# Open Borders Affirmative

## Notes

### Affirmative Notes

#### General Summary

The current US immigration system works through a complex array of visas/quotas. To come to the country you need to qualify for a visa and then be “chosen” as one of the X number of people per year admitted on that visa.

This affirmative would completely eliminate that system. Instead of having visas or quotas, there would be a “default presumption of admittance,” which means it’s assumed anyone can come to the country and stay for however long they want. The plan requires “strict scrutiny” for rejecting admission. Strict scrutiny is a legal term that comes from equal protection jurisprudence and is the *highest bar* for judging whether or not there is a compelling state interest. So the government would have to provide compelling/specific evidence that a specific person (rather than a whole country of origin) posed a security/health threat. This bar would be very difficult for the government to meet, resulting in many more people being admitted.

There are two advantages to the affirmative: morality and economy. You can read either or both.

#### Morality Advantage

The morality advantage says that we should recognize a “right to migrate.” This is based on the idea that people should be able to move to improve their circumstances — whether they are experiencing government oppression or just a bad labor market, the right to life and liberty require mobility if they are to be pursued.

While there is currently a readily acknowledged “right to exit” in international law—i.e. you should be allowed to leave your country—there is no equally acknowledged “right of entry” — that another country must accept you. The right to leave without the right to go somewhere else isn’t very helpful, and thus a right to migrate must be accepted. This advantage has evidence that rejects “consequential” decision making — the it criticizes way at the end of the debate the judge might add up lives saved vs. lives lost. It argues instead that some rights are “prima facia” — they are so important that they can’t be violated through appeals to consequences.

#### Economy Advantage

The economy advantage argues that limits on migration are in effect regulations on economic activity. In the status quo, we have basically unlimited capital mobility—i.e money can move around the globe freely—but highly restricted labor migration. This results in inefficient resource allocation — there is often a mismatch between where jobs are and where the workers who could best fill those jobs are. Open borders facilitates the free flow of workers so people can easily pursue better jobs in other places. There are both growth (GDP) internal links, and poverty/inequality internal links. You can read either impact (or both) in the 1AC.

#### Answering the Brain Drain DA

“Brain Drain” is the idea that when many people move to a particular country it does harm to the country they are leaving. Essentially, the most skilled people will leave, leaving behind a country without high skilled workers like doctors. The DA argues that that process causes big problems for the developing countries. The negative also argues that the DA “turns the case” — because of brain drain, the plan actually *increases* inequality and poverty and is unethical.

There are two arguments you want to emphasize when answering brain drain. The first is “*brain circulation”* — this is the idea that with open borders people would be more willing to move back and forth between countries, so even if they move to the US, they (or their kids) are likely to return. This is a turn that is better for open borders than other affirmatives because of the magnitude of restrictions eliminated — people will be way more confident that if they leave the US for some period they will be able to return. The second argument is *“brain gain”* — these are a variety of different arguments about why emigration (people moving out of their home country) helps those home countries by stimulating educational development or remittances (immigrants sending money home.)

#### Answering the Overpopulation DA

The Overpopulation DA argues that the US population is declining or stabilizing, but a big increase in immigration will reverse these trends and encourage more population growth in the US and in developing countries, which hurts the environment. The basic premise of this strategy is that instead of an unlimited individual right to mobility we should have rights that are balanced with non-human interests (i.e. animals and the environment).

There is a long history of people using “overpopulation” arguments to justify racist immigration policies and eugenics — the idea that we should curate the human gene pool by eliminating people deemed “less worthy” than others. Despite that history, population concerns are a major objection to immigration that is voiced by both the left (environmentalists) and the right (nativists.) The cards in this file represent the “left” objection to immigration. While there is plenty of evidence making overpopulation arguments from the right, those arguments are largely different like “immigrants will use up the welfare state” or “immigrants overwhelm health care infrastructure.” In this debate, the negative will argue that people moving to the US increases consumption of natural resources, and that emigration allows home countries to adopt less environmentally responsible policies because they know immigration will happen and will make up for it.

There are two major categories of aff responses — case outweighs, and substantive responses to the DA itself.

For the economy advantage, you should focus on the short timeframe of your impact and how it might turn or interact with the negative’s environment impacts. Why might the environment get worse if the economy collapses?

For the morality advantage, you want to focus on the reasons the rhetoric/policy of the overpopulation argument is racist and dangerous. You can also use the 1AC impact cards from the morality advantage to explain that we should not be concerned with the consequences of the policy.

There are also substantive responses to the DA — how close is the US to being overpopulated? What is the relationship between immigration and damage to the environment? The aff has evidence to push back against each of the major negative claims.

# Case Arguments

## 1AC

### 1AC — Morality Advantage

#### Advantage [#] is Morality.

#### Immigration restrictions are an inhumane denial of the opportunity to improve one’s situation — they can’t be justified.

Kukathas 13 — Chandran Kulathas, Chair in Political Theory and head of the Department of Government at the London School of Economics and Political Science, Former Professor of Political Theory in the Department of Political Science at the University of Utah, DPhil in Politics from Oxford University, MA in Politics at the University of New South Wales, BA in History and PoliSci at Australian National University, 2013 (“The Case for Open Immigration,” in Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics, 2nd Edition, ed. Andrew I. Cohen and Christopher Heath Wellman, 2014, ISBN-10: 1118479394, p. 380)

The second reason for favoring open borders is a principle of humanity. The great majority of the people of the world live in poverty, and for a significant number of them the most promising way of improving their condition is to move. This would remain true even if efforts to reduce trade barriers were successful, rich countries agreed to invest more in poorer ones, and much greater amounts of aid were made available to the developing world. For even if the general condition of a society were good, the situation of particular individuals would often be poor, and for some of them immigration would offer the best prospect of improving their condition. To say to such people that they are forbidden to cross a border in order to improve their condition is to say to them that it is justified that they be denied the opportunity to get out of poverty, or even destitution. And clearly there are many people who share this plight, for numerous illegal immigrants take substantial risks to move from one country to another – courting not only discomfort and even death by traveling under cover in dangerous conditions, but also punishment at the hands of the authorities if caught.

A principle of humanity suggests that very good reasons must be offered to justify turning the disadvantaged away. It would be bad enough to meet such people with indifference and to deny them positive assistance. It would be even worse to deny them the opportunity to help themselves. To go to the length of denying one’s fellow citizens the right to help those who are badly off, whether by employing them or by simply taking them in, seems even more difficult to justify – if, indeed, it is not entirely perverse.

Not all people who look to move are poor or disadvantaged. Nor do all of them care about freedom. But if freedom and humanity are important and weighty values, the prima facie case for open borders is a strong one, since very substantial considerations will have to be adduced to warrant ignoring or repudiating them. I suggest that no such considerations are to be found. But to show this, it is necessary to look more closely at arguments that restrictions of immigration are defensible, and indeed desirable.

#### Utilitarian justifications for restrictions are a smokescreen for discrimination.

Johnson 9 — Kevin R. Johnson, Professor of Public Interest Law at UC Davis School of Law, JD from Harvard, BA in Economics from UC Berkeley, 2009 (Opening the Floodgates: Why America Needs to Rethink its Borders and Immigration Laws, 2009, ISBN-13: 978-0814743096, p. 90-91)

Despite technically complying with the colorblindness demanded by the U.S. Supreme Court,17 modern immigration laws also have racially disparate impacts. People of color are disproportionately barred from entering the country. Such a result is in tension with the nation’s stated commitment to equality under the law.18

Although discrimination against the poor, the disabled, HIV-positive persons, or racial minorities would be patently unlawful if directed against citizens in the United States, it is nothing less than routine under the U.S. immigration laws. One is left to wonder what the moral justifications could be for keeping these groups out of the United States. The elaborate system of controls that inflicts disparate impacts on people of color raises similar questions. All of these excluded groups seem to fall squarely within the category of the “huddled masses” for whom the nation has long—and loudly—declared itself open. There is, however, a simple answer. Most of the exclusionary categories in U.S. immigration law are not based on fairness, equality, or any respect for individual rights. Instead, the restrictions and exclusions are based on crude and arbitrary utilitarian calculations of the relative costs and benefits offered by different groups of immigrants to U.S. society. Of course, such considerations are the antithesis of a liberal devotion to individual rights. (90-1)

#### Utilitarianism is incapable of evaluating human rights — it instrumentalizes the individual, rendering life meaningless.

Donnelly 85 — Jack Donnelly, PhD PoliSci from UC Berkley, 1985 (The Concept of Human Rights, 1985, ISBN-13: 978-0312159412, p. 52-55)

Subservient to utility, there is no objection either to the word or the thing; that which is useful is right: a right is that which grows out of the application of the greatest happiness principle' (Bentham 1834:1, 136-7; compare 1838:11, 501, 111, 159; 1970:58; 1952:1, 333). But the claim that a right is that which is useful confuses rights with what is right (as defined by utility) and thus is just a specification of the (inaccurate) simple-beneficiary theory discussed above. Furthermore, the subservience of utility to rights is the whole point of the special normative force of rights as trumps; subservient to utility, 'rights' are no longer rights. Rights are not the record of utilitarian calculations — or rather, if they are it is a contingent fact of no conceptual significance. Utility does not determine which rights one has. Usually utility does not even determine which rights ought to be exercised, respected, enforced or overridden in particular cases. Ordinarily, rights simply are not subject to utilitarian validation of any sort. Consider a case such as the nazi rally in the late seventies in Skokie, Illinois, a community with a sizable number of Jewish refugees and survivors of the Holocaust. Suppose that we are able to determine empirically, beyond all reasonable doubt, that letting the nazis march provides pleasure to a few and displeasure, even anguish, to a large number; i.e. that the balance of pleasure to pain unambiguously favours prohibiting the rally, even if we give full weight to the long-run costs of the precedents that might be established. None the less, if the rally is speech, as it seems to be, and if the Constitution guarantees the right to speak, as it clearly does, the rally must be permitted. This is simply the way entrenched basic rights work; a protection that did not work this way would not be a right. Or suppose that virtually everyone in a society intensely enjoys torturing members of a fringe political group, so that a calculation of pleasures and pains establishes beyond all doubt that such torture would maximise utility. Such a determination would only increase the importance of rights to freedom of expression and personal liberty. The utility of torture does not imply that the intended victims have no rights, or even that their rights can be justifiably infringed. Utilitarian calculations are not only irrelevant to whether or not one 'has' a right, but in most cases utility is not even the decisive factor in determining what ought to be done, all things considered. Suppose that A has an admitted surplus of money, to which he holds property rights, and B is destitute. Suppose further that a one-time transfer of money from A to B would increase the balance of pleasure, even considering the costs in terms of perceived security to A and others similarly situated. If utility (beneficial obligation) truly yielded rights, B would have a right to that money.6 Central to the very idea of A's right to the money, however, is that B doesn't have a right to it (because A does, and the money is not a public good). The existing distribution of funds in this example may be profoundly unjust. One way to establish this might be through a utilitarian calculation. None the less, A's right to the money largely insulates him from utilitarian claims; A's right, as it were, removes his money from the common fund from which all might be presumed to be justified in drawing on the basis of interest or need — and it is precisely such features of rights that cannot be captured in directly utilitarian terms. Notice that I have yet to mention natural or human rights. This is because utilitarianism has nothing special to say about human rights, as opposed to other kinds of rights. Bentham's attacks on natural rights in particular, including his famous description of imprescriptible natural rights as 'nonsense upon stilts' (1838:11, 501), have absolutely nothing to do with utilitarianism. Instead, they rest on Bentham's legal positivism. Bentham, at a number of points, argues — or rather, asserts —that 'there are no rights other than legal rights' (1838:111, 221, 11, 500-1, VIII, 557; 1970:57, 63, 220, 291). This is simply an arbitrary stipulation. Furthermore, it is at odds not only with our ordinary understanding and practice, but with utilitarianism as well, since laws may easily conflict with utility, especially under Bentham's command theory of law. Either rights are 'the fruits of the law, and of the law alone' (1838:111, 221), or they are subservient to utility. Utilitarianism is incompatible with natural or human rights not because they are human rights, but because they are rights. Rights simply do not work in the same way as considerations of utility; in numerous important cases, rights and utility prescribe different actions or evaluations. None the less, the 'non-utilitarian' ways rights work may be capable of indirect utilitarian justification. Utilitarian moral theories usually are divided into two classes, act and rule utilitarianism. Act utilitarianism involves the direct application of the principle of utility to particular cases. Rule utilitarianism, however, applies the principle of utility directly (only) to 'rules' or social practices. Once a `rule' has been justified as in sum consistent with utlity, particular acts are judged by their conformity to the 'utilitarian' rule. A rule-utilitarian theory of rights does seem to be possible in principle. However, it is largely without interest as a theory of rights because of its concentration on the compatibility of rights and utility. Even if we grant that rights and utility are compatible (in the sense that plausible utilitarian arguments can be advanced to 'justify' the practice in general as well as the implementation, respect or enforcement of numerous particular rights), a rule-utilitarian theory of rights tells us nothing about the nature, source or substance of rights. In fact, concentrating on the question of compatibility — which may be of some importance in evaluating utilitarianism as a general moral theory — is likely to obscure the fundamental differences between rights-based and utility-based moral and political theories and practices. For example, a rule utilitarian may be able to justify the list of basic rights enumerated in, say, the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen; i.e. such a set of rights might be shown to have social consequences which in sum are beneficial, making them (indirectly) 'utilitarian'. Such a utilitarian account, however, would seriously misrepresent the actual natural rights logic that Paine, for example, (correctly) argues underlies the Declaration. The actual justification of this set of rights stresses human dignity, the human person, rather than utility and largely undifferentiated interests and preferences. While a utilitarian may be able to provide some sort of after-the-fact 'justification' for a list of rights, it is difficult to imagine the list being generated from a utilitarian starting point. Beginning with persons endowed with basic rights, whether by `nature' or by the fundamental principles of a regime, we are likely to act and reason differently than if we begin with utility, as it were, tabula rasa. Rights-based theories rest on essentially qualitative moral judgments of persons and practices, as opposed to the fundamentally quantitative approach of utility. Basic moral and political rights are not just weighting factors in utilitarian calculations that deal with an undifferentiated 'happiness'. Rather, they are demands and constraints of a different order, grounded in an essentially substantive judgment of the conditions necessary for human development and flourishing. They also provide means — rights — for realising human potentials. The neutrality of utilitarianism, its efforts to assure that everyone counts 'equally', results in no-one counting as a person; as Robert E. Goodin puts it, people drop out of utilitarian calculations, which are instead about disembodied preferences (1981:95; compare Dworkin 1977:94-100, 232-8, 274 ff.). In Aristotelian terms, utilitarianism errs in basing its judgments on 'numerical' rather than 'proportional' equality.

#### Strictly consequential decision frameworks are unsustainable — they collapse into irrational violence.

Williams 5 — Michael Charles Williams, Professor of Public and International Affairs at the University of Ottawa, Ph.D., 2005 (The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations, 2005, ISBN-13: 978-0521534758, p. 172-3)

If viewed simply as the consideration of likely outcomes, an ethic of consequences is without doubt deeply flawed. Not only is such a vision limited in its capacity to reflect upon the values it presupposes, but it may become the basis of a patently irresponsible politics. Most simply, a reduction of ethics to consequences risks becoming irresponsible pre­cisely by taking for granted the value of its ends and reducing all other actors — and indeed all actions — solely to the consideration of their effi­ciency as means to this end. The outcome of this could scarcely be more clearly expressed than in Edward Luttwak's definition of strategy; as he puts it: 'strategy is not a neutral pursuit and its only purpose is to strengthen one's own side in the contention of nations'.3 In this case, the value of the end is placed beyond consideration, and it is only the consequences of actions which further the goals of this end (in this case, the nation) that are of concern. The difficulties here are obvious. One is left wondering, for example, what might be Luttwak's opinion of a strategist supporting a policy of global domination via genocidal exter­mination. Purely consequential calculation either assumes and leaves unexamined the values to which one is to be responsible (a given state, community, or creed), or (and perhaps at the same time) renders pru­dence the servant of an uncriticised and potentially purely irrational set of drives or commitments. It conspicuously, and damningly, avoids asking the question, 'responsible to whom or to what?'. If this form of objectivity (instrumental calculation) and scepticism (uncriticised ends) were all that Realism entailed, it would indeed seem to support a form of pure decisionism or irrationalism, making for a quite sophisticated but extremely radical form of realpolitik — or a neu­tral 'policy science' — acting in the name of whatever ideology or insti­tution, party or programme happened to prevail at a given moment. Yet despite the attempts of theorists of such a crude realpolitik to appro­priate the title and tradition of 'Realism' for themselves, it seems clear that there is little in such a stance that the wilful Realists surveyed in this book would find compelling. For if all Realist ethics amounts to is just a consideration of consequences, then the fanaticist politics of religious faction so scathingly attacked by Hobbes, the model (and cri­tique) of technical rationality that Morgenthau identified as central to understanding Nazism, or the logic of domination that Rousseau found and rejected in instrumental reason, would have little resonance in the Realist tradition.

