a set of policies that recognize no limits to the commodification of the world. Unfortunately for capi­talism, “neoliberalism is broken.” To explain why, Mason turns to the work of Nikolai Kondratieff, a brilliant Soviet economist whom Stalin had murdered in 1938. According to Kondratieff, capitalism goes up and down in 50-year cycles. At the bottom of a cycle, old technologies and business models cease to function. In response, entrepreneurs, both public and private, roll out new technologies to open up untapped markets, and an upswing begins. This leads to a loosening of credit, which accelerates the upswing. These cycles bring to mind the concept of “creative destruction” popularized in the 1940s by the economist Joseph Schumpeter. But Mason downplays the importance of the entrepreneur, whom Schumpeter cast in a central role, and focuses instead on the effect of class-based politics on productivity. Mason’s first cycle runs from 1790 to 1848. The upswing began when British entrepreneurs first harnessed steam power to run their factories, and it ended with the depression of the 1820s. The subse­quent downswing produced the revolutions of 1848, when the emergent bourgeois classes of Europe burst onto the historical stage. Mason’s second cycle runs from 1848 to the mid-1890s. The spread of railways, the telegraph, and shipping drove growth until the depression of the 1870s. In the decades that followed, strong labor movements gained momen­tum all over the world, and capital, in response, became more concentrated. Electricity and mass production then powered a third upswing that crashed in the Great Depression and the massive capital destruction of World War II. After the war, a fourth cycle began with innovations in electronics and synthetics, improvements in the organization of production, and labor’s relative victory over capital in the institutions of the welfare state. That cycle’s upswing peaked in the mid-1970s, but this time, there was no major depression. The fourth cycle stalled. THE END OF CAPITALISM Mason’s argument about why a major depression has not arrived during the past 40 years, the Great Recession notwithstanding, is partly conventional and partly surprising. The conventional explanation has four components. First, after U.S. President Richard Nixon took the dollar off the gold standard in 1971, the United States moved to a paper standard, which eliminated the constraints on deficit financing that the gold standard entailed. Second, the financialization of the developed economies masked the reality of stagnant incomes by substituting credit for wage increases. Third, the emergence of global imbalances in finance and trade allowed the United States to keep consuming as Asian countries stepped in as producers. Finally, advances in infor­mation technology empowered capital and weakened labor, and helped spread neoliberal practices across the globe. That is a fairly familiar analysis. The unconventional part of Mason’s answer harks back to Marx and Kalecki and stresses how neoliberalism managed to prevent profits from falling more effectively than any previous economic system. Mason borrows from Marx and Kalecki the idea that average profits in any market will fall due to both compe­tition and the flood of capital into a new market, which reduce returns on investment. As a result, capitalists will always try to replace human labor with machines to protect their share of profits. During a downswing, as profits shrink, capitalists will do everything they can to boost their share of profits at the expense of labor: they will force employees to work intensively and will accelerate their attempts to replace workers with machines. In the past, such attempts to restore profits simply by crushing labor failed. In each of the first three waves, one way or another, workers managed to resist. The best examples of such resistance were the postwar constraints on capitalism: strong unions, rigorous regulations, and generous welfare systems. When workers defy capitalists’ attempts to squeeze profits from them by building such institutions, firms have to adapt. Rather than fight labor over the fixed distribution of income, they are forced to invest in improving workers’ produc­tivity, to the benefit of both parties: this was the post–World War II growth story. But under neoliberalism, capitalists have managed to squeeze labor in an entirely new way. Globalization oblit­erated the power of workers to resist, because if they did, capital—and jobs—could easily flow elsewhere. This explains why the number of labor strikes has declined so steeply all over the world. As Mason writes, “The fourth long cycle was prolonged, distorted and ultimately broken by factors that have not occurred before in the history of capitalism: the defeat . . . of organized labour, the rise of information technology and the discovery that once an unchal­lenged superpower exists, it can create money out of nothing for a long time.” Still, Mason believes that these factors have only delayed capitalism’s inevitable collapse. Where Marx thought that organized labor would rise up and overthrow the system, Mason bets that information technology will destroy it from within. Digital goods, such as music files and software, create a real problem for markets: they destroy the role of price in balancing supply and demand. People can copy digital goods freely forever: they have zero marginal cost and are nonrival in consumption. When one person downloads a music file or a piece of code from the Internet, for example, she makes it no harder for anyone else to do the same. So the only way that firms can maintain their profits is by enforcing monopoly property rights: consider Apple and Samsung suing each other for the right to profit from patents or the need for major pharmaceutical companies to keep drugs prohibitively expensive.

### Link — Economy/Growth

#### Fixation on economic growth relies on sacrificial logic of human capital — it’s not sustainable.

Brown 16 — (Wendy, PoliSci@Cal, PhD, Sacrificial Citizenship: Neoliberalism, Human Capital, and Austerity Politics, *Constellations*, 23:1, March 2016, p. 3-14)

In short, at the same time that links between the state, finance, and corporate capital are intensified, concerted action by workers, consumers, and citizens is all but eliminated in fact, in political discourse, and in the elite and popular political imagination. And when consumer, worker, and citizen organizations are defanged by the law, these forms of identity and the antagonism they represent soon dissolve, generating that “transformation of the soul” Margaret Thatcher identified as fundamental to the success of the neoliberal project. These kinds of legal decisions combined with the neutralizing strategies of governance aim at this effect, replacing such identities with that of human capital. Conversion of the worker, the consumer, the activist citizen — all entities capable of linking together into a social force — into isolated bits of self-investing human capital both makes them more governable and integrates them into a project: economic growth, to which they may potentially be sacrificed. The conversion breaks down barriers to this governance and integration; it also abets both. To grasp how and why this occurs, however, we must return to the general problematic of neoliberal governance formations and consider in particular two of its component parts, devolution and responsibilization. Devolution, Responsibilization and Shared Sacrifice Neoliberalism's economization of the political, its jettisoning of the very idea of the social, and its displacement of politics by governance diminishes all significant venues for active citizenship. One can see these three forces combined in the metrics by which the costs of higher education are now appraised — on the one hand, in terms of the investment by consumers in their own economic future, on the other hand in terms of the investment by the state in its economic future. These metrics occlude the historical concern of higher education with developing or renewing citizens, knowledge, civilization, culture, or the public's capacity to govern itself. Another example of compressing democratic citizenship and democratic justice into economic purposes can be seen in President Obama's 2013 “State of the Union” address, delivered shortly after his re-election. In a speech soaring with calls for social justice and ecological renewal, each item in what many pundits saw as a revived progressive agenda was expressly legitimated by its contribution to economic growth. Thus, while Obama argued on behalf of Medicare, tax reform, immigration reform, an end to Washington bickering and brinksmanship, raising the minimum wage, fighting sex discrimination and domestic violence, and increased government investment in science and technology research, clean energy, home ownership, education, each cause was framed in terms of its contribution to economic growth or American competitiveness. “A growing economy that creates good, middle-class jobs — that must be the North Star that guides our efforts,” Obama declared.23 “Every day,” he intoned midway through the speech, “we must ask ourselves three questions as a nation.” And what were these questions whose answers would constitute supervenient guides to law and policy formation, and to collective and individual conduct in the world's oldest democracy and most dominant nation? How do we attract more jobs to our shores? How do we equip our people with the skills needed to do those jobs? And how do we make sure that hard work leads to a decent living?24 Success in these three areas, Obama promised, would in turn yield the ultimate goal of the nation and the government stewarding it: broad-based growth for the economy as a whole. This framing weighs all policy issues, including justice and planetary survival, according to their GDP-generating capacities. Indeed, if one item on Obama's progressive agenda turns out to deter (or even fail to stimulate) growth, it would apparently have to get scratched from the program. This framing also reduces citizenship to participation in national growth and thus to political passivity, continuous with (if more subtle than) G.W. Bush's infamous encomium to “shop, fly, and spend” as consummate acts of patriotism in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. From a governance perspective, where what is prized is teamwork in achieving the goal of growth rather than contestation and deliberation about norms, there is no place for agitated or agonistic citizenship. Nor is there a place for citizen expression bound to interest groups and ad hoc mobilizations, both of which are treated as failures of buy-in or consensus-building. However, while neoliberal political rationality administered through governance eliminates the last classical republican traces of citizenship formulated as public engagement, it retains even as it transforms the idea of citizen sacrifice. If citizen virtue is reworked as responsibilized entrepreneurialism, it is also reworked as the “shared sacrifice” potentially required for a healthy or troubled but above all a flexible economy. Such sacrifice may range from suffering the direct effects of job outsourcing, furloughs or pay and benefits cuts, to suffering the indirect effects of stagflation, credit crunches, liquidity or currency crises. It may be shared widely as the curtailed state investment in education; it may be suffered individually as a “last-hired, first-fired” phenomenon; or, as is most often the case, it may be suffered disproportionately by a weak group or class, as is the case with furloughs or reduced government services. Whatever the case, active citizenship is slimmed to tending oneself as responsibilized human capital, while sacrificial citizenship expands to include anything related to the health of a firm or nation, or again, the health of the nation as firm. This slimming and expansion are facilitated through the neoliberal supplanting of democratic political values and discourse with governance, that consensus model of order that integrates all into a supervenient project. Recall that governance replaces law with guidelines related to project goals, conflicting class positions with “stakeholders,” class consciousness with team consciousness, and political or normative challenges with a focus on the technical and the practical. It is through such replacements and the reduction of national political purpose to economic survival and growth that, for example, tax-paying workers become an acceptable revenue source for the bailouts of investment banks managed by billionaires. This is also what legitimates slashing public employee salaries and pensions or hiking student tuition in response to finance capital meltdowns, state fiscal crises, and regressive tax policy. In short, neoliberal governance converts the classically modern image of the nation comprising diverse concerns, issues, interests, and points of power to the nation on the model of Walmart where managers are “team leaders,” workers are “junior associates,” and consumers are “guests” — each is integrated into the smooth functioning of the whole and bound to the single end of economic prosperity defined in terms of investment climate and growth.

### Link — Competitiveness

#### Global “war for talent” discourse corrupts migration policy and causes structural violence.

Brown and Tannock 9 — Phillip Brown, Prof of Social Sciences @ Univ of Cardiff, AND Stuart Tannock, Interdisciplinary PhD in social sciences and humanities from Stanford, Researcher @ Univ. of Cardiff, Education, Meritocracy and the Global War for Talent, Journal of Education Policy Vol. 24, No. 4, July 2009

The **dominant discourse of the knowledge economy** attaches increasing importance to a global competition for talent (Reich 1991). Indeed, corporate and national **policy debates** are being **framed around the view** that intense economic competition has sparked a ‘war for talent’, accelerating the **evolutionary path** towards meritocratic societies, as companies and governments seek to exploit the talents of the ‘brightest’ and the ‘best’ regardless of nationality, gender, ethnicity or social background. This article outlines the rhetoric of the global ‘war for talent’ popularised by consultancy companies including McKinsey (Michaels, Handfield-Jones, and Axelrod 2001). It shows how Western governments share many of the assumptions that underpin the war for talent in shaping policies, especially in respect to higher education and managed **migration**. It then assesses the sociological implications of these ideas for education and social justice. The article also shows why the war for talent entails a neoliberal view of market competition that **encourages rising income inequalities**, and challenges the linear relationship between ‘learning’ and ‘earning’ (human capital). Finally, as companies attempt to create complex global webs of skilled labour (Brown, Lauder, and Ashton 2008), it raises important questions for the study of education policy. What does meritocratic competition mean when extended beyond national boundaries? What implications does the global war for talent have for our understanding of education, economy and social justice? (377-8)

### Link — Hegemony

#### Hegemony justifications for immigration expansion reinforce US imperialism.

Tannock 9 — Stuart Tannock, Interdisciplinary PhD in social sciences and humanities from Stanford, Researcher @ Univ. of Cardiff, White Collar Imperialisms: the H-1B debate in America, Social Semiotics Vol 19 No. 3 2009

The aftermath of the 9/11 World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks saw a precipitous drop in foreign entries to the United States in all visa categories, the H-1B included (Paral and Johnson 2004). Newly-heightened concern with homeland security led to a clampdown on all immigrant and non-immigrant visa programs: barriers to entry for non-citizens were raised, based on political and racial profiling; there was an upsurge in the surveillance, harassment and deportation of non-citizens already in America, especially for those of Arab or Muslim background; and noncitizens were prohibited from working on ‘‘sensitive technology’’ areas in US universities and laboratories (Doumani 2006; Fernandes 2007). Yet the 9/11 attacks had another effect, and that was to push into the open just how pivotal American business, political and academic elites saw the country’s visa programs as being to maintaining and extending US hegemony. At the very moment that the clampdown on non-citizens was proceeding, an alarm was being sounded on the chilling effect this could have on US science, wealth and power. ‘‘The federal government is beginning, however unintentionally, to dismantle an industry that we spent 50 years establishing in the conviction that the presence of international students and scholars serves the national interest,’’ complained Victor Johnson (2003), the Association of International Educators Policy Advisor. Secretaries of State Colin Powell and Condoleeza Rice both emphasized the value to foreign policy interests of educating foreign ruling elites at American universities on F and J visas. ‘‘I can’t tell you how many times I’ve met foreign leaders and heads of state who studied in America,’’ Rice (2006) noted: They’ve gone to community colleges, they’ve gone to small colleges, they’ve gone to land-grant colleges, they’ve gone to research universities. They’ve all had the common experience of . . . studying in America. And the experience then becomes one that binds them to us in a way that can never be broken. (See also Johnson 2003; Ahmad 2004) In testimony to US Congress, President of the National Academy of Engineering William Wulf likewise emphasized the importance to the United States of foreign born scientists, engineers and high-tech workers. ‘‘Throughout the last century,’’ Wulf (2005) testified: our great successes in creating both wealth and military ascendancy have been due in large part to the fact that we welcomed the best scientists and engineers from all over the world. . . We have been skimming the best and brightest minds from across the globe, and prospering because of it. In 2005, the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine’s Committee on Prospering in the Global Economy of the 21st Century released their Rising above the gathering storm report. Fittingly, the Committee was headed by Norman Augustine, former CEO of Lockheed Martin, one of the country’s largest weapons manufacturers for the task of the Committee was as much about seeking to build a ‘‘new American century’’ as any of America’s military wars and occupations overseas. Augustine and his fellow Committee members warned that the United States was facing a perfect storm that threatened to knock the legs out from under US power. One pressing concern was the recruitment of foreign-born skilled workers. At the very moment the increasingly liberalized global economy and labor market that the United States had long been pushing in its own interests was emerging, America risked falling behind, due to the combination of its own repressive visa regime, global fallout from its deeply unpopular wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the rising competition for skilled immigrant students and workers from other nations around the world. Congress, the Committee insisted, needed to act quickly to liberalize its visa program: increase the number of H-1Bs offered each year; provide unlimited H-1Bs to foreign-born graduates from US universities with PhDs in science, technology, engineering, mathematics ‘‘or other fields of national need’’; and create a new, permanent, ‘‘skills-based, preferential immigration option’’ (National Academies 2005, 78). In Congressional testimony in the fall of 2005, Augustine spelled out explicitly what was at stake: Americans, with only 5% of the world’s population but with nearly 30% of the world’s wealth, tend to believe that scientific and technological leadership and the high standard of living it underpins is somehow the natural state of affairs. But such good fortune is not a birthright. If we wish our children and grandchildren to enjoy the standard of living most Americans have come to expect, there is only one answer: We must get out and compete. (Augustine 2005; original emphasis) Current calls for expanding the H-1B visa program, then, when made by business dominated coalitions such as Compete America and others, have come to be linked explicitly with a project of protecting America’s ‘‘supremacy,’’ ‘‘leadership,’’ ‘‘preeminence,’’ or ‘‘edge’’ over other nations (AILA 2007; Compete America 2007; National Academies 2005). This is thanks in part to the increasingly naked language of US imperialism that was unleashed with the attacks of September 11 (Foster 2005). ‘‘Without more access to H-1Bs,’’ the AILA (2007, 51) insists, ‘‘the US stands to lose rapidly not only the competitive edge generations of Americans have worked so hard to achieve, but also its pre-eminence in a variety of scientific and technical fields areas vital to our prosperity and national security.’’ What astonishes about these arguments is their utterly unquestioned assumption, first, that America should have the absolute right and ability ‘‘to hire and retain the world’s best talent’’ (Compete America 2007); and second, as seen in the quotation of President Bush above, that foreigners should be expected to want to help America address its problems and increase its prosperity rather than those of the countries elsewhere around the world where their own communities and families live. Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld is often alleged by anti-war campaigners to have once said: ‘‘it’s not our fault God put America’s oil under other people’s countries’’ (Galloway 2007). It is this kind of logic precisely that generates the endlessly repeated statements that highly-skilled foreign workers should be brought to America’s shores to buttress its position of global hegemony. The rest of the world’s resources exist in order to service American needs and help America help itself. Whether these resources be oil and gas or scientific and engineering talent, the ideology of imperialist self-interest remains essentially unchanged**. (**318-20)

