# Open Borders Negative

## Notes

The affirmative can read one or both advantages- Economy/Poverty, and Morality. This negative contains case answers to both, and two complete strategies that are designed to solve one part of the case and read offense about the other

Brain Drain-This strategy is a plan inclusive counterplan that has the US open the borders except in instances where allowing migration would have negative effects on the other countries economy. As an example, if Zambia was experiencing a nurse shortage then the US would not allow nurses from Zambia to immigrate to the US. This CP solves basically 100% of the economy advantage, but solves LESS of the morality advantage- the nurses from Zambia who cannot leave are denied their right to migrate. The Disad/CP have a variety of turns to the morality advantage about why brain drain makes poverty worse and is therefore unjust. These turns case arguments DO require you to win consequences matter for the most part, so you will still want to answer/engage the morality page.

Overpopulation-This strategy solves less of the economy (as it restricts migration) but has a lot of morality offense for why it is a better option. The basic premise of this strategy is that instead of an unlimited individual right to mobility we should have rights that are balanced with non-human interests (i.e. animals and the environment). This relies on a more communitarian/non-anthropocentric conception of rights and justice. There are a variety of links but they all basically make the argument that unrestrained personal mobility is in tension with protecting the natural world.

Answering morality

There are 3 different ways the negative can answer morality

Consequentialism Good- These arguments say policy makers must weigh consequences/use utilitarianism. You would use these arguments to win access to your disad/argue it outweighs the case

No right to migrate- these are substantive answers to the specific moral claims of the 1AC, rather than abstract arguments about what moral system we should use.

Specific Turns- each off case strategy has specific answers to morality you should couple with whichever off case you chose to read

Answering Economy

In addition to defense that indicts the “trillion dollar bills” idea, there are two primary negative offensive arguments about the “open borders” idea

Mass Migration- this argues that in order to solve billions of people would need to move/relocate and that aff studies don’t adequately take this into account

Wages- a mass flood of immigrants would depress wages in the short run hurting the economy of host nations

Most of the evidence for both of these comes from Borjas, an economist at Harvard. There is aff/neg evidence debating his models/qualifications you will want to familiarize yourself with.

### Brain Drain Disad Guide

Brain Drain- when a wealthy/developed country attracts migrants from a developing country who have skills that society could use (doctors, nurses, engineers etc)

Brain Gain- when migrants encourage developing countries to improve their educational system/there are spillover effects that benefit that country

Brain Circulation- when migrants move back and forth between home and host country, spreading their knowledge

Bottom Billion- the idea that we should evaluate things morally from the perspective of the poorest billion people/adopt policies that benefit them most

The brain drain disad says that open borders would encourage people with skills to migrate from developing countries to developed countries. This exodus means developing countries no longer have the skilled workers they need to develop infrastructure/advance their economies so that they can grow their economy/get out of poverty. If the affirmative does not read the poverty/structural violence impact in the 1AC you might want to add it to your 1NC shell.

The CP sets up a narrow set of exclusions that will prevent immigrants from countries that could experience catastrophic brain drain as a result of migration. When explaining the CP you want to emphasize that the number of people affected is *small* but that it is significant/meaningful for the home country. I.E some countries really need 1 or 2 more doctors, but the US probably doesn’t experience a great deal of benefit from 2 additional doctors. So you want to explain that the CP doesn’t affect many people (and therefore solves the *majority* of morality) but that those small handful of people have a big impact/are meaningful to the host nation.

### Overpopulation Disad Guide

Carrying Capacity- the number of people a country or parcel of land can sustainably provide for

Demographics-population statistics about a nation

Demographic decline- the idea that a nation can “age”- i.e. its average population can get older, which creates problems like there aren’t enough workers or social security runs out of money as there are more people taking out than putting in

Limits to growth- there are natural, environmental ceilings on how much economic or population growth can occur, pushed beyond these limits the ecosystem will collapse

The overpopulation disad says the US population is stabilizing/declining, but an increase in immigration will reverse these trends and encourage more population growth in developing countries. This disad is problematic in that there is a long history of people using “overpopulation” arguments to justify racist immigration policies and eugenics- the idea that we should curate the human gene pool by eliminating people deemed “less worthy” than others. Despite that history, population concerns are a major objection to immigration that is voiced by both the left (environmentalists) and the right (nativists). The cards in this file represent the “left” objection to immigration. While there is plenty of evidence making overpopulation arguments from the right, those arguments are largely different like “immigrants will use up the welfare state” or “immigrants overwhelm health care infrastructure”. The two links you want to emphasize are that moving to the US increases consumption, and that emigration allows home countries to adopt less environmentally responsible policies because they know immigration will happen/will make up for it.

The counterplan is not a “pic” like the brain drain CP but is instead a *uniqueness CP*. The US currently has a very liberal immigration policy (compared to the CP) which hurts the uniqueness for the disad. So the CP is designed to make immigration law MORE restrictive and therefore reduce its effects on the environment.

## Morality Advantage Answers

### 1NC — Morality Advantage Answers

#### Morality of immigration is self-referential and ideological — don’t let it drive policy.

Borjas 15 — George Borjas, Professor of Economics and Social Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School, recipient of the 2011 IZA Prize in Labor Economics, Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research, Ph.D. in Economics from Columbia, 2015 (“Immigration and Globalization: A Review Essay,” Journal of Economic Literature, December, Vol. 53, No. 4, Available Online at <https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jel.53.4.961>, Accessed 08-09-2018)

Before concluding, let me point out that I have assiduously avoided the ethical issues surrounding the relaxation of immigration restrictions throughout the essay. I am certainly not qualified to comment on the morality of the restrictions that countries enact to restrict population flows across international borders. Although these ethical issues are often alluded to (both Collier and Ruhs offer lengthy discussions of these issues), the moral argument is often far too ideological and too steeped in an author’s value system to be very convincing. Moreover, I suspect that the axioms one postulates about the foundations of a just society are very likely to influence the ending point regarding the morality of immigration restrictions—one need look no further than the different systems of distributive justice proposed by Nozick and Rawls for evidence that assumptions drive conclusions. Abstracting from these ethical issues, there is a clear message for anyone examining the link between immigration and globalization: beware of social engineers who promise the existence of trillion-dollar bills on a mythical sidewalk at the end of the rainbow; those promises are often based on flimsy modeling and inadequate evidence. (973)

#### No absolute right to mobility — even aff authors concede some limits are needed.

Miller 13 — David Miller, Professor of Political Theory at Oxford University, Fellow at Nuffield College, former Professor at the University of Lancaster, trained in philosophy at Cambridge and Oxford, 2013 (“The Case for Limits,” in Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics, 2nd Edition, ed. Andrew I. Cohen and Christopher Heath Wellman, 2013, ISBN-10: 1118479394)

Liberal political philosophers who write about migration usually begin from the premise that people should be allowed to choose where in the world to locate themselves unless it can be shown that allowing an unlimited right of migration would have harmful consequences that outweigh the value of freedom of choice (see, for instance, Carens, 1987; Hampton, 1995). In other words, the central value appealed to is simply freedom itself. Just as I should be free to decide who to marry, what job to take, what religion (if any) to profess, so I should be free to decide whether to live in Nigeria, or France, or the USA. Now these philosophers usually concede that in practice some limits may have to be placed on this freedom – for instance, if high rates of migration would result in social chaos or the breakdown of liberal states that could not accommodate so many migrants without losing their liberal character. In these instances, the exercise of free choice would become self-defeating. But the presumption is that people should be free to choose where to live unless there are strong reasons for restricting their choice. I want to challenge this presumption. Of course there is always some value in people having more options to choose between, in this case options as to where to live, but we usually draw a line between basic freedoms that people should have as a matter of right and what we might call bare freedoms that do not warrant that kind of protection. It would be good from my point of view if I were free to purchase an Aston Martin tomorrow, but that is not going to count as a morally significant freedom – my desire is not one that imposes any kind of obligation on others to meet it. In order to argue against immigration restrictions, therefore, liberal philosophers must do more than show that there is some value to people in being able to migrate, or that they often *want* to migrate (as indeed they do, in increasing numbers). It needs to be demonstrated that this freedom has the kind of weight or significance that could turn it into a right, and that should therefore prohibit states from pursuing immigration policies that limit freedom of movement. (364)

#### Policies must balance between competing interests — rights to move are not absolute.

Miller 13 — David Miller, Professor of Political Theory at Oxford University, Fellow at Nuffield College, former Professor at the University of Lancaster, trained in philosophy at Cambridge and Oxford, 2013 (“The Case for Limits,” in Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics, 2nd Edition, ed. Andrew I. Cohen and Christopher Heath Wellman, 2013, ISBN-10: 1118479394)

The second issue is discrimination among migrants who are not refugees. Currently, states do discriminate on a variety of different grounds, effectively selecting the migrants they want to take in. Can this be justified? Well, given that states are entitled to put a ceiling on the numbers of people they take in, for reasons canvassed in the previous section, they need to select somehow, if only by lottery (as the USA began to do in 1995 for certain categories of immigrant). So what grounds can they legitimately use? It seems to me that receiving states are entitled to consider the benefit they would receive from admitting a would-be migrant as well as the strength of the migrant’s own claim to move. So it is acceptable to give precedence to people whose cultural values are closer to those of the existing population – for instance, to those who already speak the native language. This is a direct corollary of the argument in the previous section about cultural self-determination. Next in order of priority come those who possess skills and talents that are needed by the receiving community.2 Their claim is weakened, as suggested earlier, by the likelihood that in taking them in, the receiving state is also depriving their country of origin of a valuable resource (medical expertise, for example). In such cases, the greater the interest the potential host country has in admitting the would-be migrant, the more likely it is that admitting her will make life worse for those she leaves behind. So although it is reasonable for the receiving state to make decisions based on how much the immigrant can be expected to contribute economically if admitted, this criterion should be used with caution. What cannot be defended in any circumstances is discrimination on grounds of race, sex, or, in most instances, religion – religion could be a relevant criterion only where it continues to form an essential part of the public culture, as in the case of the state of Israel. If nation-states are allowed to decide how many immigrants to admit in the first place, why can’t they pick and choose among potential immigrants on whatever grounds they like – admitting only red-haired women if that is what their current membership prefers? I have tried to hold a balance between the interest that migrants have in entering the country they want to live in, and the interest that political communities having in determining their own character. Although the first of these interests is not strong enough to justify a right of migration, it is still substantial, and so the immigrants who are refused entry are owed an explanation. To be told that they belong to the wrong race, or sex (or have hair of the wrong color) is insulting, given that these features do not connect to anything of real significance to the society they want to join. Even tennis clubs are not entitled to discriminate among applicants on grounds such as these. (372-373)

#### Preventing extinction comes first — all moral views agree.

Plummer 15 — Theron Plummer, researcher in philosophy at St. Anne’s College at the University of Oxford, Ph.D., 2015 (“Moral Agreement on Saving the World,” Practical Ethics, May 18th, Available Online at <http://blog.practicalethics.ox.ac.uk/2015/05/moral-agreement-on-saving-the-world/>, Accessed 08-09-2018)

There appears to be lot of disagreement in moral philosophy. Whether these many apparent disagreements are deep and irresolvable, I believe there is at least one thing it is reasonable to agree on right now, whatever general moral view we adopt: that it is very important to reduce the risk that all intelligent beings on this planet are eliminated by an enormous catastrophe, such as a nuclear war. How we might in fact try to reduce such existential risks is discussed elsewhere. My claim here is only that we – whether we’re consequentialists, deontologists, or virtue ethicists – should all agree that we should try to save the world. According to consequentialism, we should maximize the good, where this is taken to be the goodness, from an impartial perspective, of outcomes. Clearly one thing that makes an outcome good is that the people in it are doing well. There is little disagreement here. If the happiness or well-being of possible future people is just as important as that of people who already exist, and if they would have good lives, it is not hard to see how reducing existential risk is easily the most important thing in the whole world. This is for the familiar reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. There are so many possible future people that reducing existential risk is arguably the most important thing in the world, even if the well-being of these possible people were given only 0.001% as much weight as that of existing people. Even on a wholly person-affecting view – according to which there’s nothing (apart from effects on existing people) to be said in favor of creating happy people – the case for reducing existential risk is very strong. As noted in this seminal paper, this case is strengthened by the fact that there’s a good chance that many existing people will, with the aid of life-extension technology, live very long and very high quality lives. You might think what I have just argued applies to consequentialists only. There is a tendency to assume that, if an argument appeals to consequentialist considerations (the goodness of outcomes), it is irrelevant to non-consequentialists. But that is a huge mistake. Non-consequentialism is the view that there’s more that determines rightness than the goodness of consequences or outcomes; it is not the view that the latter don’t matter. Even John Rawls wrote, “All ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy.” Minimally plausible versions of deontology and virtue ethics must be concerned in part with promoting the good, from an impartial point of view. They’d thus imply very strong reasons to reduce existential risk, at least when this doesn’t significantly involve doing harm to others or damaging one’s character. What’s even more surprising, perhaps, is that even if our own good (or that of those near and dear to us) has much greater weight than goodness from the impartial “point of view of the universe,” indeed even if the latter is entirely morally irrelevant, we may nonetheless have very strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Even egoism, the view that each agent should maximize her own good, might imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. It will depend, among other things, on what one’s own good consists in. If well-being consisted in pleasure only, it is somewhat harder to argue that egoism would imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk – perhaps we could argue that one would maximize her expected hedonic well-being by funding life extension technology or by having herself cryogenically frozen at the time of her bodily death as well as giving money to reduce existential risk (so that there is a world for her to live in!). I am not sure, however, how strong the reasons to do this would be. But views which imply that, if I don’t care about other people, I have no or very little reason to help them are not even minimally plausible views (in addition to hedonistic egoism, I here have in mind views that imply that one has no reason to perform an act unless one actually desires to do that act). To be minimally plausible, egoism will need to be paired with a more sophisticated account of well-being. To see this, it is enough to consider, as Plato did, the possibility of a ring of invisibility – suppose that, while wearing it, Ayn could derive some pleasure by helping the poor, but instead could derive just a bit more by severely harming them. Hedonistic egoism would absurdly imply she should do the latter. To avoid this implication, egoists would need to build something like the meaningfulness of a life into well-being, in some robust way, where this would to a significant extent be a function of other-regarding concerns (see chapter 12 of this classic intro to ethics). But once these elements are included, we can (roughly, as above) argue that this sort of egoism will imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Add to all of this Samuel Scheffler’s recent intriguing arguments (quick podcast version available here) that most of what makes our lives go well would be undermined if there were no future generations of intelligent persons. On his view, my life would contain vastly less well-being if (say) a year after my death the world came to an end. So obviously if Scheffler were right I’d have very strong reason to reduce existential risk. We should also take into account moral uncertainty. What is it reasonable for one to do, when one is uncertain not (only) about the empirical facts, but also about the moral facts? I’ve just argued that there’s agreement among minimally plausible ethical views that we have strong reason to reduce existential risk – not only consequentialists, but also deontologists, virtue ethicists, and sophisticated egoists should agree. But even those (hedonistic egoists) who disagree should have a significant level of confidence that they are mistaken, and that one of the above views is correct. Even if they were 90% sure that their view is the correct one (and 10% sure that one of these other ones is correct), they would have pretty strong reason, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, to reduce existential risk. Perhaps most disturbingly still, even if we are only 1% sure that the well-being of possible future people matters, it is at least arguable that, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, reducing existential risk is the most important thing in the world. Again, this is largely for the reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. (For more on this and other related issues, see this excellent dissertation). Of course, it is uncertain whether these untold trillions would, in general, have good lives. It’s possible they’ll be miserable. It is enough for my claim that there is moral agreement in the relevant sense if, at least given certain empirical claims about what future lives would most likely be like, all minimally plausible moral views would converge on the conclusion that we should try to save the world. While there are some non-crazy views that place significantly greater moral weight on avoiding suffering than on promoting happiness, for reasons others have offered (and for independent reasons I won’t get into here unless requested to), they nonetheless seem to be fairly implausible views. And even if things did not go well for our ancestors, I am optimistic that they will overall go fantastically well for our descendants, if we allow them to. I suspect that most of us alive today – at least those of us not suffering from extreme illness or poverty – have lives that are well worth living, and that things will continue to improve. Derek Parfit, whose work has emphasized future generations as well as agreement in ethics, described our situation clearly and accurately: “We live during the hinge of history. Given the scientific and technological discoveries of the last two centuries, the world has never changed as fast. We shall soon have even greater powers to transform, not only our surroundings, but ourselves and our successors. If we act wisely in the next few centuries, humanity will survive its most dangerous and decisive period. Our descendants could, if necessary, go elsewhere, spreading through this galaxy…. Our descendants might, I believe, make the further future very good. But that good future may also depend in part on us. If our selfish recklessness ends human history, we would be acting very wrongly.” (From chapter 36 of On What Matters)

#### Must consider consequences — intent-based frameworks crush our ability to respond to violence.

McCluskey 15 — Martha McCluskey, JSD @ Columbia, Professor of Law @ SUNY-Buffalo, 2015 (“How the "Unintended Consequences" Story Promotes Unjust Intent and Impact,” Berkeley La Raza Law Journal, Vol. 22, 2015, Available Online at doi: dx.doi.org/doi:10.15779/Z381664, Accessed 08-09-2018)

**By similarly making structures of inequality appear beyond the reach of law** reform, **the "unintended consequences" message helps update and reinforce the narrowing of protections against intentional racial harm. Justice is centrally a question of whose** interests and whose **harms should count**, in what context and in what form and to whom. **Power is centrally about being able to act without having to take harm to others into account**. **This power to gain by harming others is strongest when it operates through** systems and **structures that make disregarding that harm appear** routine, rational, and beneficial or at least **acceptable** or perhaps inevitable. By portraying law's unequal harms as the "side effects" of systems and structures with unquestionable "main effects," **the** "**unintended consequences" story helps affirm the resulting harm** even as it seems to offer sympathy and technical assistance. In considering solutions to the financial market problems, the policy puzzle is not that struggling homeowners' interests are overwhelmingly complex or uncertain. Instead, the bigger problem is that overwhelmingly powerful interests and ideologies are actively resisting systemic changes that would make those interests count. The failure to criminally prosecute or otherwise severely penalize high-level financial industry fraud is not primarily the result of uncertainty about the harmful effects of that fraudulent behavior, but because the political and justice systems are skewed to protect the gains and unaccountability of wealthy executives despite the clear harms to hosts of others. **The unequal effects of** the prevailing **policy** response to the crisis **are foreseeable and obvious, not accidental or surprising**. It would not take advanced knowledge of economics to readily predict that modest-income homeowners would tend to be far worse off than bank executives by a policy approach that failed to provide substantial mortgage forgiveness and foreclosure protections for modest-income homeowners but instead provided massive subsidized credit and other protections for Wall Street. Many policy actions likely to alleviate the unequal harm of the crisis similarly are impeded not because consumer advocates, low-income homeowners, or racial justice advocates hesitate to risk major changes in existing systems, or are divided about the technical design of alternative programs or more effective mechanisms for enforcing laws against fraud and racial discrimination. Instead, the problem is that these voices pressing for effective change are often excluded, drowned out or distorted in Congress and in federal agencies such as the Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve, or in the media, in the mainstream economics profession, and to a large extent in legal scholarship about financial markets. More generally, those diverse voices from the bottom have been largely absent or marginalized in the dominant theoretical framework that constructs widespread and severe inequality as unforeseeable and largely inevitable, or even beneficial. Moreover, **justice requires careful attention to both harmful intent and to complex harmful effects**. But **the concept of "unintended consequences" inverts justice by suggesting that the best way to care** for those at the bottom **is to not care to make law more attentive** to the bottom. "**Unintended consequences" arguments promote a simplistic moral message in the guise of sophisticated intellectual critique**-the message that those who lack power should not seek it because the desire for more power is what hurts most. Further, **like Ayn Rand's overt philosophy of selfishness, that message promotes the theme that those who have power to ignore** their **harmful effects on others need not-indeed should not-be induced by law to care about this harm**, because this caring is what is harmful. One right-wing think tank has recently made this moral message more explicit with an economic values campaign suggesting that the intentional pursuit of economic equality is a problem of the immoral envy of those whose economic success proves they are more deserving.169 **Legal scholars and advocates who intend to put intellectual rigor and justice ahead of service to** financial **elites should reject stories of "unintended consequences" and instead scrutinize the power and laws that have so effectively achieved the intention of making devastating losses to so many of us seem natural, inevitable, and beneficial**.