#### Refusing the model of crisis-centered politics is crucial prevent structural injustice and insecurity.

Charlesworth 2 — Hilary Charlesworth, Director Centere for International and Public Law at the Australian National University, JD from Harvard, 2002 (“International Law: A Discipline of Crisis,” Modern Law Review, Vol. 65, No. 3, May, Available Online at <https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/1097579.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Aa71e431f70c762fa4446d01146e1b2ce>, Accessed 08-08-2018)

A concern with crises skews the discipline of international law. Through regarding ‘crises’ as its bread and butter and the engine of progressive development of international law, international law becomes simply a source of justification for the status quo. The framework of crisis condemns international lawyers, as David Kennedy puts it, to ‘a sort of disciplinary hamster wheel’.76 One way forward is to refocus international law on issues of structural justice that underpin everyday life. What might an international law of every day life look like? At the same time that the much-analysed events in Kosovo were taking place, 1.2 billion people lived on less than a dollar a day.77 We know that 2.4 billion people in the developing world do not have access to basic sanitation, and that half of this number are chronically malnourished; we know that the developed world holds one quarter of the world’s population, but holds 4/5 of the world’s income; we know that military spending worldwide is over $1 billion a day and that alternative uses of tiny fractions could generate real change in education, health care and nutrition; we know that almost 34 million people worldwide live with HIV/AIDS;78 we know that violence against women is at epidemic levels the world over. Why are these phenomena not widely studied by international lawyers? Why are they at the margins of the international law world? An international law of everyday life would require a methodology to consider the perspectives of non-elite groups. For example, we should able be to study ‘humanitarian intervention’ from the perspective of the people on whose behalf the intervention took place. International lawyers’ accounts of humanitarian intervention prompted by Kosovo do not take the views of the objects of intervention into account. If they did so, we would be likely to end up with a much more contradictory, complex and confusing account of humanitarian intervention than international lawyers have thus far produced. We should also enlarge our inquiries. For example, with respect to the idea of collective security, how can we think about the global security more broadly? Johan Galtung has developed the notion of structural violence that highlights causes other than warfare, for example poverty, as the major cause of death and suffering.79 Other scholars have identified the interconnections of poverty, environmental degradation, discrimination, exploitation, militarisation and violence as the causes of insecurity.80 Feminist scholars have drawn attention to the threats posed, to women not by foreign states, but by more local actors, including the men in their families. On this analysis security would mean the absence of violence and economic and social justice. If the idea of security is understood more broadly, the futility of the standard form of international collective action becomes clear. Military intervention is an inappropriate mechanism if the causes of insecurity are poverty, discrimination and violence protected by structures within the state.

#### A focus on short-term, low probability risks necessitates a sacrifice of justice. The plan’s push for accountability is a better path to peace.

Bassiouni 3 — M. Cherif Bassiouni, Distinguished Research Professor of Law, President, International Human Rights Law Institute, DePaul University College of Law, President, International Institute for Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences, President, International Association of Penal Law, 2003 (“Justice and peace : the importance of choosing accountability over realpolitik,” Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, Spring, Available Online at <https://works.bepress.com/m-bassiouni/15/download/>, Accessed 08-08-2018)

At the end of the Second World War, the world collectively pledged "never again." While the intention of this global promise may have been sincere, its implementation has proved elusive. There have been over 250 conflicts in the twentieth century alone, resulting in the deaths of an estimated 75 to 170 million persons. Both State and non-state actors routinely commit extra-judicial execution, torture, rape and other violations of international human rights and humanitarian law. In most cases, political considerations permit perpetrators of gross violations of human rights to operate with impunity. Yet, alongside the sad truth of our consistently violent world stands the moral commitment of the post-war pledge and the related vision of peace, justice and truth.

The human rights arena is defined by a constant tension between the attraction of realpolitik and the demand for accountability. Realpolitik involves the pursuit of political settlements unencumbered by moral and ethical limitations. As such, this approach often runs directly counter to the interests of justice, particularly as understood from the perspective of victims of gross violations of human rights. Impunity, at both the international and national levels, is commonly the outcome of realpolitik which favors expedient political ends over the more complex task of confronting responsibility. Accountability, in contrast, embodies the goals of both retributive and restorative justice. This orientation views conflict resolution as premised upon responsibility and requires sanctions for those responsible, the establishment of a clear record of truth and efforts made to provide redress to victims.

The pursuit of realpolitik may settle the more immediate problems of a conflict, but, as history reveals, its achievements are frequently at the expense of long-term peace, stability, and reconciliation. It is difficult to achieve genuine peace without addressing victims' needs and without [\*192] providing a wounded society with a sense of closure. A more profound vision of peace requires accountability and often involves a series of interconnected activities including: establishing the truth of what occurred, punishing those most directly responsible for human suffering, and offering redress to victims. Peace is not merely the absence of armed conflict; it is the restoration of justice, and the use of law to mediate and resolve inter-social and inter-personal discord. The pursuit of justice and accountability fulfills fundamental human needs and expresses key values necessary for the prevention and deterrence of future conflicts. For this reason, sacrificing justice and accountability for the immediacy of realpolitik represents a short-term vision of expediency over more enduring human values.

#### Anti-immigration arguments must pass a high bar given the violation of individual rights — they can’t meet that burden.

Kukathas 13 — Chandran Kulathas, Chair in Political Theory and head of the Department of Government at the London School of Economics and Political Science, Former Professor of Political Theory in the Department of Political Science at the University of Utah, DPhil in Politics from Oxford University, MA in Politics at the University of New South Wales, BA in History and PoliSci at Australian National University, 2013 (“The Case for Open Immigration,” in Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics, 2nd Edition, ed. Andrew I. Cohen and Christopher Heath Wellman, 2014, ISBN-10: 1118479394, p. 379-380)

Open borders are consistent with – and on occasion, protect – freedom in a number of ways. First, and most obviously, closed borders restrict freedom of movement. Borders prevent people from moving into territories whose governments forbid them to enter; and to the extent that they cannot enter any other territory, borders confine them within their designated boundaries. This fact is not sufficient to establish that so confining people is indefensible; but if freedom is held to be an important value, then there is at least a case for saying that very weighty reasons are necessary to restrict it. Several other considerations suggest that such reasons would have to be weighty indeed. First, to keep borders closed would mean to keep out people who would, as a consequence, lose not only the freedom to move but also the freedom they might be seeking in an attempt to flee unjust or tyrannical regimes. The effect of this is to deny people the freedom they would gain by leaving their societies and to diminish the incentive of tyrannical regimes to reform the conditions endured by their captive peoples. Second, closing borders means denying people the freedom to sell their labor, and denying others the freedom to buy it. Good reasons are needed to justify abridging this particular freedom, since to deny someone the liberty to exchange his labor is to deny him a very significant liberty. Third, and more generally, keeping borders closed would mean restricting people’s freedom to associate. It would require keeping apart people who wish to come together whether for love, or friendship, or for the sake of fulfilling important duties, such as caring for children or parents. Now, to be sure, defenders of restricted immigration do not generally argue that borders should be completely sealed, or that no one should be admitted. Many concede that exceptions should be made for refugees, that some people should be allowed to come into a country to work, and that some provision should be made for admitting people who wish to rejoin their families. Those who want restricted or controlled immigration are not indifferent to freedom. Nonetheless, even those who argue for generous levels of immigration by implication maintain that people should be turned away at the border. This in itself is a limitation of liberty, for which good reasons must be given. In the end, or so I will argue, the reasons that have been offered are not weighty enough to justify restricting freedom even to a limited degree.

### 1AC — Economy Advantage

#### Advantage [#] is the Economy.

#### **Borders are tightening globally. This is equivalent to leaving trillion dollar bills lying on the sidewalk.**

Eaton 17 — George Eaton, political editor of the NewStatesman, 2017 (“The economic and moral case for global open borders,” NewStatesman, August 21st, Available Online at <https://www.newstatesman.com/2017/08/economic-and-moral-case-global-open-borders>, Accessed 08-08-2018)

Across the world, borders are being closed, not opened. In the US, Donald Trump has vowed to halve immigration to 500,000 and to cap the number of refugees at 50,000. In the UK, the Conservative government has reaffirmed its pledge to end free movement after Brexit is concluded. In Europe, Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic are being sued by the EU for refusing to accept a mandatory share of refugees. Even Jeremy Corbyn’s Labour Party has followed the rightward drift. Its general election manifesto promised to end free movement, and Corbyn recently complained of the “wholesale importation of underpaid workers from central Europe”. Among economists, however, a diametrically opposed conversation prevails. They argue that rather than limiting free movement, leaders should expand it: from Europe to the world. Michael Clemens, a senior fellow at the Center for Global Development, likens the present system to leaving “trillion-dollar bills on the sidewalk”. Economists estimate that allowing migrants to move to any country they choose would increase global GDP by between 67 and 147 per cent. A doubling of GDP (a $78trn increase) would correspond to 23 years of growth at 3 per cent. By contrast, the International Monetary Fund estimates that permitting the entirely free movement of capital would add a mere $65bn.

#### Recession coming now — 2/3rds of economists agree current growth ends by 2020.

Davidson 18 — Paul Davidson, staff writer for USA Today, 2018 (“The economy is humming. So why do experts foresee a recession in 2020?,” USA Today, June 11th, Available Online at <https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2018/06/11/recession-2020-heres-why-economists-think-may-happen/686177002/>, Accessed 08-08-2018)

The skies of the U.S. economy are clear and sunny, but many analysts see storm clouds on the horizon. By many measures, the economy is in its best shape since the Great Recession of 2007 to 2009. Unemployment hit an 18-year low of 3.8% in May. Average wage growth is widely expected to reach 3% by the end of the year. And the economy is projected to grow nearly 3% in 2018 for just the second time since the downturn. Yet the economic expansion is the second-longest in U.S. history, leading many economists to forecast a recession as early as next year. Half the economists surveyed last month by the National Association of Business Economics foresee a recession starting in late 2019 or in early 2020, and two-thirds are predicting a slump by the end of 2020. Why? Precisely because things seem to be going so well. The late stage of an economic expansion is most vulnerable to a popping of the bubble. It's typically when unemployment falls, inflation heats up, the Federal Reserve raises interest rates to cool the economy down — often going too far — and investors and consumers pull back. “It’s just the time when it feels like all is going fabulously that we make mistakes, we overreact, we overborrow,” says Mark Zandi, chief economist of Moody’s Analytics. But some other ingredient typically is needed to tip an economy into recession, Zandi says. In 1990-91, it was an oil price shock. In 2001, it was the bursting of the dotcom bubble and resulting stock market decline. In 2007, it was the housing crash. “A recession fundamentally is an outbreak of pessimism” that causes consumers and businesses to rein in spending, economist Jesse Edgerton of JPMorgan Chase says.

#### Immigration restrictions are the single largest impediment to growth and a driver of global poverty. Overwhelming evidence shows open borders solve.

Bregman 16 — Rutger Bregman, author of Utopia for Realists: The Case for a Universal Basic Income, Open Borders, and a 15-Hour Workweek, MA in History from Utrecht University, 2016 (“The Surprisingly Compelling Argument for Open Borders,” Fortune, April 17th, Available Online at <http://fortune.com/2016/04/17/immigration-open-borders/>, Accessed 08-08-2018)

There’s just one problem with all of the standard arguments against migration: They’re wrong.

In fact, plenty of research shows that there is no better way to make the world wealthier—a lot wealthier—than migration. Four different studies have shown that, depending on the level of movement in the global labor market, the estimated growth in “gross worldwide product” would be in the range of 67% to 147%. Effectively, open borders would make the whole world twice as rich. This has led New York University researcher Michael Clemens to conclude that we’re currently leaving “trillion-dollar bills on the sidewalk.” If all the developed countries would let in just 3% more immigrants, the world’s poor would have $305 billion more to spend, according to a 2007 study by the World Bank. That’s the combined total of all development aid—times three. The problem, in short, isn’t too much migration, but too little. In our era of “globalization,” goods, services, and stocks crisscross the globe, but figures from the United Nations Populations Fund show that only 3% of the world’s population lives outside their country of birth. By making people stay put, national borders form by far the greatest impediment to economic growth. Growth isn’t a cure-all, of course, but in most countries, it’s still the main driver of progress. Opening up our borders, even just a little, is the most powerful weapon we have in the global fight against poverty.

#### Migration captures “comparative advantage” making the global economic pie larger for everyone.

Matthews 14 — Dylan Matthews, staff writer for Vox.com, 2014 (“The case for open borders,” Vox, December 15th, Available Online at https://www.vox.com/2014/9/13/6135905/open-borders-bryan-caplan-interview-gdp-double, Accessed 08-08-2018)

The economic case that open borders would dramatically improve the well-being of the world is rock solid. "Imagine that you’ve got a million people farming in Antarctica. They’re eking out this bare subsistence in agriculture in the snow," he says. "Obviously, if you let those farmers leave Antarctica and go someplace else to farm, the farmers are better off. But isn’t it also better for the world if you let people stop eking out this existence, contributing nothing to the world, and go someplace where they could actually use their skills and not just feed themselves, but produce something for the world economy?" Alternately, think about what happened in the 1960s and '70s as more and more women joined the workforce in the United States. Was the result mass unemployment for men, as women took all their jobs? Of course not — the economy adjusted, and we're all better off for it. "Would we really be a richer society if we kept half the population stuck at home?" Caplan asks. "Isn’t it better to take people who have useful skills and let them do something with it, than to just keep them locked up someplace where their skills go to waste?" That's the basic argument for open borders: that you're "moving productive resources" — people — "from places where they’re next to useless to places where they can contribute a lot." The size of the numbers involved makes the case even more compelling. "You might think that moving from Haiti to the United States would cause a 20 percent increase in wages, but no. It’s more like a 2,000 percent increase in wages," Caplan notes. "The difference between the productivity of labor in poor countries and rich countries is so vast, it’s hard to wrap your mind around it." With numbers that big, the potential gains are enormous. A doubling of world GDP is a reasonable estimate. "This isn’t just trickle-down economics. It’s Niagara Falls economics," he says. "If production in the world were to double, almost everyone is going to get enough of that doubling that they’re going to, in the end, be better off as a result. You can’t double the output of the world and leave a lot of people poor as a result."

#### Prefer our evidence — aff claims are the most settled fact in economics. Consensus of experts agree.

Davidson 15 — Adam Davidson, Founder of NPR’s “Planet Money” and contributing writer for the New York Times Magazine, 2015 (“Debunking the Myth of the Job-Stealing Immigrant,” New York Times, March 24th, Available Online at https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/29/magazine/debunking-the-myth-of-the-job-stealing-immigrant.html?\_r=0 3-24, Accessed 08-08-2018)