### Alternative — Critical Intellectual

#### Critical academics need non-nationalist starting points for emancipatory projects.

Tannock 7 — Stuart Tannock, Interdisciplinary PhD in social sciences and humanities from Stanford, Researcher @ Univ. of Cardiff , To Keep America number 1: confronting the deep nationalism of US higher education, Globalisation, Societies and Education Vol 5 No 2, July 2007

The starting point for understanding and responding critically to national security retrenchment—and more generally, for understanding the nature and position of the work we do as academics operating out of the American university in a globalised world—needs to be to confront the deep nationalism of US higher education. The question of academic freedom, in and of itself, is a procedural, managerial and organisational matter: important but not foundational. It acquires substance and direction only when issues of **procedure** and due process are combined with discussion of the **basic political and social purpose** and vision of US higher education as a whole—in other words, the question of to whom and to what the American university should be held responsive and **accountable,** or how the American university should best serve the public good. Critical scholars and activists have two options, both of which are essential. They need to embrace the nationalism of the American academy, seeking to redefine and redirect it toward better ends; and they need also to **question and** reject this nationalism altogether. American higher education (its most elite institutions especially) has increasingly become the almost exclusive preserve for the children and interests of the country’s most powerful and wealthy: ‘As wealthy fill top colleges, concerns grow over fairness’; ‘Selective colleges heighten inequality’; ‘Elites still control the universities’; ‘The rich get smarter’. So read the media headlines of our day (Fantasia, 2004; Kirp, 2004; Leonhardt, 2004; Reich, 2000). Sputnik fever and the contemporary project to rebuild the national security university in America are, likewise, driven by some of the wealthiest, most privileged men (and a few women) on the planet. This is the perspective of the Lou Gerstners, Craig Barretts, Norm Augustines and Bill Gates of the world that we are hearing from—the CEOs, not the poor, working or even middle class, the AAU not the AAUP. The language of nationalism, combined with the fact that higher education is legitimised through reference to serving the national good, provides an invaluable tool for taking back both the country and the campus ‘for the people’. Even in the heart of the most powerful country on earth, the discourse of the nation can be **progressive and liberating**. For critical academics, the task is one of explaining how the work they do on campus serves an alternative and preferable vision of the national public good, **national security and national interest—**and indeed, assisting in the countrywide development, articulation and defense of **such an alternative vision in the first place**. But framing work done on the US college campus in terms of its service to the national interest can never be all we do. Though some brave souls and noble spirits in American higher education may perform intellectual gymnasticsto explain how their concern with injustice and inequality around the globe serves the long-term, better interests of the US itself, and how there is actually no real conflict in seeking to pursue such globally-minded work while based in institutions devoted explicitly to serving the US national good, **such arguments are morally undesirable and politically and physically impossible**. How can we claim, as Jonathan Cole (2005, p. 11) does, that ‘as scholars and scientists [in America], we place a premium on openness, rigor, fairness’, that ‘we are part of an international community of scholars and scientists whose ideas transcend international borders’, that ‘we collaborate and exchange ideas with Iraqis, Russians, Iranians, Chinese, and Israelis without considering politics or nationality’ —how can we claim all of these things when we work in institutions that are oriented explicitly to serving the American national good? How can we invite foreign scholars and students into our colleges and universities and demand that the work they do **serve Americans before all others**? How can we go overseas and expect our educators and researchers to be welcomed into other countries and communities when we know we are coming not primarily for their good but, first and foremost, for our own? How can we claim a spirit of internationalism, when our university presidents and national politicians openly seek ‘dominance over the global production of techno-scientific and social-scientific intelligentsias’ (Ahmad, 2004)—as is manifest so clearly in today’s Sputnik fever? It is also impossible. When US politicians and higher education leaders speak out about national security and interest, they define these things **explicitly** and repeatedly **in terms of protecting America’s economic prosperity** and standard of living. The AAU’s 2006 National Defense Education and Innovation Initiative commits American universities to protecting the nation’s ‘thriving middle class and … steadily rising standard of living’. In the Council of Graduate Schools’ 2005 NDEA 21 report, ‘sustained economic growth [and] prosperity’ in the country are to be defended at all costs (p. 4). The National Academies’ 2005 Rising above the gathering storm: energising and employing America for a brighter economic future is concerned ‘to ensure our nation continues to enjoy the jobs, security and high standard of living that this and previous generations worked so hard to create’ (p. 12). But the US standard of living is not sustainable worldwide, and can only come about at the **expense of the environment and the rest of the world’s peoples**. The US is a country with 5% of global population but 30% of global wealth. As Eduardo Galeano (2000) writes in Upside down: Each inhabitant of the North consumes ten times as much energy, nineteen times as much aluminum, fourteen times as much paper, and thirteen times as much iron and steel as someone in the South. … The widespread adoption of such models of consumption faces a small impediment: it would take ten planets the size of this one for poor countries to consume as much as rich ones do. (Galeano, 2000, p. 216, emphasis in original) Academics in the US need to reject the demand that the work they do **pass first and always** through the prism **of American national interest**. But they need to reject this demand not in the name of scholarly autonomy, academic freedom or ivory tower retreat, but on the principle of service—accountability and responsiveness— to a public good defined not **nationally but globally.** Such a claim is difficult to make: higher education continues to be organised and funded primarily at or below the national level. It is also a claim that is difficult to make justly and effectively: we do not have an extensive philosophical tradition or political practice of conceptualising or operationalising the public good beyond the boundaries of the nation. For academics as for others, nationalism has become second nature. If the way is uncertain, though, the target is clear. Presumably, this is precisely the type of work that institutions of higher education should be **capable of rising to the task of tackling**. (265-7)

\*\*\* This is also an answer to the permutation.

### Alternative — Interrogate Competitiveness

#### Their advantage framing is not neutral — “competition” isn't natural or inevitable, it’s contingent. We must interrogate alternative methods that don’t require endorsing rigid nationalism or border crackdowns.

Brown and Tannock 9 — Phillip Brown, Prof of Social Sciences @ Univ of Cardiff, AND Stuart Tannock, Interdisciplinary PhD in social sciences and humanities from Stanford, Researcher @ Univ. of Cardiff, Education, Meritocracy and the Global War for Talent, Journal of Education Policy Vol. 24, No. 4, July 2009

The vision **conjured up by the rhetoric of a global war for talent is of a** cut-throat world where individuals and nations must **endlessly compete** with one another to rise to the top – hardly a welcome proposition for anyone committed to principles of equality, community, social justice and the public good. But equally, a reactive and unreflective defence of past models of education and development, in which concern with meritocratic opportunity extends only to the borders of affluent nations, is not an attractive option either. The discourse of global meritocracy makes clear the social exclusion, injustice and inequality that are the consequences when education policy and practice are shaped by ‘methodological nationalism’ (Tannock 2009a; Wimmer and Schiller 2002). Moving beyond the global war for talent discourse requires us to challenge the neoliberal model of globalisation and development, and question the injustices of nationalism in social, economic and educational policy. But it also requires us to see our way out of the dead-ends in current education theory and ideology by addressing two essential questions: ‘talent for what?’ and ‘education for what?’ Talent for what? The lump of coal fallacy A central paradox of the rising concern over a global war for talent is that ‘talent’ is frequently left vague and undefined. There is no agreed definition of what constitutes talent. Business elites claim that ‘a certain part of talent eludes description: You simply know it when you see it’ (Michaels, Handfield-Jones, and Axelrod 2001, xii). Whatever truth there might be to such a statement, it also gives corporate employers an awful lot of leeway to make self-interested and unfair recruitment and promotion decisions, and provides a dubious basis on which to build a whole raft of sweeping reforms in employment, immigration and education policy (Brown and Hesketh 2004). The type of talent we are talking about in the global war for talent is obviously essential. Whether a country stocks up on free market or socialist economists, talented union busters or union organisers, brilliant corporate lawyers or public interest regulators, and so on, will move the relative fates and fortunes of the country’s citizens and residents in very different directions. In practice, talent, as conceived by political and business elites in the global war for talent, tends to be **narrowly defined** in terms of formal education credentials, market value and business interest. Britain’s Highly Skilled Migrant Programme, for example, defined the highly skilled in terms of their past earnings history (i.e. the more money you make, the more skilled you are assumed to be and the more welcome you are to immigrate to Britain), and included an ‘MBA Provision’ that automatically granted entry to the country to any graduate from a select list of 50 of the world’s top business schools (these programmes were superseded in 2008 by Britain’s new points-based immigration system) (UK Treasury 2004). More than this, stocking up on one kind of talent can lead to the erosion and destruction of other kinds of talent. Many rich nations now face shortages in teaching, health and caring professions, as the most highly educated of their youth flock to higher paid, higher status and more glamorous positions in law, business and finance (Freeman 2005). In the neoliberal era, warns Neuberger (2000), ‘the concept of public service, which in recent history has been a source of pride, has gradually fallen into disrepute. Ambitious young people, leaving schools and universities, no longer see public service as the height of personal achievement’. Even the Governor of the Bank of England, Mervyn King, has been led to speak out against the social and educational distortions caused by sector-based inequalities in material wealth, working conditions and cultural prestige: I do think it is rather unattractive that so many young people, when contemplating careers, look at the compensation packages available in the City [financial sector] and think … it is the only place to work in. It shouldn’t be. It should be one of the places, but not the only one. (quoted in Seager and Wearden 2008) The deteriorating conditions in schools, hospitals and universities that push talented workers out of, and away from, these essential sectors, are often the result of ‘talented’ and ‘successful’ management consultants and financial advisors pushing through privatisation, restructuring, tax-reduction and other cost-cutting and profit-maximising reform packages (e.g. Pollock 2004). Rather than address the consequence of perverse incentives and inequalities such as these, rich nations are recruit**ing skilled immigrants to take on the jobs that the native-born are** turn**ing down** – thus **perpetuating the global war for talent, and displacing inequality onto the backs of the foreign-born**. **One** essential starting **point to work our way out of the** intellectual straightjacket that we are presented with by the global war for talent, then, is to challenge the tendency to talk about talent (and skill and education) as if it were a lump of coal you can either have more or less of (as one management consulting firm says quite literally, for example, ‘talent is the new oil’ (Heidrick and Struggles 2007, 2)). This is an endemic problem in human capital theory generally. For the language of human capital theory, and the concept of the global war for talent that derives from it, is **narrowly economistic, politically opaque and unilinear in its measurements**. What is at stake in progressive social change, though, is not just how much education, skill and talent individuals and nations have, but the type of education, skill and talent they acquire and develop, and the ends to which they put these. We need to open up the black box of learning that remains sealed in human capital theory accounts and investigate the ideological content within**.** What we learn, after all, can push us in diametrically opposing directions. We need to talk about the social and political content and significance of different kinds of talent and skill: we need to ask always, talent and skill for what? (Tannock forthcoming)

#### Discourse of “competitiveness” obfuscates the crucial questions — challenging this rhetoric has essential real world effects.

Schoenberger 98 — Erica Schoenberger, Prof of Geography with Joint Appointment in Anthropology @ Johns Hopkins, BA History Stanford, MCP Berkeley, PHD Berkeley, Discourse and Practice in Human Geography, Progress in Human Geography 22,1 (1998)

What is the relationship, then, between discourse and our material reality and between discourse and our ability to act in the world ± at least as it relates to the issue of competitiveness? Here are some thoughts. The relationship between discourse and material reality/action is mediated by the social power of the discursive agent. The social resources deployed in validating the discourse on competitiveness are really quite impressive. But they can be deployed with great economy or remain entirely latent because of the way the discourse has **been successfully naturalized**. The beauty of it is that, once the conversation moves on to this terrain, we more or less automatically fall silent of our own accord. This may be a particular instance of Foucault's notion of disciplinary individualism, in which the essence of freedom is voluntary compliance with the rules ± in this case, the established order of a particular discipline (Foucault, 1995; cf. Poovey, 1995). Once the word is uttered, its disciplinary force is made manifest. This isn't meant to imply that we unavoidably end up by simply parroting the economists and business persons. But it does suggest that we may be **subtly deflected** from certain kinds of questions or challenges to the discourse and the practices associated with it, whether this is in an academic setting or a more general public arena. This rather simple observation has, I want to stress, real consequences for academics and nonacademics alike. For academics, the substance of our questions and challenges is our stock in trade. We get research funds on the basis of them and write articles which will anchor our careers, allowing us to ask new questions to get more funding and so on. Meanwhile we are contributing to the collective construction of a body of knowledge ± an **interpretive structure** ± which shapes a more general understanding of the world. **We make and validate ourselves through our discourse.** The silencing and deflecting effect of the discourse on competitiveness can also be seen in various forms of public discourse about any number of issues: the environment, welfare reform, healthcare reform and, more obviously, the competitiveness of the national economy. Again, when all goes well, no specific exercise of overt power has to be undertaken. The disciplining effect of the discourse has been naturalized and internalized, so it is effective even with people whose interests are plainly not served by it. It also makes it all the more remarkable when some undisciplined groups of people do, in the end, fight back. (5-6)

### Alternative — Discourse Analysis

#### Discourse analysis reveals hidden perspectives and provides a new set of intellectual and material resources that allow us to better address the world.

Schoenberger 98 — Erica Schoenberger, Prof of Geography with Joint Appointment in Anthropology @ Johns Hopkins, BA History Stanford, MCP Berkeley, PHD Berkeley, Discourse and Practice in Human Geography, Progress in Human Geography 22,1 (1998)

Colonial subjects have long had to struggle with what it means to use the language of the master ± even in postcolonial times. In our normal understanding of academic life, we aren't supposed to have anything in common with colonial subjects on this or any other issue. But if we are strongly objective about ourselves and our work as Sandra Harding urges, can we be sure that the desired objectivity of our research is not subtly undermined by our reliance on a language and a discourse that is not entirely of our own choosing and, arguably, is a language and a discourse that **represents the interests of particular social groups** and not others? The answer, I think, is that we can't be sure, so we have to check repeatedly and try to figure out what difference it makes. What difference, for example, does it make to conclude that Nike's offshore manufacturing is an accumulation strategy rather than a competitive strategy, or that Baltimore's competitive status is undermined by poverty, not by costs? I don't think it necessarily means specific, nameable things. I suspect, rather, that over time, if we keep checking back on ourselves and our work in this way, we will contribute to **building an alternative ensemble** of intellectual and **material resources** that can be used to pose and answer different kinds of question ± our own questions, and questions arising from the discourses and material circumstances of different sorts of people. Among other things, I suspect this would help us to liberate ourselves from the constraining shadows of other disciplines, such as economics, and to recreate geography as a central arena of inquiry and debate within the university and outside it (cf. Clark, 1997). I don't at all want to argue that, having absorbed the hegemonic discourse, we are all doomed to be Stepford geographers who can only serve that discourse. But I think it must help us to know more clearly why we're doing what we're doing, and why we do it in a particular way. Examining and debating our own discourse and the practices deeply associated with it with some of the same intensity and care with which we examine and debate **the world `out there' will** help us understand these things better. (12-13)

### Impact — Competitiveness Rhetoric

#### Competitiveness metaphors render violence of the market invisible, naturalizing it.

Schoenberger 98 — Erica Schoenberger, Prof of Geography with Joint Appointment in Anthropology @ Johns Hopkins, BA History Stanford, MCP Berkeley, PHD Berkeley, Discourse and Practice in Human Geography, Progress in Human Geography 22,1 (1998)

The discourse on competitiveness comes from two principal sources and in part its power is their power. In the first instance, it is the discourse of the economics profession which doesn't really need to analyse **what it is or what it means socially**. The market is the impartial and ultimate arbiter of right behaviour in the economy and competitiveness simply describes the result of responding correctly to market signals. **The blandness of this `**objective' language **conceals the underlying** harshness of the metaphor.For Adam Smith, the idea of competition plausibly evoked nothing more disturbing than a horse race in which the losers are not summarily executed. Since then, the close identification of marginalist economics with evolutionary theory has unavoidably imbued the concept with the sense of a **life or death struggle** (cf. Niehans, 1990).3 In short, on competitiveness hangs life itself. As Krugman (1994: 31) defines it: `. . . when we say that a corporation is uncompetitive, we mean that its market position is . . . unsustainable ± that unless it improves its performance it will cease to exist.' As with evolutionary theory, our ability to **strip the moral and ethical content** from the concepts of life and death is not so great as the self-image of modern science suggests. Competitiveness becomes inescapably associated with ideas of fitness and unfitness, and these in turn with the unstated premise of merit, as in `deserving to live' and `deserving to die'. (3-4)

#### Competitiveness rhetoric naturalizes inequality and destroys democratic coalitions.

Gindin 4 — Sam Gindin, MA Economics UW Madison, Prof of Political Science York University, Globalization and Labor: Defining the Problem, Speech at Brandeis 4-24-04 http://www.net4dem.org/mayglobal/Events/Conference%202004/papers/SamGindin.pdf

As long as we remain on the **terrain of competitiveness,** no effective challenge **to capitalism is possible.** Whatever ‘progressive’ face third-wayists try to place on it – as with ‘training’ or ‘industrial strategies’ - the goal of competitiveness is, to begin with, **morally indefensible:** its underlying principle is that access to employment for one group of workers essentially comes from undermining the standards - and taking the jobs - of others. At best, it promises permanent insecurity since even ‘winning’ is an inherently temporary and fragile circumstance. And competitiveness is ultimately destructive to building any kind of independent political capacity because the alliances it invites are with ‘our employers’, while **the enemy it identifies is other workers**. Competitiveness is of course more than an ideological construct; it is a real-word constraint. But there is a world of difference between acknowledging a **constraint that we must deal with** in the short run, as opposed to raising it to the status of a **goal by way of the oxymoron of ‘progressive competitiveness**’. The issue is how to cope with this constraint as we move to **limit and eventually** eradicate its dominance over our lives. To reject competitiveness, it is important to emphasize, is not to reject being ‘productive’, but to **distinguish between** being productive **for capital**, and developing our individual and collective capacities to **democratically address the needs we** define for ourselves**.** On the terrain of competitiveness, the removal of tools and equipment from a community may be rational; on the terrain of democratic capacities this robs workers of their productive potentials. Competitiveness directs training towards teaching workers to adapt to technology; the focus on democratic capacities raises controlling technology. **Competitiveness hoards knowl**edge; a focus on collective capacities looks to **generalize and therefore democratize knowledge.** Any practical challenge to competitiveness necessarily implies challenging the freedom of capital to restructure production across firms, sectors, and borders. The issue of limiting capital’s freedom to ignore borders inherently involves a degree of ‘protectionism’, risking a corresponding national chauvinism. It is therefore crucial, as Greg Albo has insisted, to understand this response in the context of the attempt to create and protect national spaces for democratic experimentation with other ways to organize our lives.3 What we are ‘protecting’ ourselves against is not other societies – whose popular forces also need to develop such spaces – but capital’s unilateral right to decide the allocation of resources, goods, investment and labour. What we are rejecting is not integration into an international economy, but a **particular kind of integration**: one that dominates, and thereby undermines, what we (again the international ‘we’) are struggling to build within each of our domestic spaces. (7-8)

### Impact — Great Power War

#### Competitiveness necessitates economic imperialism risking nuclear escalation. The U.S.-led neoliberal order has massacred millions in the name of protecting economic primacy.