#### Public officials must consider consequences — even if there’s uncertainty.

Gooden 95 — Robert Gooden, philosopher at the Research School of the Social Sciences, 1995 (Utilitarianism as Public Philosophy, ISBN-13: 978-0521468060, p.62-63)

Consider, first, the argument from necessity. Public officials are obliged to make their choices under uncertainty, and uncertainty of a very special sort at that. All choices—public and private alike—are made under some degree of uncertainty, of course. But in the nature of things, private individuals will usually have more complete information on the peculiarities of their own circumstances and on the ramifications that alternative possible choices might have on them. Public officials, in contrast, are relatively poorly informed as to the effects that their choices will have on individuals, one by one. What they typically do know are generalities: averages and aggregates. They know what will happen most often to most people as a result of their various possible choices. But that is all. That is enough to allow public policy-makers to use the utilitarian calculus—if they want to use it at all—to choose general rules of conduct. Knowing aggregates and averages, they can proceed to calculate the utility payoffs from adopting each alternative possible general rules.

#### Policy predictions are possible and useful.

Mearsheimer 1 — John Mearsheimer, professor of political science at the University of Chicago, 2001 (The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 2001, Available Online via googleprint, p.8)

As a result, all political forecasting is bound to include some error. Those who venture to predict, as I do here, should therefore proceed with humility, take care not to exhibit unwarranted confidence, and admit that hindsight is likely to reveal surprises and mistakes. Despite these hazards, social scientists should nevertheless use their theories to make predictions about the future. Making predictions helps inform policy discourse, because it helps make sense of events unfolding in the world around us. And by clarifying points of disagreement, making explicit forecasts helps those with contradictory views to frame their own ideas more clearly. Furthermore, trying to anticipate new events is a good way to test social science theories, because theorists do not have the benefit of hindsight and therefore cannot adjust their claims to fit the evidence (because it is not yet available). In short, the world can be used as a laboratory to decide which theories best explain international politics. In that spirit I employ offensive realism to peer into the future, mindful of both the benefits and the hazards of trying to predict events.

### Disad Turns Case

#### DA turns the case — any negative impact creates xenophobic backlash.

Johnson 9 — Kevin R. Johnson, Professor of Public Interest Law at UC Davis School of Law, JD from Harvard, BA in Economics from UC Berkeley, 2009 (Opening the Floodgates: Why America Needs to Rethink its Borders and Immigration Laws, 2009, ISBN-13: 978-0814743096, p. 2)

At the same time, however, the United States has an immigration dark side. A mean-spirited, anti-immigrant impulse has sporadically gripped the nation, particularly during times of social stress. During these times, the U.S. immigration laws have been harsh, discriminatory, and aggressively enforced. Consequently, U.S. law has barred many innocent groups of people from its shores for the very worst of reasons. The near-complete prohibition of immigration from China, which lasted from the late nineteenth century until 1965, is perhaps the most famous example. The measures taken by the federal government against Arab and Muslim noncitizens—and generally against all noncitizens—after the tragic events of September 11, 2001, are the most recent.

#### DA turns the case — immigration policies with negative impacts create hostile crackdowns on immigrants.

Johnson 9 — Kevin R. Johnson, Professor of Public Interest Law at UC Davis School of Law, JD from Harvard, BA in Economics from UC Berkeley, 2009 (Opening the Floodgates: Why America Needs to Rethink its Borders and Immigration Laws, 2009, ISBN-13: 978-0814743096, p. 45)

U.S. immigration law is famous for its cyclical, turbulent, and ambivalent nature. At times, the nation has embraced some of the most liberal immigration admissions laws and policies in the world. The nation’s immigration laws, in these times, have been truer to the ideal of offering open arms to the “huddled masses” than they are today. Despite the law’s current restrictions on immigration, U.S. law remains more open in terms of admissions and access to citizenship than the laws of many developed nations. At other times in U.S. history, however, the nation has capitulated to the nativist impulse and embraced immigration laws and policies that, in retrospect, make us cringe with shame and regret. Time and time again, fear and social stress have sparked fiery attacks on the nation’s most vulnerable outsiders. Punitive immigration laws and tough enforcement, as well as harsh treatment of immigrants and minorities who shared similar characteristics in the United States, followed. The cyclical nature of immigration politics—and thus immigration law and policy—often has been directly linked to the overall state of the U.S. economy and the perceived social evils of the day. A wide divergence in popular opinion about immigration and immigrants has contributed to the wild fluctuations in U.S. policy. War, political and economic turmoil, and other tensions affect the nation’s collective attitude toward immigration. Social stresses, like terrorism in modern times, find a ready and unimpeded outlet in immigration law and its enforcement. Immigration law, unlike the vicissitudes of the economy or the whims of terrorists, can be controlled (even if enforcement might not work). (45)

### Extend: “Extinction First”

#### The risk of extinction justifies moral loopholes.

Bok 88 — Sissela Bok, Professor of Philosophy at Brandeis, 1988 (“The World Should Perish,” in Applied Ethics and Ethical Theory, Ed. David Rosenthal and Fudlou Shehadi, ISBN-13: 978-0874802894)

The same argument can be made for Kant’s other formulations of the Categorical Imperative: “So act as to use humanity, both in your own person and in the person of every other, always at the same time as an end, never simply as a means”; and “So act as if you were always through actions a law-making member in a universal Kingdom of Ends.” No one with a concern for humanity could consistently will to risk eliminating humanity in the person of himself and every other or to risk the death of all members in a universal Kingdom of Ends for the sake of justice. To risk their collective death for the sake of following one’s conscience would be, as Rawls said, “irrational, crazy.” And to say that one did not intend such a catastrophe, but that one merely failed to stop other persons from bringing it about would be beside the point when the end of the world was at stake.For although it is true that we cannot be held responsible for most of the wrongs that others commit, the Latin maxim presents a case where we would have to take such a responsibility seriously—perhaps to the point of deceiving, bribing, even killing an innocent person, in order that the world not perish.

#### The possibility of extinction demands epistemic modesty.

Schell 82 — Jonathan Schelle, writer for the New Yorker and nuclear weapons expert, 1982 (The Fate of the Earth, ISBN-13: 978-0224020640)

For the generations that now have to decide whether or not to risk the future of the species, the implication of our species’ unique place in the order of things is that while things in the life of mankind have worth, we must never raise that worth above the life of mankind and above our respect for that life’s existence. To do this would be to make of our highest ideals so many swords with which to destroy ourselves. To sum up the worth of our species by reference to some particular standard, goal, or ideology, no matter how elevated or noble it might be, would be to prepare the way for extinction by closing down in thought and feeling the open-ended possibilities for human development which extinction would close down in fact. There is only one circumstance in which it might be possible to sum up the life and achievement of the species, and that circumstance would be that it had already died, but then, of course, there would be no one left to do the summing up. Only a generation that believed itself to be in possession of final, absolute truth could ever conclude that it had reason to put an end to human life, and only generations that recognized the limits to their own wisdom and virtue would be likely to subordinate their interests and dreams to the as yet unformed interests and undreamed dreams of the future generations, and let human life go on.

#### Horrendous consequences justify escape clauses in absolute morality.

Anscombe 93 —G.E.M. Anscombe, Professor of Philosophy at Cambridge University, 1993 (“War and Murder,” in Absolutism and Its Consequentialist Critics, ed. Joram Graf Haber, 1993, ISBN-13: 978-0847678402, p. 58-59)

Whenever a defender of traditional morality protests that there are moral rules which, whatever the consequences, must not be broken, such as the rule prohibiting murder- the killing of the materially innocent‑a natural reaction is to confront him with imaginary horror upon imaginary horror, and to inquire whether it would not be permissible, nay right, to commit murder if these horrors would be the consequences of his not committing it. And so it has come to seem natural to accept as much of utilitarianism as this: that no moral system can be philosophically acceptable unless it is supplemented by an escape clause, to the effect that, in all cases of a choice of evils, if one of those evils is so great that incurring it rather than any of the others would be calamitous, and if it can only be avoided by taking a certain action, then that action is to be taken even if it is in breach of a precept of the system.

### Extend: “Government Must Consider Consequences”

#### The public nature of policy-making necessitates consequentialism.

Brock 93 — Dan W. Brock, American philosopher, bioethicist, Professor Emeritus of Medical Ethics in the Department of Global Health and Social Medicine at Harvard Medical School, the former Director of the Division of Medical Ethics (now the Center for Bioethics) at the Harvard Medical School, and former Director of the Harvard University Program in Ethics and Health (PEH), held the Tillinghast Professorship at Brown University and served as a member of the Department of Clinical Bioethics at the National Institutes of Health, B.A. in economics from Cornell and Ph.D. in philosophy from Columbia University, 1993 (“The Role of Philosophers in Policy-Making,” in Life and Death: Philosophical Essays in Biomedical Ethics. Cambridge University Press, Jan 29th, p. 409-410. )

The central point of conflict is that the first concern of those responsible for public policy is, and ought to be, the consequences of their actions for public policy and the persons that those policies affect. This is not to say that they should not be concerned with the moral evaluation of those consequences-they should; nor that they must be moral consequentialists in the evaluation of the policy, and in turn human, consequences of their actions-whether some form of consequentialism is an adequate moral theory is another matter. But it is to say that persons who directly participate in the formation of public policy would be irresponsible if they did not focus their concern on how their actions will affect policy and how that policy will in turn affect people. The virtues of academic research and scholarship that consist in an unconstrained search for truth, whatever the consequences, reflect not only the different goals of scholarly work but also the fact that the effects of the scholarly endeavor on the public are less direct, and are mediated more by other institutions and events, than are those of the public policy process. It is in part the very impotence in terms of major, direct effects on people's lives of most academic scholarship that makes it morally acceptable not to worry much about the social consequences of that scholarship. When philosophers move into the policy domain, they must shift their primary commitment from knowledge and truth to the policy consequences of what they do. And if they are not prepared to do this, why did they enter the policy domain? What are they doing there?

#### Policymakers have to be held to different standards because of their responsibility to everyone — the aff’s moral framework is itself immoral.

Nye 86 — Joseph Nye, professor of security affairs at Harvard, 1986 (Nuclear Ethics, ISBN-13: 978-0029230916, p. 33-4)

While the cosmopolitan approach has the virtue of accepting transnational realities andd avoids the sanctification of the nation-state, an unsophisticated cosmopolitanism also has serious drawbacks. First, if morality is about choice, then to underestimate the significance of states and boundaries is to fail to take into account the main features of the real setting in which choices must be made. To pursue individual justice at the cost of survival or to launch human rights crusades that cannot hope to be fulfilled, yet interfere with prudential concerns about order, may lead to immoral consequences. And if such actions, for example the promotion of human rights in Eastern Europe, were to lead to crises and an unintended nuclear war, the consequences might be the **ultimate immorality**. Applying ethics to foreign policy is more than merely constructing philosophical arguments; it must be relevant to the international domain in which moral choice is to be exercised.

### Extend: “Must Balance Competing Interests”

#### A “right to exit” doesn’t demand open borders — must balance competing interests.

Miller 13 — David Miller, Professor of Political Theory at Oxford University, Fellow at Nuffield College, former Professor at the University of Lancaster, trained in philosophy at Cambridge and Oxford, 2013 (“The Case for Limits,” in Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics, 2nd Edition, ed. Andrew I. Cohen and Christopher Heath Wellman, 2013, ISBN-10: 1118479394)

The right of exit is certainly an important human right, but once again it is worth examining why it has the significance that it does. Its importance is partly instrumental: knowing that their subjects have the right to leave inhibits states from mistreating them in various ways, so it helps to preserve the conditions of what I earlier called “decency.” However, even in the case of decent states the right of exit remains important, and that is because by being deprived of exit rights individuals are forced to remain in association with others whom they may find deeply uncongenial – think of the militant atheist in a society where almost everyone devoutly practices the same religion, or the religious puritan in a society where most people behave like libertines. On the other hand, the right of exit from state A does not appear to entail an unrestricted right to enter any society of the immigrant’s choice – indeed, it seems that it can be exercised provided that at least one other society, society B say, is willing to take him in. It might seem that we can generate a general right to migrate by iteration: the person who leaves A for B then has the right to exit from B, which entails that C, at least, must grant him the right to enter, and so forth. But this move fails, because our person’s right of exit from A depended on the claim that he might find continued association with the other citizens of A intolerable, and he cannot plausibly continue making the same claim in the case of each society that is willing to take him in. Given the political and cultural diversity of societies in the real world, it is simply unconvincing to argue that only an unlimited choice of which one to join will prevent people being forced into associations that are repugnant to them. It is also important to stress that there are many rights whose exercise is contingent on finding partners who are willing to cooperate in the exercise, and it may be that the right of exit falls into this category. Take the right to marry as an example. This is a right held against the state to allow people to marry the partners of their choice (and perhaps to provide the legal framework within which marriages can be contracted). It is obviously not a right to have a marriage partner provided – whether any given person can exercise the right depends entirely on whether he is able to find someone willing to marry him, and many people are not so lucky. The right of exit is a right held against a person’s current state of residence not to prevent her from leaving the state (and perhaps aiding her in that endeavor by, say, providing a passport). But it does not entail an obligation on any other state to let that person in. Obviously, if no state were ever to grant entry rights to people who were not already its citizens, the right of exit would have no value. But suppose states are generally willing to consider entry applications from people who want to migrate, and that most people would get offers from at least one such state: then the position as far as the right of exit goes is pretty much the same as with the right to marry, where by no means everyone is able to wed the partner they would ideally like to have, but most have the opportunity to marry someone. (366-367)

### Extend: “No Absolute Right to Mobility”

#### Movement rights aren’t absolute — must prove another right is being violated in current country.

Miller 13 — David Miller, Professor of Political Theory at Oxford University, Fellow at Nuffield College, former Professor at the University of Lancaster, trained in philosophy at Cambridge and Oxford, 2013 (“The Case for Limits,” in Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics, 2nd Edition, ed. Andrew I. Cohen and Christopher Heath Wellman, 2013, ISBN-10: 1118479394)

The idea of a right to freedom of movement is not in itself objectionable. We are talking here about what are usually called basic rights or human rights, and I shall assume (since there is no space to defend the point) that such rights are justified by pointing to the vital interests that they protect (Griffin, 2001; Nickel, 1987; Shue, 1980). They correspond to conditions in whose absence human beings cannot live decent lives, no matter what particular values and plans of life they choose to pursue. Being able to move freely in physical space is just such a condition, as we can see by thinking about people whose legs are shackled or who are confined in small spaces. A wider freedom of movement can also be justified by thinking about the interests that it serves instrumentally: if I cannot move about over a fairly wide area, it may be impossible for me to find a job, to practice my religion, or to find a suitable marriage partner. Since these all qualify as vital interests, it is fairly clear that freedom of movement qualifies as a basic human right. What is less clear, however, is the physical extent of that right, in the sense of how much of the earth’s surface I must be able to move to in order to say that I enjoy it. Even in liberal societies that make no attempt to confine people within particular geographical areas, freedom of movement is severely restricted in a number of ways. I cannot, in general, move to places that other people’s bodies now occupy (I cannot just push them aside). I cannot move on to private property without the consent of its owner, except perhaps in emergencies or where a special right of access exists – and since most land is privately owned, this means that a large proportion of physical space does not fall within the ambit of a *right* to free movement. Even access to public space is heavily regulated: there are traffic laws that tell me where and at what speed I may drive my car, parks have opening and closing hours, the police can control my movements up and down the streets, and so forth. These are very familiar observations, but they are worth making simply to highlight how hedged about with qualifications the existing right of free movement in liberal societies actually is. Yet few would argue that because of these limitations, people in these societies are deprived of one of their human rights. Some liberals might argue in favor of expanding the right – for instance, in Britain there has been a protracted campaign to establish a legal right to roam on uncultivated privately owned land such as moors and fells, a right that will finally become effective by 2005. But even the advocates of such a right would be hard-pressed to show that some vital interest was being injured by the more restrictive property laws that have existed up to now. The point here is that liberal societies in general offer their members sufficient freedom of movement to protect the interests that the human right to free movement is intended to protect, even though the extent of free movement is very far from absolute. So how could one attempt to show that the right in question must include the right to move to some other country and settle there? What vital interest requires the right to be interpreted in such an extensive way? Contingently, of course, it may be true that moving to another country is the only way for an individual to escape persecution, to find work, to obtain necessary medical care, and so forth. In these circumstances the person concerned may have the right to move, not to any state that she chooses, but to *some* state where these interests can be protected. But here the right to move serves only as a remedial right: its existence depends on the fact that the person’s vital interests cannot be secured in the country where she currently resides. In a world of decent states – states that were able to secure their citizens’ basic rights to security, food, work, medical care, and so forth – the right to move across borders could not be justified in this way. (365)

#### Internal mobility *adequately* protects right to movement — no justification for open borders.

Miller 13 — David Miller, Professor of Political Theory at Oxford University, Fellow at Nuffield College, former Professor at the University of Lancaster, trained in philosophy at Cambridge and Oxford, 2013 (“The Case for Limits,” in Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics, 2nd Edition, ed. Andrew I. Cohen and Christopher Heath Wellman, 2013, ISBN-10: 1118479394)

Our present world is not, of course, a world of decent states, and this gives rise to the issue of refugees, which I shall discuss in the final section of this chapter. But if we leave aside for the moment cases where the right to move freely across borders depends upon the right to avoid persecution, starvation, or other threats to basic interests, how might we try to give it a more general rationale? One reason a person may want to migrate is in order to participate in a culture that does not exist in his native land – for instance he wants to work at an occupation for which there is no demand at home, or to join a religious community which, again, is not represented in the country from which he comes. These might be central components in his plan of life, so he will find it very frustrating if he is not able to move. But does this ground a right to free movement across borders? It seems to me that it does not. What a person can legitimately demand access to is an adequate range of options to choose between – a reasonable choice of occupation, religion, cultural activities, marriage partners, and so forth. Adequacy here is defined in terms of generic human interests rather than in terms of the interests of any one person in particular – so, for example, a would-be opera singer living in a society which provides for various forms of musical expression, but not for opera, can have an adequate range of options in this area even though the option she most prefers is not available. So long as they adhere to the standards of decency sketched above, all contemporary states are able to provide such an adequate range internally. So although people certainly have an interest in being able to migrate internationally, they do not have a basic interest of the kind that would be required to ground a human right. It is more like my interest in having an Aston Martin than my interest in having access to some means of physical mobility. (366)

### They Say: “Restriction Arguments = Racist”

#### Not all pro-restriction arguments are racist. Casting them as such drives debates underground.

Miller 13 — David Miller, Professor of Political Theory at Oxford University, Fellow at Nuffield College, former Professor at the University of Lancaster, trained in philosophy at Cambridge and Oxford, 2013 (“The Case for Limits,” in Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics, 2nd Edition, ed. Andrew I. Cohen and Christopher Heath Wellman, 2013, ISBN-10: 1118479394)

It is not easy to write about immigration from a philosophical perspective – not easy at least if you are writing in a society (and this now includes most societies in the Western world) in which immigration has become a highly charged political issue. Those who speak freely and openly about the issue tend to come from the far Right: they are fascists or racists who believe that it is wrong in principle for their political community to admit immigrants who do not conform to the approved cultural or racial stereotype. Most liberal, conservative, and social democratic politicians support quite strict immigration controls in practice, but they generally refrain from spelling out the justification for such controls, preferring instead to highlight the practical difficulties involved in resettling immigrants, and raising the spectre of a right-wing backlash if too many immigrants are admitted. Why are they so reticent? One reason is that it is not easy to set out the arguments for limiting immigration without at the same time projecting a negative image of those immigrants who have already been admitted, thereby playing directly into the hands of the far Right ideologues who would like to see such immigrants deprived of their full rights of citizenship and/or repatriated to their countries of origin. Is it possible both to argue that every member of the political community, native or immigrant, must be treated as a full citizen, enjoying equal status and the equal respect of his or her fellows, and to argue that there are good grounds for setting upper bounds both to the rate and the overall numbers of immigrants who are admitted? Yes, it is, but it requires dexterity, and always carries with it the risk of being misunderstood. (363)

#### Opposition to open borders can’t be pigeonholed ideologically. This is their 1AC author.

Kukathas 14 — Chandran Kulathas, Chair in Political Theory and head of the Department of Government at the London School of Economics and Political Science, Former Professor of Political Theory in the Department of Political Science at the University of Utah, DPhil in Politics from Oxford University, MA in Politics at the University of New South Wales, BA in History and PoliSci at Australian National University, 2014 (“The Case for Open Immigration,” in Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics, 2nd Edition, ed. Andrew I. Cohen and Christopher Heath Wellman, 2014, ISBN-10: 1118479394, p. 387-376)

People favor or are opposed to immigration for a variety of reasons. It is therefore difficult to tie views about immigration to ideological positions. While it seems obvious that political conservatives are the most unlikely to defend freedom of movement, and that socialists and liberals (classical and modern) are very likely to favor more open borders, in reality wariness (if not outright hostility) to immigration can be found among all groups. Even libertarian anarchists have advanced reasons to restrict the movement of peoples. (207)

## Economy Advantage Answers

[Read this version if they read the Economy Advantage in the 1AC. If they did not, read the Economy DA below this section.]