And yet the economic benefits of immigration may be the ­most ­settled fact in economics. A recent University of Chicago poll of leading economists could not find a single one who rejected the proposition. (There is one notable economist who wasn’t polled: George Borjas of Harvard, who believes that his fellow economists underestimate the cost of immigration for low-­skilled natives. Borjas’s work is often misused by anti-immigration activists, in much the same way a complicated climate-­science result is often invoked as “proof” that global warming is a myth.) Rationally speaking, we should take in far more immigrants than we currently do. So why don’t we open up? The chief logical mistake we make is something called the Lump of Labor Fallacy: the erroneous notion that there is only so much work to be done and that no one can get a job without taking one from someone else. It’s an understandable assumption. After all, with other types of market transactions, when the supply goes up, the price falls. If there were suddenly a whole lot more oranges, we’d expect the price of oranges to fall or the number of oranges that went uneaten to surge. But immigrants aren’t oranges. It might seem intuitive that when there is an increase in the supply of workers, the ones who were here already will make less money or lose their jobs. Immigrants don’t just increase the supply of labor, though; they simultaneously increase demand for it, using the wages they earn to rent apartments, eat food, get haircuts, buy cellphones. That means there are more jobs building apartments, selling food, giving haircuts and dispatching the trucks that move those phones. Immigrants increase the size of the overall population, which means they increase the size of the economy. Logically, if immigrants were “stealing” jobs, so would every young person leaving school and entering the job market; countries should become poorer as they get larger. In reality, of course, the opposite happens. Most anti-immigration arguments I hear are variations on the Lump of Labor Fallacy. That immigrant has a job. If he didn’t have that job, somebody else, somebody born here, would have it. This argument is wrong, or at least wildly oversimplified. But it feels so correct, so logical. And it’s not just people like my grandfather making that argument. Our government policy is rooted in it. The single greatest bit of evidence disproving the Lump of Labor idea comes from research about the Mariel boatlift, a mass migration in 1980 that brought more than 125,000 Cubans to the United States. According to David Card, an economist at the University of California, Berkeley, roughly 45,000 of them were of working age and moved to Miami; in four months, the city’s labor supply increased by 7 percent. Card found that for people already working in Miami, this sudden influx had no measurable impact on wages or employment. His paper was the most important of a series of revolutionary studies that transformed how economists think about immigration. Before, standard economic models held that immigrants cause long-term benefits, but at the cost of short-term pain in the form of lower wages and greater unemployment for natives. But most economists now believe that Card’s findings were correct: Immigrants bring long-term benefits at no measurable short-term cost. (Borjas, that lone dissenting voice, agrees about the long-term benefits, but he argues that other economists fail to see painful short-term costs, especially for the poor.) Economists have shifted to studying how nations so quickly adjust to new arrivals. The leading scholar on this today is Giovanni Peri of the University of California, Davis, who has shown that immigrants tend to complement — rather than compete against — the existing work force. Take a construction site: Typically, Peri has found, immigrants with limited education perform many support tasks (moving heavy things, pouring cement, sweeping, painting), while citizens with more education focus on skilled work like carpentry, plumbing and electrical installation, as well as customer relations. The skilled native is able to focus on the most valuable tasks, while the immigrants help bring the price down for the overall project (it costs a lot to pay a highly trained carpenter to sweep up a work site). Peri argues, with strong evidence, that there are more native-born skilled craftspeople working today, not fewer, because of all those undocumented construction workers. A similar dynamic is at play on Wall Street. Many technical-support tasks are dominated by recent immigrants, while sales, marketing, advising and trading, which require cultural and linguistic fluency, are typically the domain of the native-born. (Whether Wall Street’s technical wizards have, on balance, helped or hurt the economy is a question for another day.) This paradox of immigration is bound up with the paradox of economic growth itself. Growth has acquired a bad reputation of late among some, especially on the left, who associate the term with environmental destruction and rising inequality. But growth through immigration is growth with remarkably little downside. Whenever an immigrant enters the United States, the world becomes a bit richer. For all our faults, the United States is still far better developed economically than most nations, certainly the ones that most of our immigrants have left. Our legal system and our financial and physical infrastructure are also far superior to most (as surprising as that might sometimes seem to us). So when people leave developing economies and set foot on American soil, they typically become more productive, in economic terms. They earn more money, achieve a higher standard of living and add more economic value to the world than they would have if they stayed home. If largely open borders were to replace our expensive and restrictive lottery system, it’s likely that many of these immigrants would travel back and forth between the United States and their native countries, counteracting the potential brain drain by sharing knowledge and investment capital. Environmentally, immigration tends to be less damaging than other forms of growth, because it doesn’t add to the number of people on earth and often shifts people to more environmentally friendly jurisdictions. To me, immigration is the greatest example of our faulty thinking, a shortsightedness that hurts others while simultaneously hurting ourselves. The State Department issues fewer than half a million immigrant visas each year. Using the 7 percent figure from the Mariel boatlift research, it’s possible that we could absorb as many as 11 million immigrants annually. But if that’s politically untenable, what about doubling the visas we issue each year? It would still be fewer than a million, or less than 0.7 percent of the work force. If that didn’t go too badly, we could double it again the next year. The data are clear. We would be better off. In fact, the world would be better off. Whenever I’m tempted by the notion that humans are rational beings, carefully evaluating the world and acting in ways that maximize our happiness, I think of our meager immigration policies. For me, it’s close to proof that we are, collectively, still jealous, nervous creatures, hoarding what we have, afraid of taking even the most promising risk, displaying loyalty to our own tribe while we stare, suspiciously, at everyone else. It’s nice to believe that I am part of a more mature, rational generation, that my grandfather’s old ways of thinking are dying away. But I’m not so sure. We might be a lot more like him than we want to think.

#### Economic decline causes nuclear war.

Mann 14 — Eric Mann, special agent with a United States federal agency, with significant domestic and international counterintelligence and counter-terrorism experience, former special assistant for a U.S. Senator and served as a presidential appointee for the U.S. Congress, BA from U of South Carolina, MA in Security Studies from Georgetown, 2014 (“Austerity, Economic Decline, and Financial Weapons Of War: A New Paradigm For Global Security,” Graduate Thesis submitted to Johns Hopkins University for MA in Global Security Studies, May, Available Online at <https://jscholarship.library.jhu.edu/bitstream/handle/1774.2/37262/MANN-THESIS-2014.pdf>, Accessed 08-08-2018)

The conclusions reached in this thesis demonstrate how economic considerations within states can figure prominently into the calculus for future conflicts. The findings also suggest that security issues with economic or financial underpinnings will transcend classical determinants of war and conflict, and change the manner by which rival states engage in hostile acts toward one another. The research shows that security concerns emanating from economic uncertainty and the inherent vulnerabilities within global financial markets will present new challenges for national security, and provide developing states new asymmetric options for balancing against stronger states.¶ The security areas, identified in the proceeding chapters, are likely to mature into global security threats in the immediate future. As the case study on South Korea suggest, the overlapping security issues associated with economic decline and reduced military spending by the United States will affect allied confidence in America’s security guarantees. The study shows that this outcome could cause regional instability or realignments of strategic partnerships in the Asia-pacific region with ramifications for U.S. national security. Rival states and non-state groups may also become emboldened to challenge America’s status in the unipolar international system.¶ The potential risks associated with stolen or loose WMD, resulting from poor security, can also pose a threat to U.S. national security. The case study on Pakistan, Syria and North Korea show how financial constraints affect weapons security making weapons vulnerable to theft, and how financial factors can influence WMD proliferation by contributing to the motivating factors behind a trusted insider’s decision to sell weapons technology. The inherent vulnerabilities within the global financial markets will provide terrorists’ organizations and other non-state groups, who object to the current international system or distribution of power, with opportunities to disrupt global finance and perhaps weaken America’s status. A more ominous threat originates from states intent on increasing diversification of foreign currency holdings, establishing alternatives to the dollar for international trade, or engaging financial warfare against the United States.

#### The structural violence of inequality outweighs other impacts. There is an ethical obligation to address it.

Ansell 17 — David A. Ansell, Senior Vice President, Associate Provost for Community Health Equity, and Michael E. Kelly Professor of Medicine at Rush University Medical Center (Chicago), holds an M.D. from the State University of New York Upstate Medical University College of Medicine, 2017 (“American Roulette,” *The Death Gap: How Inequality Kills*, Published by the University of Chicago Press, ISBN 9780226428291)

There are many different kinds of violence. Some are obvious: punches, attacks, gunshots, explosions. These are the kinds of inter- personal violence that we tend to hear about in the news. Other kinds of violence are intimate and emotional. But the deadliest and most thoroughgoing kind of violence is woven into the fabric of American society. It exists when some groups have more access to goods, resources, and opportunities than other groups, including health and life itself. This violence delivers specific blows against particular bodies in particular neighborhoods. This unequal advantage and violence is built into the very rules that govern our society. In the absence of this violence, large numbers of Americans would be able to live fuller and longer lives. This kind of violence is called structural violence, because it is embedded in the very laws, policies, and rules that govern day-to- day life.8 It is the cumulative impact of laws and social and economic policies and practices that render some Americans less able to access resources and opportunities than others. This inequity of advantage is not a result of the individuals personal abilities but is built into the systems that govern society. Often it is a product of racism, gender, and income inequality. The diseases and premature mortality that Windora and many of my patients experienced were, in the words of Dr. Paul Farmer, "biological reflections of social fault lines."9 As a result of these fault lines, a disproportional burden of illness, suffering, and premature mortality falls on certain neighborhoods, like Windora's. Structural violence can overwhelm an individual's ability to live a free, unfettered, healthy life. As I ran to evaluate Windora, I knew that her stroke was caused in part by lifelong exposure to suffering, racism, and economic deprivation. Worse, the poverty of West Humboldt Park that contributed to her illness is directly and inextricably related to the massive concentration of wealth and power in other neighborhoods just miles away in Chicago's Gold Coast and suburbs. That concentration of wealth could not have occurred without laws, policies, and practices that favored some at the expense of others. Those laws, policies, and practices could not have been passed or enforced if access to political and economic power had not been concentrated in the hands of a few. Yet these political and economic structures have become so firmly entrenched (in habits, social relations, economic arrangements, institutional practices, law, and policy) that they have become part of the matrix of American society. The rules that govern day-to-day life were written to benefit a small elite at the expense of people like Windora and her family. These rules and structures are powerful destructive forces. The same structures that render life predictable, secure, comfortable, and pleasant for many destroy the lives of others like Windora through suffering, poverty, ill health, and violence. These structures are neither natural nor neutral. The results of structural violence can be very specific. In Windora's case, stroke precursors like chronic stress, poverty, and uncontrolled hypertension run rampant in neighborhoods like hers. Windora's ill- ness was caused by neither her cultural traits nor the failure of her will. Her stroke was caused in part by inequity. She is one of the lucky ones, though, because even while structural violence ravages her neighbor- hood, it also abets the concentration of expensive stroke-intervention services in certain wealthy teaching hospitals like mine. If I can get to her in time, we can still help her. Income Inequality and Life Inequality Of course, Windora is not the only person struggling on account of structural violence. Countless neighborhoods nationwide are suffering from it, and people are dying needlessly young as a result. The mag- nitude of this excess mortality is mind-boggling. In 2009 my friend Dr. Steve Whitman asked a simple question, "How many extra black people died in Chicago each year, just because they do not have the same health outcomes as white Chicagoans?" When the Chicago Sun- Times got wind of his results, it ran them on the front page in bold white letters on a black background: "health care gap kills 3200 Black Chicagoans and the Gap is Growing." The paper styled the head- line to look like the declaration of war that it should have been. In fact, we did find ourselves at war not long ago, when almost 3,000 Americans were killed. That was September 11,2001. That tragedy propelled the country to war. Yet when it comes to the premature deaths of urban Americans, no disaster area has been declared. No federal troops have been called up. No acts of Congress have been passed. Yet this disaster is even worse: those 3,200 black people were in Chicago alone, in just one year. Nationwide each year, more than 60,000 black people die prematurely because of inequality.10 While blacks suffer the most from this, it is not just an issue of racism, though racism has been a unique and powerful transmitter of violence in America for over four hundred years.11 Beyond racism, poverty and income inequality perpetuated by exploitative market capitalism are singular agents of transmission of disease and early death. As a result, there is a new and alarming pattern of declining life expectancy among white Americans as well. Deaths from drug overdoses in young white Americans ages 25 to 34 have exploded to levels not seen since the AIDS epidemic. This generation is the first since the Vietnam War era to experience higher death rates than the prior generation.12 White Americans ages 45 to 54 have experienced skyrocketing premature death rates as well, something not seen in any other developed na- tion.13 White men in some Appalachian towns live on average twenty years less than white men a half-day's drive away in the suburbs of Washington, DC. Men in McDowell County, West Virginia, can look forward to a life expectancy only slightly better than that of Haitians.14 But those statistics reflect averages, and every death from structural violence is a person. When these illnesses and deaths are occurring one at a time in neighborhoods that society has decided not to care about—neighborhoods populated by poor, black, or brown people— they seem easy to overlook, especially if you are among the fortunate few who are doing incredibly well. The tide of prosperity in America has lifted some boats while others have swamped. Paul Farmer, the physician-anthropologist who founded Partners in Health, an inter- national human rights agency, reflects on the juxtaposition of "unprecedented bounty and untold penury": "It stands to reason that as beneficiaries of growing inequality, we do not like to be reminded of misery of squalor and failure. Our popular culture provides us with no shortage of anesthesia."15 That people suffer and die prematurely because of inequality is wrong. It is wrong from an ethical perspective. It is wrong from a fair- ness perspective. And it is wrong because we have the means to fix it.

### 1AC — Plan

#### The United States should:

#### create a default presumption in favor of admission for legal immigration that requires strict scrutiny to override and

#### eliminate existing caps and quotas for legal immigration.

### 1AC — Solvency

#### Presumption of admission solves — it creates “loose borders” and allows global market correction.

Dalmia 14 — Shikha Dalmia, senior analyst at Reason Foundation, a nonprofit think tank advancing free markets, Bloomberg View contributor, columnist at The Week, former columnist at Forbes and the Washington Examiner, co-winner of the first Bastiat Prize for Online Journalism, 2014 (“Will Open Borders Help Or Hurt America?,” American Enterprise Institute, December 10th, Available Online at <https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/141210-AEI-Open-Borders-Debate.pdf>, Accessed 08-08-2018)

If that were the case, North Korea would be the most sovereign nation on the planet. It is entirely appropriate for sovereign nations to freely choose to offer freedom of movement across their borders. Both closed and open policies are consistent with national sovereignty. The question for America is which of these two postures is more consistent with its own core commitment to individual liberty, free market, and limited government. And I would suggest it is open borders properly understood. Open borders does not mean, at least not to me, that we should welcome any hoodlum or terrorist or contagious person into the country, no questions asked. What it does mean is that immigration policy should be based on the socioeconomic needs of the country’s residents, not the arbitrary whims of bureaucrats or grand designs of social planners. This implies that the government has a legitimate role in keeping out foreigners who pose a genuine security or public health threat to the citizenry. But beyond that, they should be allowed in whenever an American is willing to hire them or wants to live with them or for whatsoever reason at all. Government should not be in the business of keeping apart, for example, willing American employers from willing foreign workers. It doesn’t matter whether Americans want low-skilled workers to pick fruit in their farms or high-skilled workers to develop software in their computer labs or for that matter their foreign mother-in-laws to cook them Indian food, as is the case with my husband. (Laughter.) In other words, there should be a presumption for liberty built into our immigration policies. Government should be required to justify why someone can’t come into the country or why an American can’t sponsor someone to come in, not the other way around. To put it in jurisprudential terms, whenever government wants to bar an American from hiring, marrying, or living with a foreigner in the U.S., it ought to have to meet the strict scrutiny standard. This means it must show that it has a compelling state interest in keeping a foreigner or a class of foreigners and that there is no other way of accomplishing that interest but barring them. That is a far cry from how our current immigration system works. The best way to describe it is that it effectively imposes a blanket ban on immigration, which it then arbitrarily relaxes based on predefined bureaucratic categories or some political whim of the moment. Whether it is encouraging family reunification or enhancing ethnic diversity or helping some industry, central planning is deemed important at any given time. The obvious objection to open, actually the more accurate term for what I’m describing would be loose borders, is that we’d be flooded with immigrants beyond our capacity to absorb them, given that literally a quarter of the world’s population wishes to move to relatively richer countries. But just as is the case with other resources, markets and prices would regulate immigration flows far more efficiently than the government. Immigrants don’t come unless they can sustain themselves here. Immigration ebbs and flows with the economy increasing during booms, when job opportunities are plentiful and declining, even reversing during a bust, when these opportunities dry up as occurred during the recent recession. All this may sound radical or utopian, but in fact it is actually quite conservative. It is actually a call to return to the past, for America had open borders till the early 20th century, when thanks to labor union pressure mostly, combined with anti-Irish knownothingness, it imposed strict national quotas on immigrants. The genesis of a current 11- million strong unauthorized population can be directly traced to the end of the Bracero or guest worker program with Mexico, in 1965, again at the behest of labor unions, worried about wage competition by foreign labor. We didn’t replace this program with a usable alternative and created no option for these folks to apply for permanent residency. The presence of this population is the biggest hot-button issue of our time. It has poisoned and polarized the political conversation and truncated our humanity. It has arisen because we have deviated from our core commitment to freedom of movement, individual rights, and free markets. It is time we draft an immigration policy based on these commitments, and that, I would suggest, is open borders.

## 2AC — Morality Advantage

### Morality Outweighs DAs

#### Immigration restrictions are on par with history’s greatest atrocities.

Swanson 16 — Ana Swanson, covers the economy, trade and the Federal Reserve for the Washington Post, 2016 (“Opening up borders: An idea economists tend to love and politicians detest,” Washington Post, October 14th, Available Online at <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/10/14/why-economists-love-and-politicians-detest-the-idea-of-opening-the-borders-to-lots-more-immigrants/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.3644dc63446d>, Accessed 08-08-2018)

"Immigration restrictions are government-required discrimination against people who have done nothing more than be born in another country," Caplan says. Alex Tabarrok of George Mason University, a colleague of Caplan's, has also made the case for looser border restrictions, arguing that freedom of movement and access to opportunity are basic human rights. Limits on immigration defy every standard moral framework, he says, and eliminating them would result in an increase in global human freedom comparable to the abolition of slavery and the recognition of the rights of women.“Closed borders are one of the world’s greatest moral failings,” he writes.

#### Case outweighs — borders are the single largest contributor to discrimination in human history.

Eaton 17 — George Eaton, political editor of the NewStatesman, 2017 (“The economic and moral case for global open borders,” NewStatesman, August 21st, Available Online at <https://www.newstatesman.com/2017/08/economic-and-moral-case-global-open-borders>, Accessed 08-08-2018)

The moral case for open borders is similarly persuasive. As the Dutch historian Rutger Bregman writes in his recent book Utopia for Realists: “Borders are the single biggest cause of discrimination in all of world history. Inequality gaps between people living in the same country are nothing in comparison to those between separated global citizenries.” An unskilled Mexican worker who migrates to the US would raise their pay by around 150 per cent; an unskilled Nigerian by more than 1,000 per cent. In his epochal 1971 work A Theory of Justice, the American philosopher John Rawls imagined individuals behind a “veil of ignorance”, knowing nothing of their talents, their wealth or their class. It follows, he argued, that they would choose an economic system in which inequalities are permitted only if they benefit the most disadvantaged. The risk of being penalised is too great to do otherwise. By the same logic, one could argue that, ignorant of their fortunes, individuals would favour a world of open borders in which birth does not determine destiny.