Foster 17 — John Bellamy Foster 17, professor of sociology at the University of Oregon [“Revolution and Counterrevolution, 1917–2017,” Monthly Review, Vol. 69, No. 3, July-August 2017, https://monthlyreview.org/2017/07/01/revolution-and-counterrevolution-1917-2017/]

Remarkably, the new Trump administration, representing a somewhat different faction of the U.S. capitalist class—beholden particularly to the fossil-fuel industry and financial sector and drawing heavily on a lower middle-class, ultra-nationalist ideology—initially signaled a geopolitical shift, aimed at détente with Russia. This was to be accompanied by a policy of concentrating on countering the Islamic State, Iran, North Korea, and China as the principal global antagonists—a view associated with the “clash of civilizations” strategy of Samuel P. Huntington, as opposed to the Eurasian Heartland approach of Wolfowitz and Brzezinski.26 The incoming administration made it clear that China, with its rapid economic growth and increasing regional power, represented the main threat to U.S. hegemony (and U.S. jobs), and hence the main target of its imperial strategy. Nevertheless, the greater part of the U.S. military-industrial complex, from the Pentagon to the intelligence agencies to the major security contractors, has strongly resisted this shift away from Russia as the principal antagonist—to the point of insinuating treason on the part of the Trump administration for its preliminary discussions with Russian officials, portrayed as collusion with the enemy. Hence, the administration has been subject to an unprecedented number of leaks from within the national security state, and has come under investigation for its communications with Russia during the campaign and the post-election transition. For dominant sections of the U.S. ruling class, it remains essential that Russia, occupying the Eurasian Heartland, and still constituting the chief nuclear rival, should remain the principal target of U.S. grand strategy. The stability of the NATO alliance, and the entire U.S. strategy of permanently subordinating Europe to its rule, is founded on the New Cold War with Russia. For the U.S. ruling class, the strength of the U.S. economy, the supremacy of the dollar, and hence the financial power of Washington, are all seen as dependent on U.S. global primacy. Although U.S. GDP growth and that of the other core capitalist countries has stagnated, with the West losing ground economically to a rapidly developing China, the increasingly irrational geopolitical strategy coming out of Washington still has as its objective a unipolar world order. This is to be leveraged by an array of strategic assets, including the combined weight of the triad alliance of the United States and Canada, Europe, and Japan under U.S. leadership; geopolitical dominance; military and technological power; and financial supremacy via the dollar. The aggressiveness of this imperial strategy can be seen in the U.S. pursuit of absolute dominance in nuclear weapons capabilities under the rubric of the “modernization” of all three legs of its nuclear arsenal. The object is to take full advantage of the fact that a weakened Russia fell behind for years in maintaining and modernizing its own nuclear weaponry, allowing the United States to pull decisively ahead. U.S. nuclear strategy is now predicated on the “death of MAD” (Mutual Assured Destruction), that is, the demise of the entire system of deterrence.27 Those formulating U.S. strategic doctrine increasingly believe that the United States is currently capable, while using only a small part of its nuclear arsenal, of destroying enough nuclear weapons of an opponent in a first strike (or counterforce attack)—even in the case of Russia—to prevail in a nuclear confrontation. In short, Pentagon planners now believe the United States has attained “strategic primacy” in nuclear weapons capability.28 This would make a first strike against any enemy on Earth “thinkable” for the first time since 1945, when Truman ordered the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, resulting in hundreds of thousands of civilian casualties—in what was a political rather than a military decision, and the first real act of the Cold War.29 Ominously, with the imminent death of MAD, the other side too, in any period of nuclear tensions, has greater incentive to strike first, lest it be destroyed completely by a U.S. hegemon no longer restrained by fears of its own destruction in the event of a first strike on its part.30 “An essential feature of imperialism,” Lenin wrote, “is the rivalry between a number of great powers in the striving for hegemony.”31 Such dangers are redoubled over the long run when one capitalist nation, as in the case of the United States in the twenty-first century, seeks to create a unipolar world or superimperialist order. In the second half of the twentieth century, the United States showed itself to be the world’s most destructive nation, killing millions in wars, invasions, and counterinsurgencies across the globe.32 This bloody legacy continues into the present: over a single Labor Day weekend, on September 3–5, 2016, the United States dropped bombs on or fired missiles at six largely Islamic countries: Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen. In 2015, it dropped a total of over 22,000 bombs on Iraq and Syria alone.33 No country opposed to the United States can afford to underestimate the level of violence that could be directed at it by the U.S. hegemon.

### Impact — Turns Case

#### Liberalization for skilled immigrants causes crackdown on others.

Brown and Tannock 9 — Phillip Brown, Prof of Social Sciences @ Univ of Cardiff, AND Stuart Tannock, Interdisciplinary PhD in social sciences and humanities from Stanford, Researcher @ Univ. of Cardiff, Education, Meritocracy and the Global War for Talent, Journal of Education Policy Vol. 24, No. 4, July 2009

Over the past two decades, the discourse of the global war for talent has been picked up by nation-states. In large part, this is derived **directly and explicitly from the corporate human resources literature.** The same global talent ideologues (Richard Florida, Thomas Friedman, McKinsey, etc.) are invoked. The same rhetoric, arguments and assumptions are made. ‘We are in competition for the brightest and best talents – the entrepreneurs, the scientists, the high technology specialists who make the global economy tick’, announced British Immigration Minister Barbara Roche in 2000 (quoted in Rollason 2001, 338). Alastair Darling, while UK Secretary of Trade, used the well-known example of foreign all-star talent in Britain’s premier football league to state that ‘attracting the Cantonas and Bergkamps of science to the UK can only help take our world-class domestic research to the next level …. To be the best you have to work with the best’ (quoted in Jha 2006). The corporate and nation-state global wars for talent are also driven by much the same set of interests. Indeed, to a great extent, the latter is carried out to enable multinational corporations to source talent globally, and thus attract and/or retain corporate investments on national soil. Arguments about why nation-states are now compelled to launch into a global war for talent with each other start with, but go beyond, corporate human resources rhetoric. The basic story goes as follows: the path to national prosperity lies in maximising global competitiveness; to be competitive globally, nations (rich nations, in particular) need to maximise their share of the world’s high tech, high skill, knowledge economy jobs; to help create and fill these jobs, nations need to recruit the world’s most skilled and talented individuals, from wherever they come; since other nations are competing for these same workers (and indeed, for one’s own set of domestic workers), nations need to adjust their immigration, education, economic and social policy in order to attract and retain them; the global war for talent thus puts into play a game of neverending one-upmanship, and reinforces the **hegemonic development model of the competition state** (Abella 2006; Lavenex 2007; Shachar 2006). Underlying this basic storyline, however, is a further set of claims about current and/or impending shortages of skilled labour in OECD countries that threaten growth, prosperity and the overall standard of living. These labour shortages are (or soon will be) caused by: demographic shifts, namely the ageing of the population; quick production cycles in the high tech sector that demand skilled workers instantly; failures of the public education system; the unwillingness of the native-born skilled to work in certain jobs given current conditions; and the personal failures of the native-born unskilled to acquire the skills needed to work in the contemporary knowledge economy (Kapur and McHale 2005; Kuptsch and Fong 2006; OECD 2006). Because of these alleged labour shortages, because talent has never been more globally mobile or sought after, and because previous cycles of liberalisation of global capital and trade have created global supply chains and production systems which require internationally mobile professional and managerial workforces in order to operate effectively, political elites around the w**orld argue that they have** no choicebut to enter into the global war for talent. For nation-states, competing in the global war for talent entails making what are sometimes radical changes in national immigration policy. Over the past two decades, OECD countries, virtually without exception, have opened their borders to high skilled immigrants, actively recruited top workers from around the world, and transformed education, employment, tax and investment policy to make themselves more competitive and attractive to high level professional and managerial workers (Kuptsch and Fong 2006; OECD 2006). In Britain, the election of the New Labour government in 1997 ushered in a radically new era in immigration policy, that saw the country move from a goal of zero immigration to the active recruitment of the ‘most skilled and most enterprising people from abroad’ (Flynn 2005; Rollason 2001, 333). Over the next decade, new legislation and programmes to attract high skilled immigrants were introduced quite literally on a yearly basis; and in 2006, the government overhauled its immigration system entirely, in order to install an Australian-style ‘points system’ that heavily favours the entrance, to the country, of the highly skilled (Tannock forthcoming). Even traditional immigration countries such as Canada saw a series of fundamental reforms to its immigration policy and practice in the late 1980s and early 1990s that both expanded overall immigration numbers and skewed these numbers more heavily towards the highly skilled (Arat-Koc 1999; Hiebert 2006). The flipside to this global liberalisation of skilled immigration has been the worldwide effort to crackdown on and strictly limit and control low skilled immigration, as well as refugee and family reunification migration streams. The impact of these shifts in immigration policy (in conjunction with other shifts in the world economy) has been enormous. Globally, high skilled migration increased at a rate of two and a half times faster than low skilled migration between 1990 and 2000. By 2000, the college-educated made up 34.6% of immigrants to OECD countries, up from 29.8% in 1990, and far out of proportion to the 11.3% of the world’s overall labour force that they represent (Docquier and Marfouk 2005, 167–8). Small and poor countries in the Caribbean, Pacific and Africa have been hit hardest by these global migrations of the highly educated. Over 50% of college-educated individuals from Sierra Leone, it is estimated, have left their home country to work elsewhere, as have over 60% of the college-educated from Cape Verde and the Gambia, over 70% from Tonga and Samoa, and over 80% from Haiti and Jamaica (Docquier and Marfouk 2005, 175). Large and wealthy countries, too, are losing some of their highly skilled – Britain, for example, has lost a greater number of its college-educated citizens overseas than any other country in the world (Docquier and Marfouk 2005, 175). But they also have seen their labour forces mushroom with high skill immigration. Over a 12-year period (1986–1997), Canada saw its flow of immigrant computer scientists increase 15-fold, the flow of engineers increase 10-fold, the flow of natural scientists increase eight-fold, and the flow of managerial workers increase four-fold (Bambrah 2005, 40). In Britain, it is estimated that 80% of all new doctors and 73% of all new nurses registered between 1997 and 2003 were foreign-born (Pond and McPake 2006), while 22% of all new graduate recruits hired in the financial and business services sector are now foreigners (Financial Services Skills Council 2006). Between 1992 and 2000, there was a 110% increase in the number of foreign-born computer analysts and programmers working in the UK, a 60% increase in the number of foreign-born financial and office managers, and a 48% increase in the number of foreign-born teaching professionals (Dobson, Koser, McLaughlan, and Salt 2001). The global war for talent between nation-states, then, has ushered in two new facts of life on the ground: first, highly skilled and educated individuals have the potential to be more globally mobile than ever; and second, immigrants make up a large and growing proportion not just of the lower echelons of the labour market, where they have long toiled, but the high skill, upper-most levels as well. (380-2)

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### 2AC — Framework

#### Framework — the role of the ballot is to determine whether the topical plan is superior to the status quo or a competitive policy alternative. This is best because the resolution is a question of public policy—in order to meet the burden of rejoinder, they need to disprove the desirability of the plan.

#### Perfecting the law is preferable to utopian theorizing about immigration.

Derrida 1 (Interviewed by Paul Patton, In theory and Event, 5:1)