### 1NC — Economy Advantage Answers

#### Open borders cause labor saturation, inequality and wage collapse.

Ormerod 15 — Paul Ormerod, economist, director of Volterra Consulting, MA in Philosophy from Oxford, 2015 (“Open borders or fair wages: the left needs to make up its mind,” The Guardian, March 24th, Available Online at <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/mar/24/open-borders-fair-wages-left-mass-immigration-britain-economy>, Accessed 08-09-2018)

Mass immigration increases inequality. This is the unpalatable fact the liberal left in Britain refuses to accept. Markets are imperfect instruments. But it is not necessary to subscribe to free market economic theory to believe that large increases in supply tend to drive down the price. And the price of labour is the wage. Last Friday, the Guardian front page carried a report from the Office for Budget Responsibility, claiming that higher net immigration increased the UK’s economic growth rate. According to the mainstream theory of economic growth, this is undoubtedly true. Higher growth can be created by sustained increases of either capital or labour. But underlying the theory is the assumption that supply and demand balance in these markets, that the prices of the inputs are set at levels such that all available capital or labour is in fact employed and does not remain idle. So this “flourishing modern economy” with high immigration celebrated by the Guardian is based on persistent large wage inequalities. A powerful force in the global economy is driving the increase in inequality that has been seen in western economies over the past few decades. In essence, there has been a massive increase in the effective supply of labour. Over the past three decades or so, China and India have gradually been absorbed into the network of international trade. This puts pressure on European labour markets. Many call centres, for example, have been relocated to India. But much of the impact of this is indirect, operating via trade flows, and is only really felt by certain sectors of western economies. Closer to home, the opening up of eastern Europe in the early 1990s has had a strong effect, especially on countries that are their immediate neighbours, such as Germany. Employers soon realised that economies such as Poland and the Czech Republic possessed educated labour forces, whose productivity potential had been suppressed by the gross inefficiencies inherent in planned economies. German companies opened up new production plants in the old Soviet bloc countries in Europe, rather than at home. The impact on wage rates of this increase in competition was dramatic. Christian Dustmann at University College London has provided clear evidence on the evolution of wage rates in the former West Germany. The 15th percentile of the wage distribution is the level at which only 15% of wages are lower. In West Germany, at the 15th percentile, real wages have fallen almost continuously since the mid-1990s. At the 50th percentile, where half get more and half get less, the reduction has been less sharp. But the fall had set in by the early 2000s. At the 85th percentile, the mirror image of the 15th, real wages grew strongly, reaping the benefits of the recovery of the economy created by the increase in competitiveness. It is against this background that New Labour opened up Britain’s borders in the late 1990s. It was a major betrayal of the very people the party purported to represent. In addition to the global competition from countries such as China, in addition to competition closer to home from the economies of eastern Europe, New Labour allowed direct competition to enter the UK labour market on a scale unprecedented in our history. Not surprisingly, the distribution of wage rates has evolved in very similar ways to those of West Germany. It is the relatively unskilled in the bottom half of the distribution who have lost out. The liberal elite do not suffer. Indeed, they benefit because many of the services they consume are provided at lower prices than would have been the case without mass immigration. It is sometimes argued that immigrants do jobs that native British workers are unwilling to take. Very well then, without mass immigration, employers would be obliged to raise the real wage rate to induce these people to take the jobs.

#### Open borders collapse wages — it’s basic economics.

Eskow 16 — Richard Eskow, Senior Fellow at Campaign for America’s Future, Senior Advisor for Health & Economic Justice at Social Security Works, 2016 (““Open Borders”: A Gimmick, Not a Solution,” Huffington Post, Available Online at <https://www.huffingtonpost.com/rj-eskow/open-borders-a-gimmick-no_b_7945140.html>, Accessed 08-09-2018)

The work of economist Ha-Joon Chang, by contrast, provides compelling evidence that an open borders policy would exert a powerful downward pull on American workers’ wages. Devaluing Other Countries Bier then gets to the core of the open-borders argument, writing that “labor is enormously more productive here. As a result, identical workers can earn 280 percent more here than in Mexico; workers from Yemen and Nigeria, 1,300 percent more; Haitians, 2,200 percent more.” It is inhumane, he suggests, to deny workers the opportunity to multiply their earnings by such impressive percentages. But that interpretation is, to borrow a phrase, “silly, tribal and economically illiterate.” Bier fails to consider a fundamental principle of economics: when the supply of labor increases, wages go down. A massive influx of foreign workers would lead to a steep plunge in those multiples. What’s more, there are often significant cost-of-living differences between the United States and these workers’ countries of origin. And this argument is “tribal” because advocates like Bier (and Klein) apparently don’t understand that other nations, despite their relative poverty, have virtues of their own. That should be a source of deep embarrassment for them. For most migrants, their native lands hold ties of language, culture, family and community. It should not be necessary to endure the pain of displacement merely to earn a livable wage. To claim otherwise, as open-borders advocates implicitly do, is to reflect the xenophobic belief that everybody would be happier here than anywhere else.

#### Aff economic models are flawed — they aren’t real world and are anecdotes, not data.

Borjas 15 — George Borjas, Professor of Economics and Social Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School, recipient of the 2011 IZA Prize in Labor Economics, Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research, Ph.D. in Economics from Columbia, 2015 (“Immigration and Globalization: A Review Essay,” Journal of Economic Literature, December, Vol. 53, No. 4, Available Online at <https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jel.53.4.961>, Accessed 08-09-2018)

As noted above, the huge global gains typically found in these types of numerical simulations have led a number of economists to emphasize that the “gains from globalization” resulting from the decades-long effort to ease trade restrictions pale in comparison to the gains that are there for the taking if countries simply removed all existing restrictions on international migration. Clemens (2011), for example, employs the metaphor that there are trillion-dollar bills lying on the sidewalk, ready to be easily picked up, if only policymakers in the industrialized world would wisen up and remove all immigration restrictions. Things that sound too good to be true, however, usually are. It is not surprising then that the analysis of both Collier and Ruhs can be interpreted as raising central questions about the model that predicts the presence of these trillion-dollar bills on the sidewalk, as well as providing insights for understanding why nobody ever bothers to pick them up. The problem is easy to summarize: those bills are probably fake. In particular, the simulation reported in table 1 is a short-run, partial-equilibrium exercise, and its implications may have little in common with what would happen in a general equilibrium setting. Collier’s Exodus, in an important sense, marks a pivoting point in the literature by taking the long-run consequences of migration flows much more seriously than one sees in the stereotypical study. Throughout the book, Collier emphasizes how the short-run impacts of immigration can differ from what would be observed if the migration flow were to continue indefinitely: “Contrary to the prejudices of xenophobes, the evidence does not suggest that migration to date has had significantly adverse effects. . . . Contrary to self-perceived ‘progressives,’ the evidence does suggest that without effective controls migration would rapidly accelerate to the point at which additional migration would have adverse effects” (p. 245). Unfortunately, we know little (read: nothing) about how host societies would adapt to the entry of perhaps billions of new persons, so that there is much hand-wringing in Collier’s discussion of social costs, and the narrative depends far too much on references to “mutual regard,” “trust,” “moral outrage,” and other equally hard-to-measure concepts. I personally find it difficult to place much faith on the robustness of Collier’s reported evidence when the heading of a key empirical section in the chapter on social consequences is titled “Some Illustrative Anecdotes” (p. 78), and focuses mainly on the experiences of the Afro-Caribbean community in London. I have heard that the plural of anecdote is data, but Collier’s specific anecdotes do not a data set make. As interesting as the experiences of this particular immigrant community may be, I doubt they provide much information about what would happen if immigration restrictions were removed and billions of persons moved to the industrialized countries. (966-7)

#### Solvency requires *BILLIONS* of people to move.

Borjas 14 — George Borjas, Professor of Economics and Social Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School, recipient of the 2011 IZA Prize in Labor Economics, Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research, Ph.D. in Economics from Columbia, 2014 (Immigration Economics, ISBN-13: 978-0674049772)

It is not surprising that a greater fraction of the South’s workforce needs to move as the initial wage disparity between the North and the South rises. What is surprising and tends to be underemphasized (and sometimes unmentioned) is that even the lower- bound estimates of the wage ratio R trigger the movement of billions of people.18 This result reflects the simple fact that the North’s labor demand curve, for what ever reason, lies far above that of the South. Absent the transferability of the conditions that make a specifi worker much more productive in the North, a sufficiently high wage gap essentially implies that some places in the world are so inefficient at production that their equilibrium outcome is to be “economically empty” in a world with free mobility.19 (166-7)

#### Aff claims are inflated and ignore migration costs — there are no trillion dollar bills.

Borjas 14 — George Borjas, Professor of Economics and Social Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School, recipient of the 2011 IZA Prize in Labor Economics, Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research, Ph.D. in Economics from Columbia, 2014 (Immigration Economics, ISBN-13: 978-0674049772)

As in the original Hamilton- Whalley (1984) study, the exercise reveals that the gains to world income are huge. If R= 2, for example, world GDP would rise by $9.4 trillion, a 13.4 percent increase over the initial value of $70 trillion. If R= 4, world GDP would increase by $40 trillion, almost a 60 percent increase. In fact, if R were to equal 6, which may be near the upper bound of the range of plausibility suggested by the available data, world GDP would rise by $62 trillion, a near doubling! Note, moreover, that these gains would be accrued each year aft er the migration occurs, so that the present value of the gains would be astronomically high.20 Of course, these huge gains are associated with a substantial redistribution of wealth, and the LN native workers in the North are at the losing end of the deal. As Figure 7.2 shows, the infl ux of M workers reduces the North’s wage from wN to w\*. Th e implied percent wage change is given by: (math omitted by SP) Row 5 of Table 7.3 reports the wage change predicted by equation (7.24). Regardless of the value of R, the earnings of the North’s native workforce drop by 30 to 40 percent. The huge global gains typically found in these types of numerical calibrations have led a number of economists to emphasize that the “gains from globalization” resulting from the decades- long eff ort to ease trade restrictions pale in comparison to the gains that are there for the taking if countries simply removed all existing restrictions on international migration.21 Even putting aside the po liti cal difficulties in enacting such a policy, this argument in favor of unrestricted international migration glosses over two conceptual obstacles. First, the calculation assumes that people can somehow start at a specific latitude- longitude coordinate and end up at a different coordinate at zero cost. Unfortunately, even the seemingly simple transporter used by Starship Enterprise personnel, which is able to instantaneously move people across vast distances, is not costless. Th e absence of legal restrictions prohibiting the movement of people from one country to another does not circumvent the fact that it would be very costly to move billions of workers. As noted in Chapter 1, large wage differences across regions can persist for a very long time simply because many people choose not to move. In a world of income- maximizing agents, the stayers are signaling that there are substantial psychic costs to mobility, perhaps even on the order of hundreds of thousands dollars per person, and that they are willing to leave substantial wage gains on the table. Kennan and Walker (2011 p. 232), for instance, estimate that it costs $312,000 to move the average person from one state to another within the United States.22 Similarly, Artuc et al. (2010) report that average moving costs are nearly 8 times the annual salary for workers who move from one industry to another as they try to escape the adverse consequences of industry- specifi c trade shocks. Although these costs seem implausibly high, moving costs must be around that order of magnitude to be consistent with the observed fact that people do not move as much as they should given the existing regional wage diff erences. If moving costs were indeed in that range, it is easy to show that the huge global gains from migration become substantially smaller and may even vanish after taking moving costs into account. Suppose, for instance, that R = 4, so that the global gain is around $40 trillion annually when 2.6 billion workers move from the South to the North. Assuming a 5 percent rate of discount, the present value of these gains is $800 trillion! Th e 2.6 billion worker- migrants will, more likely than not, bring their families, so the actual number of people moving would be around 5.6 billion (or the 95 percent migration rate times the South’s population of 5.9 billion people). Th e “breakeven” cost of migration given in the last row of Table 7.3 is around $140,000. In short, the entire present value of the global gains is wiped out even if the costs of migration were only half of what is typically reported in existing studies.23 Needless to say, the magnitudes involved in this numerical exercise are mindboggling and should be taken with more than the proverbial grain of salt. But they do teach us an important lesson: the global gains from “free migration” need to be contrasted with the costs of moving billions of people, many of whom do not wish to move, if the exercise is to be taken seriously (167-8)

#### Mass migration weakens institutions that promoted growth in the first place.

Borjas 14 — George Borjas, Professor of Economics and Social Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School, recipient of the 2011 IZA Prize in Labor Economics, Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research, Ph.D. in Economics from Columbia, 2014 (Immigration Economics, ISBN-13: 978-0674049772)

It is also important to emphasize that the gains reported in Table 7.3 depend crucially on the assumption that the intercepts of the labor demand curves in the North and South are fixed. However, the North’s demand curve lies above the South’s demand curve, not simply because that is just the way things are, but because of very specific political, economic, institutional, and cultural factors that endogenously led to the development of different infrastructures in the two regions, with the Northern infrastructure allowing similarly skilled workers to attain a higher value of marginal product. As the important work of Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) suggests, “nations fail” mainly because of differences in political and economic institutions. For immigration to generate substantial global gains, it must be the case that billions of immigrants can move to the industrialized economies without importing the “bad” institutions that led to poor economic conditions in the source countries in the fi rst place. It seems inconceivable that the North’s infrastructure would remain unchanged aft er the admission of billions of new workers. Unfortunately, remarkably little is known about the po liti cal and cultural impact of immigration on the receiving countries, and about how institutions in these receiving countries would adjust to the infl ux. In a general equilibrium framework, it seems reasonable to imagine that the integration of the two regions could easily result in the dilution of whatever unique set of circumstances allowed the North to enjoy such a large productive advantage.24 A “modest” relaxation of immigration restrictions— say, one that only allows 10 percent of the optimal number of immigrants into the developed countries— would still imply migration fl ows of more than half a billion people, including the related family members, when R = 4. Th is limited migration fl ow would still be almost three times as large as the number of international migrants that now exist. Th e magnitude of even these limited fl ows would likely lead to diff erent results in partial and general equilibrium calibrations: As the North adapts to its new po liti cal and demographic reality, the gains implied by the partial equilibrium simulation may begin to dissipate. (168-9)

#### Successful growth requires integration.

Swanson 16 — Ana Swanson, covers the economy, trade and the Federal Reserve for the Washington Post, 2016 (“Opening up borders: An idea economists tend to love and politicians detest,” Washington Post, October 14th, Available Online at <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/10/14/why-economists-love-and-politicians-detest-the-idea-of-opening-the-borders-to-lots-more-immigrants/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.3644dc63446d>, Accessed 08-08-2018)

"They actually financially saved the social security system, or at least deferred for five or 10 years the time of reckoning. Because young people pay taxes, btaut they don’t get sick, and they don’t use retirement funds," he said. Borjas, the Harvard professor, has argued, however, that unrestricted immigration can place a fiscal burden on a state, and that the gains from immigration depend largely on whether receiving countries build enough infrastructure to accommodate them. Immigrants aren't just perfect cogs in the machine of the economy, he says -- they are real people, and their presence raises real questions about how they and their descendants fit into a society.

### Extend: “Increases Inequality”

#### Open borders increase inequality

Swanson 16 — Ana Swanson, covers the economy, trade and the Federal Reserve for the Washington Post, 2016 (“Opening up borders: An idea economists tend to love and politicians detest,” Washington Post, October 14th, Available Online at <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/10/14/why-economists-love-and-politicians-detest-the-idea-of-opening-the-borders-to-lots-more-immigrants/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.3644dc63446d>, Accessed 08-08-2018)

Not all economists agree with these arguments. Harvard economist George Borjas, for example, has made the case that more immigration into developed countries would produce large gains for some groups, such as wealthy executives and investors, but that native workers would lose out. "In the end, immigration will almost certainly improve the economic well-being of some Americans, but other Americans will be worse off," he has written.

#### Open borders don’t reduce inequality — the gains go to already-rich capitalists.

Borjas 15 — George Borjas, Professor of Economics and Social Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School, recipient of the 2011 IZA Prize in Labor Economics, Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research, Ph.D. in Economics from Columbia, 2015 (“Immigration and Globalization: A Review Essay,” Journal of Economic Literature, December, Vol. 53, No. 4, Available Online at <https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jel.53.4.961>, Accessed 08-09-2018)

There is one final redistributive impact that is worth documenting. Specifically, the income accruing to capitalists will also change. Define the gains to “global capitalists” as the excess income produced that is not paid directly to workers. The increased returns to capital are given by: (8) ΔIncome of Capitalists = [Y1 − w∗ (LN + LS)] − [Y0 − wN LN − wS LS]. As row 7 of table 1 shows, there will be a substantial increase in the wealth of global capitalists, amounting to about $12 trillion, or a 57 percent increase over their initial income. In short, a world integrated by unrestricted migration flows creates large gains for some groups, but also creates large losses for a group of workers who will vociferously fight the policy shift. It is the existence of this losing group of workers that often leads to a degeneration of the immigration debate into a collection of slurs and facile accusations of racism. Collier’s narrative, unfortunately, is not immune: “A rabid collection of xenophobes and racists who are hostile to immigrants lose no opportunity to argue that migration is bad for indigenous populations” (p. 25). The problem with such name-calling is that it downplays the fact that regardless of how the Northern workers actually feel about immigrants, their economic grievance is real and will not go away. (966)

### Extend: “Ignores Migration Costs”

#### Migration costs erase benefits from open borders.

Borjas 15 — George Borjas, Professor of Economics and Social Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School, recipient of the 2011 IZA Prize in Labor Economics, Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research, Ph.D. in Economics from Columbia, 2015 (“Immigration and Globalization: A Review Essay,” Journal of Economic Literature, December, Vol. 53, No. 4, Available Online at <https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jel.53.4.961>, Accessed 08-09-2018)

To easily illustrate the attenuating effect of migration costs, suppose that these costs are constant in the working population and equal to π times a worker’s initial salary in the South. Assume further that nonworking dependents tag along with the “householder” and migrate for free. The equilibrium condition that equates the present value of the gains from migration with the costs and that implicitly defines the number of migrants is then given by: (12) αN ∗ (LN + M∗ ) η − αS ( LS − M∗ ) η \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ r = π(αS LS η ) , where r is the rate of discount (assumed to be 5 percent).9 The bottom panel of table 2 reports the results of the simulation assuming that π = 10. Although there are now obviously fewer movers, there are still a lot of them. In the case where there are no spillovers (λ = 0), the number of movers falls only from 5.6 to 5.3 billion. However, the gains from migration fall substantially because the calculation of the gains must now account for the cost of moving over 5.3 billion people. The annualized global gain—net of migration costs—is defined by: (13) ΔY′ = (∫0 LN+M∗ αN ∗ Lη dL + ∫0 LS−M∗ αS Lη dL − Y0) − r(π αS LS η ) M∗ . Table 2 shows that these net gains fall from $40 to $28 trillion when there are no externalities, and from a positive gain of $9 trillion to a loss of almost a trillion dollars when λ = 0.5. Of course, we have no idea what the costs of migration will actually be if migration restrictions were to be removed and billions of people from poor countries were on the move. The formation of social networks among migrants could substantially lower the costs of migration for the second or third billionth mover. But congestion costs in the receiving countries could also increase exponentially, making it harder to resettle that marginal migrant. Regardless, the global gains from unrestricted migration need to be contrasted with the costs of moving billions of people if the exercise is to be taken seriously. After all, it seems that migration costs do not need to be all that high to make those trillion-dollar bills disintegrate even faster. (970-1)

#### Aff authors ignore migration costs — the plan devastates workers currently in America.

Borjas 15 — George Borjas, Professor of Economics and Social Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School, recipient of the 2011 IZA Prize in Labor Economics, Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research, Ph.D. in Economics from Columbia, 2015 (“Immigration and Globalization: A Review Essay,” Journal of Economic Literature, December, Vol. 53, No. 4, Available Online at <https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jel.53.4.961>, Accessed 08-09-2018)

A second important implication of the model is that there are going to be a lot of migrants. The simulation implies that 2.6 billion workers, or 95 percent of the workforce in the South, will move. If these workers bring along their families, the 95 percent mobility rate implies that nearly 5.6 billion persons would move from the South to the North. It is fair to say that this particular implication of the model has not received nearly the same emphasis or attention as the fact that world GDP would increase by tens of trillions of dollars. For example, the original Hamilton and Whalley (1984) article spends a great deal of time poring over detailed estimates of the dollar gains, but curiously neglects to report the number of movers required to achieve those gains at any point in the study. The glossing-over of this particular implication may be the politically sensible thing to do if one wishes to advocate these types of models in policy circles.4 However, it is conceptually impossible to buy into the argument that unrestricted immigration will increase world GDP by $40 trillion without simultaneously buying into the prediction that this will entail the movement of billions of people from the South to the North. These huge flows will necessarily imply a substantial redistribution of wealth, and these distributional consequences also tend to be overlooked. Specifically, the LN native workers in the North will be at the losing end of the deal. After all, “factor price equalization” means precisely that: factor prices are equalized, with initially high-wage workers eventually earning less and initially low-wage workers eventually earning more. As figure 1 shows, the influx of M workers reduces the North’s wage from wN to w∗ , and raises the wage of all Southern workers (whether they migrated or not) from wS to w∗ . The implied percent wage changes are given by Rows 5 and 6 of table 1 report these predicted wage effects. The earnings of the North’s native workforce fall by almost 40 percent, and the earnings of Southern workers increase by 143 percent.