### They Say: “DA Turns the Case”

#### The disad doesn’t turn the case — it requires weighing nationalism over humanity, which is deeply unethical.

Kukathas 13 — Chandran Kulathas, Chair in Political Theory and head of the Department of Government at the London School of Economics and Political Science, Former Professor of Political Theory in the Department of Political Science at the University of Utah, DPhil in Politics from Oxford University, MA in Politics at the University of New South Wales, BA in History and PoliSci at Australian National University, 2013 (“The Case for Open Immigration,” in Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics, 2nd Edition, ed. Andrew I. Cohen and Christopher Heath Wellman, 2014, ISBN-10: 1118479394, p. 380-382)

It is sometimes argued that there are strong economic arguments for limiting immigration. There are two kinds of concern here. The first is about the impact of migrants on the local market economy: large numbers of people entering a society can change the balance of an economy, driving down wages or pushing up the prices of some goods such as real estate – to the disadvantage of many people in the native population. The second is about the impact of migrants on the cost and availability of goods and services supplied through the state: education, healthcare, welfare, and the publicly funded infrastructure of roads, parks, and other non-excludable goods. Do these concerns warrant closing borders to immigrants?

In the end, the answer must be that they do not. But the reasons why are not as straightforward as might be anticipated. If our concern is the impact of migrants on the local market economy, one argument often advanced by economists is that, on balance, the net impact of immigrants is mildly positive. While immigrants do take jobs that might have gone to locals and drive down wages, while driving up some prices, they also have a positive impact on the economy. Migrants expand the size of the workforce and extend the division of labor, so society gains from the benefits this brings. As new consumers, they expand the size of the domestic market and help to lower prices for many goods. Measuring the precise impact of any cohort of immigrants is difficult; but the overall impact is, at best, positive and, at worst, only mildly negative – even with respect to employment. Moreover, the global effect of migration is positive, as it involves a movement of people from places where they are less productive and often unable to make a living to places where they are both more productive and better off – and in many cases no longer a burden on their societies.

The problem, however, is that whatever the overall impact of migration, particular persons will do badly out of it. An influx of cheap labor may be good for society overall, but bad for those who are put out of work or forced to accept lower wages. It is to these people that the critic of open borders will point to illustrate the economic costs of immigration. Why should *they* bear the costs? Equally, why should other societies be happy about the brain-drain that is also an aspect of immigration, as skilled people leave their native countries for better opportunities abroad?

While it is true that the burdens and benefits of immigration do not fall evenly or equitably on all members of a host society, open borders are defensible nonetheless for a number of reasons. First, it has to be asked why it must be assumed that locals are entitled to the benefits they enjoy as people who have immediate access to particular markets. As residents or citizens, these people enjoy the rents they secure by virtue of an arrangement that excludes others from entering a particular market.1 Such arrangements are commonplace in every society, and indeed in the world as a whole. Often those who find a resource to exploit, or a demand which they are particularly able to fulfill, are unable to resist the temptation to ensure that they enjoy the gains to be had in exploiting that resource or fulfilling that demand by preventing others from doing the same. Yet it is unclear that there is any principle that can justify granting to some persons privileged access to such rents. To be sure, many of the most egregious examples of rent-seeking (and rent-protecting) behavior are to be found in the activities of capitalist firms and industries. But this does not make such activity defensible, since it serves simply to protect the well-off from having to share the wealth into which they have tapped with those who would like to secure a little of that same wealth for themselves.

If we are considering labor markets, there is no good reason to exclude outsiders from offering their labor in competition with locals. While it may disadvantage locals to have to compete, it is equally true that outsiders will be disadvantaged if they are forbidden to do so. Also, locals who would benefit from the greater availability of labor would also be disadvantaged by the exclusion of outsiders. To prevent, say, firms from hiring outside labor would be no more justifiable on economic grounds than preventing firms from moving their operations abroad to take advantage of cheaper or more productive labor in other countries.

The same arguments hold if we are considering the case of people who wish to move to a different country to sell not their labor but their wares – perhaps by setting up a business. There is no more a justification for preventing them from doing this than there is for preventing them from trading their goods from abroad. Restricting access to markets certainly benefits some people, but at the expense of others, and generally to the disadvantage of all. If particular privileges should be accorded to some because of their state membership, the justification cannot be economic in the first of the two senses distinguished.

In the second sense of economic, however, the argument for restricting immigration is not that access to particular markets should be limited, but that the economic benefits dispensed by the state must be limited if economic resources and indeed the social system more generally are to be properly managed. Immigration dulls the edge of good husbandry. For some libertarians, the concern here is that open borders – or even increased immigration – will impose a greater tax burden on existing members of society as the poor and disabled move to states with more generous welfare provisions, as well as subsidized education and healthcare. Indeed, a number of libertarians have argued that until the welfare state is abolished, immigration will have to be tightly controlled in countries like the United States (Hoppe, 1998).

Here it would not be enough to point out that, to the extent that immigrants join the workforce, they would also contribute to the revenues of the state through taxes, even as they consume resources dispensed by the state. Open immigration might well encourage people to move with the intention of taking advantage of benefits that exceed their tax contributions. People on low incomes and with children or elderly or infirm dependents would find it advantageous to move to countries with generous public education and healthcare. This could impose a significant additional burden on taxpaying individuals and firms, or pressure a state with fiscal problems to reduce the quality of its services. Immigration is a problem for welfare states – understanding welfare in its broadest sense to include health and education services as well as unemployment relief and disability benefits.

The problem here is a significant one. But it should be noted that it is not a problem that results from the movement of the rich or able, only one that results from the movement of the poor. The independently wealthy, and the well-off moving into wellpaying jobs, will contribute to the state’s coffers through direct and indirect taxes, and may well pay for more than they consume. The poor will in all likelihood be net consumers of tax dollars – at least at the outset. An important purpose of closed borders is to keep out the poor.

If the concern is to preserve the integrity of the welfare state, however, the most that could be justified is restricting membership of the welfare system. The movement of people into a country could then be free. Such restricted forms of immigration would still impose serious disadvantages upon poorer people, for whom the attraction of immigration would diminish if they were obliged to fund their own healthcare and pay for the education of their children. Yet for many it would be better than no opportunity to move at all. Certainly, immigration with limited entitlements would be attractive to young and able people with dependents, since the opportunity to work abroad and remit money home might significantly improve all their lives.

Nonetheless, it would not do to be too sanguine about the possibility of such an arrangement. Most states would baulk at the suggestion of such arrangements, and even advocates of open immigration may reject the idea of different classes of membership. Moreover, immigrants paying taxes may feel disgruntled if their taxes do not buy them equal entitlements. In the end, it may be that the existence of the welfare state makes open borders, or even extensive immigration, very difficult – if not impossible. From the perspective of a principle of freedom, or a principle of humanity, I suggest, the standard of open borders should prevail. To defend closed borders a principle of nationality would have to take precedence. We should turn then to look more closely at the argument from nationality.

#### The neg’s nationalistic conception of social justice is incoherent and should be rejected.

Kukathas 13 — Chandran Kulathas, Chair in Political Theory and head of the Department of Government at the London School of Economics and Political Science, Former Professor of Political Theory in the Department of Political Science at the University of Utah, DPhil in Politics from Oxford University, MA in Politics at the University of New South Wales, BA in History and PoliSci at Australian National University, 2013 (“The Case for Open Immigration,” in Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics, 2nd Edition, ed. Andrew I. Cohen and Christopher Heath Wellman, 2014, ISBN-10: 1118479394, p. 383-5)

Implicit in most arguments for closed borders or restricted immigration is an assumption that the good or well-being of the members of a polity should take precedence – to a significant degree, even if not absolutely – over the good of outsiders. From this perspective, that one of my fellow countrymen is harmed or made worse off is a weighty consideration when assessing any policy, in a way that the impact of that policy on foreigners is not. Defenders of this perspective may disagree about the extent to which the interests of outsiders should be discounted; and indeed some may hold that rich nations owe substantial obligations of justice to the world’s poor. But they are agreed that something more is owed to one’s own country and its people. And this justifies protecting one’s nation from the impact of open or substantial immigration. (For contrasting views see Miller, 1988; Goodin, 1988.)

Immigration, on this view, may be damaging for a number of different reasons. We have already considered some of the economic consequences of immigration; but there are other problems as well. First, immigration in substantial numbers, even if it takes place over a long period of time, “has the effect of changing the recipient area” (Barry, 1992: 281). The influx of Indian workers in the nineteenth century changed Fiji from an island of Polynesian people to one that is bicultural, just as the movement of Indians and Chinese to Malaya turned that society into a multicultural one. The fear of many people is that immigration will change a society’s character, and perhaps undermine or displace an ancient identity (Casey, 1982). The cultural character of Britain or France cannot remain the same if substantial numbers of people move there from Africa or Asia.

Second, immigration from culturally different people may be damaging to wealthy countries to the extent that their wealth is dependent upon the existence of a political culture, and economic and social institutions, that are especially conducive to wealth-creation. Immigration from people who do not share the same values, and who would not help to sustain the same institutions, may ultimately undermine those institutions (Buchanan, 1995). If so, this may be good reason to restrict immigration not only by number but also by culture.

Third, immigration may make it very difficult for a society to develop or sustain a level of social solidarity that is necessary for a state to work well, and particularly for it to uphold principles of social justice. This argument has been developed especially forcefully by David Miller, who suggests that if immigration exceeds the absorptive capacities of a society, the bonds of social solidarity make break down. The nation is a natural reference group when people ask whether or not they are getting a fair share of society’s resources. If people have different understandings of what their rights and obligations are and disagree about what they may legitimately claim, it may become impossible to establish and operate appropriate standards of social justice (Miller 1995, 1999a). For all of these reasons, then, open borders cannot be justified. Or so it is argued.

While all of these considerations are weighty, they do not suffice to warrant limitations on freedom of movement. First, while it is true that immigrants do change the character of a place – sometimes dramatically – it is not evident that this is necessarily a bad thing. More to the point, it is difficult to know how much change is desirable, partly because the results will not be known for some time and partly because different people – even in relatively homogeneous societies – want different things. It is perfectly understandable that some people want things to remain the way they have been during their lifetimes. Yet it is no less understandable that others want changes they regard as improvements. The Know-Nothings of nineteenth-century America were completely hostile to Catholic, and especially Irish, immigration; though Irish Americans were all too ready to welcome to the United States even more settlers from Ireland. In the end, our capacity to shape society or preserve its character may be as limited as our capacity to know how much (or how little) change is really desirable – even if we could agree on what sort of character we would like our societies to have. It is also worth bearing in mind that many societies have experienced significant cultural or social transformations and not only survived but prospered. The United States in the nineteenth century welcomed immigrants from all over the world, incorporated large parts of what was once Mexico into its territory, overturned a threecentury old tradition of slavery and yet began the twentieth century a prosperous and vibrant democracy. Canada and Australia have seen their societies transformed by postwar immigration into multicultural polities, while continuing to enjoy economic growth and social stability. And the European Union continues to expand its membership by admitting states from Eastern Europe – and perhaps, eventually, Turkey – in a way that makes it possible for peoples from diverse ethnic, religious, and political traditions to move freely from one end of the continent to the other, without fearing a loss in prosperity; though there can be no doubt that this development will bring with it significant cultural changes to many of Europe’s communities. Social and cultural change can be effected by large-scale immigration, and its significance should not be discounted. But neither should it be overestimated. Nor should too much weight be given to the possibility that immigration from poor nations to rich ones will undermine the institutions of wealth-creation – though it surely is a possibility. If anything, it is perhaps more likely that immigrants who move to wealthy countries will do so because they want to take advantage of the opportunities it offers, and that they will assimilate by adopting the practices that bring success to the natives. In any case, if our interest is in wealth-creation, it is more likely that this skill will be taught to those who enter a rich country than that it will be exported successfully to some countries that are poor. The most challenging argument against open immigration, however, is that institutions of social justice can only be built if social solidarity is preserved – and that immigration may undermine that solidarity if it is not appropriately restricted. If we accept that social justice is an important concern, then Miller’s analysis and argument are powerful and convincing. The only way to resist them is to question the very idea that the nation-state is the appropriate site for the settlement of questions of distributive justice. And indeed that is what we need to do. There are a number of reasons why we should be suspicious of the idea that the nation-state is the site of distributive justice, but the most powerful have been advanced by Miller in his own critique of the idea of global social justice. Miller maintains that principles of social justice are always, “as a matter of psychological fact, applied within bounded communities” (1999a: 18). It is easier for us to make judgments of justice in small communities such as workplaces, but difficult in units larger than nation-states. We make such judgments by comparing ourselves with others. But it is difficult for us to compare ourselves with people who are remote from our own circumstances, such as people in other countries. We can more readily make judgments based on comparisons with people who belong to our own reference group – people with whom we are likely to share some common conceptions of value. When conceptions of the value of a resource differ, it becomes very difficult to establish common standards of distributive justice, since the very question of what counts as a resource to be distributed may be impossible to settle. And when we consider that different communities have conflicting views about how trade-offs should be made, for example, between the consumption of what the earth will produce and the preservation of the natural environment, it would be difficult for one community to demand a share of another’s resources on the basis of its own determination of the “true value” of those resources (Miller, 1999b: 193–6). Global social justice is difficult to defend. Yet all the things that make global justice problematic also go to make problematic social justice within the nation-state. Certainly, some nation-states are so large that it is difficult to see how they could really share a single conception of social justice. China and India between them hold more than a third of the world’s population, and harbor different languages, religions, and customs. Even the United States, though much smaller, is sufficiently diverse that there are noticeable differences among significant groups about morality and justice – from California, to Utah, to Louisiana. Britain and France are smaller still, but are home to a diversity of religions and ethnicities. If the preservation of a shared ethos or sense of social justice is an important reason to restrict immigration, then, it might be defensible if we are considering small, homogeneous nations such as Iceland or Tahiti. It might also be defensible for a state such as Israel, though it might be more difficult to make this case the more it is a multicultural (or bicultural) state. But in larger states, which are diverse and already have a long history of immigration, the idea of a shared conception of social justice might be too much to hope for. Certainly, the vigorous debates among philosophers about social justice suggest that there is no substantial agreement on this question even among a group as homogeneous as the academy. Miller’s point about the nature of social justice is a telling one; but it also tells against his own defense of restricted immigration. (For a fuller critique of Miller’s view, see also Kukathas, 2002a.) Even if states were plausible sites of social justice, however, there is another issue that has to be raised. Is it right that the preservation of local institutions of social justice take precedence over the humanitarian concerns that make open immigration desirable? As was noted earlier, immigration barriers operate largely to limit the movement of the world’s poor. It seems odd to suggest that this can be defended by appeal to the importance of social justice. If the price of social justice is exclusion of the worst-off from the lands that offer the greatest opportunity, this may be a mark against the ideal of social justice. To be fair, however, it should be acknowledged that defenders of social justice or the primacy of membership (Walzer, 1983) generally acknowledge the need to make special provision for the world’s poor. In this regard, they suggest that refugees may have a special claim to be allowed to immigrate and resettle to escape persecution. But here a number of problems arise. First, the line distinguishing a refugee and what we might term an “economic migrant” is a very fine one. As it stands, the 1951 United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees adopts a very narrow definition of refugee to include only persons with a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. Those people fleeing war, natural disaster, or famine are, on this definition, not refugees. Second, even on this narrow definition, there are more than 20 million people in the world who count as refugees who have yet to be resettled. The problem these two points pose is that making an exception for refugees requires a very significant increase in immigration – even if the narrow definition of refugee is used. If a more humane definition were adopted – one that recognized as refugees people fleeing war zones, for example – an even greater number of immigrants would have to be accepted. Yet then, if the standard of humanity is the appropriate standard, it is difficult to see why any sharp distinction should be made between the desperate fleeing war and the destitute struggling to make a living. It would perhaps be too much to hope or expect that states – especially wealthy ones – will readily lower the barriers to the free movement of peoples. As it stands, the world of states has struggled to relocate the refugees for whom it has acknowledged responsibility. Indeed, it is sobering to remember that immigration controls were tightened with the invention of the passport during the First World War precisely to control refugee flows. Nonetheless, on this much at least, both the defenders of open borders and the advocates of restrictions can agree: that at present the borders are too securely sealed.

### They Say: “Morality is Self-Referential”

#### 1NC # \_\_\_ — They Say “Morality is Self-Referential,” but our argument isn’t that the US is better, it’s that people have a right to freedom of movement. Don’t let neg authors decide where people should live. That’s Kukathas and Johnson.

### They Say: “No Right to Mobility”

#### 1NC # \_\_\_ — They Say “No Right to Mobility,” but borders are a dramatic limitation on human freedom. Even if they’re right, restrictions should be *as narrow as possible* like the plan. That’s Kukathas and Dalmia.

[Read more evidence only if you have time.]