One last question: about references that you've made to the term 'perfectibility'. You've commented: 'Hospitality is . . . immediately pervertible and perfectible: there is no model hospitality, only processes always in the course of perverting and improving, this improvement itself containing the risks of perversion.'[23] And you've also made a comment in Fidélité à plus d'un: 'I believe in historicity and so in the infinite perfectibility of law.' [24] And I wanted to ask, on the basis of some of the other discussion that's taken place this afternoon, how one could also start to think of the messianic, of messianicity, in terms of perfectibility, as containing both the possibility of improvement, but also the constant possibility of risk, or the unknown, but also in the sense of degradation, of what one doesn't hope for. Could perfectibility be another term for messianicity? # JD: Thank you. Let me start with, let's say, a very well located, punctual, question, among all the questions that you've asked today, all of which are essential and very difficult. It's about the two assertions, one that hospitality is culture itself, and that all culture is originally colonial. Are these statements incompatible or in tension or not? When I say that hospitality is culture itself, I don't mean pure unconditional hospitality, that is, I was referring to the fact that there is no culture without hospitality. I don't like the word 'culture', because it's a very obscure and vague word, but let's say of a society which shares a language, a memory, a history, a heritage, and a series of rites, rituals, norms, habits and customs that we know of no such society, no such culture, which would not claim that it is hospitable; that is, that it has some room left for the stranger who arrives, who is invited. So hospitality in that case is part of being at home; there is no home, no cultural home, no family home without some door, some opening and some ways of welcoming guests. But in that case the hospitality is conditional, in that the Other is welcome to the extent that he adjusts to the chez soi, to the home, that he speaks the language or that he learns the language, that he respects the order of the house, the order of the nation state and so on and so forth. # That's conditional hospitality, in a colonial structure in which there is a master, there is someone who is the host. As you will recall, the word host means hospes, means the master, sometimes the husband, the male master of the house, and in that case we have conditional hospitality. To which I -- I won't say 'oppose' -- but in contrast to which I try to think pure and unconditional hospitality, the idea of a pure welcoming of the unexpected guest, the unexpected arriving one. From that point of view I would distinguish between the hospitality of the invitation and the hospitality of the visitation. In the invitation, the master remains master at home, chez soi, and the host remains the host and the guest remains the guest, the invited guest -- 'Please, come in, you're invited' -- but of course as invited guest you won't disturb too seriously the order of the house, you're going to speak our language, eat the way we eat ... et cetera et cetera. To this invitation, to this hospitality of invitation, I would oppose -- or not oppose but rather distinguish from it -- the hospitality of visitation. The visitor is not an invited guest, the visitor is the unexpected one who arrives and to whom a pure host should open his house without asking questions such as: who are you? what are you coming for? will you work with us? do you have a passport? do you have a visa? and so on and so forth -- that's unconditional hospitality. # We have here the same structure as we saw previously between the law and justice. They are absolutely heterogenous but indissociable. I cannot think of a conditional hospitality without having in mind a pure hospitality. I've been giving a seminar for several years on hospitality and we have studied a number of such historical examples of the manner in which a culture of hospitality organises itself. For instance, in pre-Islamic Arabic cultures the idea of hospitality had to do with nomadism, with people being in a tent in the desert, and there were rules: if some traveller lost his way and arrived at the tent, they should receive him for three days, offering him food and bed and so on and so forth, but after three days, that was the end. That was conditional hospitality and there is a language adjusted to these situations. # But to think of this conditional hospitality one has to have in mind what would be a pure hospitality to the messianic Other, the unexpected one who just lands in my country and to whom I simply say: come and eat and sleep and I won't ask even your name -- which is another sort of violence, one of the many contradictions -- because in principle if I want to pay attention to the Other and to respect the Other, I should speak to the Other, I should address the Other. Asking 'what is your name?' is not necessarily an investigation, an interrogation: "Tell me your name". There are many ways of asking the name of the Other. One is the manner of the police and immigration when they ask 'show me your passport', 'what are you doing?' 'what will you be doing in this country?' and so on. The Other is simply 'who are you?'. You see here the two poles of the conditional and unconditional hospitality, the just and the legal hospitality. And I would say once more that unconditional hospitality is impossible, because it is impossible to decide and to make a rule out of it, to decide that as a rule I'm going to open my house or open my nation, my country, to anyone coming for I don't know what reason. It's impossible to make that decision and people who say 'we'll do that' are certainly lying. It's impossible, but that's what hospitality should be, in principle. # Now, to come back to one of your most difficult questions: what room is left for a politics of hospitality in that case, for perfectibility? If I want to improve the laws -- and this is a very concrete problem for everyone in the world today, and especially in Europe and in France -- how can we improve the situation? For instance, France has been recently, and for decades, betraying laws on political asylum, practicing a politics of immigration which is untrue to its own principle and so on and so forth. So we have to change the law, improve the law, and there is an infinite progress to be performed, to be achieved in that respect. I love the process of perfectibility, because it is marked by the context of the eighteenth century, the Aufklärung. It is often the case that people would like to oppose this period of deconstruction to the Enlightenment. No, I am for the Enlightenment, I'm for progress, I'm a 'progressist'. I think the law is perfectible and we can improve the law. We have to improve the conditions of conditional hospitality, we can change, we should change the laws on immigration, as far as possible, given a certain number of constraints. # For instance, in France -- let me take this example to be less speculative and theoretical -- some people, including me, have signed a petition saying that, in certain conditions, we were ready to shelter in our houses people who were considered illegal immigrants in France. We say, well, we are going to violate the law, to practice civil disobedience because we find the way that the government today applies the law is outrageous, but we are not simply doing this irresponsibly. The Minister of the Interior at the time said: these intellectuals are irresponsible, they are irresponsible because they want simply to open the gates and let everyone into the country, and then you will see what happens. No, we didn't say that. We were not advocating an unconditional hospitality. We said that there is today a law, for instance embodied in the Declaration of the Rights of Man, there is a law which is higher than the French legal system, than the way it is currently applied. And it's in the name of this law, of this legality, that we oppose the current interpretation of the law by the French government. So it was not in the name of pure hospitality that we did so, but in the name of a perfectible law. We wanted the law to be changed and in fact, to some extent, it has been changed. It has been changed, but not enough. Of course we were not charged. I myself, for instance, could hide some such immigrants, and they couldn't sue me. The government had to change, to some extent -- not enough, but to some extent -- its policy, its practice. So in that case we considered that the law was perfectible, that we had to improve the law, without claiming that the unconditional hospitality should become the official policy of the government. # We are not dreamers, from that point of view, we know that today no government, no nation state, will simply open the borders, and in good faith we know that we don't do that ourselves. We would not simply leave the house with no doors, no keys and so on and so forth. We protect ourselves, OK? Who could deny this in good faith? But we have the desire for this perfectibility, and this desire is regulated by the infinite pole of pure hospitality. If we have a concept of conditional hospitality, it's because we have also the idea of a pure hospitality, of unconditional hospitality. The same goes for forgiveness. This resembles but is not identical with Kant's notion of a regulative idea: that is, there is an endless inadequation between the conditional and the unconditional, and there is this regulative idea ... an inaccessible law. In fact, it's here and now that we have to try to think and to embody what unconditional hospitality should be. There is this intention and if we cannot conform to this injunction, and we cannot, obviously we cannot, its impossible, it's impossible as a rule.... # Let me try and make this more specific. It's impossible as a rule, I cannot regularly organise unconditional hospitality, and that's why, as a rule, I have a bad conscience, I cannot have a good conscience because I know that I lock my door, and that a number of people who would like to share my house, my apartment, my nation, my money, my land and so on and so forth. I say not as a rule, but sometimes, exceptionally, it may happen. I cannot regulate, control or determine these moments, but it may happen, just as an act of forgiveness, some forgiveness may happen, pure forgiveness may happen. I cannot make a determinate, a determining judgement and say: 'this is pure forgiveness', or 'this is pure hospitality', as an act of knowledge, there is no adequate act of determining judgement. That's why the realm of action, of practical reason, is absolutely heterogenous to theory and theoretical judgements here, but it may happen without even my knowing it, my being conscious of it, or my having rules for its establishment. Unconditional hospitality can't be an establishment, but it may happen as a miracle ... in an instant, not lasting more than an instant, it may happen. This is the ... possible happening of something impossible which makes us think what hospitality, or forgiveness, or gift might be. # I wanted to say just one word about the example you gave when you say -- I'm just re-reading your text -- 'In an Australian context this could have a particular resonance, as when John Howard disclaimed as not properly his the history of colonial violence in Australia, as if one would be responsible only from the starting point of that kind of property demarcation.' In that case, to go back to the question of inheritance and heritage, of course one can imagine why someone would say 'well, colonial violence occurred before I was born and I don't want to carry the burden of this responsibility'. There have been a lot of such claims in Germany with the young generation saying 'I had nothing to do with Nazism, why should I feel guilty for that?' Well, the fact is that we are responsible for some things we have not done individually ourselves. We inherit a language, conditions of life, a culture which is, which carries the memory of what has been done, and the responsibility, so then we are responsible for things we have not done ourselves, and that is part of the concept of heritage. We are responsible for something Other than us. This shouldn't be constructed as a very old conception of collective responsibility, but we cannot simply say: 'well, I, I wash my hands, I was not here'. If I go on drawing some benefit from this violence and I live in a culture, in a land, in a society which is grounded on this original violence, then I am responsible for it. I cannot disclaim this history of colonial violence, neither in Australia nor anywhere else.

#### Debates should focus on pragmatic interim goals — this builds, not prevents, radical advocacy.

Rennix 17 — (Brianna, JD Harvard, Editor@CurrentAffairs, 12-10, https://www.currentaffairs.org/2017/12/what-would-humane-immigration-policy-actually-look-like)

In a previous article, “Can We Have Humane Immigration Policy?” I outlined what I believe to be a fundamental hurdle to real immigration reform: namely, the fact that Democrats have very few clear, long-term ideas of what “reform” should even look like. The right has a very straightforward restrictionist agenda, and from this have derived a set of policies that they believe (rightly or wrongly) will be effective in restricting immigration. In its worst iteration, this restrictionism is pure, ethnostate-style xenophobia; in its “best” iteration, it reduces individuals to a number that symbolizes their economic value, and allows immigration only when it stands to benefit native-born, “real” Americans. The left, by contrast, vaguely believes that immigration is an inherently Good Thing, but has no clear idea of how much immigration is desirable, or how it ought to be regulated. Democrats have historically very often defaulted to the “admitting immigrants based chiefly on their economic usefulness” position, partly because it has seemed superficially reasonable to them, partly because they hoped to compromise with Republicans, and partly for lack of any better ideas. Now that “points-based immigration” has been touted by the Trump administration, thankfully, more people are finally beginning to understand what an ugly and inadequate idea it actually is. But what scheme of immigration regulation should the left actually pursue**,** then? In my view, we’ve dithered on this question long enough, and made far too many inhumane concessions in the process: now that we have arrived at a moment where favoring immigration and opposing Trump are becoming increasingly merged in the public imagination, it’s time to go big or go home. Our position should be simple, and ambitious. In the long term—and I don’t think we should hide the ball about this—our goal should be to ensure that anybody who wants to come to the U.S. and live and work peaceably should be allowed to do so. If an immigrant has been in the U.S. for some period of time and want to settle here permanently, they should be able to do that, too. I do not think being pro-free movement or pro-open borders as a general matter means committing to the position that a region can never restrict immigration under any circumstances. Almost every argument adduced for limiting immigration to wealthy countries is utterly specious—the U.S., in particular, is the world’s third-largest country geographically and its 179th-most densely populated, so the idea that we “can’t” take more people is a ludicrously transparent lie—but nevertheless, every region does have some genuine resource constraints. There may be situations of political unrest, natural disaster, or economic crisis that are so serious that admitting more population is actually dangerous. For example, Lebanon is currently hosting 172 Syrian refugees for every 1000 of its citizens: that means that a full 30% of its population are refugees. This is a pretty big burden for any small state to shoulder, and the situation cannot possibly go on indefinitely, especially if Lebanon finds itself spiraling towards governmental collapse, or under attack by a neighboring country. Though it’s hard to imagine how an exactly parallel situation could ever arise in the U.S., due to its sheer size, there may, someday, be other disaster scenarios that would qualify in the U.S. context. The point is, we should treat immigration restrictions as time-limited responses to specific, articulable conditions, not as a default mode. To the extent that immigration might need to be restricted or regulated more closely in certain emergency circumstances, our concern must be to admit immigrants primarily on the basis of need, and the direness of the situation they will face if returned, not according to factors like nationality, wealth, education, or ability, which is how our U.S. system presently operates. All this, however, is the long game. We certainly can’t arrive at a more open immigration system overnight, and I think that there’s a hierarchy of intermediary policy goals that would alleviate some of the most unconscionable effects of our present system, while laying the groundwork for a future immigration system that looks entirely different. Here, I’ll outline several policy changes that would benefit immigrants who are already present in the U.S., and individuals who face serious dangers in their home countries. (Stay tuned for part three, which will deal with visa allotments, employment-based immigration, and admissions more generally.) FIDDLY LEGISLATIVE FIXES Given how messed-up our immigration system is on a large scale, it’s worth asking how much time we ought to devote to tinkering with the finer points of laws that we would be better off scrapping wholesale. Some people might say that these kinds of small fixes are a waste of energy, like rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic. But I disagree. In a disaster of this scale, you want some of your people making repairs to the leaky lifeboats, and other people working to contact bigger rescue vessels, because who knows which avenue will prove more successful before the whole mess slides into the sea. What I mean by “fiddly legislative fixes” are legal changes that wouldn’t result in any immediate, sweeping changes to what categories of people are eligible for immigration relief: rather, they might slightly alter the boundaries of those categories, and also ensure that people who are eligible for immigration relief aren’t barred from getting it for reasons that are totally outside their control. The only area of immigration law with which I have any minute familiarity is asylum law, and there are certainly a number of small procedural changes in this field that could make a huge difference to an asylum-seeker’s chances of success. For example, Congress passed a catastrophically bad immigration bill in 1996 which, among many other things, included a requirement that all asylum applicants file their applications within one year of their last entry to the United States. (Supposedly, this rule is supposed to “prevent fraud,” because fraudsters are notoriously bad at reading calendars, or something.) Unfortunately, though not surprisingly, a lot of people with asylum claims don’t manage to file on time. Most people in deportation proceedings don’t have attorneys; many of them are traumatized; some of them may be sitting in immigration detention on the day of the deadline; their first-ever court hearings after entering the U.S. may even end up being scheduled past their one-year anniversary; the application form is absurdly complicated and the questions are all in English; etc., etc. You can try to file late, of course, but your application won’t be accepted unless you can prove some very specific extenuating circumstances. According to a 2010 study, nearly one in five failed asylum applications were rejected by the court solely because they were filed after the one-year deadline. Changing this rule would give a lot more immigrants access to the asylum process, and save asylum lawyers a lot of time wasted writing one-year deadline memos. No doubt there are numerous other boring, wonkish policy changes of this kind that could be slipped into larger bills with comparatively little fanfare. A more ambitious but indispensible short-term goal, which would have huge implications for the success of immigrants’ legal cases, is getting guaranteed access to lawyers for immigrants in deportation proceedings. Because immigration is a “civil,” not a “criminal” offense, people in immigration proceedings aren’t entitled to a lawyer. This is despite the fact that deportation is effectively a penalty of exile, which is at least as severe as incarceration, and in some cases (for example, when the individual is being deported back to life-threatening violence) even more severe. There are even restrictions on when federal legal aid funding can be used to aid non-citizens in immigration proceedings, which means that the sorts of legal organizations that would typically try to provide pro bono assistance to immigrants are significantly hampered in their ability to do so. My impression, based on my conversations with friends and family, is that the fact that immigrants have no guaranteed access to legal representation is not widely known, even among liberals. The Democratic position should clearly be that if deportation is on the table as a possible outcome, all immigrants should be guaranteed a lawyer. In the lead-up to this larger goal of universal representation, if we can even manage to secure mandatory lawyers for certain classes of especially vulnerable immigrants—such as minor children and people with diagnosed PTSD and other forms of mental illness—that would already make a significant difference. There have been a number of bills before Congress proposing exactly this, but they have rarely made it past the committee stage. The Democratic Party needs to start publicizing this as a major problem in our justice system, highlighting especially that the vast majority of people in deportation proceedings have not committed any crimes, beyond simply existing in our country without a specific piece of paper. It is also vitally, urgently important that Democrats begin calling for legislation to end expedited removal, a process under which immigrants who cannot affirmatively prove that they have been in the country continuously for the past two years may be immediately deported from the U.S. with no opportunity to appeal their deportation in front of a judge. This egregious practice—another unfortunate legacy of the 1996 immigration “reform” legislation signed by Bill Clinton—regularly results in the deportation of, among others, asylum-seekers and U.S. citizens.

### 2AC — Permutation

#### Perm: Do Both. The totalizing lens of the alternative fails — we can reform capitalism to avoid the worst impacts.

Reich 9 — (Robert, Former Secretary of Labor, JD from Yale, Rhodes Scholar, http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/12/how-capitalism-is-killing-democracy/ 10-12)

Most people are of two minds: As consumers and investors, we want the bargains and high returns that the global economy provides. As citizens, we don’t like many of the social consequences that flow from these transactions. We like to blame corporations for the ills that follow, but in truth we’ve made this compact with ourselves. After all, we know the roots of the great economic deals we’re getting. They come from workers forced to settle for lower wages and benefits. They come from companies that shed their loyalties to communities and morph into global supply chains. They come from CEOs who take home exorbitant paychecks. And they come from industries that often wreak havoc on the environment. Unfortunately, in the United States, the debate about economic change tends to occur between two extremist camps: those who want the market to rule unimpeded, and those who want to protect jobs and preserve communities as they are. Instead of finding ways to soften the blows of globalization, compensate the losers, or slow the pace of change, we go to battle. Consumers and investors nearly always win the day, but citizens lash out occasionally in symbolic fashion, by attempting to block a new trade agreement or protesting the sale of U.S. companies to foreign firms. It is a sign of the inner conflict Americans feel — between the consumer in us and the citizen in us — that the reactions are often so schizophrenic. Such conflicting sentiments are hardly limited to the United States. The recent wave of corporate restructurings in Europe has shaken the continent’s typical commitment to job security and social welfare. It’s leaving Europeans at odds as to whether they prefer the private benefits of global capitalism in the face of increasing social costs at home and abroad. Take, for instance, the auto industry. In 2001, DaimlerChrysler faced mounting financial losses as European car buyers abandoned the company in favor of cheaper competitors. So, CEO Dieter Zetsche cut 26,000 jobs from his global workforce and closed six factories. Even profitable companies are feeling the pressure to become ever more efficient. In 2005, Deutsche Bank simultaneously announced an 87 percent increase in net profits and a plan to cut 6,400 jobs, nearly half of them in Germany and Britain. Twelve-hundred of the jobs were then moved to low-wage nations. Today, European consumers and investors are doing better than ever, but job insecurity and inequality are rising, even in social democracies that were established to counter the injustices of the market. In the face of such change, Europe’s democracies have shown themselves to be so paralyzed that the only way citizens routinely express opposition is through massive boycotts and strikes. In Japan, many companies have abandoned lifetime employment, cut workforces, and closed down unprofitable lines. Just months after Howard Stringer was named Sony’s first non-Japanese CEO, he announced the company would trim 10,000 employees, about 7 percent of its workforce. Surely some Japanese consumers and investors benefit from such corporate downsizing: By 2006, the Japanese stock market had reached a 14-year high. But many Japanese workers have been left behind. A nation that once prided itself on being an "all middle-class society" is beginning to show sharp disparities in income and wealth. Between 1999 and 2005, the share of Japanese households without savings doubled, from 12 percent to 24 percent. And citizens there routinely express a sense of powerlessness. Like many free countries around the world, Japan is embracing global capitalism with a democracy too enfeebled to face the free market’s many social penalties. On the other end of the political spectrum sits China, which is surging toward capitalism without democracy at all. That’s good news for people who invest in China, but the social consequences for the country’s citizens are mounting. Income inequality has widened enormously. China’s new business elites live in McMansions inside gated suburban communities and send their children to study overseas. At the same time, China’s cities are bursting with peasants from the countryside who have sunk into urban poverty and unemployment. And those who are affected most have little political recourse to change the situation, beyond riots that are routinely put down by force. But citizens living in democratic nations aren’t similarly constrained. They have the ability to alter the rules of the game so that the cost to society need not be so great. And yet, we’ve increasingly left those responsibilities to the private sector — to the companies themselves and their squadrons of lobbyists and public-relations experts — pretending as if some inherent morality or corporate good citizenship will compel them to look out for the greater good. But they have no responsibility to address inequality or protect the environment on their own. We forget that they are simply duty bound to protect the bottom line.