#### Prefer the most recent evidence — aff claims have been disproven.

Borjas 15 — George Borjas, Professor of Economics and Social Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School, recipient of the 2011 IZA Prize in Labor Economics, Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research, Ph.D. in Economics from Columbia, 2015 (“Immigration and Globalization: A Review Essay,” Journal of Economic Literature, December, Vol. 53, No. 4, Available Online at <https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jel.53.4.961>, Accessed 08-09-2018)

Although much of the economic literature on immigration has typically focused on estimating employment and fiscal impacts in specific receiving or sending countries, there has been a parallel tradition that attempts to examine the impact of international migration flows from a global perspective. Beginning with the seminal work of Hamilton and Whalley (1984), a number of studies propose a variety of models that are then calibrated to describe what the economy would look like if sovereign countries surrendered their ability to restrict in- or out-migration flows.1 One common implication from these simulations is that the global gains from the removal of immigration restrictions would be huge, amounting to trillions of dollars annually. This finding has led to a popular metaphor that there are “trillion-dollar bills” lying on the sidewalk, ready for the taking, if only the receiving countries would remove the self-imposed migration barriers. The two books that form the basis for this review essay address some of these global issues from very different perspectives. Paul Collier’s Exodus: How Migration is Changing Our World examines whether the available evidence suggests that the unrestricted flows of labor will, in fact, generate the sizable gains that are promised by the generic study in the literature, while Martin Ruhs’s The Price of Rights: Regulating International Labor Migration shows that practically all receiving countries walk by the trillion-dollar bills promised by the economic models, and instead set up a variety of strict and sometimes draconian immigration restrictions. Put together, the two books suggest (at least to me) that perhaps it is time for a reappraisal of the economic argument that unrestricted migration would generate huge global gains. (962)

### Extend: “Causes Institutional Failure”

#### Mass migration collapses the institutions that are essential for economic growth.

Borjas 15 — George Borjas, Professor of Economics and Social Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School, recipient of the 2011 IZA Prize in Labor Economics, Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research, Ph.D. in Economics from Columbia, 2015 (“Immigration and Globalization: A Review Essay,” Journal of Economic Literature, December, Vol. 53, No. 4, Available Online at <https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jel.53.4.961>, Accessed 08-09-2018)

Regardless of these quibbles, Exodus makes an important conceptual contribution by suggesting that because of the misguided emphasis on showing that immigration “is good for everyone,” the literature has too often disregarded inconvenient facts, overlooked the potentially paradigm-changing general equilibrium effects, and proposed the types of political upheavals that many observers would consider to be radical rearrangements of the social order. Because there is no precise modeling and measurement of the various costs and benefits, Collier does not provide a numerical estimate of how much accounting for the general equilibrium concerns would reduce the presumed global gains. In terms of the model presented earlier, it is evident that the problem with doing such a calculation is that we simply do not know what would happen to the shape of the North’s aggregate production function after the influx of billions of persons. As Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) note, “nations fail” mainly because of differences in political and economic institutions. Analogously, Collier argues: “one reason poor countries are poor is that they are short of effective organization” and “migrants are essentially escaping from countries with dysfunctional social models” (pp. 33–34). For immigration to generate substantial global gains, it must be the case that billions of immigrants can move to the industrialized economies without importing the “bad” organizations, social models, and culture that led to poor economic conditions in the source countries in the first place. It seems inconceivable, however, that the North’s production function remains unchanged after the admission of billions of new workers. Echoing Max Frisch’s observation, Collier bluntly states: “Uncomfortable as it may be . . . migrants bring their culture with them” (p. 68)

#### Factoring institutional damage into models makes open borders *net negative*  for growth

Borjas 15 — George Borjas, Professor of Economics and Social Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School, recipient of the 2011 IZA Prize in Labor Economics, Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research, Ph.D. in Economics from Columbia, 2015 (“Immigration and Globalization: A Review Essay,” Journal of Economic Literature, December, Vol. 53, No. 4, Available Online at <https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jel.53.4.961>, Accessed 08-09-2018)

Using this approach, it is straightforward to conduct an alternative simulation of the model. Suppose again that migration is costless so that persons can easily move back and forth between the North and the South until wages are equalized across regions. This equilibrium is characterized by the restriction that: (10) αN ∗ (LN + M∗ ) η \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ αS (LS − M∗ ) η = 1, so that the equilibrium level of migration M∗ takes account of the externalities that the migrants impose on the Northern infrastructure.6 The gain in world GDP resulting from this set of assumptions is given by: (11) Δ Y∗ = ∫0 LN+M∗ αN ∗ Lη dL + ∫0 LS−M∗ αS Lη dL − Y0 . Row 2 of the top panel of table 2 shows that if λ were equal to 0.5, the net gain falls from $40 trillion to $8.8 trillion. In addition, if λ were equal to 0.75, the net gains become negative because now the entire world’s workforce is largely operating under the inefficient organizations and institutions that were previously isolated in the South but have now spilled over to the North. Let me stress that this is only a simulation—and one should put as much faith in these numbers as one puts on the promise that trillion-dollar bills lie strewn all over the sidewalk. The exercise, however, teaches a lesson that has far too often been ignored: the gains from unrestricted immigration depend largely on how the infrastructure in the receiving economies adjusts to the influx of perhaps billions of persons. Although we have no idea about how this adjustment will pan out, there will be an adjustment. In fact, even these estimates are probably too optimistic, because I have assumed that migration is costless. Migration costs, however, are real, sizable, and will further reduce the global gains. Consider, for example, the wage differences between Puerto Rico and the United States. In 2010, the mean annual earnings of a construction worker in his thirties was $23,000 in Puerto Rico and $43,000 in the United States.7 The annual income of a young Puerto Rican construction worker, therefore, would increase by $20,000 annually if he or she were to migrate, implying a lifetime present value of around $400,000 (if the rate of discount is 5 percent). A Puerto Rican nonmover— and two-thirds of Puerto Ricans have chosen not to move—is leaving almost a half-million dollar fortune unclaimed. This fact is consistent with the canonical income maximization model of migration only if the costs of migration are at least that high for the many people who choose not to move. Although this calculation may seem contrived, studies that rely on structural models of labor flows often provide similarly large estimates of migration costs. Bertoli, Fernández-Huertas, and Ortega (2013, p. 89) calculate that migration costs for the average low-educated Ecuadorian immigrant in the United States are almost nine times the worker’s salary. Similarly, Artuc, Chaudhuri, and McLaren (2010, p. 1021) estimate average moving costs that are around ten times the annual wage for workers who move from one sector to another in response to trade shocks in specific industries.8 (968-70)

### Prefer Neg Evidence

#### Be skeptical of aff claims — that not a single country has tried this is a reason to prefer the status quo.

Borjas 15 — George Borjas, Professor of Economics and Social Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School, recipient of the 2011 IZA Prize in Labor Economics, Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research, Ph.D. in Economics from Columbia, 2015 (“Immigration and Globalization: A Review Essay,” Journal of Economic Literature, December, Vol. 53, No. 4, Available Online at <https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jel.53.4.961>, Accessed 08-09-2018)

Despite this indeterminacy, Ruhs’s detailed documentation of the existence and variation in immigration policies has a crucial implication for the models that predict huge gains from unrestricted migration. To put it bluntly, why exactly are the receiving countries being so stupid? Why do policymakers in these countries not buy into the models and enact policies that would substantially increase national income? Why do countries like Canada and Australia, which offer both very high wages that would keep attracting immigrants and vast geographic regions waiting to be filled, keep strolling on that mythical sidewalk, keep seeing those trillion-dollar bills, and just keep walking right on by? This point can be quantified in the context of the simulation. Suppose that the capital stock in each region is owned by the capitalists in that region. It is then straightforward to calculate the change in the income that accrues to all Northerners after they pay out the immigrants’ salaries. This quantity is given by: (14) ΔNet Income of North = ∫0 LN+M∗ αN ∗ Lη dL − ∫0 LN αN Lη dL − wN ∗ M∗ , where wN ∗ is the wage paid in the Northern labor market after the relaxation of immigration restrictions.10 Row 3 of table 2 reports the income change accruing exclusively to Northerners. If there were no spillovers and if migration were costless, this income would increase by around $13 trillion as a result of unrestricted immigration. It would seem, therefore, that receiving countries have a huge incentive to remove immigration restrictions; the size of the national economic pie increases and the country could, in theory, redistribute some of its additional wealth so that all natives in the receiving country are better off. The simulation also shows, however, that the increase in Northern income quickly dissipates and turns negative if there are significant spillovers. If the parameter λ = 0.5, for example, the $13 trillion gain turns into a $2 trillion loss. In short, the general equilibrium effects can easily turn a receiving country’s expected windfall from unrestricted migration into an economic debacle.11 My inference from Ruhs’s The Price of Rights is that receiving countries endogenously choose those policies that are most beneficial for them. And those countries’ revealed preference—the fact that they repeatedly keep ignoring the advice of the social engineers—contains valuable information. If the trillion-dollar benefits were really there for the taking, would not some receiving country have already chosen to go down that path? The fact that these countries instead keep enacting immigration restrictions hints at the possibility that perhaps those trillion-dollar bills are not real. I know that an easy retort to this interpretation of the evidence is that the policymakers and populations of the receiving countries form a “rabid collection of xenophobes and racists.” But another interpretation, which may be just as valid, is that perhaps those policymakers and native populations know something that the social engineers ignore: there are few gains to be had after accounting for the adverse spillovers. (971-2)

#### Err on the side of preserving the status quo.

Borjas 15 — George Borjas, Professor of Economics and Social Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School, recipient of the 2011 IZA Prize in Labor Economics, Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research, Ph.D. in Economics from Columbia, 2015 (“Immigration and Globalization: A Review Essay,” Journal of Economic Literature, December, Vol. 53, No. 4, Available Online at <https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jel.53.4.961>, Accessed 08-09-2018)

The striking variation in the types of restrictions that different receiving countries impose on specific types of international migrants suggests a promising avenue for research. After all, the variation may provide a great deal of information about how receiving countries perceive and quantify the potential externalities that would arise if the country were hit by very large supply shocks from specific places. These different choices may be amenable to empirical study by carefully examining how the adopted policies reflect preexisting local conditions, including the geographic, economic, religious, linguistic, and historical linkages among the various countries. There is, in fact, a related and underappreciated inference that can be drawn from Ruhs’s exhaustive accounting of immigration restrictions. The existing research on the economic impact of immigration typically treats the policy parameters that regulate immigration flows into a receiving country as exogenously determined, and then exploits the policy-induced variation in the size and composition of these flows to measure the various economic effects. The observed policy, however, is endogenous. This endogeneity suggests that the effects observed in a particular context may provide little insight into the economic impact that similar supply shocks would have in other places and at other times. In fact, it seems likely that a particular policy is chosen because that choice leads to the greatest benefits and/or smallest costs in that place and at that time. The application of that specific policy in any other context would likely lead to a diminution of the benefits and/or an increase in the costs. A little humility about what we actually know would seem to be a prerequisite before anyone proposes a breathtaking rearrangement of the world order. (972-3)

### They Say: “Borjas is Wrong”

#### Their evidence is based on big business think-tank’ing — it’s ideological and not evidence-driven.

Ruark 14 — Eric Ruark, MA in European History, Ph.D. candidate at University of Maryland College Park Director of Research, 2014 (“The (Il)logic of Open Border Libertarians,” FAIR: Federation for American Immigration Reform, May 21st, Available Online at <http://fairus.org/sites/default/files/2017-08/The_%28Il%29Logic_of_Open_Border_Libertarians-2.pdf>, Accessed 08-09-2018)

Big-business interests have a large stake in the outcome of the debate over immigration, and they have spent much money supporting libertarian “think-tanks” that espouse an open-border policy for the United States. By all appearances, this has very little to do with any principled commitment to libertarian principles, but is a way to provide ideological cover for multi-national corporations who lobby for the passage of legislation that will undermine the standing of American workers and force taxpayers to subsidize the costs of a cheaper foreign labor force. An open border, or at least a more open border, would allow corporations to further consolidate their hold on the U.S. economy, while the middle class would lose more of its economic and political power.

#### Reject evidence that minimizes the link — it’s the result of academic censorship and extreme biases toward portraying immigration as an unmitigated good.

Borjas 16 — George Borjas, Professor of Economics and Social Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School, recipient of the 2011 IZA Prize in Labor Economics, Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research, Ph.D. in Economics from Columbia, 2016 (We Wanted Workers: Unraveling the Immigration Narrative, ISBN-13: 978-0393249019)

Times have certainly changed. Immigration has now become perhaps the most divisive political issue of our time. And immigration research has become a central focus of interest among labor economists (those of us who specialize in examining how labor markets work). Hundreds of published academic studies examine various aspects of the immigration puzzle. These two threads of interest feed off each other. As the political debate heated up, there was increasing demand for information that could be used to frame the discussion and, particularly, to support specific policy positions. Obviously, where there is demand—and especially where there are funds for researchers to conduct such studies—there will be supply, and a rapidly growing number of economists now work on immigration-related issues. The number of research studies is now so large that it would take a few months of careful reading to become familiar with the various themes. It probably would take even longer to fully appreciate the subtleties built into the theories and statistical methods that are commonly used to frame and answer the questions. Paul Collier, a renowned British public intellectual and a professor at Oxford University, published a book in 2013 entitled Exodus: How Migration Is Changing Our World. Collier himself had never conducted research on immigration issues in his academic work; instead, he had written a number of influential books on such diverse topics as the impact of government aid to poor countries and the politics of global warming. The main point of Exodus is that the presumed large benefits that immigration can impart to receiving countries may be greatly reduced as the number of immigrants increases substantially and the migration flow continues indefinitely. Large and persistent flows, Collier argued, could have many other (sometimes harmful) unintended consequences. Regardless of how one feels about this conclusion, I found it particularly insightful to read Collier's overall perception of the many social science studies that he reviewed as he prepared to write the book: A rabid collection of xenophobes and racists who are hostile to immigrants lose no opportunity to argue that migration is bad for indigenous populations. Understandably, this has triggered a reaction: desperate not to give succor to these groups, social scientists have strained every muscle to show that migration is good for everyone. This is as damning a statement about the value of social science research on immigration as one can find. As far as I know, Collier is the first distinguished academic to state publicly that social scientists have attempted to construct an intricate narrative that shows the measured impact of immigration to be "good for everyone." I have never made such an assertion in public. But I have long suspected that a lot of the research (particularly, but not exclusively, outside economics) was ideologically motivated, and was being censored or filtered to spin the evidence in a way that would exaggerate the benefits from immigration and downplay the costs.

### They Say: “Consensus of Experts Vote Aff”

#### No consensus in the field

Swanson 16 — Ana Swanson, covers the economy, trade and the Federal Reserve for the Washington Post, 2016 (“Opening up borders: An idea economists tend to love and politicians detest,” Washington Post, October 14th, Available Online at <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/10/14/why-economists-love-and-politicians-detest-the-idea-of-opening-the-borders-to-lots-more-immigrants/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.3644dc63446d>, Accessed 08-08-2018)

Polls of economists' views reflect this debate. In a survey of more than 40 of the nation's most prominent economists, half agreed that the average U.S. citizen would be better off if a large number of low-skilled foreign workers were legally allowed to enter the United States each year. Twenty-eight percent said they were uncertain, and 9 percent disagreed. However, they also recognized the costs of such policies. Nearly half of the economists also agreed that, unless they were compensated by others, many low-skilled Americans would be worse off.

## Economy DA

[Read this version if they DID NOT read the Economy Advantage in the 1AC. Otherwise, read the Economy Advantage Answers above this section.]

### 1NC — Economy DA

#### The [first/next] off is the Economy DA.

#### First, open borders cause labor saturation, inequality and wage collapse.

Ormerod 15 — Paul Ormerod, economist, director of Volterra Consulting, MA in Philosophy from Oxford, 2015 (“Open borders or fair wages: the left needs to make up its mind,” The Guardian, March 24th, Available Online at <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/mar/24/open-borders-fair-wages-left-mass-immigration-britain-economy>, Accessed 08-09-2018)

Mass immigration increases inequality. This is the unpalatable fact the liberal left in Britain refuses to accept. Markets are imperfect instruments. But it is not necessary to subscribe to free market economic theory to believe that large increases in supply tend to drive down the price. And the price of labour is the wage. Last Friday, the Guardian front page carried a report from the Office for Budget Responsibility, claiming that higher net immigration increased the UK’s economic growth rate. According to the mainstream theory of economic growth, this is undoubtedly true. Higher growth can be created by sustained increases of either capital or labour. But underlying the theory is the assumption that supply and demand balance in these markets, that the prices of the inputs are set at levels such that all available capital or labour is in fact employed and does not remain idle. So this “flourishing modern economy” with high immigration celebrated by the Guardian is based on persistent large wage inequalities. A powerful force in the global economy is driving the increase in inequality that has been seen in western economies over the past few decades. In essence, there has been a massive increase in the effective supply of labour. Over the past three decades or so, China and India have gradually been absorbed into the network of international trade. This puts pressure on European labour markets. Many call centres, for example, have been relocated to India. But much of the impact of this is indirect, operating via trade flows, and is only really felt by certain sectors of western economies. Closer to home, the opening up of eastern Europe in the early 1990s has had a strong effect, especially on countries that are their immediate neighbours, such as Germany. Employers soon realised that economies such as Poland and the Czech Republic possessed educated labour forces, whose productivity potential had been suppressed by the gross inefficiencies inherent in planned economies. German companies opened up new production plants in the old Soviet bloc countries in Europe, rather than at home. The impact on wage rates of this increase in competition was dramatic. Christian Dustmann at University College London has provided clear evidence on the evolution of wage rates in the former West Germany. The 15th percentile of the wage distribution is the level at which only 15% of wages are lower. In West Germany, at the 15th percentile, real wages have fallen almost continuously since the mid-1990s. At the 50th percentile, where half get more and half get less, the reduction has been less sharp. But the fall had set in by the early 2000s. At the 85th percentile, the mirror image of the 15th, real wages grew strongly, reaping the benefits of the recovery of the economy created by the increase in competitiveness. It is against this background that New Labour opened up Britain’s borders in the late 1990s. It was a major betrayal of the very people the party purported to represent. In addition to the global competition from countries such as China, in addition to competition closer to home from the economies of eastern Europe, New Labour allowed direct competition to enter the UK labour market on a scale unprecedented in our history. Not surprisingly, the distribution of wage rates has evolved in very similar ways to those of West Germany. It is the relatively unskilled in the bottom half of the distribution who have lost out. The liberal elite do not suffer. Indeed, they benefit because many of the services they consume are provided at lower prices than would have been the case without mass immigration. It is sometimes argued that immigrants do jobs that native British workers are unwilling to take. Very well then, without mass immigration, employers would be obliged to raise the real wage rate to induce these people to take the jobs.

#### Second, open borders collapse wages — it’s basic economics.

Eskow 16 — Richard Eskow, Senior Fellow at Campaign for America’s Future, Senior Advisor for Health & Economic Justice at Social Security Works, 2016 (““Open Borders”: A Gimmick, Not a Solution,” Huffington Post, Available Online at <https://www.huffingtonpost.com/rj-eskow/open-borders-a-gimmick-no_b_7945140.html>, Accessed 08-09-2018)

The work of economist Ha-Joon Chang, by contrast, provides compelling evidence that an open borders policy would exert a powerful downward pull on American workers’ wages. Devaluing Other Countries Bier then gets to the core of the open-borders argument, writing that “labor is enormously more productive here. As a result, identical workers can earn 280 percent more here than in Mexico; workers from Yemen and Nigeria, 1,300 percent more; Haitians, 2,200 percent more.” It is inhumane, he suggests, to deny workers the opportunity to multiply their earnings by such impressive percentages. But that interpretation is, to borrow a phrase, “silly, tribal and economically illiterate.” Bier fails to consider a fundamental principle of economics: when the supply of labor increases, wages go down. A massive influx of foreign workers would lead to a steep plunge in those multiples. What’s more, there are often significant cost-of-living differences between the United States and these workers’ countries of origin. And this argument is “tribal” because advocates like Bier (and Klein) apparently don’t understand that other nations, despite their relative poverty, have virtues of their own. That should be a source of deep embarrassment for them. For most migrants, their native lands hold ties of language, culture, family and community. It should not be necessary to endure the pain of displacement merely to earn a livable wage. To claim otherwise, as open-borders advocates implicitly do, is to reflect the xenophobic belief that everybody would be happier here than anywhere else.