#### No moral system can justify borders or exclusion.

Tabarrok 15 — Alex Tabarrok, Professor of Econ at George Mason University, Ph.D. from George Mason, co-author of the popular economics blog Marginal Revolution, 2015 (“The Case for Getting Rid of Borders—Completely,” The Atlantic, October 10th, Available Online at <https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/10/get-rid-borders-completely/409501/>, Accessed 08-08-2018)

What moral theory justifies using wire, wall, and weapon to prevent people from moving to opportunity? What moral theory justifies using tools of exclusion to prevent people from exercising their right to vote with their feet? No standard moral framework, be it utilitarian, libertarian, egalitarian, Rawlsian, Christian, or any other well-developed perspective, regards people from foreign lands as less entitled to exercise their rights—or as inherently possessing less moral worth—than people lucky to have been born in the right place at the right time. Nationalism, of course, discounts the rights, interests, and moral value of “the Other, but this disposition is inconsistent with our fundamental moral teachings and beliefs. Freedom of movement is a basic human right. Thus the Universal Declaration of Human Rights belies its name when it proclaims this right only “within the borders of each state.” Human rights do not stop at the border. Today, we treat as pariahs those governments that refuse to let their people exit. I look forward to the day when we treat as pariahs those governments that refuse to let people enter. Is there hope for the future? Closed borders are one of the world’s greatest moral failings but the opening of borders is the world’s greatest economic opportunity. The grandest moral revolutions in history—the abolition of slavery, the securing of religious freedom, the recognition of the rights of women—yielded a world in which virtually everyone was better off. They also demonstrated that the fears that had perpetuated these injustices were unfounded. Similarly, a planet unscarred by iron curtains is not only a world of greater equality and justice. It is a world unafraid of itself.

### They Say: “Must Balance Competing Interests”

#### 1NC # \_\_\_ — They Say “Must Balance Competing Interests,” but these selection arguments are a smokescreen for racism — people of color are disproportionately barred. That’s Johnson.

### They Say: “Extinction First”

#### 1NC # \_\_\_ — They Say “Extinction First,” but those utilitarian justifications make those lives meaningless. That’s Donnelly.

#### Instead, we must refuse the neg’s model of crisis-centered politics — that’s the best way to create long-term justice and security. That’s Charlesworth and Bassiouni.

[Read more evidence only if you have time.]

#### Impossible to adjudicate — everything has a chance of extinction.

Nordhaus 11 — William D. Nordhaus, economist and Sterling Professor of Economics at Yale, member of the National Academy of Sciences, senior advisor on the Borokings Panel on Economic Activity, serves on the Congressional Budget Office Panel of Economic Experts, first Chair of the Advisory Committee for the Bureau of Economic Analysis, Ph.D. in Economics from MIT, BA and MA from Yale, 2011 (“The Economics of Tail Events with an Application to Climate Change,” Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, Vol. 5, Issue 2, Summer, pp. 240–257)

The dismal theorem holds that we cannot rule out catastrophic impacts of climate change with 100 percent certainty. If we broaden our horizons, we would find that these results apply in a wide variety of circumstances in which we are highly uncertain about the technology or societal impacts of human activities. Areas in which experts have warned about potentially catastrophic outcomes include biotechnology, strange lets, runaway computer systems, nuclear proliferation, rogue weeds and bugs, nanotechnology, emerging tropical diseases, alien invaders, asteroids, and so on. Like global warming, all these outcomes have deep uncertainty in the sense that we really cannot be sure about the shape of the probability distribution. Indeed, these outcomes may have greater uncertainty than global warming because there are fewer well-understood constants in the biological and technological world than in the geophysical world. Thus, if we were to accept the dismal theorem, we would likely drown in a sea of anxiety at the prospect of the infinity of infinitely bad outcomes. Weitzman dismisses such pervasive anxieties about these other catastrophic outcomes, arguing that they are ‘‘extremely unlikely.’’ However, other scientists have come to very different conclusions. One example is Freeman Dyson, who optimistically believes that we are on the threshold of developing new technologies that can scrub carbon from the atmosphere at low cost (see Dyson 2008). In another example, Ray Kurzweil (2005) argues that we need to protect ourselves from the ‘‘GNR’’ (genetics, nanotechnology, robotics) revolution but believes that low-cost and clean energy will be attainable in two or three decades. We clearly need an economic and a statistical approach that can be generally applied to potentially catastrophic events.

#### Rights outweigh – life without values isn’t life at all.

Fuller 14 — Steve Fuller, Professor of Social Epistemology at the University of Warwick, 2014 (“Is Existential Risk an Authentic Challenge or the Higher Moral Evasion?,” ABC Religion and Ethics, October 23rd, Available Online at <http://www.abc.net.au/religion/articles/2014/10/23/4113073.htm>, Accessed 08-08-2018)

The bottom line is that the taking of risks - even ones that might be reasonably called "existential risks" - is not something to be avoided but embraced as potentially opening up opportunities that had been previously closed, precisely due to the previous success of the status quo. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the bargain was struck in terms of "the costs of progress." Indeed, the displacement and destruction of nature and people that we nowadays associate with the Industrial Revolution - still regarded as overall positive development in human history - may be understood as simply the first phase of a process whose second phase may be marked by the sorts of displacement and destruction that are now anticipated with the onset of global climate change. Toward a more authentic sense of existential risk Taken together, the Industrial Revolution and today's global climate change constitute what ecologists increasingly call the "anthropocene," the period when our species became the prime mover of environmental transformation. However, the two phases appear to differ in moral standing in today's world. The destructiveness of the Industrial Revolution is often conceded as a necessary price to pay for a globalized modernity, whereas global climate change is often presented as something that we should do our utmost to mitigate, if not outright prevent, because we cannot foresee the benefits that would justify the costs. In other words, the perceived difference between the two phases lies less in the actual damage they will turn out to have inflicted - in both cases enormous - than in our capacity to construct a balance sheet that provides some agreed account of the costs and benefits. Here it is worth recalling that it was only in the 1880s that the idea of an "Industrial Revolution" began to be presented in unequivocally positive terms. However, it would be a mistake to reduce the matter simply to our lack of 20/20 historical vision. A striking feature of today's debates over global climate change is the relative absence of serious utopian proposals comparable to the ones - including Marxist ones - that justified the undeniable costs of mass industrialisation in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, which in turn encouraged a sense of perseverance in the face of adversity. These utopias constituted the basis for the modern imagination in science, art and politics. To be sure, they were consistently challenged by various doomsday scenarios of environmental degradation and human exploitation that aimed to halt and maybe even reverse industrialisation. Indeed, many - if not most - of these scenarios did come to pass and their consequences are very much with us today. Nevertheless, they do not seem as bad now as when originally presented because their significance has been offset by the benefits inspired by the more utopian sense of the future, which over time has served to reshape humanity's value orientation in its favour. In a nutshell, then, the problem with the conception of existential risk as presented by Bostrom and other would-be "Guardians of the Galaxy" is its failure to recognize the positive side of risk, which is the realization that a radical improvement in the human condition may require a leap into the unknown, the short term consequences of which may be quite harmful but which in the long term issue in greater benefits that in turn serve to justify the risky undertaking. However, this oversight may reflect a larger sense of fatalism in the general culture, one that finds it difficult to achieve the necessary distance from events to make overarching evaluations of harms and benefits. In theological terms, one may regard this fatalism as symptomatic of an incapacity for faith, which is precisely about adopting a positive attitude toward the unknown, and equally an unwillingness to entertain the divine point-of-view. In the end is there a problem of existential risk worthy of sustained attention? The answer is most certainly yes, and it centres on how we might unwittingly undermine our own values in the course of their pursuit. So, while it is true that a radical change to the human condition - like the Industrial Revolution - may enable our values to be pursued more effectively, it is equally true that we may end up with false proxies for those values that we rationalize as better simply because they are part of the world that we are now stuck with. Social psychologists speak of this process as "adaptive preference formation," whereby we come to aspire to what we are likely to get. The resulting state of mind is sometimes called "sweet lemons" - the flipside of "sour grapes. When the Existentialists struggled with the problem of "authenticity," being true to oneself, they were approaching this problem. Contra Bostrom, it is not the problem that humanity might be annihilated by machines, but that we might become machines in the name of becoming human: the destruction of "humanity" as a concept more than the destruction of "humanity" as a population.

#### Utilitarian thinking makes any atrocity justifiable by merely tweaking the numbers. “The greatest good for the greatest number” is the logic that produced the bombing of Hiroshima.

NYT 95 — Byline Jim Holt, commentator for the BBC in New York who writes about politics and philosophy, 1995 (“Morality, Reduced to Arithmetic,” New York Times, August 5th, Available Online at <https://www.nytimes.com/1995/08/05/opinion/morality-reduced-to-arithmetic.html>, Accessed 08-08-2018)

In the debate over the question, participants on both sides have been playing the numbers game. Estimate the hypothetical number of lives saved by the bombings, then add up the actual lives lost. If the first number exceeds the second, then Truman did the right thing; if the reverse, it was wrong to have dropped the bombs.

That is one approach to the matter -- the utilitarian approach. According to utilitarianism, a form of moral reasoning that arose in the 19th century, the goodness or evil of an action is determined solely by its consequences. If somehow you can save 10 lives by boiling a baby, go ahead and boil that baby.

There is, however, an older ethical tradition, one rooted in Judeo-Christian theology, that takes a quite different view. The gist of it is expressed by St. Paul's condemnation of those who say, "Let us do evil, that good may come." Some actions, this tradition holds, can never be justified by their consequences; they are absolutely forbidden. It is always wrong to boil a baby even if lives are saved thereby.

Applying this absolutist morality to war can be tricky. When enemy soldiers are trying to enslave or kill us, the principle of self-defense permits us to kill them (though not to slaughter them once they are taken prisoner).

But what of those who back them? During World War II, propagandists made much of the "indivisibility" of modern warfare: the idea was that since the enemy nation's entire economic and social strength was deployed behind its military forces, the whole population was a legitimate target for obliteration.

"There are no civilians in Japan," declared an intelligence officer of the Fifth Air Force shortly before the Hiroshima bombing, a time when the Japanese were popularly depicted as vermin worthy of extermination.

The boundary between combatant and noncombatant can be fuzzy, but the distinction is not meaningless, as the case of small children makes clear. Yet is wartime killing of those who are not trying to harm us always tantamount to murder?

When naval dockyards, munitions factories and supply lines are bombed, civilian carnage is inevitable. The absolutist moral tradition acknowledges this by a principle known as double effect: although it is always wrong to kill innocents deliberately, it is sometimes permissible to attack a military target knowing some noncombatants will die as a side effect. The doctrine of double effect might even justify bombing a hospital where Hitler is lying ill.

It does not, however, apply to Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Transformed into hostages by the technology of aerial bombardment, the people of those cities were intentionally executed en masse to send a message of terror to the rulers of Japan.

The practice of ordering the massacre of civilians to bring the enemy to heel scarcely began with Truman. Nor did the bomb result in casualties of a new order of magnitude. The earlier bombing of Tokyo by incendiary weapons killed some 100,000 people.

What Hiroshima and Nagasaki did mark, by the unprecedented need for rationalization they presented, was the triumph of utilitarian thinking in the conduct of war. The conventional code of noncombatant immunity -- a product of several centuries of ethical progress among nations, which had been formalized by an international commission in the 1920's in the Hague -- was swept away. A simpler axiom took its place: since war is hell, any means necessary may be used to end, in Churchill's words, "the vast indefinite butchery."

It is a moral calculus that, for all its logical consistency, offends our deep-seated intuitions about the sanctity of life -- our conviction that a person is always to be treated as an end, never as a means.

Left up to the warmakers, moreover, utilitarian calculations are susceptible to bad-faith reasoning: tinker with the numbers enough and virtually any atrocity can be excused in the national interest.

### They Say: “Must Consider Consequences”

#### 1NC # \_\_\_ — They Say “Must Consider Consequences,” but those utilitarian justifications make those lives meaningless. That’s Donnelly.

### They Say: “Policymakers Must Consider Consequences”

#### 1NC # \_\_\_ — They Say “Policymakers Must Consider Consequences,” but those models justify treating people as ends, which collapses into violence. That’s Donnelly and Williams.

#### Considering their low probability impacts trades off with long-term peace. That’s Bassiouni.

[Read more evidence only if you have time.]

#### The institutional design of the state outweighs utilitarian justifications.

Hodgson 10 — Louis-Philippe Hodgson, Associate Professor of Philosophy at Glendon College, former Law and Philosophy Fellow at UCLA, former Visiting Faculty Fellow at Princeton’s Center for Human Values, Ph.D. in Philosophy, 2010 (“Kant on the right to freedom: A defense.” Ethics, Vol. 120, No. 4, Available Online at <http://www.yorku.ca/lhodgson/kant-on-the-right-to-freedo.pdf>, Accessed 08-08-2018)

Once again, Kant takes a radically different view of the matter. As he sees it, rule-of-law conditions and legal rights are not simply components in the institutional apparatus that is most likely, as a matter of fact, to provide individuals with the best possible protection; they are constitutive of freedom in a much deeper sense than Pettit allows. His reasons for thinking so are complex and ultimately stem from a difficult idea underlying the entire argument of the Doctrine of Right, according to which an individual’s rights can be conclusive—that is, determinate and enforceable—only in a civil condition.63 I have discussed that claim at some length elsewhere;64 here I only want to explain its main ramifications for the present issue. As I understand it, Kant’s position is that rights cannot be conclusive in a state of nature because no private individual can enforce rights in a way that would be fully consistent with everyone’s right to freedom. Individuals living side by side must realize conditions under which their rights can be enforced without violating anyone’s right to freedom, and doing so simply amounts to establishing a state and thus to entering a civil condition. Now, although this point is explicitly about the enforcement of rights, it is important to note that it entails that the use of force in general is problematic in a state of nature. The right to freedom demands that the legitimate use of force be tied to the protection of freedom; since Kant understands rights simply as justified claims grounded in an individual’s freedom, it follows that any legitimate use of force must be tied to the enforcement of rights.65 In short, the implication is that any use of force in a state of nature will fail to be fully consistent with the right to freedom and, hence, will fail to be fully legitimate.66 And of course, to the extent that protection against arbitrary interference requires the use of force, it runs into the same problem: it will also fail to be fully consistent with the right to freedom outside a civil condition. If Kant is correct about all this, then conditions like the rule of law and the granting of legal rights to all do not stand in a merely instrumental relation to freedom. Such conditions are not means through which one promotes the existence of a civil condition: they are part of what makes the civil condition the normative ideal that it is. If the ideal set by freedom cannot be realized outside the civil condition, then the rule of law and the granting of legal rights are essential to its realization. This is not to deny that protection may be effective without legal rights or the rule of law; the point is that focusing on protection by itself makes no sense because it is not a coherent ideal for the realization of human agency. All this suggests a picture that is strikingly different from Pettit’s. As Kant sees it, the standing of a free person is essentially tied to her membership in a civil condition—a person’s being free, we might say, depends on her having full legal standing. In particular, it is essential to the standing of a free person that she have effective legal rights—or to be more precise, since not just any rights will do, it is essential that she enjoy something like what Rawls has called a “fully adequate” scheme of legal rights, backed by a reasonably effective enforcement mechanism.67 The contrast with Pettit’s instrumental view of rights could not be sharper. Of course, since it is important on Kant’s view that individuals’ rights be backed by a reasonably effective enforcement mechanism, the concern with protection remains. But the aim is no longer to maximize protection, using whatever instruments might serve that end; it is to ensure that everyone’s right to freedom is respected, something that can only be done, on Kant’s view, by granting individuals a specific kind of protection—protection that meets a normative test, rather than a test of mere efficiency. It is also worth stressing that, on such a view, the granting of adequate protection is only part of what secures the standing of a free citizen. A civil condition worthy of the name must include a reliable police force that protects individuals, but it also must vindicate rights when wrongdoing occurs, by giving victims legal recourse against wrongdoers and by punishing wrongdoers when appropriate. That possibility is no less essential to the standing of a free individual than the protection whose importance Pettit emphasizes.

### They Say: “Policy Predictions Are Possible”

#### 1NC # \_\_\_ — They Say “Policy Predictions Are Possible,” but it’s unjust and unethical to use those predictions to deny rights to others — it’s a cover for racism. That’s Kukathas and Johnson.

[Read more evidence only if you have time.]

#### Policymakers lack foresight for consequentialism.

Wills 1 — Susan E. Wills, LLM in International and Comparative Law from Georgetown, JD from U of Miami School of Law, 2001 (“Federal Funding of Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research — Illegal, Unethical and Unnecessary,” Journal of Contemporary Health Law & Policy, Winter, 2001, Vol. 18, No. 1, p. 117   
The utilitarian principle justifies intentional, harmful acts against other humans to achieve a hoped-for benefit to a greater number of people. It is the wrong approach to public policy decisions. Its most notable proponents have been responsible for much of the misery and strife of the last century. Experience has taught us time and again that public servants, even when crafting policies that appear wholly beneficent, can cause great harm (the so-called "law of unintended consequences").

Humans lack the wisdom and foresight to completely understand the future ramifications of many actions. A father, for example, may believe that it is an entirely good thing to help his daughter with homework every day because they are spending time together and he is showing sincere interest in her life and schooling. By "helping" with homework, however, his daughter may be denied the mental struggle of searching for solutions on her own. She may not develop the mental skills to solve tough math problems, for example, or to quickly find key concepts in reading selections. If even "good" actions can produce undesirable results, how much worse is the case when evil is tolerated in the name of some conjectural, future outcome?

### They Say: “Not Feasible”

#### 1NC # \_\_\_ — They Say “Open Borders Aren’t Feasible,” but yes it is — our aff has a solvency advocate for the plan that says it’s feasible and effective. That’s Dalmia.

[Read more evidence only if you have time.]