### 2AC — Neoliberalism Good

#### US neoliberal leadership is key to global peace and prosperity — any alternative is worse.

Pritzker 16 — (Penny, former US Commerce Secretary, 6-8, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from-chaos/posts/2016/06/08-trade-investment-international-order-pritzker)

Answer: Trade agreements like TPP and TTIP enable us to set rules and standards for trade in the 21st century, which is an essential component of U.S. leadership in the world. Trade agreements allow us to shape relationships—they empower us to help set labor and environmental standards, rules for e-commerce, and intellectual property and trade secret protections. And they strengthen our national security, since we have better relations with countries where there is a strong U.S. commercial presence. With TPP, specifically, we want to ensure that our companies to have access to the countries that have the fastest-growing middle classes on earth. There is real demand for American products and services across Asia, but there are currently barriers to entry—and we don’t want our companies left behind. Trade agreements like these have tremendous benefits for the United States: one-quarter of our growth from 2000 to 2015 occurred due to our ability to export, and 11.5 million Americans go to work every day because their companies export overseas. We should make no mistake: not only would rejecting TPP be a catastrophic mistake, even delays in finalizing trade deals cost us money and jobs at home. In the United States and elsewhere, there is understandable anxiety about globalization and digitalization. But both of those trends will continue to shape the world economy regardless of whether or not we complete and enact trade agreements. In fact, those agreements are our best answer to the challenges that come with globalization and automation. They help us shape the rules and guide how globalization proceeds to best protect the interests of Americans. Q: As Secretary of Commerce, you have referred to “commercial diplomacy.” Can you explain what you mean by that, as well as what role the private sector can play in that effort? A: Countries aren’t just judged by their military power or their diplomatic power—they’re judged by their commercial and economic power, too. Even though American commercial power is unparalleled around the world, I believe that the American private sector—as a national asset—is being underutilized vis-à-vis its potential. That’s understandable, since the impact of the private sector is dispersed firm by firm and rarely measured in aggregate. But the reality is that U.S. companies are often the face of America in many places. Leaders around the world say they like U.S. companies because of how they behave and because they follow the rules. Nevertheless, across the globe today, there are still barriers to access for U.S. companies. Commercial diplomacy is a pretty simple concept: recognizing that the U.S. private sector is a major asset in shaping policy around the world, the U.S. government and private sector can work side by side with foreign governments to help improve policy. In many countries, there is a disconnect between policies they’ve enacted and stated goals for foreign direct investment and economic growth. By bringing U.S. business leaders into direct conversation with leaders of foreign governments, we can better illustrate how some policies—for instance, ones that undermine e-commerce or intellectual property rights, or that inhibit entrepreneurship—contravene their national goals. So, commercial diplomacy has enormous appeal: countries recognize they’re competing for foreign direct investment and foreign capital, and bringing public- and private-sector stakeholders to the same table helps countries identify and implement policies that make them more competitive. This is the definition of a kind of win-win diplomacy: by creating new opportunities for American companies while helping set the stage for stronger growth in partners across the world, the United States helps knit together a future of shared peace and prosperity. Q: Patterns of international trade and investment are changing, as Asian economies grow in relative economic strength and Europe is experiencing relative economic decline. How do you recommend that U.S. firms think about these geopolitical dimensions? A: U.S. companies need to be geopolitically savvy these days. Economies around the world are evolving, with emerging markets in flux in a range of unique ways, and it can be tough for companies to adapt. It’s not enough for firms to be cognizant of geopolitics—success requires engagement from both American firms and the U.S. government to shape trade and investment climates. I see it as being an important role of the Department of Commerce to foster direct dialogue between companies and governments around the world—both to identify challenges to investment and entrepreneurship and to ensure a level playing field for international competition. Leaders across the globe say they want more investment from U.S. firms and better opportunities for trade, but can at times enact policies that put up hurdles. The U.S. government and its private companies can play key roles in helping to shape those environments, to the benefit of both American and foreign companies. Most fundamentally, the United States must continue to lead the way in fostering global political stability and economic openness. Without that foundation, uncertainty will hamper markets. American global leadership remains the sine qua non for promoting American economic growth and increasing levels of growth across the world.

### 2AC — Alternative Fails

#### The alternative produces atrocities — history proves.

Stephens 17 — (Bret, SW@NYT, MA LSE, 10-27, https://mobile.nytimes.com/2017/10/27/opinion/communism-rose-colored-glasses.html?\_r=2)

“In the spring of 1932 desperate officials, anxious for their jobs and even their lives, aware that a new famine might be on its way, began to collect grain wherever and however they could. Mass confiscations occurred all across the U.S.S.R. In Ukraine they took on an almost fanatical intensity.” I am quoting a few lines from “Red Famine,” Anne Applebaum’s brilliant new history of the deliberate policy of mass starvation inflicted on Ukraine by Joseph Stalin in the early 1930s. An estimated five million or more people perished in just a few years. Walter Duranty, The Times’s correspondent in the Soviet Union, insisted the stories of famine were false. He won a Pulitzer Prize in 1932 for reportage the paper later called “completely misleading.” How many readers, I wonder, are familiar with this history of atrocity and denial, except in a vague way? How many know the name of Lazar Kaganovich, one of Stalin’s principal henchmen in the famine? What about other chapters large and small in the history of Communist horror, from the deportation of the Crimean Tatars to the depredations of Peru’s Shining Path to the Brezhnev-era psychiatric wards that were used to torture and imprison political dissidents? Why is it that people who know all about the infamous prison on Robben Island in South Africa have never heard of the prison on Cuba’s Isle of Pines? Why is Marxism still taken seriously on college campuses and in the progressive press? Do the same people who rightly demand the removal of Confederate statues ever feel even a shiver of inner revulsion at hipsters in Lenin or Mao T-shirts? These aren’t original questions. But they’re worth asking because so many of today’s progressives remain in a permanent and dangerous state of semi-denial about the legacy of Communism a century after its birth in Russia. No, they are not true-believing Communists. No, they are not unaware of the toll of the Great Leap Forward or the Killing Fields. No, they are not plotting to undermine democracy. But they will insist that there is an essential difference between Nazism and Communism — between race-hatred and class-hatred; Buchenwald and the gulag — that morally favors the latter. They will attempt to dissociate Communist theory from practice in an effort to acquit the former. They will balance acknowledgment of the repression and mass murder of Communism with references to its “real advances and achievements.” They will say that true communism has never been tried. They will write about Stalinist playwright Lillian Hellman in tones of sympathy and understanding they never extend to film director Elia Kazan. Progressive intelligentsia “is moralist against one half of the world, but accords to the revolutionary movement an indulgence that is realist in the extreme,” the French scholar Raymond Aron wrote in “The Opium of the Intellectuals” in 1955. “How many intellectuals have come to the revolutionary party via the path of moral indignation, only to connive ultimately at terror and autocracy?” On Thursday, I noted that intellectuals have a long history of making fools of themselves with their political commitments, and that the phenomenon is fully bipartisan. But the consequences of the left’s fellow-traveling and excuse-making are more dangerous. Venezuela is today in the throes of socialist dictatorship and humanitarian ruin, having been cheered along its predictable and unmerry course by the usual progressive suspects. One of those suspects, Jeremy Corbyn, may be Britain’s next prime minister, in part because a generation of Britons has come of age not knowing that the line running from “progressive social commitments” to catastrophic economic results is short and straight. Bernie Sanders captured the heart, if not yet the brain, of the Democratic Party last year by portraying “democratic socialism” as nothing more than an extension of New Deal liberalism. But the Vermont senator also insists that “the business model of Wall Street is fraud.” Efforts to criminalize capitalism and financial services also have predictable results. It’s a bitter fact that the most astonishing strategic victory by the West in the last century turns out to be the one whose lessons we’ve never seriously bothered to teach, much less to learn. An ideology that at one point enslaved and immiserated roughly a third of the world collapsed without a fight and was exposed for all to see. Yet we still have trouble condemning it as we do equivalent evils. And we treat its sympathizers as romantics and idealists, rather than as the fools, fanatics or cynics they really were and are. Winston Churchill wrote that when the Germans allowed the leader of the Bolsheviks to travel from Switzerland to St. Petersburg in 1917, “they turned upon Russia the most grisly of all weapons. They transported Lenin in a sealed truck like a plague bacillus.” A century on, the bacillus isn’t eradicated, and our immunity to it is still in doubt.

### 2AC — Capitalist Peace Theory (CPT)

#### Capitalism solves war — it creates lock-in mechanisms that bind countries together and economically dampens conflict. Prefer evidence from long-term studies.

Dafoe and Kelsey 14 — Political Science and International Economics, ’14 (Allan & Nina; assistant professor in political science at Yale & research associate in international economics at Berkeley; Journal of Peace Research, “Observing the capitalist peace: Examining market-mediated signaling and other mechanisms,” http://jpr.sagepub.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/content/51/5/619.full)

Countries with liberal political and economic systems rarely use military force against each other. This anomalous peace has been most prominently attributed to the ‘democratic peace’ – the apparent tendency for democratic countries to avoid militarized conflict with each other (Maoz & Russett, 1993; Ray, 1995; Dafoe, Oneal & Russett, 2013).More recently, however, scholars have proposed that the liberal peace could be partly (Russett & Oneal, 2001) or primarily (Gartzke, 2007; but see Dafoe, 2011) attributed to liberal economic factors, such as commercial and financial interdependence. In particular, Erik Gartzke, Quan Li & Charles Boehmer (2001), henceforth referred to as GLB, have demonstrated that measures of capital openness have a substantial and statistically significant association with peaceful dyadic relations. Gartzke (2007) confirms that this association is robust to a large variety of model specifications. To explain this correlation, GLB propose that countries with open capital markets are more able to credibly signal their resolve through the bearing of greater economic costs prior to the outbreak of militarized conflict. This explanation is novel and plausible, and resonates with the rationalist view of asymmetric information as a cause of conflict (Fearon, 1995). Moreover, it implies clear testable predictions on evidential domains different from those examined by GLB. In this article we exploit this opportunity by constructing a confirmatory test of GLB’s theory of market-mediated signaling. We first develop an innovative quantitative case selection technique to identify crucial cases where the mechanism of market-mediated signaling should be most easily observed. Specifically, we employ quantitative data and the statistical models used to support the theory we are probing to create an impartial and transparentmeans of selecting cases in which the theory – as specified by the theory’s creators –makes its most confident predictions.We implement three different case selection rules to select cases that optimize on two criteria: (1) maximizing the inferential leverage of our cases, and (2) minimizing selection bias. We examine these cases for a necessary implication of market-mediated signaling: that key participants drew a connection between conflictual events and adverse market movements. Such an inference is a necessary step in the process by which market-mediated costs can signal resolve. For evidence of this we examine news media, government documents, memoirs, historical works, and other sources. We additionally examine other sources, such as market data, for evidence that economic costs were caused by escalatory events. Based on this analysis, we assess the evidence for GLB’s theory of market mediated costly signaling. Our article then considers a more complex heterogeneous effects version of market-mediated signaling in which unspecified scope conditions are required for the mechanism to operate. Our design has the feature of selecting cases in which scope conditions are most likely to be absent. This allows us to perform an exploratory analysis of these cases, looking for possible scope conditions. We also consider alternative potential mechanisms. Our cases are reviewed in more detail in the online appendix.1 To summarize our results, our confirmatory test finds that while market-mediated signaling smay be operative in the most serious dispute, it was largely absent in the less serious disputes that characterize most of the sample of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs). This suggests either that other mechanisms account for the correlation between capital openness and peace, or that the scope conditions for market-mediated signaling are restrictive. Of the signals that we observed, strategicmarket-mediated signals were relatively more important than automatic market-mediated signals in the most serious conflicts. We identify a number of potential scope conditions, such as that (1) the conflict must be driven by bargaining failure arising from uncertainty and (2) the economic costs need to escalate gradually and need to be substantial, but less than the expected military costs of conflict. Finally, there were a number of other explanations that seemed present in the cases we examined and could account for the capitalist peace: capital openness is associated with greater anticipated economic costs of conflict; capital openness leads third parties to have a greater stake in the conflict and therefore be more willing to intervene; a dyadic acceptance of the status quo could promote both peace and capital openness; and countries seeking to institutionalize a regional peace might instrumentally harness the pacifying effects of liberal markets. The correlation: Open capital markets and peace The empirical puzzle at the core of this article is the significant and robust correlation noted by GLB between high levels of capital openness in both members of a dyad and the infrequent incidence of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) and wars between the members of this dyad (Gartzke, Li & Boehmer, 2001). The index of capital openness (CAPOPEN) is intended to capture the ‘difficulty states face in seeking to impose restrictions on capital flows (the degree of lost policy autonomy due to globalization)’ (Gartzke & Li, 2003: 575). CAPOPEN is constructed from data drawn from the widely used IMF’s Annual Reports on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Controls; it is a combination of eight binary variables that measure different types of government restrictions on capital and currency flow (Gartzke, Li & Boehmer, 2001: 407). The measure of CAPOPEN starts in 1966 and is defined for many countries (increasingly more over time). Most of the countries that do not have a measure of CAPOPEN are communist.2 GLB implement this variable in a dyadic framework by creating a new variable, CAPOPENL, which is the smaller of the two dyadic values of CAPOPEN. This operationalization is sometimes referred to as the ‘weak-link’ specification since the functional form is consonant with a model of war in which the ‘weakest link’ in a dyad determines the probability of war. CAPOPENL has a negative monotonic association with the incidence of MIDs, fatal MIDs, and wars (see Figure 1).3 The strength of the estimated empirical association between peace and CAPOPENL, using a modified version of the dataset and model from Gartzke (2007), is comparable to that between peace and, respectively, joint democracy, log of distance, or the GDP of a contiguous dyad (Gartzke, 2007: 179; Gartzke, Li & Boehmer, 2001: 412). In summary, CAPOPENL seems to be an important and robust correlate of peace. The question of why specifically this correlation exists, however, remains to be answered. The mechanism: Market-mediated signaling? Gartzke, Li & Boehmer (2001) argue that the classic liberal account for the pacific effect of economic interdependence – that interdependence increases the expected costs of war – is not consistent with the bargaining theory of war (see also Morrow, 1999). GLB argue that ‘conventional descriptions of interdependence see war as less likely because states face additional opportunity costs for fighting. The problem with such an account is that it ignores incentives to capitalize on an opponent’s reticence to fight’ (Gartzke, Li & Boehmer, 2001: 400.)4 Instead, GLB (see also Gartzke, 2003; Gartzke & Li, 2003) argue that financial interdependence could promote peace by facilitating the sending of costly signals. As the probability of militarized conflict increases, states incur a variety of automatic and strategically imposed economic costs as a consequence of escalation toward conflict. Those states that persist in a dispute despite these costs will reveal their willingness to tolerate them, and hence signal resolve. The greater the degree of economic interdependence, the more a resolved country could demonstrate its willingness to suffer costs ex ante to militarized conflict. Gartzke, Li & Boehmer’s mechanism implies a commonly perceived costly signal before militarized conflict breaks out or escalates: if market-mediated signaling is to account for the correlation between CAPOPENL and the absence of MIDs, then visible market-mediated costs should occur prior to or during periods of real or potential conflict (Gartzke, Li & Boehmer, 2001). Thus, the proposed mechanism should leave many visible footprints in the historical record. This theory predicts that these visible signals must arise in any escalating conflict, involving countries with high capital openness, in which this mechanism is operative Clarifying the signaling mechanism Gartzke, Li & Boehmer’s signaling mechanism is mostly conceptualized on an abstract, game-theoretic level (Gartzke, Li & Boehmer, 2001). In order to elucidate the types of observations that could inform this theory’s validity, we discuss with greater specificity the possible ways in which such signaling might occur. A conceptual classification of costly signals The term signaling connotes an intentional communicative act by one party directed towards another. Because the term signaling thus suggests a willful act, and a signal of resolve is only credible if it is costly, scholars have sometimes concluded that states involved in bargaining under incomplete information could advance their interests by imposing costs on themselves and thereby signaling their resolve (e.g. Lektzian & Sprecher, 2007). However, the game-theoretic concept of signaling refers more generally to any situation in which an actor’s behavior reveals information about her private information. In fact, states frequently adopt sanctions with low costs to themselves and high costs to their rivals because doing so is often a rational bargaining tactic on other grounds: they are trying to coerce their rival to concede the issue. Bargaining encounters of this type can be conceptualized as a type of war-of-attrition game in which each actor attempts to coerce the other through the imposition of escalating costs. Such encounters also provide the opportunity for signaling: when states resist the costs imposed by their rivals, they ‘signal’ their resolve. If at some point one party perceives the conflict to have become too costly and steps back, that party ‘signals’ a lack of resolve. Thus, this kind of signaling arises as a by-product of another’s coercive attempts. In other words, costly signals come in two forms: self-inflicted (information about a leader arising from a leader’s intentional or incidental infliction of costs on himself) or imposed (information about a leader that arises from a leader’s response to a rival’s imposition of costs). Additionally, costs may arise as an automatic byproduct of escalation towards military conflict or may be a tool of statecraft that is strategically employed during a conflict. The automatic mechanism stipulates that as the probability of conflict increases, various economic assets will lose value due to the risk of conflict and investor flight. However, the occurrence of these costs may also be intentional outcomes of specific escalatory decisions of the states, as in the case of deliberate sanctions; in this case they are strategic. Finally, at a practical level, we identify three different potential kinds of economic costs of militarized conflict that may be mediated by open capital markets: capital costs from political risk, monetary coercion, and business sanctions.