#### Third, the DA turns the Morality advantage — there’s an ethical obligation to resolve inequality.

Ansell 17 — David A. Ansell, Senior Vice President, Associate Provost for Community Health Equity, and Michael E. Kelly Professor of Medicine at Rush University Medical Center (Chicago), holds an M.D. from the State University of New York Upstate Medical University College of Medicine, 2017 (“American Roulette,” *The Death Gap: How Inequality Kills*, Published by the University of Chicago Press, ISBN 9780226428291)

There are many different kinds of violence. Some are obvious: punches, attacks, gunshots, explosions. These are the kinds of inter- personal violence that we tend to hear about in the news. Other kinds of violence are intimate and emotional. But the deadliest and most thoroughgoing kind of violence is woven into the fabric of American society. It exists when some groups have more access to goods, resources, and opportunities than other groups, including health and life itself. This violence delivers specific blows against particular bodies in particular neighborhoods. This unequal advantage and violence is built into the very rules that govern our society. In the absence of this violence, large numbers of Americans would be able to live fuller and longer lives. This kind of violence is called structural violence, because it is embedded in the very laws, policies, and rules that govern day-to- day life.8 It is the cumulative impact of laws and social and economic policies and practices that render some Americans less able to access resources and opportunities than others. This inequity of advantage is not a result of the individuals personal abilities but is built into the systems that govern society. Often it is a product of racism, gender, and income inequality. The diseases and premature mortality that Windora and many of my patients experienced were, in the words of Dr. Paul Farmer, "biological reflections of social fault lines."9 As a result of these fault lines, a disproportional burden of illness, suffering, and premature mortality falls on certain neighborhoods, like Windora's. Structural violence can overwhelm an individual's ability to live a free, unfettered, healthy life. As I ran to evaluate Windora, I knew that her stroke was caused in part by lifelong exposure to suffering, racism, and economic deprivation. Worse, the poverty of West Humboldt Park that contributed to her illness is directly and inextricably related to the massive concentration of wealth and power in other neighborhoods just miles away in Chicago's Gold Coast and suburbs. That concentration of wealth could not have occurred without laws, policies, and practices that favored some at the expense of others. Those laws, policies, and practices could not have been passed or enforced if access to political and economic power had not been concentrated in the hands of a few. Yet these political and economic structures have become so firmly entrenched (in habits, social relations, economic arrangements, institutional practices, law, and policy) that they have become part of the matrix of American society. The rules that govern day-to-day life were written to benefit a small elite at the expense of people like Windora and her family. These rules and structures are powerful destructive forces. The same structures that render life predictable, secure, comfortable, and pleasant for many destroy the lives of others like Windora through suffering, poverty, ill health, and violence. These structures are neither natural nor neutral. The results of structural violence can be very specific. In Windora's case, stroke precursors like chronic stress, poverty, and uncontrolled hypertension run rampant in neighborhoods like hers. Windora's ill- ness was caused by neither her cultural traits nor the failure of her will. Her stroke was caused in part by inequity. She is one of the lucky ones, though, because even while structural violence ravages her neighbor- hood, it also abets the concentration of expensive stroke-intervention services in certain wealthy teaching hospitals like mine. If I can get to her in time, we can still help her. Income Inequality and Life Inequality Of course, Windora is not the only person struggling on account of structural violence. Countless neighborhoods nationwide are suffering from it, and people are dying needlessly young as a result. The mag- nitude of this excess mortality is mind-boggling. In 2009 my friend Dr. Steve Whitman asked a simple question, "How many extra black people died in Chicago each year, just because they do not have the same health outcomes as white Chicagoans?" When the Chicago Sun- Times got wind of his results, it ran them on the front page in bold white letters on a black background: "health care gap kills 3200 Black Chicagoans and the Gap is Growing." The paper styled the head- line to look like the declaration of war that it should have been. In fact, we did find ourselves at war not long ago, when almost 3,000 Americans were killed. That was September 11,2001. That tragedy propelled the country to war. Yet when it comes to the premature deaths of urban Americans, no disaster area has been declared. No federal troops have been called up. No acts of Congress have been passed. Yet this disaster is even worse: those 3,200 black people were in Chicago alone, in just one year. Nationwide each year, more than 60,000 black people die prematurely because of inequality.10 While blacks suffer the most from this, it is not just an issue of racism, though racism has been a unique and powerful transmitter of violence in America for over four hundred years.11 Beyond racism, poverty and income inequality perpetuated by exploitative market capitalism are singular agents of transmission of disease and early death. As a result, there is a new and alarming pattern of declining life expectancy among white Americans as well. Deaths from drug overdoses in young white Americans ages 25 to 34 have exploded to levels not seen since the AIDS epidemic. This generation is the first since the Vietnam War era to experience higher death rates than the prior generation.12 White Americans ages 45 to 54 have experienced skyrocketing premature death rates as well, something not seen in any other developed na- tion.13 White men in some Appalachian towns live on average twenty years less than white men a half-day's drive away in the suburbs of Washington, DC. Men in McDowell County, West Virginia, can look forward to a life expectancy only slightly better than that of Haitians.14 But those statistics reflect averages, and every death from structural violence is a person. When these illnesses and deaths are occurring one at a time in neighborhoods that society has decided not to care about—neighborhoods populated by poor, black, or brown people— they seem easy to overlook, especially if you are among the fortunate few who are doing incredibly well. The tide of prosperity in America has lifted some boats while others have swamped. Paul Farmer, the physician-anthropologist who founded Partners in Health, an inter- national human rights agency, reflects on the juxtaposition of "unprecedented bounty and untold penury": "It stands to reason that as beneficiaries of growing inequality, we do not like to be reminded of misery of squalor and failure. Our popular culture provides us with no shortage of anesthesia."15 That people suffer and die prematurely because of inequality is wrong. It is wrong from an ethical perspective. It is wrong from a fair- ness perspective. And it is wrong because we have the means to fix it.

#### Finally, economic decline causes nuclear war.

Mann 14 — Eric Mann, special agent with a United States federal agency, with significant domestic and international counterintelligence and counter-terrorism experience, former special assistant for a U.S. Senator and served as a presidential appointee for the U.S. Congress, BA from U of South Carolina, MA in Security Studies from Georgetown, 2014 (“Austerity, Economic Decline, and Financial Weapons Of War: A New Paradigm For Global Security,” Graduate Thesis submitted to Johns Hopkins University for MA in Global Security Studies, May, Available Online at <https://jscholarship.library.jhu.edu/bitstream/handle/1774.2/37262/MANN-THESIS-2014.pdf>, Accessed 08-08-2018)

The conclusions reached in this thesis demonstrate how economic considerations within states can figure prominently into the calculus for future conflicts. The findings also suggest that security issues with economic or financial underpinnings will transcend classical determinants of war and conflict, and change the manner by which rival states engage in hostile acts toward one another. The research shows that security concerns emanating from economic uncertainty and the inherent vulnerabilities within global financial markets will present new challenges for national security, and provide developing states new asymmetric options for balancing against stronger states.¶ The security areas, identified in the proceeding chapters, are likely to mature into global security threats in the immediate future. As the case study on South Korea suggest, the overlapping security issues associated with economic decline and reduced military spending by the United States will affect allied confidence in America’s security guarantees. The study shows that this outcome could cause regional instability or realignments of strategic partnerships in the Asia-pacific region with ramifications for U.S. national security. Rival states and non-state groups may also become emboldened to challenge America’s status in the unipolar international system.¶ The potential risks associated with stolen or loose WMD, resulting from poor security, can also pose a threat to U.S. national security. The case study on Pakistan, Syria and North Korea show how financial constraints affect weapons security making weapons vulnerable to theft, and how financial factors can influence WMD proliferation by contributing to the motivating factors behind a trusted insider’s decision to sell weapons technology. The inherent vulnerabilities within the global financial markets will provide terrorists’ organizations and other non-state groups, who object to the current international system or distribution of power, with opportunities to disrupt global finance and perhaps weaken America’s status. A more ominous threat originates from states intent on increasing diversification of foreign currency holdings, establishing alternatives to the dollar for international trade, or engaging financial warfare against the United States.

### 2NC — Economy DA

Extensions for the Economy DA are in the “Economy Advantage Answers” section above.

## Brain Drain DA

### 1NC — Brain Drain DA

#### The [first/next] off is the Brain Drain DA.

#### First, the status quo balances migration and brain gain — it’s Goldilocks.

Khilji and Schuler 17 — Shaista E. Khilji, Professor of Human and Organizational Learning and International Affairs at GW University, founding editor of the South Asian Journal of Business Studies, worked on President Obama’s initiative to develop transparent US government culture, and Randall Schuler, Professor of Strategic International Human Resource Management and Strategic Human Resources Management, former director of the Center for Global Strategic Human Resource Management, Fellow of the American Psychological Association, 2017 (“Talent Management in the Global Context,” in The Oxford Handbook of Talent Management, edited by David G. Collings, Kamel Mellahi, and Wayne F. Cascio, ISBN-13: 978-0198758273)

China, following in Korean and Taiwanese footsteps, provides a good example of a country that has successfully embarked on a comprehensive policy of luring back dia sporic persons. Zweig (2006) traces Chinese interest in diasporas to the 1990S, when the central government realized that in order to improve science and technology in China, it had to let people go abroad freely, and then compete for them in the international market by creating a domestic environment that would attract them. Subsequently, the Chinese government improved the environment for immigrants and returnees by devel oping job introduction centers, offering preferential policies (of giving them more living : space and higher professional titles), establishing a national association of returned students, and increasing support for scientific research. Local governments also started competing for talent by instituting their own policies. At the same time, universities and government-funded research organizations also actively started recruiting immigrants and returnees. Many other countries in Asia and Eastern Europe have adopted similar practices to lure back highly skilled persons to support their respective economic devel opment (Ragazzi, aoi; Tung and Lazarova, 2006). These programs and incentives have resulted in a reverse brain drain globally, or what Saxenian refers to as “brain circulation” (2005: 36)—that is, the ability of the diasporic and returnees to establish business relationships or to start new businesses while main taining their social and professional ties elsewhere (countries they graduated from and gained experience in). These returnees have proven critical to the overall development of talent nationally by transferring their knowledge and experience to the people they work with (DeVoretz and Zweig, 2008; Kapur and McHale, 2005; Tung and Lazarova, 2006) and establishing a new form of economic growth model through entrepreneur ship and experimentation (Saxenian, 2005).

#### Second, increasing open migration causes devastating brain drain in developing countries.

Brock and Blake 16 — Gillian Brock, Ph.D. Professor of Humanities at Auckland, and Michael Blake, Ph.D. Professor of Philosophy at Washington University, 2016 (“Global Justice and the Brain Drain,” Journal Ethics & Global Politics, Vol. 9, Issue 1, Available Online at <https://doi.org/10.3402/egp.v9.33498>)

Our world is a terribly unequal place. It is unequal in terms of simple dollars and cents: the average citizen of Malawi has an annual income of US$320, while the average citizen of Japan has an annual income of almost US$48,000.1 This sort of inequality has been much discussed in recent political philosophy and theory; theorists have spent a great deal of time trying to understand precisely what sorts of inequality might be regarded as unjust, and why.2 The world is, however, terribly unequal in other ways, and these ways have not received similar levels of analysis. Consider again Malawi and Japan: Japan has around 21 physicians per 10,000 people, while Malawi has only one physician for every 50,000 people.3 This radical inequality in medical skills and talents has, obviously, bad consequences for health; people born in Malawi will live, on average, 32 years fewer than their counterparts born in Japan.4 These facts are troubling in themselves. They become more troubling, though, when we start asking why nations like Malawi have so few physicians. It is not that the citizens of developing countries have no interest in becoming physicians, or entirely lack the opportunity for training. Indeed, developing societies spend a great deal of money training new physicians and spots in medical schools are avidly sought. Rather, the low number of physicians has much to do with what medical training provides\*namely, the opportunity to leave that developing society, in search of perceived better prospects. Developed societies such as the United States and the United Kingdom have made immigration comparatively easy for those with scarce medical skills, and such citizens often choose to pursue these immigration options. Consider, for instance, that in 2000, Ghana trained 250 new nurses\*and lost 500 nurses to emigration.5 In 2001, Zimbabwe graduated 40 pharmacists\*and lost 60.6 In 2002 alone, Malawi lost 75 nurses to the United Kingdom\*a cohort that represented 12% of all the nurses resident in Malawi.7 The result has been a continued shortage of medical personnel in developing countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, despite considerable African investment in education. This phenomenon of high levels of migration of skilled people from developing nations to developed ones is often referred to as the brain drain. Brain drain should be troubling to those who care about global justice. The phenomenon seems poised to perpetuate the inequality in life-chances between developing and developed societies. The absent talent of the emigrant undermines both the life-chances of present citizens of the developing society\*a society with fewer doctors, after all, is a society in which more people will die avoidable deaths\*and the chances for that society to develop flourishing institutions for future citizens. The phenomenon is troubling in other ways: the wealthy citizens of the developed world, already well-equipped with skilled citizens, are further increasing their stock by drawing on some of the world’s worst-off societies, thus rendering those societies even more badly positioned to address citizens’ needs in the future.8

#### Finally, brain drain turns the case. Elites benefit disproportionately at the expense of the poorest billion. Aff evidence comes from an ideologically flawed data set.

Collier 13 — Paul Collier, Ph.D. Professor of Economics and Public Policy at Oxford University, 2013 (“Migration Hurts the Homeland,” New York Times, November 13th, Available Online at <https://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/30/opinion/migration-hurts-the-homeland.html>, Accessed 08-09-2018)

Migration is good for poor countries, but not in every form, and not in unlimited amounts. The migration that research shows is unambiguously beneficial is the kind in which young people travel to democracies like America for higher education and then go home. Not only do these young people bring back valuable skills directly learned in the classroom; they bring back political and social attitudes that they have assimilated from their classmates. Their skills raise the productivity of the unskilled majority’, and their attitudes accelerate democratization. For example, global data on students from poor countries who have studied abroad since 1950 shows that those who went to democracies accelerated political liberalization in their home societies out of all proportion to their numbers. Democratization across Latin America, Africa and Asia has been supported by this process. In an opinion article in The Washington Post last spring, Mr. Zuckerberg asked, “Why do we kick out the more than 40 percent of math and science graduate students who are not U.S. citizens after educating them?” My response: Whatever the reason, it is a highly effective way of helping poorer societies. Even what looks like a brain drain can sometimes be beneficial. When educated people emigrate and settle in a richer country’, the poorer country’ suffers a direct loss; but by demonstrating that the effort to acquire education can end triumphantly’, it can encourage many others to pursue an education, too. The brain drain becomes a reality’ only’ if too many’ of the educated leave. But many poor countries have too much emigration. I do not mean that they would be better with none, but they would be better with less. The big winners from the emigration of the educated have been China and India. Because each has over a billion people, proportionately few people leave. In contrast, small developing countries have high emigration rates, even if their economies are doing well: Ghana, for instance, has a rate of skilled emigration 12 times that of China. If, in addition, their economies are in trouble, they suffer an educational hemorrhage. The top rankings for skilled emigration are a roll call of the bottom billion. Haiti loses around 85 percent of its educated youth, a rate that is debilitating. Emigrants send money back, but it is palliative rather than transformative. China and India, with their low rates of emigration and high rates of return, have dominated global thinking about how migration affects countries of origin. But the core development challenge is now whether the poor, small societies can catch up. Unlike China and India, they have too much emigration. They can do little about it, but we can do quite a lot: Their emigration rates are set by our immigration policies. Much of the pressure for more rapid immigration comes from diasporas wanting to bring in dependent relatives. But bowing to this pressure is not necessarily humane: Bringing relatives to America reduces the incentive to send remittances back home. Migrant families do well for themselves by jumping into a chain of lifeboats headed for the developed world, but this can be at the expense of the vastly larger group of families left behind. Seemingly the most incontestable case for a wider door is to provide a refuge for those fleeing societies in meltdown. The high-income democracies should indeed provide such a refuge, and this means letting more people in. But the right to refuge need not imply the right to residency. The people best equipped to flee from societies in meltdown are their elites: The truly poor cannot get farther than a camp over the border. Post-meltdown, the elites are needed back home. Yet if they have acquired permanent residence they are reluctant to return. For example, South Sudan, one of the world’s poorest countries, is bleeding a remittance outflow: Government officials told me that key people can be coaxed back only by high salaries, and even then they leave their families abroad and send their Sudanese earnings back to them. Our priority' should be to design policies of refuge that reconcile our duty' of rescue with the legitimate concerns of post-conflict governments to attract back the people who could rebuild their countries. Emigres face a coordination problem: Going home is much less scary' if others are doing the same. The right to refuge could include sunset rules linked to peace settlements and the monitored efforts of post-conflict governments. Bright, young, enterprising people are catalysts of economic and political progress. They are like fairy godmothers, providing benefits, whether intended or inadvertent, to the rest of a society". Shifting more of the fairy" godmothers from the poorest countries to the richest can be cast in various lights. It appeals to business as a cheap supply of talent. It appeals to economists as efficient, since the godmothers are indeed more productive in the rich world than the poor. (Unsurprisingly, our abundance of capital and skills raises their productivity.) It appeals to libertarians as freeing human choice from the deadening weight of bureaucratic control. At the more radical end of this spectrum, aficionados of Ayn Rand will see it as the triumphant release of the strong minority" from the clutches of the weak majority" “migrants shrugged.” Many on the left, for their part, don’t like to recognize that we’re taking away fairy" godmothers. They' prefer to believe that they' re helping poor people flee difficult situations at home. But we might be feeding a vicious circle, in which home gets worse precisely' because the fairy' godmothers leave. Humanitarians become caught up trying to help individuals, and therefore miss the larger implications: There are poor people, and there are poor societies. An open door for the talented would help Facebook's bottom line, but not the bottom billion.