#### Confronting open borders requires rethinking notions of feasibility.

Kukathas 13 — Chandran Kulathas, Chair in Political Theory and head of the Department of Government at the London School of Economics and Political Science, Former Professor of Political Theory in the Department of Political Science at the University of Utah, DPhil in Politics from Oxford University, MA in Politics at the University of New South Wales, BA in History and PoliSci at Australian National University, 2013 (“The Case for Open Immigration,” in Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics, 2nd Edition, ed. Andrew I. Cohen and Christopher Heath Wellman, 2014, ISBN-10: 1118479394, p. 387-388)

Whatever the merits of the case for open borders, it is highly unlikely that we will see an end to immigration controls at any time soon – for reasons that were canvassed at the beginning of this paper. In one important respect, free migration is entirely unfeasible: it is politically untenable.

One reason why it is politically untenable is that most voters in wealthy countries do not favor immigration, particularly by the poor. Another is that states themselves do not favor uncontrolled population movements. In a world order shaped by the Westphalian model of states operating within strict geographical boundaries, and dominated by the imperative to secure the welfare of members, the free movement of peoples is not a strong possibility. The inclination of most people to hold on to the advantages they possess also makes it unlikely that nations will open up their borders to allow others to come and take a greater share of what they control.

Yet if the free movement of peoples is not politically feasible, how can there be a case for open borders? Surely, political theory, in considering issues of public policy, should keep its focus on the world of the possible rather than on impossible ideals.

There is a good deal of truth to this. But there is, nonetheless, good reason for putting the case for open immigration. One important consideration is that many feasibility problems have their roots not in the nature of things but in our way of thinking about them. Many of the reasons open immigration is not possible right now have less to do with the disadvantages it might bring than with an unwarranted concern about its dangers. Even to the extent that the source of the problem for open immigration lies in the nature of things, however, it is worth considering the case for open borders because it forces us to confront the inconsistency between moral ideals and our existing social and political arrangements. One of the reasons why open immigration is not possible is that it is not compatible with the modern welfare state. While one obvious response to this is to say, “so much the worse for open immigration,” it is not less possible to ask whether the welfare state is what needs rethinking.

#### Be skeptical of feasibility arguments used against morality.

Kukathas 13 — Chandran Kulathas, Chair in Political Theory and head of the Department of Government at the London School of Economics and Political Science, Former Professor of Political Theory in the Department of Political Science at the University of Utah, DPhil in Politics from Oxford University, MA in Politics at the University of New South Wales, BA in History and PoliSci at Australian National University, 2013 (“The Case for Open Immigration,” in Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics, 2nd Edition, ed. Andrew I. Cohen and Christopher Heath Wellman, 2014, ISBN-10: 1118479394, p. 376)

To put a case for free immigration is not easy. Though it may be simple enough to enunciate political principles and stand doggedly by them, in questions of public policy coherence and consistency are merely necessary, but not sufficient, virtues. The feasibility of any policy proposal is also important, and political theory needs to be alive to this. “How open can borders be?” is an obvious question that it may not be possible to evade. The defense of free immigration offered here is, I hope, sensitive to this requirement. Nonetheless, it is an important part of its purpose to suggest that, in the end, political theory needs also to be suspicious of feasibility considerations, particularly when they lead us to morally troubling conclusions.

## 2AC — Economy Advantage

### They Say: “Plan Causes Wage Collapse & Inequality”

#### 1NC # \_\_\_ — They Say “Plan Causes Wage Collapse and Inequality,” — group it.

#### Trillion Dollar Bills on the Sidewalk — immigration restrictions are the main impediment to economic growth and eliminating poverty. The plan gives the world’s poor *trillions more dollars.* That’s Bregman and Eaton.

#### Lump of Labor Fallacy — they’re right that the labor supply goes up, but so does demand, which balances things out and raises living conditions for everyone. That’s Davidson. This is empirically proven when women joined the workforce. That’s Matthews.

#### Prefer Our Evidence — they have *one fringe economist*. We have a consensus of experts that the economic benefits are the “most settled fact in economics.” That’s Davidson.

#### Immigration doesn’t hurt wages — Borjas is wrong.

Smith 18 — Noah Smith, Bloomberg Opinion columnist, former assistant professor of finance at Stony Brook University, 2018 (“Immigrants Haven't Hurt Pay for Americans,” Bloomberg, February 14th, Available Online at https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2018-02-14/immigrants-haven-t-hurt-pay-for-americans)

Wages actually rose faster when more foreign laborers were entering the U.S.

As President Donald Trump’s push for immigration restriction continues, his supporters among the pundit class continue to make economic arguments for closing the country’s gates. That’s only understandable -- it’s easy to blame immigrant competition for economic woes. But very often, it’s wrong

On a recent appearance on Fox News, classicist and historian Victor Davis Hanson started off with some good and important points about the need for a shared culture to bind together the U.S.’s multiracial society. But he then continued to make some very dodgy economic arguments. Hanson asserted that “the Trump miracle [is] giving empowerment to the working … classes,” and that this empowerment was also being driven by “a radical curtailment [of] illegal immigration.” Hanson credits reduced illegal immigration with lower unemployment and increasing competition for workers.

Hanson is right about two big things. First, illegal immigration has indeed been radically curtailed:

The decline didn’t happen under Trump; it began under George W. Bush, when the Great Recession abruptly reduced demand for low-skilled labor. But illegal immigration didn’t pick up again after the recovery began, thanks to several factors -- increased deportations and stronger border enforcement by the Barack Obama administration, combined with much lower fertility and higher income levels in Mexico, the main source of illegal immigration.

Hanson is also correct that U.S. unemployment is very low:

Though a better measure of labor-market health, the prime-age employment-to-population ratio, shows more modest performance:

But was the halting of illegal immigration responsible for the recovery of employment? There are good reasons to think that it was a minor factor at best.

First of all, research shows that low-skilled immigration has at most a small effect on the wages of native-born workers. Though one high-profile researcher, Harvard University’s George Borjas, has claimed to find more deleterious effects, repeated studies of refugee influxes have found very small or nonexistent impacts on employment and wages. Since refugees tend to be very low-skilled immigrants, these findings imply that illegal immigration to the U.S. didn’t put many -- or any -- native-born Americans out of work.

[Read more evidence only if you have time — the best answers are already in the 1AC.]

#### Immigration restrictions lock in economic inequality and exacerbate international poverty.

Tabarrok 15 — Alex Tabarrok, Professor of Econ at George Mason University, Ph.D. from George Mason, co-author of the popular economics blog Marginal Revolution, 2015 (“The Case for Getting Rid of Borders—Completely,” The Atlantic, October 10th, Available Online at <https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/10/get-rid-borders-completely/409501/>, Accessed 08-08-2018)

To paraphrase Rousseau, man is born free, yet everywhere he is caged. Barbed-wire, concrete walls, and gun-toting guards confine people to the nation-state of their birth. But why? The argument for open borders is both economic and moral. All people should be free to move about the earth, uncaged by the arbitrary lines known as borders. Not every place in the world is equally well-suited to mass economic activity. Nature’s bounty is divided unevenly. Variations in wealth and income created by these differences are magnified by governments that suppress entrepreneurship and promote religious intolerance, gender discrimination, or other bigotry. Closed borders compound these injustices, cementing inequality into place and sentencing their victims to a life of penury. The overwhelming majority of would-be immigrants want little more than to make a better life for themselves and their families by moving to economic opportunity and participating in peaceful, voluntary trade. But lawmakers and heads of state quash these dreams with state-sanctioned violence—forced repatriation, involuntary detention, or worse—often while paying lip service to “huddled masses yearning to breathe free.” Wage differences are a revealing metric of border discrimination. When a worker from a poorer country moves to a richer one, her wages might double, triple, or rise even tenfold. These extreme wage differences reflect restrictions as stifling as the laws that separated white and black South Africans at the height of Apartheid. Geographical differences in wages also signal opportunity—for financially empowering the migrants, of course, but also for increasing total world output. On the other side of discrimination lies untapped potential. Economists have estimated that a world of open borders would double world GDP. Even relatively small increases in immigration flows can have enormous benefits. If the developed world were to take in enough immigrants to enlarge its labor force by a mere one percent, it is estimated that the additional economic value created would be worth more to the migrants than all of the world’s official foreign aid combined. Immigration is the greatest anti-poverty program ever devised. And while the benefits of cross-border movements are tremendous for the immigrants, they are also significant for those born in destination countries. Immigration unleashes economic forces that raise real wages throughout an economy. New immigrants possess skills different from those of their hosts, and these differences enable workers in both groups to better exploit their special talents and leverage their comparative advantages. The effect is to improve the welfare of newcomers and natives alike. The immigrant who mows the lawn of the nuclear physicist indirectly helps to unlock the secrets of the universe.

#### Immigration doesn’t hurt wages — English skills and housing gains compensate.

Matthews 14 — Dylan Matthews, staff writer for Vox.com, 2014 (“The case for open borders,” Vox, December 15th, Available Online at https://www.vox.com/2014/9/13/6135905/open-borders-bryan-caplan-interview-gdp-double, Accessed 08-08-2018)

Opponents of open borders often grant that it would grow the economy. The problem, they say, is that most of those benefits presumably accrue to migrants. What about the workers who are already there? Don't they lose out, in particular low-skilled workers who are already struggling and would face increased competition from low-skilled immigrants? Not necessarily. "Low-skilled" is actually kind of a misleading term here. Even American high school dropouts have at least one key skill that immigrants generally don't: the ability to speak English. That makes it possible for immigrants to complement the labor of low-skilled, native-born workers, rather than replacing it. "Low-skilled Americans who are fluent in English in a place like New York City wind up supervising the low-skilled immigrants," Caplan says. "They wind up being the bridge, or the people who train immigrants in jobs that they wouldn’t even know about from their home countries." Think about it this way. Low-skilled immigrants increase the supply of people who can do janitorial work or wash dishes or whatnot, which you'd expect to reduce wages for Americans in those jobs. But they also decrease, relatively speaking, the supply of people who can speak English. That raises wages for Americans who can speak English. "When you put that together, it’s at least unclear whether most Americans lose," Caplan surmises. "Furthermore, you can change your occupation. You could move to a job that does less of what is worth less after immigration, and move into a job that does more of what’s valued more." Immigration also has a well-documented, positive effect on housing prices. Most Americans own homes at some point in their life, so even if they lose out from immigration in the labor market, they could make up the loss in the housing market. "The Americans who lose from immigration are those who are very low-skilled, who also don’t speak very good English to begin with, and also don’t own real estate," Caplan concludes. "It's a quite small group. If you’re a real nationalist who cares about all Americans, then you should favor immigration, because only like 5 or 10 percent of Americans are losing." And in any case, whatever losses that 5 or 10 percent incurs are swamped by the gains to the rest of the world, and in particular the migrants themselves.

#### Status quo *illegal* immigration is worse for wages.

Daly 13 — Herman Daly, Professor at the University of Maryland School of Public Affairs, former senior economist in the environment department of the World Bank, cofounder of the journal Ecological Economics, 2013 (“Open Borders and the Tragedy of Open Access Commons,” CASSE: Center for the Advancement of the Steady State Economy, June 3rd, Available Online at <https://steadystate.org/open-borders-and-the-tragedy-of-open-access-commons/>, Accessed 08-08-2018)

We have in the US a strong cheap-labor lobby that uses immigration (especially illegal immigration) to force down wages and break labor unions, as well as weaken labor safety standards. This is less the fault of the immigrants than of our own elite employing class and pandering politicians. The immigration issue in the US is largely an internal class battle between labor and capital, with immigrants as pawns in the conflict. Class division is more basic than the racial and ethnic divide in current US immigration politics, although the latter is not absent. Progressives in the US, with their admirable historical focus on racial justice, have been slow to see the increasing dominance of the class issue in immigration. The Wall Street Journal, the Chamber of Commerce, and big corporations in general, do not mind seeing the class question submerged by racial and ethnic politics favoring easy immigration as a cheap-labor supplement to off-shoring. It feeds the myth that we are a classless society, even as it contributes to increasing income inequality. Also, given the closeness of recent elections, a bit of ethnic pandering can be politically decisive.

#### Immigration prevents outsourcing which is net worse for wages.

Bregman 16 — Rutger Bregman, author of Utopia for Realists: The Case for a Universal Basic Income, Open Borders, and a 15-Hour Workweek, MA in History from Utrecht University, 2016 (“The Surprisingly Compelling Argument for Open Borders,” Fortune, April 17th, Available Online at <http://fortune.com/2016/04/17/immigration-open-borders/>, Accessed 08-08-2018)

To disprove this fallacy, we can turn to a study by the Center for Immigration Studies—a think tank that opposes immigration—which found that immigration has virtually no effect on wages. Other research even shows that new arrivals lead to an uptick in the earnings of the domestic workforce. Hard-working immigrants boost productivity, which brings paycheck payoffs to everybody. All too often, moreover, the alternative to hiring immigrants is to outsource work to other countries. And that, ironically, does force wages down.

### They Say: “Aff Economic Models Flawed”

#### 1NC # \_\_\_ — They Say “Aff Economic Models Flawed,” but they are a peer reviewed consensus on the most settled fact in economics. A poll of leading economists couldn’t find a single one that disagreed. That’s Davidson.

### They Say: “Solvency Requires Billions to Move”

#### 1NC # \_\_\_ — They Say “Solvency Requires Billions to Move,” but even just a 3% increase in immigration would give hundreds of billions of dollars to the world’s poor. That’s feasible and enormously beneficial. That’s Bregman.

#### Structural violence from inequality is the biggest impact — we only need to win a small reduction to outweigh their DA. That’s Ansell.

### They Say: “Aff Claims Inflated”

#### 1NC # \_\_\_ — They Say “Aff Claims Inflated,” but vote aff even if we don’t double global GDP — even a small change dramatically reduces inequality, and we have an ethical obligation to do it. That’s Bregman and Ansell.

#### And, people *will* move, proven by the hundreds of thousands of people who have applied to immigrate and are excluded by current policies.

[Read more evidence only if you have time.]

#### Aff economy claims are conservative — they don’t include innovation or synergy.

Caplan 14 — Bryan D. Caplan, Professor of Economics at Georgie Mason University, published in the American Economic Review, the Economic Journal, the Journal of Law and Economics, Social Science Quarterly, the Journal of Public Economics, the Southern Economic Journal, and Public Choice, Ph.D. in Economics from Princeton, BA in Economics from UC Berkeley, 2014 (“The case for open borders,” Bryan Caplan interviewed by Dylan Matthews, Vox, December 15th, Available Online at https://www.vox.com/2014/9/13/6135905/open-borders-bryan-caplan-interview-gdp-double, Accessed 08-08-2018)

By the way, these estimates of how much open borders would enrich the world, they’re all what I’d called static estimates, where they basically just say, "Everything stays the same except we move some labor from a low-value area to a high-value area." It doesn’t consider the possibility that this could actually lead to greater innovation, or there could be some great synergies when you get two different kinds of people together. It really is an underestimate of all that can be accomplished. Just think about all the talent that right now goes to waste. Take Sendhil Mullainathan, the Harvard economist. When he was kid he rode around in an ox cart. He grew up in some remote village in India riding around in an ox cart, and, now, he’s a professor at Harvard. If he had stayed behind in India, what are the odds that he would be a world-famous professor? Pretty slim. There is so much brain power and talent that is stuck in the Third World, and most of it going to waste. Some people wind up getting to the Indian Institute of Technology, and do great things, but there are so many talented people who just die unknown, unheard of, because they are stuck in a part of the world where being a genius doesn’t really matter.

### They Say: “Plan Weakens Institutions”

#### 1NC # \_\_\_ — They Say “Plan Weakens Institutions,” but previous waves of immigrants haven’t weakened institutions, they’ve improved the economy. That’s the most settled fact in economics. That’s Davidson.

[Read more evidence only if you have time.]

#### Immigration sustains creativity and knowledge circulation that has empirically been the crucial internal link to US economic strength.