#### Uniqueness goes aff — war is massively declining.

McKenna 15 — Professor of Philosophy, ’15 (Michael; 3/4/15; professor of philosophy; Guru Magazine, “Ho wmany people have died in wars throughout history?” http://gurumagazine.org/askaguru/culture/many-people-died-wars-throughout-history/)

Calculating the total number of people who have died in wars throughout history is difficult. As Winston Churchill apparently said, “history is written by the winners”; and this becomes truer the further back we go. The victorious side of any war may exaggerate the number of enemies killed, while glossing over their own losses so as to brag of their military superiority. Equally, if the victor is aware of their public image, they may want to downplay the carnage of war and the atrocities they committed. What this unfortunately means is that any estimate of the number of deaths caused by war will be very rough indeed. This is further complicated by the lack of consensus amongst historians as to what actually constitutes a war and how to measure the number of deaths due to the effects of war (e.g. famine). That being said, we can arrive at a ballpark figure by looking at some of the major conflicts in history. The 20th century is described as the “bloodiest”, with an estimated 187 million deaths due to the various wars combined. Almost unbelievably, this number is nearly as high as the total number of deaths due to the entirety of war throughout all history before that point\*. An increased world population, combined with huge armies and modern killing machines (explosives, machine guns, chemical weapons, etc.) have made us frighteningly efficient at killing one another. Taking the median estimates of death tolls for various conflicts throughout history, the best estimates put the total death toll due to all wars at 341.7 million people \*\*. To add a note of optimism, experimental psychologist Steven Pinker argues that violence (including acts of war) is declining. He argues that if you adjust wartime casualties to reflect the population of the time, modern (20th century and after) wars have nothing on more historical conflicts. World War II, for example, tops all lists as the biggest killer (up to 85 million). However, when the numbers are adjusted for the world population at the time, World War II comes out at only number 9, with the rest of the top 10 being before the 20th century. At the top of the list is the An Lushan Rebellion in the Tang Dynasty of China, which may have killed up to one sixth of the entire world population in 755.

### 2AC — Capitalism Solves the Environment

#### Capitalism allows us to innovate and solve environmental crises.

Shireman 15 — (Bill; 2/19/15; Eco Activist, author, and CEO at Future 500; The Guardian, “Envisioning a future with less doom and gloom: opportunities for the next generation of optimists,” http://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/2015/feb/19/realistic-optimists-post-carbon-economy-nature-environment-business)

When it comes to stories about the fate of the earth, headlines are usually dominated by tales of gloom and doom. And there’s certainly a great deal to be depressed about: global temperatures hit their highest levels ever last year, oceans are growing so warm and acidic that fisheries could be lost, and food and water systems are in decline. A big reason for focusing on the negative is that bad news tends to drive action. According to research by my organization, sustainable business nonprofit Future 500, negative messages typically yield two and a half times as much fundraising and five times as much media attention as positive ones. But as effective as the doom-and-gloom storyline is, there’s another important environmental narrative that’s waiting to be told. Following the work of environmental pioneers like William McDonough, Paul Hawken, Amory Lovins and other eco-designers, it’s clear that there’s an audience – and a desperate need – for a new generation of realistic optimists to help us envision a genuinely prosperous post-carbon economy. There is much to be optimistic about. In its 2013 report The 3% Solution, wildlife nonprofit World Wildlife Fund says that the key challenge facing developed countries is the need to reduce carbon emissions by roughly 3% a year. The McKinsey Global Institute says that’s not only doable, but it’s exactly what the economy needs to grow sustainably and overcome its economic deficits. Specifically, it says, the US needs to squeeze a third more value out of the energy it uses in the next decade, and improve that efficiency by 3% a year or more thereafter, to avoid painful economic and environmental consequences. The quest for that 3% solution may prove challenging, but it will also open up a wide range of business opportunities. Here are some of the biggest potential opportunities and the companies trying to tap them: Creating living farms, oceans and forests The industrial agriculture system treats land like a machine. It’s based on the assumption that, if farmers feed the earth the right fuel and keep out contaminants, the engine will run smoothly and generate massive agricultural output. That can be true, but nature offers a much more productive and sustainable model: life. Farms, forests and oceans have the capacity to create more value than they consume, something that machines can’t do. What’s more, they’re inherently sustainable. One step that large-scale agriculture could take towards adopting the nature-based model would be to shift to carbon-reducing agriculture. Fertile soil is a complex system with millions of carbon-sequestering microorganisms per square inch. Tilling, a common agricultural practice, burns fuel, releases poisonous exhaust gasses and strips the soil. The standard solution – pumping in pesticides, herbicides and nitrogen – only adds to the problem by contaminating groundwater and polluting oceans with runoff. Studies have shown that more natural soil amendments, like compost, manure and charcoal products, like those produced by the Biochar Company, can reduce atmospheric carbon and keep soils highly productive. In terms of water usage, treatment alternatives developed by companies like Algae Systems purify water at low cost, while generating carbon-negative fuels and fertilizers that are chemically identical to petroleum-based products. On the retail end, Whole Foods is driving mainstream consumer demand for approaches like these. At the same time, organic, slow and local food movements are also continuing to gain momentum. For further-reaching substantive change, however, major food companies and manufacturers will need to get involved in order to make any broader systemic changes mainstream. The sustainable seafood movement could offer a useful model for businesses and activists looking to change the agriculture system. Increasingly, careful fisheries management and the support of retailers like Walmart and Safeway are making sustainable seafood more commonplace. At the same time, groups like Environmental Defense Fund are continuing to push the needle forward. Admittedly, the aquaculture battle is still raging and oceans are still in crisis. Carbon emissions are making them warmer, more acidic and less productive, and resource competition is driving fishing well beyond sustainable yields. So how can a living agriculture approach further benefit the seas? One way is to end the race for fish through “catch shares,” a market based system that sets aside a secure share of fish for individual fishermen, communities or fishing associations. Forestry is another industry that could potentially offer a useful agricultural model. On the market end, brands like Nestle and Staples are helping to shift the market towards more sustainable forest practices. In this case, too, the problem is far from over, and activist groups are continuing to ramp up pressure on customers of companies like April and a host of other palm oil and paper producers. The “zero deforestation” effort, championed by Greenpeace and others, has driven attention and engagement to a critical international issue. Prosperity, not consumption, by design Another business opportunity lies in the shift from excessive consumption to impressive design. Traditional business models are moored in consumption. The industrial economy, for example, propelled consumption by accelerating the speed of extraction. Natural systems, on the other hand, develop value through efficient, smart design. AT&T, Advanced Micro Devices and Cisco are already putting this lesson to work, bringing productivity leaps to the non-digital economy. The internet of things is connecting computing devices and the Internet in factories, farms, buildings and homes. To put this in context, while industrial companies find it difficult to achieve 25% productivity gains, AMD expects a 2,500% gain in energy productivity for its computer processors by 2020. New technologies are also following nature’s lead when it comes to design. Rather than following the traditional model of extracting complex raw materials from the earth, AMD is producing microchips and solar cells that take plentiful raw materials like silica and inscribe on them a value-creating design, building value up. That’s why – as Future 500 has documented – innovations in microchips, telecommunications, and the Internet often yield productivity gains of 1000% or more. If producers and consumers can use these innovations wisely – admittedly, a big “if” – it will be possible for the economy to harness nature’s value-creating strategy. The sharing economy is another step forward. When digital technologies come into contact with consumptive industrial-era practices, the result can be positively disruptive. How many fewer hotels, rental cars, and taxis do we need, now that AirBNB, Zipcar and Uber enable consumers to share what they already have? Putting a price on carbon The third strategy also applies a core principle of nature: feedback and adaptation. While Congress delays on overarching federal climate policy, hundreds of companies are acting on their own, supporting an internal carbon price that drives down energy costs and carbon emissions simultaneously. Carbon taxes in British Columbia and Sweden, for example, outperform regulations and emission trading systems combined. Critics argue that a carbon tax can’t happen broadly, but environmental groups have more carbon-pricing allies than they think. Even oil company ExxonMobil, a major carbon producer, is a genuine supporter – a fact that many simply can’t comprehend. But Exxon Mobil’s data tells it that, in the long term, it’s smart policy to insure that carbon pays its way. Adopting a carbon tax shift is one systemic way to put a price on an atmospherically dangerous byproduct. And while the quest for that 3% solution will be difficult, it will open up a wide range of opportunities as well. So let’s begin to think outside the standard gloom-and-doom mentality to make systemic, positive environmental changes that benefit multiple interests. When we do, we might very well discover that the technological, corporate, and political support needed to save the planet is well within our reach.

#### Capitalist innovation solves — it promotes self-development and mitigates the terminal impact.

Bailey 14 — (Ronald; 10/31/14; award-winning science correspondent; Reason, “Is Capitalism Environmentally Unsustainable?”, http://reason.com/archives/2014/10/31/is-capitalism-unsustainable?n\_play=54547667e4b0dcc26e7944fe)

Human activity is remaking the face of the Earth: transforming and polluting the landscape, warming the atmosphere and oceans, and causing species to go extinct. The orthodox view among ecologists is that human liberty—more specifically economic activity and free markets—is to blame. For example, the prominent biologist-activists Paul and Anne Ehrlich of Stanford University recently argued in a British science journal that the environmental problems we face are driven by "overpopulation, overconsumption of natural resources and the use of unnecessarily environmentally damaging technologies and socio-economic-political arrangements to service Homo sapiens' aggregate consumption." The Ehrlichs urge the "reduction of the worship of 'free' markets that infests the discipline" of economics. But the notion that economic activity and free markets are antithetical to the flourishing of the natural world is complicated by the fact that the countries with the biggest environmental problems today, and the least means and apparent interest in addressing them, are not the liberalized ones with advanced capitalist economies but the ones with weak or nonexistent democracies and still-developing economies. So is it really the case that liberty and the environment are simply opposed? Does the good of one come only at the expense of the other? Or can liberty and a flourishing natural environment reinforce one another, the good of one encouraging the good of the other? Can economic activity under a system of liberty be environmentally sustainable in the long run? ... Many of these academics—though not all—acknowledge that market economies on the whole have greatly improved the lot of humanity over the past few centuries, leading to better standards of living, higher levels of education, and more civil and political rights. But they argue that the system of liberty produces accumulating externalities that will eventually drive civilization to self-destruction. Either human beings start restructuring civilization soon, the Ehrlichs warn, or "nature will restructure civilization for us." The Lockean response to these academics' worries is that free-market capitalism is as much about growing inward as outward—about learning to derive progressively more value from a finite supply of natural resources, so that we need not consume ever more of those resources. On this understanding, there need be no contradiction between meeting human material needs and preserving a large portion of the natural environment. So we have two broad views of the sustainability of the system of liberty, and they could hardly be more opposed: one of steady growth and self-reinforcing gains in the efficient use of natural resources, and one in which this growth may be maintained for a deceptively bountiful period of human history before it collapses in on itself. ... We can now begin to see the shape of an answer to our initial question of whether liberty and the natural environment must necessarily be opposed. In early stages of modern economic development, as liberty is unleashed in open-access orders, people convert relatively plentiful but unproductive nature into more productive but relatively scarcer human labor—that is, higher population—and manufactured capital. In those early stages, liberty and the environment function as what economists call "substitute goods," with more liberty resulting in less demand for the environment in its natural state. In such societies, fertility rates remain high and environmental amenities and quality continue to deteriorate. But at later stages of economic development, human and manufactured capital become so effective, thanks especially to technological progress, that the environment can be returned to a more natural state. And since such societies are more prosperous, they can better afford the costs of environmental regulations, even inefficient ones. ... Free markets are the most robust mechanism ever devised by humanity for delivering rapid feedback on how decisions turn out. Profits and losses discipline people to learn quickly from and fix their mistakes. By contrast, top-down bureaucratization tends to stall innovation and to make it more difficult for people and societies to adapt rapidly to changing conditions, economic and ecological. Centrally planned economies fail; centrally planning the world's ecology will fail as well. Our aim must be to find ways for liberty and the environment to flourish together, not to sacrifice one in the vain hope of protecting the other.

### 2AC — Capitalism is Sustainable

#### Neoliberalism is sustainable — problems can be solved with pragmatic politics.

Strain 14 — (Michael; 3/30/14; resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute; NY Times, “Responsible Politics Can Cure Capitalism’s Ills” http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/03/30/was-marx-right/responsible-politics-can-cure-capitalisms-ills)

Though it is not hard to see why Marx believed that the free enterprise system required the exploitation of workers, it is hard to see why anyone would believe that today. In 1970, 26.8 percent of the world's population lived on less than one dollar per day. In 2006, only 5.4 percent did — an 80 percent drop in this extreme poverty measure in less than four decades. What economic system was responsible for this accomplishment? It wasn't "from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs." It was free enterprise. Far from exploiting workers, free enterprise liberated them from deep poverty. Marx was a brilliant thinker and writer, but economists who have meticulously studied his writings easily find its flaws. An obvious one is central to his theory, that the value of an object is determined by the labor required to produce it. This is obviously false: I could spend hundreds of hours writing a song; Bruce Springsteen could write one in 15 minutes worth far more than mine. Q.E.D. But as devastatingly wrong as Marx was about the most important questions he tried to tackle (see also: "Union, Soviet"), Marx was right about quite a bit. There is an inherent instability in capitalism — cycles of boom and bust lead to human misery. Capitalism does create income and wealth inequality. Our tough times now heighten our sensitivity to asymmetries, making Marx's observations particularly poignant. Wages are stagnant, while corporate profits are high. Millions knock on doors looking for jobs with no success, while the economy's superstars take home seven-figure salaries. Political candidates debate the marginal tax rate on the highest earners while ignoring the unemployed. But these problems don't mean capitalism will inevitably unravel, as Marx thought. First, many of today's problems are temporary results of the Great Recession. And on a deeper level, Marx erred significantly in believing that social relations and social institutions are founded upon economics. We are not slaves to changes in the way goods and services are produced and exchanged. Likewise, the flipside of communism is mistaken: The economy is not a holy, untouchable, object. In fact, both Marxism and pure laissez-faire elevate the economy above its proper station, ignoring the ability (Marxism) and the duty (laissez-faire) of culture, and through it politics, to soften the rough edges of the free enterprise system. The social safety net for the truly needy is the example of how culture and politics can correct the excesses of the free enterprise system. We let the free enterprise system create wealth and give people the freedom to pursue their dreams and to flourish, while letting culture direct the fruits of the market to proper social ends. Finding the right balance is the hard work of responsible politics.

#### Neoliberalism is self-correcting.

Perry 15 — (Mark J., econ and finance prof @ UMich—Flint, PhD in econ @ George Mason University, MBA @ University of Minnesota, scholar @ American Enterprise Institute, member of the Board of Scholars for the Mackinac Center for Public Policy, “Government regulation vs. regulation by market forces and consumer-regulators”, 1/16/15, *American Enterprise Institute*, https://www.aei.org/publication/government-regulation-vs-regulation-market-forces-consumer-regulators)

I’ve argued many times before on CD that when it comes to regulation of markets, businesses or industries, it’s never a choice between: a) government regulation and b) no regulation. Rather, it’s a choice between: a) government regulation and b) regulation by arguably the most ruthless, meticulous, and conscientious group of regulators imaginable: consumers. These ruthless consumer-regulators waste no time trashing products they don’t like on websites like Amazon (see example here), trashing restaurants they don’t like on Yelp (see example here), giving bad sellers negative reviews on eBay, giving bad movies negative reviews on Rotten Tomatoes (see example here), giving contractors negative reviews on Angie’s List, giving bad Uber drivers negative reviews, giving bad taxi drivers negative reviews (that would never work), etc. The one million companies that typically file for bankruptcy every year have also felt the wrath and strict disciplinary actions of the swarm of millions of pesky, ruthless consumer-regulators who have no tolerance for bad service, poor quality products, and high prices, and never hesitate to express their dissatisfaction when they regulate every day of the year with their regulatory certificates of approval, knows as dollar bills. When enough consumer-regulators withhold their regulatory certificates of approval from a restaurant, store or business, bankruptcy is often the inevitable collective decision of the nation’s most callous, cruel, ruthless and cold-blooded consumer-regulators. On the other hand, the ruthless consumer-regulators also waste no time praising, endorsing and recommending the products, restaurants, movies, services, sellers, contractors and businesses they like, both by supporting them with plenty of their regulatory certificates of approval (dollars), and by giving them positive, sometimes even glowing reviews on Amazon, Yelp, Rotten Tomatoes, eBay, Angie’s List, Uber, etc. The distinction above between regulation by government/politicians/bureaucrats versus regulation by consumer-regulators was explained exceptionally well by economist (and old friend) Howard Baejter in his excellent article that appeared in FEE this week titled “There’s No Such Thing as an Unregulated Market: It’s a choice between regulation by legislators or by consumers,” here’s a key excerpt: We never face a choice between regulation and no regulation. We face a choice between kinds of regulation: regulation by legislatures and bureaucracies, or regulation by market forces — regulation by restriction of choice, or regulation by the exercise of choice. There is no such thing as an unregulated free market. If a market is free, it is closely regulated by the free choices of market participants. The actions of each constrain and influence the actions of others in ways that make actions regular — more or less predictable, falling within understandable bounds. Government regulation is not the only kind of regulation; market forces also regulate. Recognizing this, communicating it to others, and getting the awareness into public discourse are key steps toward greater economic liberty. The benefit of this semantic change — opening up the meaning of “regulation” to include regulation by market forces — is to raise the question, which works better? Regulation by market forces works better, but that’s another argument. The first step is to recognize that market forces regulate, too. So we have a paradox: the less a market is regulated — no, that’s not the right word; the less a market is restricted — by government, the more it is regulated by market forces. Conversely, the more government restriction, the less regulation by market forces. There is a direct trade-off between the two. Bottom Line: The choice isn’t between government regulation and a completely unregulated economy; the real choice is who gets to serve as the primary group of regulators: a) government bureaucrats and legislators who are often captured by regulated industries like taxi cartels, or b) the consumer-regulators. And there’s no question that captured government regulators almost always put the special interests of the well-organized, concentrated groups of regulated producers like the taxi cartel over the public interest of the dis-organized, dispersed thousands/millions of consumer-regulators. As Howie points out, government regulation often “crowds out” regulation by market forces and consumer-regulators, and markets therefore operate less efficiently because the interests of the producers take priority over the interests of consumers. I’d say in conclusion that if the goal is to protect consumers, we need a lot more regulation by impersonal market forces and consumer-regulators and a lot less regulation by the government/politicians/bureaucrats.