### They Say: “Brain Circulation Not Drain”

#### Educational structure prevents brain circulation — relevant skills aren’t taught.

Skolnikoff 93 — Eugene B. Skolnikoff, Professor of Political Science at MIT, 1993 (“Knowledge without Borders? Internationalization of the Research Universities,” The American Research University, Vol. 22, No. 4, Fall, Available Online at <https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/20027206.pdf>, Accessed 08-09-2018)

Brain Drain. As American society and universities became increasingly attractive to citizens of other countries after the war, a steadily growing number of students, especially from developing countries, have come to American universities and have stayed in the country after graduation. The issues associated with this migra tion of talent or "brain drain" have been a continuing source of controversy because of the effects on the countries from which the individuals came. Some have argued that the universities have a responsibility to ensure that the students return home after gradu ation, or at least a responsibility to tailor an educational program suitable for the situation of that home country. Most research universities make little provision for adjusting their educational program to the needs of developing countries. This is especially so in the most popular fields of engineering and science where the quality of the curriculum depends on close inter action with the cutting edge of research, a relationship that cannot be altered by fiat. In fields in which issues of particular concern to development form important parts of the research agenda, such as urban studies, political science, and civil engineering, relevant courses and research opportunities can be offered. But, in the majority of fields at a research university, the domestic needs of developing countries are not directly addressed. This increases the likelihood that students from those countries will be dissatisfied if they return home after completing a degree. In effect, the advanced curriculum of the research universities is providing an added incentive for those from developing countries to stay in the United States. But the students typically come because of that advanced curriculum, and not to learn about their own problems. Universities cannot be indifferent to the issue, but neither is it their role to restrict admissions, control students after graduation, or compromise their educational objectives because of the possible effects on other countries. It is clear, however, that this is an important economic and foreign policy issue for the United States, and a domestic issue for the countries of origin. As mentioned earlier, some countries are making new efforts to create the condi tions at home that will lure their former nationals back. This is a sensible step for those countries, for it is only by finding ways to make effective use of the training received in the United States that the economic advantages to the home nation can be realized. The US government is not an innocent party or indifferent to the brain drain; immigration legislation actually encourages individuals with skills to remain in the United States. If the brain drain were to dry up, the US economy would suffer unless successful steps had already been taken to increase the supply of American students moving into the fields in which foreign students are making such a large contribution. (247-8)

### They Say: “Brain Drain Arguments Faulty”

#### Open borders cause brain drain — empirics prove.

Obama 16 — Barack Obama, former US president, JD from Harvard, 2016 (“Young Leaders of the Americas Youth Address,” November 20th, Available Online at <http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/barackobama/barackobamaYLAI2016.htm>, Accessed 08-09-2018)

PRESIDENT OBAMA: Thank you. Thank you very much. Well, first of all, I know that your father is very proud that you said he's the smartest man you know. I hope that Malia and Sasha would say the same thing about their father -- I don’t know. But I'm sure that made him feel good. Look, America is a nation of immigrants. Those of you who visited America, if you walk in an American city -- not just New York or Los Angeles, but St. Louis or Indianapolis or Columbus, Ohio -- if you walk down the street, you see people that look like they could be from anyplace. Because the fact is, is that except for the Native American populations, everybody in America came from someplace else. All of us are immigrants. And that's been our greatest strength, because we've been able to attract talent from everywhere. I use this as an example: You notice that the United States did really well in the Olympics. Now, some of that is because we're a big country, we're a wealthy country, so we have all these training facilities and we can do all kinds of -- best equipment. All that is true. But you know what, China is a bigger country and spends a lot of money also. The big advantage that America has, if you look at our team -- actually, two big advantages. First, we passed something called Title IX many years ago that requires that women get the same opportunities in sports as men do. (Applause.) And that's why -- one of the reasons the American teams did so well is the women were amazing, and just because they've gotten opportunities. Right? Which teaches us something about the need to make sure that women and men, boys and girls, get the same opportunities. Because you do better when everybody has a chance, not just some. But the second thing -- you look at a U.S. Olympic team and there are all kinds of different sorts of people of all different shapes and sizes. And part of it is because we draw from a bigger genetic pool than anybody -- right? We have people who -- these little gymnasts, they're like this big. Simone Biles came by the White House. She's a tiny little thing. Amazing athlete. Then we have Michael Phelps, he's 6'8" and his shoulders are this big. And that's good for swimming. He couldn’t do gymnastics, but he's a really good swimmer. The point is, is that when you have all this talent from all these different places, then you actually, as a team, do better. And that's been the great gift of America. Now, what we have to do not just in the United States, but in all countries, is to find a way to have a open, smart immigration policy, but it has to be orderly and lawful. And I think that part of what's happened in the United States is that even though the amount of illegal immigration that is happening has actually gone down while I've been President, the perception is that it has just gone up. Partly this is because it used to be that immigrants primarily stayed in Texas and Arizona and New Mexico, border countries, or in Florida. And now they're moving into parts of the country that aren’t used to seeing immigrants, and it makes people concerned -- who are these people, and are they taking our jobs and are they taking opportunity, and so forth. So my argument has been that no country can have completely open borders, because if they did, then nationality and citizenship wouldn’t mean anything. And obviously if we had completely open borders, then you would have tens of millions of people who would suddenly be coming into the United States -- which, by the way, wouldn’t necessarily be good for the countries where they leave, because in some places like in Africa, you have doctors and nurses and scientists and engineers who all try to leave, and then you have a brain drain and they're not developing their own countries. So you have to have some rules, but my hope is, is that those rules are set up in a way that continues to invite talented young people to come in and contribute, and to make a good life for themselves. What we also, though, have to do is to invest in countries that are sending migrants so that they can develop themselves. So you mentioned Cuba, for example, where your father fled. He left in part because they didn’t feel that there was enough opportunity there. Part of the reason I said let's reopen our diplomatic relations with Cuba is to see if you can start encouraging greater opportunity and freedom in Cuba. Because if you have people who have been able to leave Cuba and do really well in the United States, that means they have enough talent that they should be able to do really well by staying at home in Cuba.

### Impact Outweighs

#### The plan is exploitative — ethical obligation to protect developing countries rom brain drain.

Delgado and Stefancic 95 — Richard Delgado, JD, Professor of Law at University of Colorado, and Jean Stefancic, JD, Research Associate in Law at University of Colorado, 1995 (“Cosmopolitanism Inside Out: International Norms and the Struggle for Civil Rights and Local Justice,” Connecticut Law Review, Vol. 27, Spring, Available Online at <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2411633>, Accessed 08-09-2018)

There are thus many reasons not to apply cosmopolitanism as its latter day advocates urge. Doing so stands to deprive so-called advanced countries of a source of knowledge and experience that they may need. n94 And, as we have pointed out, in narrowing the range of options available, it renders cosmopolitanism of taste and life choice difficult, if not impossible, even for Westerners. n95 Is the recent interpretation of it merely an intriguing "flip," a clever reversal, like political correctness and reverse discrimination, put forward by conservatives who basically do not much care for diversity and rowdy, noisy, clamorous identity politics? n96 We think there is more to it than that, and that the kind of anti-minority, anti-identity sentiment that marches under the cosmopolitanism banner has a thinly veiled power dimension. Consider the timing of the cosmopolitan turn. Many formerly backward nations, which suffered under the yoke of colonialism, are devel- [\*786] oping. They are building industry and beginning to contribute to pollution and the international environmental crisis. At the same time, their populations are booming. Since many of them are still not yet economically self-sufficient nor politically stable, their excess populations are finding their way to economically advanced countries in a wave of immigration, both legal and illegal. n97 If these countries can be persuaded to be "cosmopolitan" and to accept environmental standards dictated by the advanced countries and billed as "the law of nations," their economic development will be slowed but pollution may be abated somewhat. n98 If they can be encouraged to cooperate with immigration controls and standards according to which only urbane, skilled, collegeeducated citizens (not unskilled laborers) will immigrate to the advanced countries, countries in the First World will be better off. Third World countries will be encouraged to forget historic injustices they have suffered and grievances they may justly harbor, and begin doing business with the advanced countries on terms which disrupt these First World countries as little as possible. Developing countries, like minority groups everywhere, need protection first, then the opportunity to assimilate ("mongrelize," as Rushdie puts it) later. Unless this order is followed, cosmopolitanism will be exploitive and one way, as exemplified, for example, by those in the United States who appropriate black music but have little to do otherwise with black culture, n99 or like immigration laws that cause a brain drain from Third World countries because they allow resettlement by surgeons, engineers, and others likely to fit into the professional managerial sectors of the economy. n100

## Overpopulation DA

### 1NC — Overpopulation DA

#### The [first/next] off is the Overpopulation DA.

#### First, the US population is declining now. Continued decline is crucial to combat environmental destruction and climate change.

Dodson 18 — Jenna Dodson, Assisting Researcher at the Overpopulation Project, Ms.C. from Virginia Commonwealth University, 2018 (“US birth rate lowest in 30 years – the overlooked benefits,” The Overpopulation Project, May 24th, Available Online at <https://overpopulation-project.com/2018/05/24/the-united-states-birth-rate-in-2017-good-news/>, Accessed 08-09-2018)

The United States’ birth rate has fallen to a 30-year low, and the media is giving this new figure much attention. Unfortunately, most of that attention is misplaced. Since last week, countless news organizations released articles reviewing the new report from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) that documents the 3,853,472 births last year. Overall, the vast majority of articles are cautionary, referencing problems commonly associated with degrowth such as aging societies and shrinking labor forces. It is true that if the total fertility rate of 1.76 is sustained, then the current generation will not be replaced. However, the fertility rate has generally been below replacement level since 1971. And why is this portrayed as a bad? In fact, it is very much the opposite – it is an opportunity. An opportunity that necessitates a departure from our obsession with growth, and a willingness to embrace a new perspective. USA birth rate and number of births The United States is home to over 326 million people, who on average, each emit 16.5 metric tons of carbon dioxide per year. Despite the average American consuming roughly the same amount of energy as 60 years ago, total emissions have increased by 180%. The primary driver of this increase? Population growth. Furthermore, population growth has been identified by the International Panel on Climate Change as a key driver of anthropogenic emissions leading to climate change. Climate change impacts society in a variety of ways, including changes in rainfall and crop yields, water stress, effects on human health, and even energy supply. Recent research has shown that the highest-impact action to reduce personal emissions and help slow climate change is to have one fewer child. Fewer births that can contribute to a lower population growth and alleviate climate change impacts is a promising figure to be encouraged. As many news responses point out, a trend of lower birth rates would also shift the demographic structure of the United States towards an older population. However, what the news sources neglected to include were the positive effects of population aging. Firstly, an aging population would augment the emission reduction from fewer births through a reduction in energy consumption. A study from the Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research found that aging populations are associated with improvements in education, increased productivity, shared wealth, higher quality of life, and overall healthier populations. Over time, aging populations from declining birth rates will lead to fewer people – this is already happening in more than 20 countries, including Japan and many countries in Eastern Europe. With the appropriate social programs and policies, a smaller, older population can provide social and environmental benefits for the betterment of the country. There are substantial social and environmental benefits to be had from declining birth rates in the United States. Last year, the decline was primarily driven by a decrease in unintended teen pregnancies and an increase in women joining the workforce, indicators of social progress. If this degrowth continues, the United States has the opportunity to expand on this progress, reduce emissions, and allocate more resources to each citizen. This will enhance the benefits of an aging society to improve the overall quality of life for its population, and environment.

#### Second, immigration restriction is *vital* to efforts to control international population.

Miller 13 — David Miller, Professor of Political Theory at Oxford University, Fellow at Nuffield College, former Professor at the University of Lancaster, trained in philosophy at Cambridge and Oxford, 2013 (“The Case for Limits,” in Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics, 2nd Edition, ed. Andrew I. Cohen and Christopher Heath Wellman, 2013, ISBN-10: 1118479394)

The second reason for states to limit immigration that I want to consider concerns population size.1 This is a huge, and hugely controversial, topic, and all I can do here is to sketch an argument that links together the issues of immigration and population control. The latter issue really arises at two different levels: global and national. At the global level, there is a concern that the carrying capacity of the earth may be stretched to breaking point if the total number of human beings continues to rise as it has over the last half century or so. At national level, there is a concern about the effect of population growth on quality of life and the natural environment. Let me look at each level in turn. Although there is disagreement about just how many people the earth can sustain before resource depletion – the availability of water, for example – becomes acute, it would be hard to maintain that there is no upper limit. Although projections of population growth over the century ahead indicate a leveling off in the rate of increase, we must also expect – indeed should welcome – increases in the standard of living in the developing world that will mean that resource consumption per capita will also rise significantly. In such a world it is in all our interests that states whose populations are growing rapidly should adopt birth control measures and other policies to restrict the rate of growth, as both China and India have done in past decades. But such states have little or no incentive to adopt such policies if they can “export” their surplus population through international migration, and since the policies in question are usually unpopular, they have a positive incentive not to pursue them. A viable population policy at global level requires each state to be responsible for stabilizing, or even possibly reducing, its population over time, and this is going to be impossible to achieve if there are no restrictions on the movement of people between states. At national level, the effects of population growth may be less catastrophic, but can still be detrimental to important cultural values. What we think about this issue may be conditioned to some extent by the population density of the state in which we live. Those of us who live in relatively small and crowded states experience daily the way in which the sheer number of our fellow citizens, with their needs for housing, mobility, recreation, and so forth, impacts on the physical environment, so that it becomes harder to enjoy access to open space, to move from place to place without encountering congestion, to preserve important wildlife habitats, and so on. It’s true, of course, that the problems arise not simply from population size, but also from a population that wants to live in a certain way – to move around a lot, to have high levels of consumption, and so on – so we could deal with them by collectively changing the way that we live, rather than by restricting or reducing population size (De-Shalit, 2000). Perhaps we should. But this, it seems to me, is a matter for political decision: members of a territorial community have the right to decide whether to restrict their numbers, or to live in a more ecologically and humanly sound way, or to do neither and bear the costs of a high-consumption, high-mobility lifestyle in a crowded territory. If restricting numbers is part of the solution, then controlling immigration is a natural corollary. (371-2)

#### Third, immigration to the US is a “safety valve” that stops environmental reforms in other countries. Instead, the US can be a global leader in sustainability.

Cafaro and Staples 9 — Philip Cafaro, Senior Researcher at The Overpopulation Project, Professor of Philosophy at Colorado State, former president of the International Society for Environmental Ethics, and Winthrop Staples, MA from Colorado State, 2009 (“The Environmental Argument for Reducing Immigration into the United States,” Environmental Ethics, Vol. 31, March)

Now, if emigration helped America’s source countries get their own demographic houses in order, or opened up an ecological space that they used to create more sustainable or just societies, a case might be made for continuing to allow mass immigration into the U.S. Instead, America’s permissive immigration policies appear to enable demographic and ecological irresponsibility and continuing social injustice. As an example, consider Guatemala, where currently about ten percent of the adult population lives and works in the U.S., and a recent poll showed that most young Guatemalans hope to do so in the future. Guatemalan women’s total fertility rate averaged 4.6 children in 2005, for an annual growth rate of 2.4 percent per year.35 The Guatemalan government outlaws abortion (except when a mother’s life is at risk) and does little to encourage contraception. Guatemala has high deforestation rates and an unjust, highly inequitable distribution of wealth. But there is little effort to change any of this, perhaps because the negative effects of local overpopulation are lessened through immigration and counterbalanced, for many individuals, by the positive incentives of having more remittances from family members in the United States. Americans should do what we can to help other countries move toward sustainability, whether that means increasing funds for green development projects, or shutting off the “safety valve” which allows political elites to postpone necessary reforms. But we believe that our primary responsibility is to create a sustainable society in the United States. Not just because our local environmental duties are important. Not just because this is the main way we may further our responsibilities as global citizens. Perhaps most significant would be the powerful example of the world’s wealthiest nation—the land of “The Apprentice” and “Who Wants to Be a Millionaire?”—rejecting the path of endless growth and embracing sustainability. Limiting immigration into the United States and stabilizing our population would send a powerful message around the world that the time to create just, sustainable societies is now. (27)

#### Finally, immigration is the most important factor for population and consumption. Limiting it prevent extinction.

Kolankiewicz 10 — Leon Kolankiewicz, environmental scientist and national natural resources planner, masters in environmental planning from U of British Columbia, worked with the US Fish and Wildlife Service, National Marine Fisheries Service, Alaska Dept of Environmental Conservation, U Wash, U New Mexico, 2018 (“From Big to Bigger: How Mass Immigration and Population Growth Have Exacerbated America's Ecological Footprint,” Progressives for Immigration Reform, Policy Brief #10-1, Available Online at <http://progressivesforimmigrationreform.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/big-to-bigger.pdf>, Accessed 08-09-2018)

As of early 2010, the United States has a rapidly growing population of 308 million.33 In the 1990s, U.S. population expanded by nearly 33 million, the largest single decade of growth in American history since the decennial national censuses began in 1790. The 1990s exceeded even the peak decade of the Baby Boom, the 1950s by nearly five million (Figure 7). The 2001-2010 decade now drawing to a close will approach this record increment. Far from coasting to a stop or cessation in growth, U.S. population remains stubbornly and persistently high, and is literally growing with no end in sight. At current growth rates, every year more than three million net new residents are added to the U.S. population.34 The U.S. Census Bureau projects that by 2050, the population of the United States will have grown to 439 million. This is an increase of 131 million, or 43 percent, over our current population of 308 million. In 2050, if the Census Bureau’s current projections come to pass, the U.S. population would still be adding 3.45 million residents a year (more than today, though the annual growth rate will have declined somewhat), and there would be 5.7 million births compared to 4.3 million annual births today.35 Yet it is misleading to imply that increased births would be the dominant force behind this massive population growth. That is because many of those births would not occur, or at least would not occur in the United States, were it not for the persistently high levels of net immigration that are assumed by the Census Bureau in these projections. In 2050, the Bureau’s projections assume “net international migration” (immigration minus emigration) of 2.05 million, an increase from 1.34 million in 2010. This assumption reflects the Bureau’s professional judgment that domestic and international pressures to further increase already high immigration rates will only intensify. If the factors behind demographic change are divided between “net natural increase” (births minus deaths) and “net migration” (immigration minus emigration), then in 2050, 41 percent of the annual increment of 3.45 million would be attributable to net natural increase, and 59 percent would be due to net migration. However, even this breakdown understates the decisive influence that the level of immigration has in determining America’s demographic future. The full impact of immigration on demographic trends only becomes apparent when the U.S.-born descendents of immigrants are accounted for because, after all, these U.S. births would not have occurred but for the prior acts of migration by eventual parents that made them possible. When births to immigrants are accounted for, demographers at the Pew Research Center calculated recently that: If current trends continue, the population of the United States will rise to 438 million in 2050, from 296 million in 2005, and 82 percent of the increase will be due to immigrants arriving from 2005 to 2050 and their U.S.-born descendants.36 [emphasis added] Figures 8-10 graphically illustrate the powerful role of immigration policy in shaping current and future U.S. demographic trends. Figure 8 shows U.S. population growth from 1790 to 1970; the steepening curve, one characterized by larger and larger increments over time is a shape characteristic of all phenomena experiencing exponential growth. If, however, the 1970 levels of demographic components (net immigration, fertility or birth rates, and mortality rates) had been maintained over the decades that followed, the growth trajectory would have appeared more like that of the curve in Figure 9, rather than the much steeper curve in Figure 8. At the time of the first celebration of Earth Day in 1970, young environmentalists who had just finished reading Paul Ehrlich’s best-selling 1968 book The Population Bomb and listening to one of Earth Day Founder Senator Gaylord Nelson’s moving speeches believed whole-heartedly in the cause and necessity of U.S. and global population stabilization. They endorsed the view of popular cartoonist Walt Kelly’s character Pogo that, “We have met the enemy and he is us” (a play on words of the famous line by Commodore Perry: “We have met the enemy, and they are ours”). In other words, the more of “us” there are, the more “enemies,” or at least environmental burdens Mother Earth faces. If this generation had been able to realize its vision of slowing and then stopping U.S. population growth and reining in the environmental degradation it caused, the trajectory might have looked something like that of the curve in Figure 9. Growth would have tapered off and America’s population would never have hit 300 million. Instead, because of the rapidly rising wave of immigration unleashed by the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, Americans and their environment are facing the grim, and utterly unsustainable, future of ever-greater demographic pressures represented by Figure 10. What bearing do these “inconvenient truths” have on America’s Ecological Footprint? In a nutshell — everything. Current immigration levels are enlarging the already enormous U.S. Ecological Footprint and ecological deficit. With the U.S. population booming by more than 10 percent a decade, the only way to maintain — much less reduce the current, unacceptable size of our EF is to reduce our per capita consumption every decade by more than 10 percent — not just for one or five decades, but indefinitely, for as long as population growth continues. One doesn’t have to be a physicist or a political scientist to recognize that an achievement of this magnitude would be technically and politically unrealistic, if not impossible. America is already in ecological overshoot, and massive population growth driven by high immigration rates only serves to exacerbate the situation. Figure 11 shows current trends with respect to the Ecological Footprint and Biocapacity of the United States from 1961 through 2006.37 As is evident from the crossing lines in this graph, America’s EF first surpassed its biocapacity in the late 1960s, just prior to the first Earth Day. Since then the gap or ecological deficit has only continued to widen. While the addition of each new American does not necessarily increase our per capita or per person (as opposed to our aggregate) EF — only increased per capita resource consumption and CO2 generation does that, it does directly decrease our per capita biocapacity, and thus increases our ecological deficit. Population growth does this in two ways. First, given a fixed biocapacity — that is, a land base that is demonstrably finite and constant, with fixed maximum acreages of potential cropland, grazing land, forestland, and fishing grounds — it is a simple mathematical reality that adding more people who depend on this ecologically productive land base reduces per capita biocapacity. Second, the more than three million new Americans added every year require space and area in which to live, work, play, shop, and attend school. As open space is converted into the “built-up land” category, some combination of forestland, cropland, and grazing land is inevitably developed. (In the 1950s, Orange County, California, home to Disneyland, was touted by developers as “Smog Free Orange County,” but by the 1990s, after four decades of relentless sprawl development to accommodate Southern California’s multiplying millions, it became known as “Orange Free Smog County”). In this way, our country’s biocapacity is steadily and inexorably diminished by a growing population. The USDA Natural Resources Conservation Service’s (NRCS’s) National Resources Inventory (NRI) estimated that the United States lost 44 million acres of cropland, 12 million acres of pastureland, and 11 million acres of rangeland from 1982 to 1997, for a total loss to our agricultural land base of 67 million acres over this 15-year period.38 (One explanation of the much higher acreage of lost cropland than pastureland and rangeland was that a larger fraction of the cropland acreage was not “lost” per se, but deliberately “retired” from active production into the so-called Conservation Reserve Program or CRP, a program administered by the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Farm Service Agency. These were lands of marginal quality and high erodibility, lands on which modern, intensive agriculture is unsustainable). All 49 states inventoried lost cropland. Overall cropland losses continued in the next NRI published in 2007.39 The impacts of the loss of this land extend beyond agriculture. The USDA has estimated that each person added to the U.S. population requires slightly more than one acre of land for urbanization and highways.40 Clearly, more land is required as more people are added to our population. A comparison of NRI acreage — 25 million acres of newly developed land over the 1982-1997 period and 67 million acres of agricultural land lost shows that development per se is not responsible for all or even half of agricultural land loss. Arable land is also subject to other natural and manmade phenomena such as soil erosion (from both water and wind), salinization, and waterlogging that can rob its fertility, degrade its productivity and eventually force its retirement or increase its dependency on ever greater quantities of costly inputs like (fossil-fuel derived) nitrogen fertilizers. Arguably, however, much of these losses are due to over-exploitation by intensive agricultural practices needed to constantly raise agricultural productivity (yield per acre) in order to provide ever more food for America’s and the world’s growing populations and meat-rich diets. Thus, the potent combination of relentless development and land degradation from soil erosion and other factors is reducing America’s productive agricultural land base even as the demands on that same land base from a growing population are increasing. If the rates of agricultural land loss that have prevailed in recent years were to continue to 2050, the nation will have lost 53 million of its remaining 377 million acres of cropland, or 14 percent, even as the U.S. population grows by 43 percent from 308 million to 440 million.41 Continuing on to 2100, the discrepancy between booming population numbers and declining cropland acreage widens even further (Figure 12). The Census Bureau’s “middle series” projection (made in the year 2000) is 571 million, more than a doubling of U.S. population in 2000.42 (The “highest serious” projection was 1.2 billion, and actual growth since these projections were made has been between the middle and highest series). If the same rate of cropland loss were to continue, the United States would lose approximately 106 million acres of its remaining 377 million acres of cropland, or nearly 30 percent. Cropland per capita, that is, the acreage of land to grow grains and other crops for each resident, would decline from 1.4 acres in 1997 to 0.47 acres in 2100, a 66 percent reduction. If this occurs, biotechnology will need to work miracles to raise yields per acre in order to maintain the sort of diet Americans have come to expect. These ominous, divergent trends — an increasing population and declining arable land, have actually led some scientists to think the unthinkable: that one day America may no longer be able to feed itself, let alone boast a food surplus for export to the world. In the 1990s, Cornell University agricultural and food scientists David and Marcia Pimentel and Mario Giampietro of the Istituto Nazionale della Nutrizione in Rome, Italy, argued that by approximately 2025, the United States would most likely cease to be a food exporter, and that food grown in this country would be needed for domestic consumption. These findings suggest that by 2050, the amount of arable land per capita may have dropped to the point that, “the diet of the average American will, of necessity, include more grains, legumes, tubers, fruits and vegetables, and significantly less animal products.”43 While this might, in fact, constitute a healthier diet both for terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems and for many calorically and cholesterol-challenged Americans, it would also represent a significant loss of dietary choice. As nations get wealthier, they tend to “move up the food chain” in the phrase of the Earth Policy Institute’s Lester Brown, that is they consume higher trophic level, more ecologically demanding and damaging meat and dairy products, but were these predictions to hold true, Americans, for better or worse, would be moving in the opposite direction. From 2005 to 2006, the U.S. per capita ecological deficit widened from 10.9 to 11.3 acres, continuing the long-term trend depicted in Figure 11. Assuming the Census Bureau’s official population projections for 2050 actually do happen, the U.S. population would be 43 percent larger than at present. Even if there were no further increase in the U.S. per capita EF, which is, as can be seen from the 45-year trend in Figure 11, a rather generous assumption, a 43 percent increase in the U.S. population would correspond to a further 43 percent reduction in biocapacity per capita, even without the types of continuing land and resource degradation just discussed above for cropland. The 2006 U.S. biocapacity was 10.9 global acres (ga) per capita. By 2050, if current U.S. demographic trends and projections hold, this will have been reduced to 6.2 ga per capita. If the per capita American EF of consumption were to remain at the 2006 value of 22.3 ga, the ecological deficit in 2050 would increase to 16.1 ga per capita. In essence, if we American “Bigfeet” do not opt for a different demographic path than the one we are treading now, Ecological Footprint analysis indicates unequivocally that we will continue plodding ever deeper into the forbidden zone of Ecological Overshoot, trampling our prospects for a sustainable future. Incidentally, we would also be trampling the survival prospects for many hundreds of endangered species with which we share our country. These birds, mammals, fish, amphibians, reptiles, butterflies, mussels, and other taxa are menaced with extinction by our aggressive exploitation of nearly every ecological niche, nook, and cranny. In nature, no organism in overshoot remains there for long. Sooner or later, ecosystem and/or population collapse ensues. Are we humans, because of our unique scientific acumen, immune from the laws of nature that dictate the implacable terms of existence to all other species on the planet? Our political, economic, and cultural elites seem to think so, and en masse, we certainly act so. Yet ironically, many scientists themselves believe otherwise: that all-too-human hubris, unless checked by collective wisdom and self-restraint, will prove to be our undoing, and that **civilization as we know it may unravel**.44