Cabrera 17 — Ángel Cabrera, President of George Mason University, chair of the Association of Public and Land-grant Universities Commission on International Initiatives, 2017 (“Why open borders are crucial for innovation,” Washington Post, March 21st, Available Online at [www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/2017/03/21/why-open-borders-are-crucial-for-innovation/?utm\_term=.22d9223be35d](http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/2017/03/21/why-open-borders-are-crucial-for-innovation/?utm_term=.22d9223be35d), Accessed 08-08-2018)

American innovation has been the envy of the world for the last century. Our ability to discover scientific breakthroughs, invent disruptive technologies and build successful companies that make those advances broadly available has been unparalleled. This creativity is the product of a culture that is uniquely open to new ideas, that encourages and rewards risk taking, that values people for what they achieve, not where they come from. It is also the result of a constant supply of talented people from outside the United States, many of whom came to this country seeking world-class education and an open society where they could thrive. That is why our public universities have overwhelmingly spoken up against the recent travel bans President Trump issued through executive order. While changes in immigration policy may very well be necessary, any moves that create additional barriers to the free flow of business and educational exchange threaten to erode our economic advantage and negatively impact our future. Consider this: all six Nobel Prize winners in the United States last year were immigrants, as were 40 percent of all American Nobel recipients in physics, chemistry, medicine and physiology since 2000. Microsoft is led by an Indian, as is Google, which was co-founded by a Russian. Tesla is the creation of a South African who’s now also revolutionizing space aircraft. The online shopping company eBay was started by a French national of Iranian descent, and the iPhone was designed by a Brit. Immigrants or their children started more than 40 percent of Fortune 500 companies, according to the Kauffman Foundation, and more than 50 percent of billion-plus startups had at least one foreign-born founder. A 2007 study by researchers from Duke University, the University of California at Berkeley and the Kauffman Foundation found that more than half of the foreign-born founders of American tech companies initially came to the United States to study. In some critical fields, such as engineering and computer science, foreign nationals already account for more than half of all doctoral degrees granted in America. The influx of international students into our universities does not take away resources from American students. On the contrary, foreign students contribute much-needed tuition dollars and have a positive impact on our local economies. The roughly 1 million foreign students attending U.S. colleges and universities last year contributed more than $32 billion to the U.S. economy – double the amount of 10 years prior – and supported more than 400,000 U.S. jobs. International students strengthen our campuses by creating additional opportunities for American students to develop a more global mindset and build relationships that will prepare them to be more effective in an increasingly global marketplace. Despite these benefits, the advantage that American universities enjoy in attracting foreign talent should not be taken for granted. The perception of openness is just as important as the legal reality of openness. Whenever the United States is seen as less open and welcoming to people and ideas, this dynamic source of innovative talent suffers, as we saw in the years following the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. In 2000, the United States attracted approximately 23 percent of all international students seeking to study outside their home country. After the attacks, changes in immigration policy and a belief that the United States was a less welcoming dropped that share to 17 percent. Only in recent years has our percentage of international students returned to 2000 levels. This loss was others’ gain. In the decade or so after 9/11, when the proportion of international students who came to the United States was shrinking, other English-speaking countries experienced rapid growth international students. The United Kingdom expanded its pool from 11 percent in 2000 to 18 percent in 2014; Australia expanded from 12.5 percent to 18.2 percent in that time, and Canada expanded its pool from less than 5 percent to nearly 10 percent. Drastic changes in U.S. immigration policy could once again encourage international students to look elsewhere. Current students from the six countries directly affected by the latest version of the travel ban may find other places to continue their education. This is especially true for those with single-entry visas who are effectively pre-empted from leaving the United States because they will not be allowed to re-enter. Similarly, other potential international students may decide to pursue their education outside the United States, as we appear to shut our doors to individuals of certain backgrounds. Few would argue against carefully vetting all who wish to enter the United States, and preventing anyone who represents a clear threat from reaching our shores. But that shouldn’t mean shutting our borders to one of our main sources of innovation and growth. Openness has been this country’s strength since its founding. Let us not lose sight of how we got here.

#### Immigration improves the economy for all — consensus of economic data disproves neg turns.

Swanson 16 — Ana Swanson, covers the economy, trade and the Federal Reserve for the Washington Post, 2016 (“Opening up borders: An idea economists tend to love and politicians detest,” Washington Post, October 14th, Available Online at <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/10/14/why-economists-love-and-politicians-detest-the-idea-of-opening-the-borders-to-lots-more-immigrants/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.3644dc63446d>, Accessed 08-08-2018)

The argument is essentially two-fold. First, the same worker can create more economic value in some places than in others, because of differences in factors that affect the productivity of businesses, such as natural resources, infrastructure, technologies and laws. For example, a worker skilled in math is more likely to excel in a country with computers, while a natural entrepreneur will thrive in a region where laws make it easy to start businesses. Differences in productivity are reflected in the vastly different wages people can earn for similar types of work across the world. According to estimates by Clemens, Claudio Montenegro and Lant Pritchett, who examined a data set of more than 2 million workers, the average Peruvian can make 2.6 times as much in the United States as in Peru, while a Haitian can make seven times more. "Right now, you have a ton of human talent, billions of people, stuck in countries where it’s hard to get anything done," says Bryan Caplan, a professor of economics at George Mason University. "Think about what you could accomplish in Haiti. Not very much -- it’s a messed-up place. There are so many people trapped in these places." Second, many economists say that an influx of immigrants can expand an economy, potentially even raising wages for the native born. While economic studies have produced varying results, most have shown that immigrants have a neutral or positive impact on the job prospects of native-born Americans. An expansive study released by the National Academies of Sciences in September found that immigration has mostly helped the U.S. economy in recent decades and had little effect on the wages or employment of native-born Americans. According to the study, the main group negatively affected by newly arriving immigrants was actually earlier waves of immigrants with similar language skills. To a lesser extent, new immigrants also competed for work with the lowest-skilled Americans, such as high-school dropouts. But in general, immigration left the native population slightly better off. Angel Gurría, the secretary-general of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, said in a recent interview in Washington that the effects of migration are net positive, even fiscally. "How is it possible? Well, take a country like Spain. They were growing fast, there was a lot of construction, and they imported 5 million immigrants from Latin America," he said. Millions of immigrants came into the country legally and paid taxes under bilateral agreements. "They actually financially saved the social security system, or at least deferred for five or 10 years the time of reckoning. Because young people pay taxes, but they don’t get sick, and they don’t use retirement funds," he said. Borjas, the Harvard professor, has argued, however, that unrestricted immigration can place a fiscal burden on a state, and that the gains from immigration depend largely on whether receiving countries build enough infrastructure to accommodate them. Immigrants aren't just perfect cogs in the machine of the economy, he says -- they are real people, and their presence raises real questions about how they and their descendants fit into a society. Polls of economists' views reflect this debate. In a survey of more than 40 of the nation's most prominent economists, half agreed that the average U.S. citizen would be better off if a large number of low-skilled foreign workers were legally allowed to enter the United States each year. Twenty-eight percent said they were uncertain, and 9 percent disagreed. However, they also recognized the costs of such policies. Nearly half of the economists also agreed that, unless they were compensated by others, many low-skilled Americans would be worse off.

### They Say: “Immigrants Can’t Integrate”

#### 1NC # \_\_\_ — They Say “Immigrants Can’t Integrate,” but empirics prove they improve the economy without taking away from native workers. That’s Bregman.

[Read more evidence only if you have time.]

#### Assimilation and integration concerns are a myth — empirics disprove.

Caplan 14 — Bryan D. Caplan, Professor of Economics at Georgie Mason University, published in the American Economic Review, the Economic Journal, the Journal of Law and Economics, Social Science Quarterly, the Journal of Public Economics, the Southern Economic Journal, and Public Choice, Ph.D. in Economics from Princeton, BA in Economics from UC Berkeley, 2014 (“The case for open borders,” Bryan Caplan interviewed by Dylan Matthews, Vox, December 15th, Available Online at https://www.vox.com/2014/9/13/6135905/open-borders-bryan-caplan-interview-gdp-double, Accessed 08-08-2018)

Dylan Matthews: Another common point of concern is assimilation. People are concerned that large-scale immigration creates populations within countries that are permanently marginalized, that can't be integrated into the rest of society. The evidence for this in the US is very thin but in places like France and Germany, you can see the case a bit more. What’s your reply to that, and why is immigration restriction not the best way of solving that problem? Bryan Caplan: Immigration restriction is indeed a good way of keeping cultural homogeneity. Japan has got cultural homogeneity, and they have hardly any immigration. If they let in more people, they’d be less homogeneous. In response, I would begin by challenging the goal of cultural homogeneity. Who wants to go and move to a part of the country with almost no immigrants? Places like that are boring. Maybe not just because they lack immigrants, but a conspicuous fact about the low-immigration areas of the country is that they’re just dull places to be. Probably the main kind of cultural assimilation that bothers people is not learning English. This is something where we have very good data, and what the data say is that second generation immigrants have almost total fluency in English. This has been true throughout the entire history of American immigration, and remains true today. Over 90 percent of second generation Mexicans, the group we think of as having the lowest rate of assimilation, are fluent in English. Most complaints about lack of fluency are about first-generation immigrants. There has never been a time when most first generation immigrants learned to speak the language well, for obvious biological reasons. It’s very hard for an adult to learn to speak a new language fluently, but the idea that this is some long-term problem is really just silly. Their kids do learn fluent English. It’s not a problem that is going to change the country in any long-term way. The first generation is going to speak with an accent, or maybe if they come at an old age they’ll never learn to speak English, but it doesn’t mean that they can’t contribute and be useful members of society. The reason why we have this illusion that Spanish-speaking immigrants are not learning English is that there are so many Spanish-speaking immigrants that there is always a new wave of first-generation immigrants. Historically, it was very common to have a wave of German immigrants which then stops, and then, pretty soon, everyone of German ancestry speaks fluent English. It’s not because the first-generation Germans learned to speak fluent English. It’s because they died off and they were not replaced with a new wave of first generation German-speaking immigrants. The same goes for Italians, for Greeks, and so forth. But we’ve had 50 years of wave after wave of Spanish-speaking immigrants. Each time, the first generation doesn’t learn to speak fluent English, and so you look around and you keep seeing these Spanish-speakers who have not assimilated, and you think it’s about the individuals, but it’s really about the cohorts. For Europe, I put a lot of blame on European welfare states, which make it relatively easy for immigrants to never actually try to get jobs. The best way to assimilate and learn how to deal with other people is to get a job where you need to assimilate and deal with other people. As long as you can be more or less permanently on welfare, then it’s very easy to live in an enclave and not deal with other people, but if there is an expectation that you should get a job, then this naturally tends to acculturate people, you increase tolerance, and you build ties between people. This may be a little bit flippant, but, to me, it’s much easier to understand what the Italians or Germans are talking about when they say immigrants don’t assimilate and learn their culture than what Americans are talking about when they say that. In Germany or Italy it’s easy to understand what would be on a test of cultural literacy. In the United States it’s not. Do you name the six lead characters on Friends? Ask how many points a touchdown is worth? You certainly can’t ask people to name three operas. You probably can’t ask them to name three Broadway musicals. There just isn’t nearly as much distinctive American culture that you think people would need to assimilate to. But maybe that's wrong. Maybe it’s extremely important for everyone to be on the same cultural page. So how about this? How about in order to come to this country you have to pass a cultural literacy test? If this were all that it took to get into the US, the world study of English and American culture would blossom as never before, as people tried to learn all the stuff they needed in order to get in. The truth is that there is already a ton of people on earth who are already pre-assimilated, whose entertainment life or their cultural life revolves around American culture. In the 19th Century, you weren’t going to find a lot of people in Germany or Italy who were already reading American books and following American entertainment stars.

### They Say: “Opens the Floodgates”

#### 1NC # \_\_\_ — They Say “Plan Weakens Institutions,” but “floodgates” arguments are irrational fear and American exceptionalism.

Johnson 9 — Kevin R. Johnson, Professor of Public Interest Law at UC Davis School of Law, JD from Harvard, BA in Economics from UC Berkeley, 2009 (Opening the Floodgates: Why America Needs to Rethink its Borders and Immigration Laws, 2009, ISBN-13: 978-0814743096, p. 26-28)

Fears abound that the minimization of border controls will open the “floodgates,” allowing millions of immigrants from around the world to overwhelm, if not destroy, the United States as we know it.65 The floodgates concern betrays an attitude of U.S. superiority and the assumption that, if the opportunity existed, people the world over could not resist coming to the best of all nations. As we have learned in recent years, however, not all people cherish life in the United States. Most of the world does not try to immigrate, or even consider immigrating, to this country. Most Mexicans, for example, stay in Mexico. The same is true for most of the people in Europe, Africa, Asia, and North and Latin America. As one commentator observed:

Most people have no inclination to leave their native soil, no matter how onerous conditions become. Would-be emigrants must fight off the ties of family, the comfort of familiar surroundings, the rootedness in one’s culture, the security of being among “one’s own,” and the power of plain inertia. Conversely, being uprooted carries daunting prospects: adjusting to alien ways, learning a new language, the absence of kith and kin, the sheer uncertainty of it all.66

The glue of the familiar—family, friends, culture, language, geography, and other characteristics of any physical location—anchor many people to where they were born. Free movement within the United States generally has not led to mass migrations, even though economic, political, and social disparities exist between the various states.67 For example, many, if not most, Mississippians remain in Mississippi despite the superior economic opportunities in many other states. Migration between states occurs, but, for most of U.S. history, open borders between the states have generally not resulted in large population readjustments. Despite human inertia and the general affinity for family and homeland, the deep-seated fear persists that, absent strict migration controls, the United States risks being overwhelmed by hordes of immigrants of different races, cultures, and creeds who will “take over” the country. This fear is perhaps the major impediment to any proposal to ease migration controls and open the borders. Thus, any debate about immigration— from relatively minor efforts to more aggressive ones—must invariably confront the floodgates concern.

There is one significant empirical blind spot to the call for open borders. Uncertainty exists about the size of the possible flows of immigrants into the United States if the nation were to adopt an openborders regime. One influential supporter of the reduction of immigration controls declined to advocate open borders because of, among other reasons, the lack of data that would allow for an accurate estimate on the resulting flow of immigrants to the United States.68 However, while better empirical estimates undoubtedly might help, they are unlikely to be definitive. Few empirical studies in the realm of immigration have proven to be. Debate rages, for example, about the costs and benefits of immigration. Consequently, we do not know precisely how many migrants would pursue a life in the United States if the opportunity were more freely available. That lack of information makes it harder to engage in a reliable cost/benefit analysis of an open-borders system. Regardless, the bottom line is that there is no hard evidence that the “floodgates” would burst if migration controls were eased. At a minimum, however, the system of migration would be more orderly, humane, and fair than the current one. (26-8)

[Read more evidence only if you have time.]

#### Puerto Rico proves no flood of immigrants.

Johnson 9 — Kevin R. Johnson, Professor of Public Interest Law at UC Davis School of Law, JD from Harvard, BA in Economics from UC Berkeley, 2009 (Opening the Floodgates: Why America Needs to Rethink its Borders and Immigration Laws, 2009, ISBN-13: 978-0814743096, p. 28-29)

Closer to home, the economic disparities between the island of Puerto Rico, a U.S. territory populated by U.S. citizens with the right to travel to the mainland, and the mainland United States has not led to a mass exodus from Puerto Rico. As Table 1.2 shows, the per capita GDP of the United States is twice that of Puerto Rico. Although there is a steady stream of migration from Puerto Rico to the mainland, there has not been a flood of migration from that island, and its population is relatively stable. Cultural and national affinities for Puerto Rico among its inhabitants contribute to limited migration from the island. Even though superior economic opportunities and public benefits are to be found on the mainland, most Puerto Ricans do not leave. (28-9)

### Extend: “Plan Increases GDP”

#### Open borders can double GDP — immigration is single biggest factor in increasing growth.

Swanson 16 — Ana Swanson, covers the economy, trade and the Federal Reserve for the Washington Post, 2016 (“Opening up borders: An idea economists tend to love and politicians detest,” Washington Post, October 14th, Available Online at <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/10/14/why-economists-love-and-politicians-detest-the-idea-of-opening-the-borders-to-lots-more-immigrants/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.3644dc63446d>, Accessed 08-08-2018)

From the perspective of many economists, however, it's a shame more politicians don't support giving people the greater freedom to move across national borders. Some economists have suggested that allowing people to work where their labor is most highly valued — something that is hardly realistic, given the political environment in the developed world— could double the size of the global economy. More than a dozen studies reviewed by economist Michael Clemens, a senior fellow at the pro-immigration Center for Global Development, suggested that eliminating barriers to global mobility would increase world gross domestic product by between 67 and 147 percent. Clemens says the benefits are huge even for a more modest loosening of restrictions on immigration. His research suggests that allowing just 5 percent of the people now living in poor countries to work temporarily or permanently in richer countries would add trillions of dollars to the global economy. The economic gains would be greater than those from dismantling every remaining barrier to trade and investment around the world.

### Extend: “Borjas is Wrong”

#### Reject evidence from Borjas — he’s biased and wrong.

Smith 15 — Noah Smith, Bloomberg Opinion columnist, former assistant professor of finance at Stony Brook University, 2015 (“An Immigrant Won't Steal Your Raise,” Bloomberg, December 18th, Available Online at https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2015-12-18/an-immigrant-isn-t-going-to-steal-your-pay-raise)

But in 2015, George Borjas of Harvard University's Kennedy School came out with a shocking claim -- the celebrated Card result, he declared, was completely wrong. Borjas chose a different set of comparison metro areas -- Anaheim, San Jose and Anaheim in California, and Rochester and Nassau-Suffolk counties in New York -- that had employment growth trends similar to Miami's before 1980. He also focused on a very specific subset of low-skilled Miami workers. Unlike Card, Borjas found that the Mariel boatlift immigration surge had a big negative effect on native wages for this vulnerable subgroup.

Now, in relatively short order, Borjas' startling claim has been effectively debunked. Giovanni Peri and Vasil Yasenov, in a new National Bureau of Economic Research working paper, use a much more robust comparison method than either Card or Borjas. This approach is called synthetic controls, and involves using data on real cities to construct imaginary cities that were extremely similar to Miami in 1980. Peri and Yasenov find that Card's result, not Borjas', was based on the more robust set of comparisons.

Even more damning, Peri and Yasenov find that Borjas only got the result that he did by choosing a very narrow, specific set of Miami workers. Borjas ignores young workers and non-Cuban Hispanics -- two groups of workers who should have been among the most affected by competition from the Mariel immigrants. When these workers are added back in, the negative impact that Borjas finds disappears.