### Extend: “Framework”

#### Concrete research on the pragmatics of immigration is essential to social change.

Pastor and Alva 4 — MANUEL PASTOR is Professor of Latin American and Latino Studies and Director of the Center for Justice, Tolerance, and Community at the University of California, Santa Cruz, AND SUSAN ALVA is affiliated with the Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights of Los Angeles “Guest workers and the new transnationalism: possibilities and realities in an age of repression,” social justice vol 31. Nos. 1-2 (2004)

We embarked on this project partly for that reason: part of a groupʼs power derives from its capacity to organize and pressure policymakers, but power is often enhanced when advocates can demonstrate that they have an alternative approach that makes sense and is realistic or factible in the political realm. We believed that behind public proclamations against guest worker programs might lay a serious and honest interest by advocates in thinking through the best possible program. Our research process, which coupled activist and academic methodologies, helped to create a way in which central concerns could surface and, we hope, eventually inform the public debate. In doing this, we have uncovered a set of basic principles that advocates seem to accept and that could help to structure positions in the future. Progressives, in our view, cannot afford pure, unadulterated opposition to the emerging guest workers alternatives. We must understand the emerging transnational realities and propose nuanced alternatives that resonate with those most affected. We must be willing to engage in real debate, even as we rely on a firm compass and set of beliefs regarding the rights of transnational workers. Currently, this willingness to be visionary and pragmatic is especially critical. Advocates may disagree on the relative merits of AgJOBS versus the DaschleHagel proposal, but we cannot afford the fragmentation that would let the flawed Bush plan pass unchallenged through the political currents. In a world in desperate need of more humane policies for immigrants and non-immigrants alike, creativity in our thinking and action will be necessary to carve new approaches that can benefit all residents.

#### The alternative to policy discussions is nativist retaliation.

Cunningham-Parmeter 10 — Keith, Assistant Professor of Law, Willamette University Industrial and Labor Relations Review Jnauary, 63 Indus. & Lab. Rel. rev 357

The author's admonition against repeating the sins of the Bracero Program forms the core of his policy argument. Some readers may be surprised to learn that a modern guestworker program continues today, with ongoing abuses. Bacon ponders why, in light of the historical failure of previous guestworker programs, today's immigration reform proposals contain temporary worker components. Although Bacon argues convincingly that an expanded guestworker program would worsen already miserable working conditions, no realistic alternative is really offered. As such, the non-prescriptive critique left this reviewer wanting more. Bacon's only clear immigration reform proposal, in fact, involves large-scale legalization coupled with more long-term visas for future migrants. Even if such an outcome were politically feasible (unlikely), the plan would not account for those workers who will remain undocumented after legalization. Some immigrants will fail to qualify for amnesty; others will violate the terms of their visas and stay in the United States without papers. Readers are left to guess how Bacon would deal with this lasting undocumented population. [\*359] Illegal People does not contain many specifics on trade reform either. Given how well Bacon documents the problems caused by international trade agreements, should the United States pull back and raise tariffs once again? The answer is an implicit "no," given Bacon's admission that globalization cannot be halted. Perhaps trade policies could be revised to provide migrants with freedom of association, workplace rights, and some sort of status between countries. Although it alludes to these ideas at times, Illegal People does not clearly outline how any such plan could be enacted or enforced. The scarcity of policy proposals in the book can be traced to Bacon's background as an organizer. For him, the battle over trade, labor, and status will be won on the shop floor, not the legislative floor. He praises immigrants who demand "unconditional amnesty" (p. 157), seeming unconcerned about how such slogans alienate the political center and decrease the possibility of modest reforms. But political compromise is not Bacon's goal. Mobilizing workers is far more important, he would argue, than any short-term fixes offered by politicians.

#### You can’t wish away the immigration system — policy discussions are essential to challenge racist attitudes.

Williams 6 — Columnist, Activist, Pastor of the Resurrection Community Church in Oakland, CA [Byron Williams, May 9, 2006, Immigration Frenzy Points Out Need for Policy Debate, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/byron-williams/immigration-frenzy-points\_b\_20717.html]

As a child I recall Thanksgiving with mixed emotions. I enjoyed the big family feast with relatives I had not seen since the previous Thanksgiving, but I dreaded the days after. It was turkey ad nauseam. By the sixth day my father would make what he called "Turkey a la King," which was turkey remnants along with whatever else he could find to put in the pot. As emotions flare on both sides of the immigration debate it has morphed into "Immigration a la King." But unlike my father's mysterious concoction, the ingredients are well known. It consists of one part legitimate public policy, one part ethnocentrism, and one part political pandering. There is no doubting we need a legitimate public policy conversation around illegal immigration. The porous nature of America's borders coupled with the post 9/11 climate does warrant national concern. **If, however, we remove the legitimate public policy aspect, what's left? What's left is ugly, reactionary fear-based hatred symbolizing America at its worst.** With 9/11 approaching its 5th anniversary, why are we just getting around to dealing with immigration? Like a wounded, cornered animal, the Republican-led Congress and the president conveniently fan the flames of one of America's greatest tragedies, resurfacing fear, in order to gain short-term political points. It is hard to embrace the concept that at this late date the administration and Congress are worried about Al Qaeda members coming across the border in man made tunnels or in the back of trucks when you consider the 9/11 attackers entered the country legally. They have successfully created a climate where vigilantes known as the Minutemen--who do a disservice to the brave individuals who fought during the Revolutionary War by embracing the name--are viewed as patriotic by taking the law into their own hands allegedly protecting American's borders. How many poor white southerners willingly accepted a death sentence by fighting for the Confederacy to protect a "southern way of life" in which they did not participate? They were seductively lured, in part, by the notion that all hell would break loose if emancipated African slaves were elevated to their same impoverished status. The ethnocentrism and political pandering has sadly infected parts of the African American community. If one removes the veil of objecting to the comparisons between the civil right movement and Hispanic immigration demonstrations, which a number of African Americans hide behind, they would discover the same fear that plagues the dominant culture. This does not dismiss the obvious concerns about the plight of low-skilled African Americans who find themselves competing with immigrants for certain entry-level employment. But again, this is part of the much needed public policy debate that is submerged under the current political frenzy. Freely throwing around words such "illegal" and "Al Qaeda" opens the door to dehumanization. And once an individual has been dehumanized that individual can be taken advantage of. Even those who compassionately advocate for a guest worker program, forget that the last such program that existed on a large scale in this country was struck down by Abraham Lincoln on September 22, 1863. There are legitimate concerns on both sides of this issue. But history has shown us there is something wrong when marginalized groups are systematically pitted against each other. For all of the cries to protect the borders and the loss of job opportunities for low-skilled Americans, I doubt there would be 11 million undocumented individuals in the country if no one was hiring. There can be no legitimate immigration debate that does not hold the business community equally accountable for hiring undocumented individuals while paying less than a living wage. **Each individual must come to his or her decision as to how they feel about immigration. But the only way to have an authentic policy is to have an authentic policy debate--one that does not include the unnecessary ingredients that ultimately lead to dehumanization**.

### Extend: “Permutation”

#### Pure discursive focus fails — the perm solves best.

Heyman 1 — Josiah Heyman is professor of anthropology in the Department of Social Sciences, Michigan Technological University, Houghton , Class and Classification at the US-Mexico Border, Human Organization Vol 60 no 2 2001

Past anthropologists were mightily concerned with the persuasive capacity of classification. They faced two challenging and still pertinent questions about efficacy: how classification affects people’s inward thinking (Strauss 1992) and outward behavior (Rappaport 1967). Scholars like Victor Turner (1967: Chap. 1) were intrigued by unconscious processes connecting symbols and ritual performance to motivated social action. On the other hand, in immigration policy debates, classificatory effects are understood as an outward, behavioral issue: do laws and their enforcement obtain conformity by desire for rewards and fear of penalties? In an robust view of human action, both approaches to efficacy are necessary. (129)

#### The perm is Goldilocks — it solves their offense while avoiding damaging growth and dynamism.

Muller 13 — (Jerry Z, PhD, Prof and Chair History @Catholic, March/April, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2013-02-11/capitalism-and-inequality)

The left, in turn, needs to come to grips with the fact that aggressive attempts to eliminate inequality may be both too expensive and futile. The very success of past attempts to increase equality of opportunity -- such as by expanding access to education and outlawing various forms of discrimination -- means that in advanced capitalist societies today, large, discrete pools of untapped human potential are increasingly rare. Additional measures to promote equality are therefore likely to produce fewer gains than their predecessors, at greater cost. And insofar as such measures involve diverting resources from those with more human capital to those with less, or bypassing criteria of achievement and merit, they may impede the economic dynamism and growth on which the existing welfare state depends. The challenge for government policy in the advanced capitalist world is thus how to maintain a rate of economic dynamism that will provide increasing benefits for all while still managing to pay for the social welfare programs required to make citizens' lives bearable under conditions of increasing inequality and insecurity. Different countries will approach this challenge in different ways, since their priorities, traditions, size, and demographic and economic characteristics vary. (It is among the illusions of the age that when it comes to government policy, nations can borrow at will from one another.) But a useful starting point might be the rejection of both the politics of privilege and the politics of resentment and the adoption of a clear-eyed view of what capitalism actually involves, as opposed to the idealization of its worshipers and the demonization of its critics.

### Extend: “Capitalist Peace Theory (CPT)”

#### Capitalist peace theory is empirically verified.

Harrison 11 — (Mark, Professor of Economics at the University of Warwick, Centre for Russian and East European Studies, University of Birmingham, research fellow at the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace; Stanford University, “Capitalism at War” http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/staff/academic/harrison/papers/capitalism.pdf)

Capitalism’s Wars America is the world’s preeminent capitalist power. According to a poll of more than 21,000 citizens of 21 countries in the second half of 2008, people tend on average to evaluate U.S. foreign policy as inferior to that of their own country in the moral dimension. 4 While this survey does not disaggregate respondents by educational status, many apparently knowledgeable people also seem to believe that, in the modern world, most wars are caused by America; this impression is based on my experience of presenting work on the frequency of wars to academic seminars in several European countries. According to the evidence, however, these beliefs are mistaken. We are all aware of America’s wars, but they make only a small contribution to the total. Counting all bilateral conflicts involving at least the show of force from 1870 to 2001, it turns out that the countries that originated them come from all parts of the global income distribution (Harrison and Wolf 2011). Countries that are richer, measured by GDP per head, such as America do not tend to start more conflicts, although there is a tendency for countries with larger GDPs to do so. Ranking countries by the numbers of conflicts they initiated, the United States, with the largest economy, comes only in second place; third place belongs to China. In first place is Russia (the USSR between 1917 and 1991). What do capitalist institutions contribute to the empirical patterns in the data? Erik Gartzke (2007) has re-examined the hypothesis of the “democratic peace” based on the possibility that, since capitalism and democracy are highly correlated across countries and time, both democracy and peace might be products of the same underlying cause, the spread of capitalist institutions. It is a problem that our historical datasets have measured the spread of capitalist property rights and economic freedoms over shorter time spans or on fewer dimensions than political variables. For the period from 1950 to 1992, Gartzke uses a measure of external financial and trade liberalization as most likely to signal robust markets and a laissez faire policy. Countries that share this attribute of capitalism above a certain level, he finds, do not fight each other, so there is capitalist peace as well as democratic peace. Second, economic liberalization (of the less liberalized of the pair of countries) is a more powerful predictor of bilateral peace than democratization, controlling for the level of economic development and measures of political affinity.

#### Capitalist peace theory is true.

McMaken 15 — (Ryan, Communications Director and Editor @ Ludwig von Mises Institute, editor of Mises Daily and The Austrian, MA in poli sci @ UC Denver, citing **Steven Pinker**, psychology prof @ Harvard, PhD @ Harvard, “Steven Pinker: Capitalism Has Made Us Less Warlike”, 7/9/15, Accessed 6/26/16, https://mises.org/blog/steven-pinker-capitalism-has-made-us-less-warlike) srivats\_narayanan

Nevertheless, modern industrialized states do recognize the costs of major wars to be very high, and that does not appear to have always been the case. Part of the reason for the high cost of war today is the fact that commerce with other states is so very profitable. Even the most obtusely nationalistic politicians are often forced to admit that killing large numbers of people in your foreign markets is probably a bad idea. In a recent interview at Vox, Pinker elaborated on this a little further: Zack Beauchamp: One story you hear from political scientists for why there's been less war recently that it's just less profitable—countries don't gain very much, economically or politically, from taking over new land anymore. Does that seem right to you? Steven Pinker: Yes, it's one of the causes. It's the theory of the capitalist peace: when it's cheaper to buy things than to steal them, people don't steal them. Also, if other people are more valuable to you alive than dead, you're less likely to kill them. You don't kill your customers or your lenders, so the arrival of the infrastructure of trade and commerce reduces some of the sheer exploitative incentives of conquest. This is an idea that goes back to the Enlightenment. Adam Smith and Montesquieu extolled it; it was on the minds of the founders when they built incentives for free trade into the Constitution. I don't think it's the entire story of the decline in war. But I do think it's part of the story. There was a well-known study from Bruce Russett and John O’Neal showing statistically that countries that engage in more trade are less likely to get into militarized disputes, and countries that are more integrated into the world economy are less likely to get into trouble with their neighbors. While the empirical data supporting this theory is interesting and useful, the theory itself is old news for Austrians, of course, since both Bastiat and Mises made the case long ago that more trade leads to fewer military conflicts. And this has long been the position of laissez-faire liberals, including Richard Cobden the 19th-century free-trade English liberal and so-called International Man who was known for his anti-nationalistic insistence on trade instead of war. And then there's that phenomena where, thanks to the market, people are more useful to you alive than dead. For more on this, see Mark Tovey's analysis of how this works in a post-apocalyptic situation. Pinker goes on: Countries that trade with each other are less likely to pick fights with each other. Independently, individual countries that get more integrated into the global economy are less likely to make trouble.