### 1NC — Morality Advantage Supplement

#### Mobility rights are anthropocentric — they make it impossible to limit human consumption.

Cafaro and Staples 9 — Philip Cafaro, Senior Researcher at The Overpopulation Project, Professor of Philosophy at Colorado State, former president of the International Society for Environmental Ethics, and Winthrop Staples, MA from Colorado State, 2009 (“The Environmental Argument for Reducing Immigration into the United States,” Environmental Ethics, Vol. 31, March)

Perhaps the most important objections raised against restrictive immigration policies are that they are unjust, because they are unfair to potential immigrants.One concise way of stating this point is to say that would-be immigrants have a right to live and work in the United States. While some immigrants’ rights proponents argue for abolishing national borders altogether, most assert a general human right to freely move and settle without regard to national borders, subject to reasonable state restrictions to keep out criminals and prevent gross harms to receiving societies. Clearly this right does not exist in American law. The Constitution names no right to immigrate, and the Supreme Court has consistently upheld the federal government’s right to regulate immigration into the country. Neither does such a right exist in international law. The UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights does not assert a general human right to immigrate into the country of one’s choice; nor do other major framework international rights treaties.22 Proponents, then, claim first the existence of a moral right to immigrate freely across borders, and second that national laws should be amended accordingly. What arguments do they provide for creating this new and important legal right? Chandran Kukathas gives the following “liberal egalitarian” argument for open borders. From a proper universalistic moral point of view, he maintains, citizens of rich countries have no special claims to the resources and opportunities into which they have been born. “Egalitarianism demands that the earth’s resources be distributed as equally as possible,” he writes, “and one particularly effective mechanism for facilitating this is freedom of movement.” Egalitarians want to equalize not just resources, but opportunities. Allowing people to migrate from poor, overcrowded countries with high unemployment and little chance for economic advancement to wealthier, less crowded countries equalizes opportunities. “Our starting point,” Kukathas suggests, “should be a recognition of our common humanity and the idea that both the resources of the earth and the cooperation of our fellows are things to which no one has any privileged entitlement.” For these reasons, “the movement of peoples should be free.”23 This is a powerful argument, since it rests on egalitarian values that many people share. It also relies on the common thought: “What right do I have to ‘shut the door’ on people who are just as good as I am and who, through no fault of their own, have been born into less happy circumstances?” Kukathas’ argument may speak particularly strongly to people who feel some sympathy with egalitarianism, but not enough to do anything about it personally, for it says to wealthy Americans, “You don’t have to give up anything yourself to help poor people overseas live better lives. You can fulfill any moral obligations you may have toward them by allowing them to come here and cut your grass, cook your food and diaper your children.” Nevertheless, despite these strengths, there are good reasons to reject the liberal egalitarian argument for open borders. Any rights claim must be tested against its effects on all interested parties—not just the parties pressing the claim. Even widely accepted, fundamental human rights must be balanced against other rights and other important interests. As we have seen, current high levels of immigration into the United States are leading to a larger population, which makes it much harder to share the landscape generously with nonhuman beings. Allowing a general right to immigrate into the U.S. would greatly accelerate this process. With “open borders,” the interests of nonhuman nature would be sacrificed completely to the interests of people. The economic interests of would-be immigrants would trump the very existence of many nonhuman organisms, endangered species, and wild places in the United States. Kukathas (and most immigrants’ rights advocates) can accept this trade-off. As the previous quotes illustrate, Kukathas sees nature essentially as “the Earth’s resources”; the only question to ask about them is how people may divide them up fairly and efficiently. In seeking to make sense of Australian environmentalists’ arguments for limiting immigration, he reduces these to worries that “parks and sewerage services” will be “degraded”—a revealingly soulless locution.24 But those of us who reject this anthropocentric perspective must consider the interests of the nonhuman beings that would be displaced by an ever increasing human presence. We ourselves believe that the human appropriation of natural landscapes has progressed so far in America, that any further appropriation is unjust. Some readers might not be willing to go that far (although if that is the case, we wonder what you are waiting for). But it is important to realize that accepting a general right to immigrate leaves no room to take nature’s interests seriously, in the U.S. or elsewhere, since it ensures that the human appropriation of nature will continue to increase. For this reason alone, it must be rejected by anyone committed to generous sustainability.(18-19)

#### Reject social justice liberalism. Its knowledge claims create a slippery slope to an ecological crisis.

Bowers 8 — C. A. Bowers , Professor of Environmental Studies at Oregon, 2008 (“Transitions: Educational Reforms that Promote Ecological Intelligence or the Assumptions Underlying Modernity?,” University of Oregon Press, Available Online at https://scholarsbank.uoregon.edu/xmlui/handle/1794/8618, Accessed 08-09-2018)

Yet there continue to be differences between how liberals understand the nature of progress. A useful way of identifying these differences is to identify liberals working to alleviate poverty and various forms of exploitation as social justice liberals. Liberals who use critical inquiry to develop new technologies and to exploit new markets should be labeled as market liberals. The former were and continue to be critical of the exploitive nature of the free enterprise system, while the latter were and still are willing to let the “invisible hand” supposedly operating in the free market system distribute the benefits to the deserving—which usually means those who are already privileged. Given these differences, and they are hugely important, the two groups of liberals nevertheless share a common set of silences and prejudices. Already mentioned is their shared prejudice of the knowledge systems of other cultures—particularly indigenous cultures. They also shareavery narrow and thu sbasic misunderstanding of the nature and importance of cultural traditions. In effect, they both fail to recognize the misconceptions of the Enlightenment thinkers whoonly identified oppressive traditions, and did not understand the intergenerational knowledge and skills that enabled communities to be more self-sufficient and to have complex symbolic lives. And both social justice and market liberals fail to understand that language is not simply a conduit in a sender/receiver process of communication, but instead is metaphorically layered in ways that reproduce past misconceptionsin today’s taken-for-granted patterns of thinking. This latter oversight accounts for howboth social justiceand marketliberals are continually embracing whatever is represented as a progressive step forward—and not asking about which traditionsare vital to the well-being of community andto a sustainable futureare being lost. There are many unrecognized assumptions that are shared by students on university campuses who identify themselves as conservatives and the professors whom they regard as subverting the American way of life. Again, the failure to recognize the shared assumptions and silences can, in part, be traced to the failure of universities to engage students in a discussion of the writings of the early political theorists whose influence continues to today. The misunderstandings resulting from this lack of historical knowledge are particularly evident when the beliefs and values of the self-identified conservative students are compared with the market liberal agenda promoted by the CATO and American Enterprise Institutes. Indeed, they turn out to be nearly identical—though some of these students balk at the idea of open debate as advocated by the American Enterprise Institute. As most university faculty embrace social justice liberalism they see no reason to introduce students to the thinking of philosophical conservatives or to the ideas of classical liberal thinkers. And the few social justice faculty who are introducing their students to the writings of environmental writers such as Rachel Carson, Aldo Leopold, Wendell Berry, and Vandana Shiva fail to clarify for students that these are essentially conservative environmental thinkers. By not engaging students in discussions of the different forms of conservatism, including the faux conservatism of President George W. Bush and his religious, corporate, and military base of support, students are more likely to accept without question Lakoff’s designation of environmentalists as liberal progressive activists. And they will continue to perpetuate the silences and prejudices that have been an aspect of liberal thinking since the time of the Enlightenment—which will keep them from recognizing that revitalizing the diversity of the world’s cultural commons will be a necessary part of achieving a sustainable future. The reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Control, which reflect the consensus thinking of 600 scientists from more than 100 countries on the nature and causes of global warming, brings into focus another aspect of the slippery slope thatboth the market and social justice liberals are greasing. As the melting of the permafrost in the northern latitudes release the vast quantity of methane gas that is an even greater contributor to global warming than carbon dioxide, as the glaciers that are the source of fresh water for hundreds of millions of people disappear, as the temperature of the world’s oceans rise and as the oceans absorb more CO2 that contribute to their increased acidity, as droughts and changes in weather patterns forces the migration of plants, animals, and people, and as more of the world’s major fisheries near collapse, the convergence of the slippery slope leading to environmental catastrophe with the slippery slope leading to a fascist form of government become a more likely possibility. What is not usually recognized is that the emergence of fascism between the two world wars resulted when democratic institutions became so weakened that they were no longer able to address the sources of economic and social unrest. People have demonstrated time and again that they prefer order over chaos, and they have often embraced the strong political leader who, as the supreme “decider”, does away with the seemingly endless debates which are at the center of the democratic process. The convergence of economic unrest resulting from the globalization of the market liberal agenda with the deepening ecological crises could easily lead to a repeat of this earlier history. Both market and social justice liberals carry forward the silences and prejudices that have been part of the legacy of Enlightenment thinkers**—**indeed some of these silences and prejudices can be traced back to the thinking of Plato who invented the idea of pure thinking that supposedly is free the of cultural influences carried forward through narratives. These include the intergenerational knowledge, skills, and activities that enable members of communities to live more self-sufficient and thus less money and consumer dependent lives.Working to conserve the diversity of the world’s languages and thus the diversity of knowledge of local ecosystems is yet another critical area of concern that is not being given adequate attention by social justice liberals who, unlike Krugman,refuse to consider anything that is associated with the word conservatism—partlybecause they lack knowledge of the many forms of conserving that are an inescapable part of daily life-- andpartlybecause the word conservatism is now associated with authoritarian politics and the pursuit of economic self-interest. There are many other analogs than those associated with the ideas and policies of market liberals that need to be considered in determining the different meanings of the word “conservatism”. Briefly, learning to think and communicate in the language of one’s cultural groups conserves its many taken-for-granted patterns of thinking and values. Our DNA is also a powerful conserving force that influences the most fundamental aspects of our biology. The taken-for-granted nature of most of our cultural knowledge and values is also an inescapable aspect of what can be referred to as embodied conservatism. And then there is temperamental conservatism which is expressed in a preference for certain foods, wearing certain clothes, having certain friends, and so forth. These different expressions of conservatism are largely part of our embodied experiences, and are different in fundamental ways from conservative ideas of how societies should be organized and governed.In order to conserve the gains in social justice and civil liberties it is important to keep in mind that not all of conservative ideas, such as those advocating the right of states to enforce racist policies, the cultural tradition of child brides, honor killings, and poll taxes, should be carried forward. On the other hand, the current practice of using the word to stigmatize individuals and groups who are more aware of the traditions that are the basis of their mutually supportive and intergenerationally connected communities should not be continued. In order to make more informed judgments of about the different expressions of conservatism—judgments about what should be supported and what should be resisted—we need to expand our political vocabulary. In addition to rectifying our use of political terminology so that labels accurately reflect the beliefs and practices of different groups, we need to follow the practice of different religious groups who use adjectives that identify the religious group’s specific orientation or the tradition it is part of. Examples include the distinction between Orthodox and Reform Judaism, Greek Orthodox Christians and Evangelical Christians, moderate and fundamentalists Muslims, and so forth. The adjectives are not always as accurate as we would like, but they avoid the problem of including a wide range of interpretations and agendas under a single rubric. The distinction between market and social justice liberals is an example that has been introduced here. Other examples might include environmental conservatives and indigenous conservatives. The problem of relying upon a single rubric can be seen in Thomas Frank’s reference to the Christians in Kansas who support President George W. Bush’s efforts to dismantle the separation of powers and the Constitution as conservative. Referring to them as members of the religious right would have brought into focus their political agenda, which included abolishing abortion, gays, separation of church and state, and equal opportunities for women and other previously marginalized groups. Journalists and media pundits need to use the label of extremists if it accurately represents the political agenda of certain individuals and groups. For example, Vice-President Richard Cheney and David Addington need to be identified as extremists. And there is a need to use the label of fascist when it accurately fits the ideas and political agenda of an individual or group. It is important to note that few graduates of our universities possess a knowledge of the core ideas and practices shared by different fascist regimes, and thus are unable to recognize political trends that are moving the society in that direction. Most of all, we need to avoid the intellectual laziness that characterizes so much of our formulaic use of conservative and liberal. There is an urgent need for the more reflective people to criticize our universities for their failure to educate students about the history of ideas we now refer to as ideologies—including the need for them to understand which ideologiesare contributing to overshooting the sustaining capacity of the Earth’s natural systems. If we can’t get this figured out we will continue to be caught in the double bind of promoting the globalization of the consumer dependent lifestyle while at the same time searching for the technologies that will slow the rate of global warming partly being caused by consumerism. And our difficulties will be further exacerbated if the current misuse of our most prominent political language continues to marginalize the awareness thatin this era of political uncertainties and deepening ecological crises we need a political discourse that addresses what needs to be conserved. Pg. 87-89

### Extend: “Population Key to Environment”

#### Population growth exacerbates every major environmental issue.

Cafaro and Staples 9 — Philip Cafaro, Senior Researcher at The Overpopulation Project, Professor of Philosophy at Colorado State, former president of the International Society for Environmental Ethics, and Winthrop Staples, MA from Colorado State, 2009 (“The Environmental Argument for Reducing Immigration into the United States,” Environmental Ethics, Vol. 31, March)

What of premise (2) that population growth contributes significantly to a host of environmental problems within our borders? Here, unfortunately, we’re faced with an embarrassment of riches. From many potential examples, let us briefly discuss one: urban sprawl. In the past two decades, sprawl, defined as new development on the fringes of existing urban and suburban areas, has come to be recognized as an important environmental problem in the United States. Between 1982 and 2001, the United States converted 34 million acres of forest, cropland, and pasture to developed uses, an area the size of Illinois. The average annual rate of land conversion increased from 1.4 million acres to 2.2 million acres over this time, and continues on an upward trend.4 Sprawl is an environmental problem for lots of reasons, including increased energy consumption, water consumption, air pollution, and habitat loss for wildlife. Habitat loss is by far the number one cause of species endangerment in the United States5; unsurprisingly, some of the worst sprawl centers (such as southern Florida and the Los Angeles basin) also contain large numbers of endangered species. What causes sprawl? Transportation policies that favor building roads over mass transit appear to be important sprawl generators. So are zoning laws that encourage “leapfrog” developments far out into the country, and tax policies that allow builders to pass many of the costs of new development on to current taxpayers rather than new home buyers. Between 1970 and 1990, these and other factors caused Americans’ per capita land use in the hundred largest metropolitan areas to increase 22.6 percent. In these same areas during this same period, however, the amount of developed land increased 51.5 percent.6 What accounts for this discrepancy? The number one cause of sprawl by far is population growth. New houses, new shopping centers, and new roads are being built for new residents. As figures 2a and 2b illustrate, in recent decades, cities and states with the highest population growth rates have also shown the most sprawl. The most comprehensive study to date on the causes of sprawl in the United States analyzed several dozen possible factors. Grouping together all those factors which can increase per capita land use and comparing these with the single factor of more “capitas,” it found that in America between 1982 and 1997, fifty-two percent of sprawl was attributable to population increase, while forty-eight percent was attributable to misguided policies that increased land use per person.7 Some “smart growth” advocates resist the conclusion that population growth is an important sprawl factor, partly because they don’t want to obscure the need for good planning and land use policies. They point out that several metropolitan areas that lost population in recent decades exhibited significant sprawl, including St. Louis, Detroit, and Pittsburgh. Of America’s hundred largest metropolitan areas, eleven lost population between 1970 and 1990; yet, they sprawled an average of twenty-six percent (see figure 2a). This shows that poor land use planning and bad transportation, zoning and tax policies are indeed important in generating sprawl. On the other hand, cities with growing populations sprawled even more. Several states that managed to decrease their per capita land use during this period also sprawled, due to high rates of population growth. From 1982 to 1995, Nevada decreased its per capita land use twenty-six percent while sprawling thirty-seven percent, due to a whopping ninety percent population increase. Arizona decreased per capita land use thirteen percent while its population increased fifty-eight percent, generating forty percent sprawl.8 These examples show that population growth also causes sprawl. The bottom line is that if we want to stop sprawl, we must change the transportation, tax, zoning, and population policies that encourage it. We will not stop sprawl if we simply accept as inevitable that factor—population increase—which the best research shows accounts for over half of the problem. Nor will we solve our other major domestic environmental problems because premise two is true. (9-11)

#### Immigration is the *vital* internal link to combatting population growth.

Cafaro and Staples 9 — Philip Cafaro, Senior Researcher at The Overpopulation Project, Professor of Philosophy at Colorado State, former president of the International Society for Environmental Ethics, and Winthrop Staples, MA from Colorado State, 2009 (“The Environmental Argument for Reducing Immigration into the United States,” Environmental Ethics, Vol. 31, March)