But it gets worse. Borjas was so careful in choosing his arbitrary comparison group that his sample of Miami workers was extremely tiny -- only 17 to 25 workers in total. That is way too small of a sample size to draw reliable conclusions. Peri and Yasenov find that when the sample is expanded from this tiny group, the supposed negative effect of immigration vanishes.

All of this leaves Borjas' result looking very fishy. He would have had to have searched hard to find the one small group of workers who seemed to suffer from the Mariel influx. Borjas could well have been subject to heavy confirmation bias -- he might have been so fundamentally certain that immigration was bad for native workers that he searched and searched until he found one group that seemed to confirm his pre-existing beliefs. In science terms, that is called data mining; it's a big no-no.

In debates about immigration, the anti-immigrant side inevitably cites Borjas. He has gained fame and notoriety for being the most prestigious economist who thinks that immigration is a disaster for native workers. All of Borjas' papers seem to arrive at this same conclusion. Participants in immigration debates really should stop citing Borjas' research so much.

### Extend: “Plan Helps Worldwide”

#### Open borders allows more efficient allocation of labor, doubling world productivity.

Caplan 14 — Bryan D. Caplan, Professor of Economics at Georgie Mason University, published in the American Economic Review, the Economic Journal, the Journal of Law and Economics, Social Science Quarterly, the Journal of Public Economics, the Southern Economic Journal, and Public Choice, Ph.D. in Economics from Princeton, BA in Economics from UC Berkeley, 2014 (“The case for open borders,” Bryan Caplan interviewed by Dylan Matthews, Vox, December 15th, Available Online at https://www.vox.com/2014/9/13/6135905/open-borders-bryan-caplan-interview-gdp-double, Accessed 08-08-2018)

Dylan Matthews: Let's get into the economics then. Most economists who've tried to model the effects of open borders estimate it would cause a very, very large increase in the size of the global economy — roughly doubling it, in most papers I've seen. Why would that happen? What's the mechanism? Bryan Caplan: There are some countries where wages are really high and some countries where wages are really low. The question is, "Why is that? Why exactly is the wage so low in Haiti?" You might think that there is something wrong with the Haitians, but the immigration that we already allow shows us that isn’t true. If you move someone from Port Au Prince to Miami, he almost instantly gets an enormous raise. So most of the difference is not due to differences between the workers. It’s a difference in conditions. Open borders allow people to move from the parts of the world where their labor pretty much goes to waste, where it’s hard for anyone to get anything done, and to places where their skills can shine, where they’re able to show what they can do, where they're able to contribute far more. Imagine that you’ve got a million people farming in Antarctica. They’re eking out this bare subsistence in agriculture in the snow. Obviously, if you let those farmers leave Antarctica and go someplace else to farm, the farmers are better off. But isn’t it also better for the world if you let people stop eking out this existence, contributing nothing to the world, and go someplace where they could actually use their skills and not just feed themselves, but produce something for the world economy? The final part is the size of the numbers involved. You might think that moving from Haiti to the United States would cause a 20 percent increase in wages, but no. It’s more like a 2,000 percent increase in wages. The difference between the productivity of labor in poor countries and rich countries is so vast, it’s hard to wrap your mind around it. It comes down to the logic of moving productive resources from places where they’re next to useless to places where they can contribute a lot. Prosperity comes from production, and open borders would massively increase production. As I said in the Intelligence Squared debate, this isn’t just trickle-down economics. It’s Niagara Falls economics. If production in the world were to double, almost everyone is going to get enough of that doubling that they’re going to, in the end, be better off as a result. You can’t double the output of the world and leave a lot of people poor as a result. When you have that massive an outpouring of production, that’s going to raise all or almost all boats.

## 2AC — Solvency

### Extend: “Plan Solves”

#### Legal presumption solves ethics and the economy while conserving government resources.

Johnson 6 — Kevin R. Johnson, Professor of Public Interest Law at UC Davis School of Law, JD from Harvard, BA in Economics from UC Berkeley, 2006 (“Radical Immigration Reform: Opening Up the Borders?,” LTVN, December 18th, Available Online via the Wayback Machine at <https://web.archive.org/web/20070318182406/http://legalnews.tv/commentary/radical_immigration_reform_opening_up_the_borders_20061218.html>, Accessed 08-08-2018)

I offer a radical alternative - for the United States to open its borders. The borders of the United States should be open with no numerical limits on the number of immigrants who can enter the country in any given year. The current family and employment preferences and diversity visa system, as well as the per country caps that limit immigration annually from any one nation, would be abolished in their entirety. The nation would eliminate the current hyper-complex system of immigration controls, which have proven difficult to enforce and relatively easy to circumvent. An open admissions system would be far simpler, fairer, efficient, and realistic. I do not propose, however, complete dismantling of border controls. Rather, immigrants generally would need to secure a visa from the U.S. government in order to gain lawful admission through a port of entry. The strong legal presumption at all stages of the visa application process would be that the non-citizen applicant is entitled to admission into the United States, the precise opposite of the current legal presumption. The visa application process would, as it currently does, require a background check and scrutiny of each non-citizen’s criminal record and health history. The government would strive to ensure that various federal and international law enforcement agencies share all available information about possible criminal or terrorist ties of visa applicants. Non-citizens seeking long-term admission into the country would apply for a visa that would afford them with the status equivalent to that of a current lawful permanent resident. Much government time and effort would be saved by streamlining the entire visa system and eliminating the many quotas, ceilings, complex immigrant visa requirements, and the myriad of exclusion grounds that exist under current U.S. law. Moreover, the system would be far fairer than current law to Non-citizens. Many would-be migrants who currently have no avenue for entry under the current system for immigrating to the United States would have one. This new system would eliminate the per country ceilings of less than 26,000 per year that result in long waits by immigrants seeking entry under certain family and employment preferences from high-immigration nations, such as China, India, Mexico, and the Philippines. The only bar to entry in the open borders system proposed here would be a narrowly drawn exclusion based on a showing by a preponderance of the evidence that a particular non-citizen posed a clear and present danger to the national security or public safety of the United States. Only Non-citizens persons guilty of crimes demonstrating that they pose a danger to public safety, proven terrorists, and persons with communicable diseases that constitute a substantial public health risk would be denied entry into the United States. Such a change in the law would represent a radical departure from the many requirements and long laundry lists of overbroad exclusion grounds that exist under the current U.S. immigration laws and result in the denial of lawful admission to tens of thousands of potential entrants each year. An open borders system is more consistent with the U.S. Constitution’s devotion to individual rights, the economic interests of the nation, and the social and political forces fueling immigration. Perhaps free labor migration within North America akin to that permitted within the European Union is a good first step. In any event, the nation should realize that border fences and like measures just will not work.

# Off-Case

## Brain Drain DA Answers

### 2AC — Brain Drain DA

#### Turn — open borders promote brain circulation, not brain drain.

Bregman 16 — Rutger Bregman, author of Utopia for Realists: The Case for a Universal Basic Income, Open Borders, and a 15-Hour Workweek, MA in History from Utrecht University, 2016 (“The Surprisingly Compelling Argument for Open Borders,” Fortune, April 17th, Available Online at <http://fortune.com/2016/04/17/immigration-open-borders/>, Accessed 08-08-2018)

This brings us to a fascinating paradox: Open borders promote immigrants’ return. Take the border between Mexico and the U.S. In the 1960s, 70 million Mexicans crossed it, but in time, 85% returned home. Since 9/11, the U.S. side of the border has been heavily militarized, which has discouraged immigrants from going back. “We annually spend billions of taxpayer dollars on border enforcement that is worse than useless—it is counterproductive,” observes a sociology professor at Princeton University. “Migrants quite rationally responded to the increased costs and risks by minimizing the number of times they crossed the border.”

#### Brain drain arguments are faulty — they ignore market driven skills acquisition, assume finite skilled workers, and devalue rights to movement.

Clemens and McKenzie 9 — Michael Clemens, Senior Fellow @ Center for Global Development, Ph.D. from Harvard, and David McKenzie, Lead Economist @ World Bank Development Research Group with a Ph.D. from Yale, 2009 (“ Think Again: Brain Drain,” Foreign Policy, October 22nd, Available Online at <http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/22/think-again-brain-drain/>, Accessed 08-09-2018)

Allowing skilled emigration is stealing human capital from poor countries." No. Many of the same countries courted by the United States through aid and trade deals complain bitterly of the "brain drain" of their doctors, scientists, and engineers to the United States and other rich countries. If correct, these complaints would mean that current immigration policy amounts to counterproductive foreign policy. Thankfully, however, the flow of skilled emigrants from poor to rich parties can actually benefit both parties. This common idea that skilled emigration amounts to "stealing" requires a cartoonish set of assumptions about developing countries. First, it requires us to assume that developing countries possess a finite stock of skilled workers, a stock depleted by one for every departure. In fact, people respond to the incentives created by migration: Enormous numbers of skilled workers from developing countries have been induced to acquire their skills by the opportunity of high earnings abroad. This is why the Philippines, which sends more nurses abroad than any other developing country, still has more nurses per capita at home than Britain does. Recent research has also shown that a sudden, large increase in skilled emigration from a developing country to a skill-selective destination can cause a corresponding sudden increase in skill acquisition in the source country. Second, believing that skilled emigration amounts to theft from the poor requires us to assume that skilled workers themselves are not poor. In Zambia, a nurse has to get by on less than $1,500 per year — measured at U.S. prices, not Zambian ones — and a doctor must make ends meet with less than $5,500 per year, again at U.S. prices. If these were your annual wages, facing U.S. price levels, you would likely consider yourself destitute. Third, believing that a person’s choice to emigrate constitutes "stealing" requires problematic assumptions about that person’s rights. The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that all people have an unqualified right to leave any country. Skilled migrants are not "owned" by their home countries, and should have the same rights to freedom of movement as professionals in rich countries.

#### Open borders benefit all — Puerto Rico proves no brain drain.

Matthews 14 — Dylan Matthews, staff writer for Vox.com, 2014 (“The case for open borders,” Vox, December 15th, Available Online at https://www.vox.com/2014/9/13/6135905/open-borders-bryan-caplan-interview-gdp-double, Accessed 08-08-2018)

Even if open borders would be economically beneficial for recipient countries, it's worth asking if it benefits the countries people are leaving. A common worry is that open borders would cause a "brain drain," taking talent away from developing countries and hurting them, even as it helps their (former) residents. The idea here is a little confused; we should care about making life better for people, whether or not they stay in their home country. But it's wrong even on its own terms. If we're worried about brain drain, we should really be concerned about the current immigration system, in which high-skilled immigrants are privileged over low-skilled ones, ensuring that what migration does occur disproportionately takes the former out of their home countries. In any case, emigration actually helps home countries in a wide variety of ways. Emigrants typically send back money, which can be hugely consequential for their home country's economy. They can create social networks in host countries, and later come home and use those connections to advance their home country's development. Caplan points to the Chinese diaspora as a prime example: "A lot of what’s going on in the development of China is there is this huge, disparate community of ethnic Chinese all over the place, and they have relatives in China. This makes it very easy for them to do business with each other." Moreover, actual examples we have of open borders suggest that migrants' home countries actually benefit. Take Puerto Rico. Shortly after the US conquered it in the Spanish American War, the Supreme Court established that it was illegal to restrict migration between the island and the rest of the United States. The result was open borders between the US and a much poorer territory, imposed more or less randomly by a court. It made for a good test of the policy's effect: since then, Puerto Rico has far surpassed neighboring countries like the Dominican Republic economically. "In terms of brain drain, it seems like there has been a lot less than for any other Latin American country, because from Puerto Rico, you can come regardless of your skill level, whereas, for every other country in Latin America, it is much easier for the skilled workers to get in," Caplan notes. "Over half the population has left, but Puerto Rico, by the standards of Caribbean island nations, is a paradise."

#### Brain drain is outdated theory — prefer brain circulation.

Clemens and McKenzie 9 — Michael Clemens, Senior Fellow @ Center for Global Development, Ph.D. from Harvard, and David McKenzie, Lead Economist @ World Bank Development Research Group with a Ph.D. from Yale, 2009 (“ Think Again: Brain Drain,” Foreign Policy, October 22nd, Available Online at <http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/22/think-again-brain-drain/>, Accessed 08-09-2018)

Conventional wisdom once held that the wealth of a country declined when it imported foreign goods, since obviously cash was wealth and obviously buying foreign goods sent cash abroad. Adam Smith argued that economic development — or the "wealth of nations" — depends not a country’s stock of cash but on structural changes that international exchange could encourage. In today’s information age, the view has taken hold that human capital now rules the wealth of nations, and that its departure in any circumstance must harm a country’s development. But economic development is much more complex than that. But thanks to new research, we have learned that the international movement of educated people changes the incentives to acquire education, sends enormous quantities of money across borders, leads to movements back and forth, and can contribute to the spread of trade, investment, technology, and ideas. All of this fits very uncomfortably in a rhyming phrase like "brain drain," a caricature that would be best discarded in favor of a richer view of the links between human movement and development.

### Extend: “Immigration Helps Developing Countries”

#### Emigration net positive for developing countries: remittances, brain circulation, social networking, skill acquisition

Caplan 14 — Bryan D. Caplan, Professor of Economics at Georgie Mason University, published in the American Economic Review, the Economic Journal, the Journal of Law and Economics, Social Science Quarterly, the Journal of Public Economics, the Southern Economic Journal, and Public Choice, Ph.D. in Economics from Princeton, BA in Economics from UC Berkeley, 2014 (“The case for open borders,” Bryan Caplan interviewed by Dylan Matthews, Vox, December 15th, Available Online at https://www.vox.com/2014/9/13/6135905/open-borders-bryan-caplan-interview-gdp-double, Accessed 08-08-2018)

Dylan Matthews: What do you make of the brain drain argument? If you have open migration, and 80 percent of Haiti moves to the US, will the remaining 20 percent have an even more miserable existence? Does that negate the benefits? Bryan Caplan: The first thing to know is that the main reason for selective brain drain is current immigration policy, because right now it is much easier for a skilled worker to get in than an unskilled worker. The reason you have so many skilled workers leaving and so few unskilled workers leaving is because skilled workers can legally leave, and unskilled workers cannot. The main point of open borders is to open up immigration to low-skilled workers as well. But the conventional wisdom among economists who study this is that the net effect even of the smartest people leaving the country is, in general, quite positive, for a few reasons. One is remittances. Your high-skilled workers leave, but they don’t suddenly cut all their emotional ties as soon as they go. Instead, they go and they make a lot more money, and they send a lot of that money home. Remittances exceed foreign aid now. There are a lot of areas in the Third World that are really kept afloat by the people who have left. Within the US we have the much milder idea of people commuting into the city. They work, and then they send the money back home into the suburbs. That way they support their family far better than they could if they had to take the best job they could get within five miles of their house. It’s not such a weird idea. There has also been a lot of work done on the question of whether the possibility of going abroad if you become more skilled actually leads to an increase in the acquisition of skills among people who remain behind. A classic example is the Philippines. The Philippines is a massive exporter of nurses, so you might think this would mean that the Philippines would have almost no nurses left, but, actually, they have an unusually favorable ratio of nurses to population, and a big part of the answer is there are a lot of Filipinos going to nursing school, incentivized by this chance they might be able to go abroad and then become a nurse and make a ton of money abroad. Many don’t actually get that permission, but they still become nurses, and then they wind up being nurses at home. On top of this, a lot of immigrants eventually come home. They go abroad, they often acquire business connections while they’re abroad, and they return. They not only bring the skills back, but they also bring back connections, which are a huge deal. A lot of what’s going on in the development of China is there is this huge disparate community of ethnic Chinese all over the place, and they have relatives in China. This makes it very easy for them to do business with each other. A lot of what the so-called brain drain does is create these same kinds of social networks, which wind up being a big help for development. If you want to get an idea about what to really expect under open borders, my favorite social experiment is Puerto Rico. In 1904 there was a Supreme Court case which ruled that Puerto Rican immigration could not be restricted. After the Spanish American War, Puerto Rico became a territory of the US. A Puerto Rican woman went to New York City, and the US Government tried to deport her, she sued, and she won. The Supreme Court didn’t just say that this woman gets to stay. They said any Puerto Rican is free to come and go to the United States. So by judicial fiat, which easily could have the other way, you wind up opening borders between Puerto Rico and the United States. By the way, one funny footnote to the case is the cultural gap was so large that the official Supreme Court docket misspells the woman's name, because they had so little familiarity with Spanish at the time they just got the spelling wrong. There is actually very good data on Puerto Rican migration. In the first 10 years, only a few thousand people come, but then it just becomes like 10,000, and then 30,000, 50,000 and, by now, over half of Puerto Ricans live in the United States. In terms of brain drain, it seems like there has been a lot less than for any other Latin American country, because from Puerto Rico you can come regardless of your skill level, whereas, for every other country in Latin America, it is much easier for the skilled workers to get in. Over half the population has left, but Puerto Rico by the standards of Caribbean island nations is a paradise. It’s poorer than any American state, even worse than Mississippi, but compared to any of the other islands around there, Puerto Rico is doing fantastically well. It does show us what happens not only to Puerto Ricans who moved, but even to the people that stayed behind. They’re still doing very well compared to how they would be if they didn’t have this open borders benefit.