#### Globalization solves war and a litany of existential threats — short term, political expediency is irrelevant.

Goldin 15 — (Ian; 8/23/15; Director of the Oxford Martin School, Professor of Globalization and Development at the University of Oxford; Project Syndicate, “Global Solutions for Globalization’s Problems," https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/globalization-and-managing-systemic-risk-by-ian-goldin-2014-11)

OXFORD – The last few decades of globalization and innovation have resulted in the most rapid progress that the world has ever known. Poverty has been reduced. Life expectancy has increased. Wealth has been created at a scale that our ancestors could not have imagined. But the news is not all good. In fact, the achievements brought about by globalization are now under threat. The world has simultaneously benefited from globalization and failed to manage the inherent complications resulting from the increased integration of our societies, our economies, and the infrastructure of modern life. As a result, we have become dangerously exposed to systemic risks that transcend borders. These threats spill across national boundaries and cross the traditional divides between industries and organizations. An integrated financial system propagates economic crises. International air travel spreads pandemics. Interconnected computers provide rich hunting grounds for cybercriminals. Middle Eastern jihadis use the Internet to recruit young Europeans. Living standards rise – and greenhouse-gas emissions follow, accelerating climate change. As a byproduct of globalization, crises that once burned locally and then quickly flamed out now risk sparking international conflagrations. A pandemic, flood, or cyber attack in the City of London or Wall Street could send the entire world into a financial tailspin. If the progress that globalization has delivered is to be sustained, countries must accept shared responsibility for managing the risks that it has engendered. National governments – whether powerful, like the United States and China, or weak, like Iraq and Liberia – are unable to address these cascading and complex challenges on their own. Only a small fraction of the risks arising from globalization require a truly global response. But, by definition, these risks transcend the nation-state; thus, coordinated action is required to address them effectively. The nature of the response needs to be tailored to the threat. In the case of pandemics, the key is to support countries where outbreaks occur and help those most at risk of infection. Widespread dangers, such as climate change or a new financial crisis, can require the cooperation of dozens of countries and a broad range of institutions. In nearly every case, an international effort is needed. An important characteristic of the risks of a globalized world is that they often become more serious over time. As a result, the speed at which they are identified, along with the effectiveness of the response, can determine whether an isolated event becomes a global threat. One need only look at the rise of the Islamic State, the outbreak of Ebola, the fight against climate change, or the financial contagion of 2008 to see what happens when a danger remains unidentified for too long or a coordinated response is missing or mismanaged. And yet, just as the need for robust regional and international institutions is at its greatest, support for them is waning. A growing number of citizens in Europe, North America, and the Middle East blame globalization for unemployment, rising inequality, pandemics, and terrorism. Because of these risks, they regard increased integration, openness, and innovation as more of a threat than an opportunity. This creates a vicious circle. The concerns of the electorate are reflected in rapidly growing support for political parties that advocate increased protectionism, reductions in immigration, and greater national control over the marketplace. As a result, governments across Europe, North America, Asia, and Oceania are becoming more parochial in their concerns, starving international agencies and regional organizations of the funding, credibility, and leadership capabilities needed to mount a proper response to the challenges of globalization. In the short term, countries may be able to duck their global responsibilities, but the threat posed by events beyond their borders cannot be kept at bay forever. Unaddressed, the endemic dangers of a globalized world will continue to grow. In confronting dangers such as the Islamic State, Ebola, financial crisis, climate change, or rising inequality, short-term political expediency must be overcome – or the entire world will come to regret it.

### They Say: “Commodification”

#### Capitalism and commodification are crucial to self-cultivation. That liberates people from drudgery and promotes innovation and knowledge.

Muller 13 — (Jerry Z, PhD, Prof and Chair History @Catholic, March/April, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2013-02-11/capitalism-and-inequality)

The growth of market-oriented households and what came to be called "commercial society" had profound implications for practically every aspect of human activity. Prior to capitalism, life was governed by traditional institutions that subordinated the choices and destinies of individuals to various communal, political, and religious structures. These institutions kept change to a minimum, blocking people from making much progress but also protecting them from many of life's vicissitudes. The advent of capitalism gave individuals more control over and responsibility for their own lives than ever before -- which proved both liberating and terrifying, allowing for both progress and regression. Commodification -- the transformation of activities performed for private use into activities performed for sale on the open market -- allowed people to use their time more efficiently, specializing in producing what they were relatively good at and buying other things from other people. New forms of commerce and manufacturing used the division of labor to produce common household items cheaply and also made a range of new goods available. The result, as the historian Jan de Vries has noted, was what contemporaries called "an awakening of the appetites of the mind" -- an expansion of subjective wants and a new subjective perception of needs. This ongoing expansion of wants has been chastised by critics of capitalism from Rousseau to Marcuse as imprisoning humans in a cage of unnatural desires. But it has also been praised by defenders of the market from Voltaire onward for broadening the range of human possibility. Developing and fulfilling higher wants and needs, in this view, is the essence of civilization. Because we tend to think of commodities as tangible physical objects, we often overlook the extent to which the creation and increasingly cheap distribution of new cultural commodities have expanded what one might call the means of self-cultivation. For the history of capitalism is also the history of the extension of communication, information, and entertainment -- things to think with, and about. Among the earliest modern commodities were printed books (in the first instance, typically the Bible), and their shrinking price and increased availability were far more historically momentous than, say, the spread of the internal combustion engine. So, too, with the spread of newsprint, which made possible the newspaper and the magazine. Those gave rise, in turn, to new markets for information and to the business of gathering and distributing news. In the eighteenth century, it took months for news from India to reach London; today, it takes moments. Books and news have made possible an expansion of not only our awareness but also our imagination, our ability to empathize with others and imagine living in new ways ourselves. Capitalism and commodification have thus facilitated both humanitarianism and new forms of self-invention.

### They Say: “Inequality”

#### Inequality means we need to reform capitalism, not abandon it.

Muller 13 — (Jerry Z, PhD, Prof and Chair History @Catholic, March/April, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2013-02-11/capitalism-and-inequality)

Inequality is indeed increasing almost everywhere in the postindustrial capitalist world. But despite what many on the left think, this is not the result of politics, nor is politics likely to reverse it, for the problem is more deeply rooted and intractable than generally recognized. Inequality is an inevitable product of capitalist activity, and expanding equality of opportunity only increases it -- because some individuals and communities are simply better able than others to exploit the opportunities for development and advancement that capitalism affords. Despite what many on the right think, however, this is a problem for everybody, not just those who are doing poorly or those who are ideologically committed to egalitarianism -- because if left unaddressed, rising inequality and economic insecurity can erode social order and generate a populist backlash against the capitalist system at large. Over the last few centuries, the spread of capitalism has generated a phenomenal leap in human progress, leading to both previously unimaginable increases in material living standards and the unprecedented cultivation of all kinds of human potential. Capitalism's intrinsic dynamism, however, produces insecurity along with benefits, and so its advance has always met resistance. Much of the political and institutional history of capitalist societies, in fact, has been the record of attempts to ease or cushion that insecurity, and it was only the creation of the modern welfare state in the middle of the twentieth century that finally enabled capitalism and democracy to coexist in relative harmony. In recent decades, developments in technology, finance, and international trade have generated new waves and forms of insecurity for leading capitalist economies, making life increasingly unequal and chancier for not only the lower and working classes but much of the middle class as well. The right has largely ignored the problem, while the left has sought to eliminate it through government action, regardless of the costs. Neither approach is viable in the long run. Contemporary capitalist polities need to accept that inequality and insecurity will continue to be the inevitable result of market operations and find ways to shield citizens from their consequences -- while somehow still preserving the dynamism that produces capitalism's vast economic and cultural benefits in the first place.

### They Say: “Reps First/Starting Point”

#### Focus on representations and language of immigration produces useless analysis.

Heyman 1 — Josiah Heyman is professor of anthropology in the Department of Social Sciences, Michigan Technological University, Houghton, Class and Classification at the US-Mexico Border, Human Organization Vol 60 no 2 2001

The study of classification requires, first, analyzing the conceptual categories in and of themselves. This step involves delineating overt classifications and also revealing covert categories and symbolic operations. Without questioning the manifest importance of such interpretative work, I caution against two excessively “intellectualist” tendencies: 1) to do “social” analysis by maneuvering verbalized terms for kinds of people; and 2) to see the intellectual categories as self-enacting, which they are not. Some analysts restrict themselves only to experience-near symbols and meanings, while others aggressively dissect the hidden resonances of discourse. In both cases, however, the assumption is that the activity of people follows unproblematically from the words generated within it. Such an assumption cuts off analysis both of behavior and of words, and is unwarranted, given the contradictory interplay of thought and action in culture (Murphy 1971). In general, we should not short-circuit social analysis by “reading” discursive labels, however contested, as an intellectually deciphered map of social process. Classification is public acts of cognition about selves and others, performed by actors who, no matter how powerful, speak for themselves and not the entirety of social arrangements (Wolf 1999). This understanding of discourse begs further questions: by whom and how are meanings propagated? To address them, we need to study the prosaic conduct of symbolic classification. (129)

#### Pragmatic advocates must embrace security rationales for migration.

Cook 10 — MARIA LORENA COOK Department of International and Comparative Labor, School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University, The Advocate’s Dilemma: Framing Migrant Rights in National Settings Studies in Social Justice Volume 4, Issue 2, 145-164, 2010

But how effective are universal human rights framings of migration in persuading citizens to alter their support for restrictive border and immigration policies? There are political, legal, and discursive limits on the use of human rights frames, particularly in the United States. Moreover, much of the contemporary debate on immigration in the US and other advanced industrial democracies revolves around arguments about security, economics, and law—arguments that are rooted in the nation-state. This gives rise to the advocate’s dilemma: on the one hand, universal norms such as human rights, which are theoretically well suited to advancing immigrants’ claims, may have little resonance within national settings; on the other hand, the debates around which immigration arguments typically turn, and the terrain on which advocates must fight, derive their values and assumptions from a nation-state framework that is self-limiting, for reasons I explain below. (146)

#### Economic framing enhances democracy.

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The discourse of flows, economic growth, and the work ethic highlights the desirability of integrating immigrants into the mainstream of U.S. society, which ultimately leads to a strengthening of democracy in the United States. For the CCIR, education plays a key role in the **construction of citizens**. The CCIR calls for civic participation, a full commitment to educating immigrants in English, and teaching them about “economic opportunity.” For them, local communities also need to be involved in this educational commitment so that they can welcome immigrants and facilitate integration. Offering a “realistic” framework for meeting U.S. labor needs and for integrating immigrants into U.S. society animates the CCIR. Turning immigrants into citizens, however, is neither a quick nor a one-stop occurrence. To “earn citizenship,” one must complete a lengthy and rigorous process that includes the following: admit breaking the law, pay a fine, pay back taxes, pass a background check, and learn English. After immigrants apply, they need to work for 6 years in the United States and be “productive” and “hard” workers. For the CCIR, workers and immigrants alike are not implicitly or explicitly marked as “Mexican” or “Latin American.” The visuals on their Web page, in fact, show people from a variety of countries. In a statement on immigration reform, United Farm Workers president Arturo S. Rodriguez (2007) articulated the CCIR’s view of earned citizenship as strengthening the United States: This is the first step to provide earned legalization for our nation’s immigrant community, including the thousands of hard-working farm workers who perform some of the most important and vital work for this country— feeding America and making us stronger. Rodriguez’s statement highlights a pathway to earned citizenship, found, for example, in his talk of “earned legalization.” Liberal and moderate Democrats such as Senator Obama share this perspective on citizenship. Although the CCIR’s position seems to represent the views of most liberals, sharp divisions exist between liberal and moderate Democrats. According to a Pew survey, both liberal and moderate Democrats favor a path to citizenship for undocumented immigrants and recognize the ways in which immigrant labor contributes to the U.S. economy. Moderate Democrats, however, want to limit the number of immigrants who enter the United States and strongly support restrictive measures such as building a fence along the U.S.–Mexico border.6 (94-5)

### They Say: “Security/Economic Framing Bad”

#### Security and economic arguments are essential to successful immigration debates.

Cook 10 — MARIA LORENA COOK Department of International and Comparative Labor, School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University, The Advocate’s Dilemma: Framing Migrant Rights in National Settings Studies in Social Justice Volume 4, Issue 2, 145-164, 2010

I have argued here that given the global occurrence of migration and its links to globalization, it makes sense for migrant advocates to base their campaigns and actions on a “global frame”: human rights and international law and standards applied to migrants. Yet because national legislation, national judicial systems, and national sovereignty still play a central role in determining immigration policy, international human rights law is a limited instrument for use in seeking rights for unauthorized migrants. In most restrictive immigration policy environments, moreover, arguments about economics, security, and law articulated within a national framework tend to prevail. Advocates employing a global frame may find themselves talking past the mass publics they want to influence and unable to counter their opponents effectively.

#### Security and economic framing is inevitable. We must challenge nativist conclusions to stop restrictionist tendencies.

Cook 10 — MARIA LORENA COOK Department of International and Comparative Labor, School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University, The Advocate’s Dilemma: Framing Migrant Rights in National Settings Studies in Social Justice Volume 4, Issue 2, 145-164, 2010

Nativists have framed the debate in the US through a combination of website appeals by lobby groups (Numbers USA),12 popular radio talk shows (e.g., Rush Limbaugh), and television “news” (Lou Dobbs on CNN; Fox News). Nativists’ domination of local media outlets and their ability to organize at the grassroots have shifted the national debate in an increasingly conservative direction. Republicans and Democrats who initially supported immigration reform have become more cautious or have become restrictionists themselves, as in the case of Republican Senator John McCain, a former co-sponsor of a comprehensive immigration reform bill with Democratic Senator Edward Kennedy (Goldman, 2010). Those who were earlier marginalized as extreme have moved to the mainstream, as former U.S. Republican Representative Tom Tancredo’s case shows (Anti-Defamation League, 2007). Reflecting this rightward shift, the tenor of the 2007-08 presidential primary campaign debates was conservative on immigration. Even when Democrats (and Obama) talked about the legalization of 12 million undocumented immigrants, they were careful to avoid the term “amnesty,” stressed the need to “get in line,” and affirmed their strong support for “securing our borders” as a first step. What made the nativists’ voice on the immigration issue so powerful, especially in the face of similar resolve on the part of immigrants and immigrant rights advocates, as shown in the 2006 immigrant rights marches (Bada, Fox, & Selee 2006)? Immigration restrictionists drew upon a combination of economic, security, and legal arguments to stir anxiety and build on insecurities in sectors of the population (Lakoff & Ferguson, 2006; De Genova, 2005). Economic arguments are not new and have long been tied to concerns over the impact of trade and the restructuring of industry and work in the US. Many economic arguments also reflect a class division between those who see their work or wages affected by the presence of immigrants and those who see advantages to employers and consumers because of the ability to rely on cheap labour. Even though the latest wave of nativism began during a period of relative economic prosperity, the recent economic crisis and unemployment in the US have lent even more force to these arguments. For example, two of the largest immigration-restrictionist groups, Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR) and Numbers USA, have positioned themselves on the side of “citizen workers” during the economic crisis, arguing that high immigration undermines American workers (Barry, 2008b). Although security issues have long been entangled with immigration debates, in the first decade of the 21st century security discourse came to occupy an especially important place in these debates. In the post-9/ll environment, nativists and others seized upon border security as a symbol of the government’s failure to protect the nation. Politicians used security arguments to rationalize both the buildup of national border security and the extension of immigration enforcement throughout the country (Koulish, 2010). This concern with national security overlapped with a growing insecurity about the changes wrought by immigration, especially in “new destination” areas of the country, such as southern states that had previously seen little immigration from Mexico and Central America (Zúñiga & Hernández-León, 2005). This insecurity was expressed as a problem of costs to communities (in the form of taxes, use of education and health services, and overcrowded housing), but it was also seen as a cultural threat. The presence of ethnically different people in communities that had long been black and/or white; the encroachment of Spanish in stores, signs, radio and television; and the fear that “assimilation” was unlikely to occur all contributed to this sense of threat (Chavez, 2008; Huntington, 2004). In this way, national security became the means by which to legitimize concerns about cultural threat that might otherwise invite accusations of racism. (153-4)

#### Our advantages challenge the “discourse of danger” used to justify exclusion.

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This discussion of framing has so far focused on the role of nativist groups in the US. But a growing literature on securitization suggests that states also engage in framings around immigration. Indeed, immigration is one area where states can reassert their national sovereignty under globalization. The state’s authority and power are most clearly manifested in, and symbolized by, its border control policies. Securitizing migration leads states to adopt certain policy tools. In particular, states expand their use of “techniques of policing” applied to border security (Andreas, 2003). This can take the form of high-tech surveillance systems, increases in funding and personnel destined to border security, and related policies such as expanded detention, expedited removal, and the externalization of borders. States also securitize migration through discursive means, by engaging in “insecurity framing” (Huysmans, 2006, p. 4). According to Huysmans (2006): Securitizing immigration and asylum constructs political trust, loyalty and identity through the distribution of fear and an intensification of alienation. It is a peculiar process of constitution of a political community of the established that seeks to secure unity and identity by instituting existential insecurity (emphasis mine). (p. 47) This mobilization of fear and institution of insecurity are key components of the securitization of migration. Both are accomplished by “instituting credible claims” that migrants are a “danger, risk, or threat” to the survival of political units, and by conveying a sense of urgency or crisis (Huysmans, 2006, pp. 4 & 47). As Hage (1998) notes, this process plays on a “trauma resulting from a fear of losing...one’s anchorage in the nation” (pp. 23-24). This framing of migration also draws a boundary around the political community and privileges this community over migrants, outsiders, and foreigners in the allocation of protection and rights. Likewise, it creates distance between members of the community and those migrants, outsiders, and foreigners. Securitizing migration therefore makes ample political sense for states in terms of symbolic political value, the assertion of national sovereignty, and the political payoff of fear, such as votes for those who advocate border security. While the material dimensions of border security—the border militarization and surveillance technology—may primarily affect non-citizens, the discursive elements can create fear and so generate acceptance of these policies among citizens. Citizens who are immigrant advocates, however, may find themselves confronting both material and discursive dimensions of securitization head on. Border security policies, heightened surveillance, and laws that criminalize aid to migrants can make advocates the target of surveillance and prosecution and restrict the resources they need to continue their advocacy. The state’s insecurity framing of migration can make it even harder for advocates to influence public opinion and to devise effective counter-framing strategies. In particular, securitization presents advocates with the difficult challenge of reframing migration out of the security discourse of the state, a task that requires advocates to effectively displace the fear and insecurity that has settled around immigration. (155)