The environmental argument for reducing immigration into the United States is relatively straightforward: (1) Immigration levels are at a historic high and immigration is now the main driver of U.S. population growth. (2) Population growth contributes significantly to a host of environmental problems within our borders. (3) A growing population increases America’s large environmental footprint beyond our borders and our disproportionate role in stressing global environmental systems. (4) To seriously address environmental problems at home and become good global environmental citizens, we must stop U.S. population growth. (5) We are morally obligated to address our environmental problems and become good global environmental citizens. (6) Therefore, we should limit immigration into the United States to the extent needed to stop U.S. population growth. This conclusion rests on a straightforward commitment to mainstream environmentalism, easily confirmed empirical premises, and logic. Nevertheless, it is not the consensus position among American environmentalists. Some environmentalists support continued high levels of immigration, while most are uncomfortable with the topic and avoid discussing it. So strong is this aversion that groups such as the Sierra Club, which during the 1970s prominently featured strong commitments to U.S. population stabilization, have dropped domestic population growth as an issue.1 Several years ago, the group Zero Population Growth went so far as to change its name to Population Connection (“PC” for short). In 2006, the United States passed the 300 million mark in population—that’s 95 million more people than were here for the first Earth Day in 1970—with little comment from environmentalists. In 2007, as Congress debated the first major overhaul of immigration policy in nearly twenty years, leaders from the principal environmental organizations remained silent about competing proposals that could have meant the difference between a U.S. population of 300 million, 600 million, or 1.2 billion people in 2100. Like immigration policy for the past fifty years, immigration policy for the next fifty looks likely to be set with no regard for its environmental consequences. We believe this situation is a bad thing. As committed environmentalists, we would like to see our government set immigration policy (and all government policy) within the context of a commitment to sustainability. We don’t believe that the goals we share with our fellow environmentalists and with a large majority of our fellow citizens—clean air and clean water; livable, uncrowded cities; sharing the land with the full complement of its native flora and fauna—are compatible with continued population growth. It is time to rein in this growth—or forthrightly renounce the hope of living sustainably here in the United States.(5-6)

#### Open borders causes exploitive behavior that weakens state safety nets and destroys the biosphere.

Daly 13 — Herman Daly, Professor at the University of Maryland School of Public Affairs, former senior economist in the environment department of the World Bank, cofounder of the journal Ecological Economics, 2013 (“Open Borders and the Tragedy of Open Access Commons,” CASSE: Center for the Advancement of the Steady State Economy, June 3rd, Available Online at <https://steadystate.org/open-borders-and-the-tragedy-of-open-access-commons/>, Accessed 08-08-2018)

 “Open borders” refers to a policy of unlimited or free immigration. I argue here that it is a bad policy. If you are poor and your country provides no social safety net, you move to one that does. If you are rich and your country makes you pay your taxes, you move (or at least move your money) to one that doesn’t. Thus safety nets, and public goods in general, disappear as they become both overloaded and underfunded. That is the “world without borders,” and without community. That is the tragedy of open access commons. Some will think that I am attacking a straw man, because, they will say, no sensible person really advocates open borders. They simply advocate, it will be said, “more generous levels of immigration, and a reasonable amnesty for existing illegal immigrants.” I agree that some form of strictly conditional amnesty is indeed necessary as the lesser evil, given the impasse created by past non-enforcement of our immigration laws. Deporting 12 million long-settled residents is too drastic and would create more injustices than it would rectify. But unless we enforce immigration laws in the future there will soon be need for another amnesty (the first, often forgotten, was in 1986), and then another — a de facto open-borders policy. Nevertheless, the policy of open borders should be fairly discussed, not only because some people explicitly advocate it, but also because many others implicitly accept it by virtue of their unwillingness to face the alternative. Immigration is a divisive issue. A good unifying point to begin a discussion is to recognize that every country in the world has a policy of limiting immigration. Emigration is often considered a human right, but immigration requires the permission of the receiving country. Some countries allow many legal immigrants. Others allow few. As the World Bank reported in its Global Bilateral Migration Database: The United States remains the most important migrant destination in the world, home to one fifth of the world’s migrants and the top destination for migrants from no less than sixty sending countries. Migration to Western Europe remains largely from elsewhere in Europe. There are also arguments about the emigration side of open borders — even if emigration is a human right, is it unconditional? Might “brain-drain” emigrants have some obligation to contribute something to the community that educated and invested in them, before they emigrate to greener pastures? Immigrants are people, and deserve to be well treated; immigration is a policy, and deserves reasoned discussion in the public interest. It seems that neither expectation is fulfilled, perhaps partly because the world has moved from largely empty to quite full in only one lifetime. What could work in the world of two billion people into which I was born, no longer works in today’s world of seven billion. In addition to people, the exploding populations of cars, buildings, livestock, ships, refrigerators, cell phones, and even corn stalks and soybean plants, contribute to a world full of “dissipative structures” that, like human bodies, require not only space but also a metabolic flow of natural resources beginning with depletion and ending with pollution. This growing entropic throughput already exceeds ecological capacities of regeneration and absorption, degrading the life-support capacity of the ecosphere.

### They Say: “Morality Outweighs”

#### Community concerns can justify restricting individual right to migration.

Cafaro and Staples 9 — Philip Cafaro, Senior Researcher at The Overpopulation Project, Professor of Philosophy at Colorado State, former president of the International Society for Environmental Ethics, and Winthrop Staples, MA from Colorado State, 2009 (“The Environmental Argument for Reducing Immigration into the United States,” Environmental Ethics, Vol. 31, March)

A general right to immigrate also would conflict with American citizens’ right to self-government. Immigration can change the character of a society, for better or worse; large-scale immigration can change a society quickly, radically and irrevocably. Since self-government is a fundamental and well-established human right, the citizens of particular nations arguably should retain (through their elected officials) significant control over immigration policies. As Michael Walzer puts it, in an influential discussion of immigration, “Admission and exclusion are at the core of communal independence. They suggest the deepest meaning of self-determination.Without them, there could not be communities of [a specific] character, historically stable, ongoing associations of men and women with some special commitment to one another and some special sense of their common life.”25 The citizens of a nation may work hard to create particular kinds of societies: societies which are sustainable, for example, or which limit inequalities of wealth, or which treat women and men as equals. They typically develop feelings of affiliation and social commitments that have great value in themselves and that enable communal projects which create further value. It seems wrong to suggest that these achievements, which may provide meaning, secure justice, and contribute substantially to people’s quality of life, must be compromised because people in other countries are having too many children, or have failed to create decent societies themselves. Such a situation does not call for the creation of a new right which undermines the self-government of others. Instead, it suggests that would-be immigrants need to take up responsibilities for self-government which they and their leaders have neglected in their own countries.2 (19-20)

### They Say: “Right to Migration Outweighs”

#### Environmental limits to the right to migrate demand no open borders.

Cafaro and Staples 9 — Philip Cafaro, Senior Researcher at The Overpopulation Project, Professor of Philosophy at Colorado State, former president of the International Society for Environmental Ethics, and Winthrop Staples, MA from Colorado State, 2009 (“The Environmental Argument for Reducing Immigration into the United States,” Environmental Ethics, Vol. 31, March)

Environmentalists also worry that increasing human numbers will rob future generations of their right to enjoy a healthy environment with its full complement of native species. As the authors watch increasing numbers of people displace wildlife along Colorado’s Front Range, we recall a rueful passage from Henry David Thoreau’s journal, as he reflected on his own Concord landscape: When I consider that the nobler animals have been exterminated here, I cannot but feel as if I lived in a tamed, and, as it were, emasculated country . . . I take infinite pains to know the phenomena of the spring, thinking that I have here the entire poem, and then, to my chagrin, I hear that it is but an imperfect copy that I possess and have read, that my ancestors have torn out many of the first leaves and grandest passages, and mutilated it in many places.27 We believe that like Thoreau, our descendants will “wish to know an entire heaven and an entire earth.” Since a growing population undermines the right of future Americans to enjoy a safe, clean environment and to know and explore wild nature, we must reject a general right to freely immigrate into the United States. For American environmentalists the interests of nonhuman nature, the right and responsibility of self-government, and our concern for future generations, all come together in our efforts to create a sustainable society. Because we take this responsibility seriously and because it cannot be achieved without stopping America’s population growth, we must reject a general right to immigrate into the United States. Please note that this discussion does not deny the importance of human rights. It presupposes them. Rights allow us to protect important human interests and create egalitarian societies which maximize opportunities for people to flourish. We believe rights are justified ultimately because they contribute to such human flourishing. But when rights are pressed so far as to undermine human or nonhuman flourishing, they should be rejected.28 (20-1)

### They Say: “Immigration Prevents Fiscal Crisis”

#### This is a ponzi scheme, not rational economics.

Anton 18 — Michael Anton, lecturer and research fellow at Hillsdale College, former national security official in the Trump Administration, 2018 (“Why do we need more people in this country, anyway?,” Washington Post, June 21st, Available Online at <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/why-do-we-need-more-people-in-this-country-anyway/2018/06/21/4ee8b620-7565-11e8-9780-b1dd6a09b549_story.html?utm_term=.74ebf5d9f4bd>, Accessed 08-09-2018)

Another argument for more people is to point to falling birthrates among the native-born. In fact, the United States remains near the top of birthrates in the developed world. Regardless, consider that immigration not only lowers wages but also raises housing prices by increasing demand and stresses public schools by adding non-English-speaking students. And as such factors worsen, research suggests that people are putting off marriage - which reduces birthrates. Related is the claim that more people are necessary to solve our looming entitlement crisis. This quickly falls apart once you think it through. In 1967, future Nobel laureate Paul Samuelson favorably compared Social Security to a Ponzi scheme, arguing that it will be sustainable because younger people will always outnumber retirees. But does anyone really believe that the United States - or any country - is capable of sustaining population growth without end? Somehow, the United States needs to find a way to meet its fiscal commitments without stuffing the land beyond the bursting point.

#### Fixation on growth is immoral — must consider environment first.

Cafaro and Staples 9 — Philip Cafaro, Senior Researcher at The Overpopulation Project, Professor of Philosophy at Colorado State, former president of the International Society for Environmental Ethics, and Winthrop Staples, MA from Colorado State, 2009 (“The Environmental Argument for Reducing Immigration into the United States,” Environmental Ethics, Vol. 31, March)

On the other hand, focusing on whether mass immigration is “good for the economy” ignores the fact that any immigration policy creates economic winners and losers. According to Harvard economist George Borjas, “Immigration induces a substantial redistribution of wealth, away from workers who compete with immigrants and toward employers and other users of immigrant services.”37 It does so because compared to other industrialized nations, the U.S. imports a much higher percentage of less-educated, lower-skilled workers; Borjas notes that “between 1980 and 1995, immigration increased the number of high school dropouts by 21 percent and the number of high school graduates by only 4 percent.” During this same period, the wage disparity between these two groups increased 11 percent, with perhaps half of that disparity a result of mass immigration.38 Borjas calculates that between 1980 and 2000, immigration reduced the average annual earnings of high school dropouts by 7.4 percent, or $1,800 on an average salary of $25,000.39 For these workers, who could least afford it, real wages actually declined during this period. While the economic effects of immigration are complex and the details are open to debate, it appears that over the past few decades high immigration levels have contributed to increased economic growth, lower wages for the poorest Americans, and an increase in economic inequality in the United States. Continued high levels of immigration will likely further these trends. Far from strengthening the case for continued mass immigration, these effects provide three additional reasons to oppose it. First, an immigration policy which benefits rich citizens (who hire immigrants) at the expense of poor citizens (who compete with them) seems prima facie unjust.40 If Americans want to help poor foreigners, we should not do so on the backs of our own poor citizens. (Liberal proponents of mass immigration are as loath to accept its effects on workers’ wages as they are to accept its demographic and environmental effects. But this is willed ignorance. After all, trade groups representing landscapers and restaurant owners lobby for increased immigration precisely because it allows their members to hire workers for less money.) Second, accepting greater economic inequality in exchange for greater overall wealth seems a foolish trade-off for Americans today. We are already wealthy enough to provide for our real needs and reasonable desires. Further wealth when combined with greater inequality is a recipe for frustration, envy, and social tension. Third, mass immigration’s contribution to economic growth, far from being a net good, gives environmentalists their most important reason to oppose it. Human economic activity is the primary driver of ecological degradation. Future generations are going to have to reject the paradigm of an ever-growing economy and instead develop a sustainable economy which respects ecological limits.41 The sooner we get cracking on this, the better. Here in the United States, economic and demographic “growthism” are intimately intertwined—yet another reason why American environmentalists cannot ignore domestic population issues. (28-9)

### They Say: “Legal Immigration Not Key”

#### Legal immigration is the primary driver of population growth, not “illegal” immigration.

Hurlbert 1 — Stuart H. Hurlbert, Professor of Biology and Director of the Center for Inland Waters at San Diego State University, 2001 (“Wall Street Journal Needs to Open Its Eyes, Not Border,” San Diego State University News Center, July 4th, Available Online at <http://www.sci.sdsu.edu/salton/OpenBorderBartleyWSJ.html>, Accessed, 08-09-2018)

Mr. Bartley's paean to high immigration rates and open borders reflects considerable misunderstanding of the big picture. I comment on only two of its many blindspots: the environment and the "unstoppability" of immigration. Rapid population growth is the major cause of accelerating environmental degradation in the U.S. This population growth is now driven primarily by legal immigration. Illegal immigration is a significant but secondary driver. And, in distant third place, are births to U.S. citizens, or rather the difference between births and deaths among citizens. Our population growth rate is now higher than that of any other industrialized nation. Combined with our high per capita rates of resource consumption and waste generation, this rate of population growth occasions great environmental damage. Some of it is irreversible, and all of it is our legacy to our children and grandchildren. Thus it is accurate to say that immigration is the greatest controllable cause of environmental degradation in the U.S. The environment, of course, has never been a matter of prime concern to the Wall Street Journal, so to see it neglected or 'externalized' from an analysis once again is no surprise.

### They Say: “US Population Declining Now”

#### Doesn’t justify open borders

Cassidy 18 — John Cassidy, political and economics columnist at The New Yorker, 2018 (“Why the United States Needs More Immigrants,” The New Yorker, June 22nd, Available Online at <https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/why-the-united-states-needs-more-immigrants>, Accessed 08-09-2018)

This shortage of young people is far from just an American phenomenon. (In many European countries, the age-dependency ratio is rising even faster.) This doesn’t justify a policy of open borders. But it does mean that the United States needs a President who is willing to face the real challenges facing the country, and recognize the benefits of large-scale immigration.

### They Say: “Immigration Inevitable”

#### Immigration not inevitable — selective enforcement drives it now.

Hurlbert 1 — Stuart H. Hurlbert, Professor of Biology and Director of the Center for Inland Waters at San Diego State University, 2001 (“Wall Street Journal Needs to Open Its Eyes, Not Border,” San Diego State University News Center, July 4th, Available Online at <http://www.sci.sdsu.edu/salton/OpenBorderBartleyWSJ.html>, Accessed, 08-09-2018)

It is equally misguided for Mr. Bartley to state that "There is no realistic way to stop the resulting flow of people [across our borders] -- certainly no way that would be acceptable to the American conscience." The great majority of Americans want a reduction in legal immigration and a halt to illegal immigration -- and know full well that there are perfectly "acceptable" means to achieve both objectives. What we do not find "acceptable" is the kowtowing of Congress and the Executive Branch to the powerful special interests fighting for cheap labor and cheap causes. With respect to legal immigration all that is needed is legislation to reduce levels to what they were say, in the 1950s and 1960s. Why would most Americans not find this "acceptable?" With respect to illegal immigration, this is high only because for decades we have offered many rewards and essentially no penalties to those who attempt it. Those who hire illegal aliens likewise are usually given a free pass. To solve this problem, little more is required than to enforce laws already on the books -- laws clearly "acceptable" to the American people. Recent testimony by Mr. Roy Beck before the House Judiciary Committee has thoroughly documented the failure of The Executive Branch to enforce U.S. immigration laws or to assist communities heavily impacted by illegal immigrants. This dereliction of duty has risen to a level that a growing portion of the U.S. population views as treasonous. Mr. Beck offers a number of constructive suggestions that could bring about rapid reversal of this dangerous state of affairs.

### They Say: “Population Arguments Are Racist”

#### Coping with population growth requires pragmatism — environmental harms hurt the least well off most.

Cafaro and Staples 9 — Philip Cafaro, Senior Researcher at The Overpopulation Project, Professor of Philosophy at Colorado State, former president of the International Society for Environmental Ethics, and Winthrop Staples, MA from Colorado State, 2009 (“The Environmental Argument for Reducing Immigration into the United States,” Environmental Ethics, Vol. 31, March)

But why should this population growth matter? Because, finally, some environmentalists argue that immigration just moves people around, so it is (or may be) environmentally neutral. As one reader of an earlier version of this paper commented, “Efforts to reduce overpopulation in New York or the United States do not help alleviate overpopulation worldwide, because people who aren’t let in have to go someplace else.” Added another reader, “Ecological damage may be worse if people remain in their home countries rather than immigrating to the U.S. Immigration restrictions seem to privilege the USA’s wild places over other, perhaps more biodiverse, places around the world.” Although one of us has spent time overseas working to protect endangered species, we plead guilty to a special concern for America’s wildlife and wildlands. But we don’t apologize for it. Environmentalism necessarily involves love, connection and efforts to protect particular places. Environmental philosophers should think long and hard before advocating anything that weakens this “local focus,” because a passionate connection to places that are “near and dear” to us is how environmentalism works, in Boston or Beijing. Thinking locally doesn’t involve believing American (or Chinese) landscapes are more valuable than others. It involves acting as if they are the most important landscapes in the world and using our most accessible political levers to protect them. Although questions about the justice of moral particularism are vexed, we believe that a large degree of “environmental particularism” is justified, on both ethical and pragmatic grounds. However, cosmopolitan ethical universalists who reject our parochialism should still support our proposal to reduce immigration into the United States, since doing so would also benefit the rest of the world. They should do so because moving people to America, far from being environmentally neutral, increases overall global resource consumption and pollution. This increase in consumption in turn threatens to weaken the already stressed global ecosystem services that we all depend upon—with the world’s poorest people facing the greatest danger from possible ecological failures. Consider a table comparing the average U.S. “ecological footprint” with averages from our ten largest immigration “source” countries. On average, immigrating from nine of these ten countries greatly increases an individual’s ecological footprint—and the ecological footprints of his or her descendants—by 100 percent to 1,000 percent or more. In the case of Mexico, which accounts for nearly a third of all immigration into America, immigration increases individuals’ consumption and pollution approximately 350 percent.34 There probably are cases where immigrants consume more but do less ecological damage than they would have had they remained in their countries of origin (slash-and-burn agriculturalists inhabiting biologically rich forests?), but clearly these are the exceptions. More Americans is bad news for America’s native flora and fauna. But given global warming, it is also bad news for poor people living in the Sahel or in the Bhramaputra Delta. (25-6)

#### Here’s a defense of our population impact from an external organization that’s not critiqued by their evidence. It proves sustainability claims *aren’t inherently tied to violent nativism* or *excusing US consumption*.

Assadourian 17 — Erik Assadourian, Senior Fellow at the Worldwatch Institute and a sustainability researcher who is primarily focused on rooting out the plague of consumerism and overconsumption; The Worldwatch Institute is a globally focused environmental research organization that was was named as one of the top ten sustainable development research organizations by Globescan Survey of Sustainability Experts, 2017 (“Why We Must Talk About Population,” Millennium Alliance for Humanity and the Biosphere, October 10th, Available Online at https://mahb.stanford.edu/blog/must-talk-about-population/)

As for immigrants—sure it probably wasn’t the best idea for Professor Phil Cafaro to go on Tucker Carlson’s show to support anti-immigrant sentiments, but Cafaro’s point is valid, even if uncomfortable and confusing for progressives. Until America has a one-planet footprint, all new immigrants are going to increase global impacts because they’ll consume more in the US than in their home countries. (This even suggests all adoption ideally should be domestic, which opens a-whole-nother can of worms!)

That’s not to say we should ban immigration or foreign adoption, but it means we should have a clear plan around immigration (along with one on reducing American consumption) and we should offset immigration by reductions in births of Americans (easier done if we have a population goal in mind for the United States). This offset is essentially what’s happening in European countries that have smaller than replacement rate birthrates—but the problem there is that this cultivates anti-immigrant sentiments as white European populations darken. With America at least, we have always been an immigrant nation so theoretically we could adapt, though obviously the current administration and its supporters are fomenting the same fears and biases that Americans have shown since its early days, as waves of immigrants from Ireland, Southern Europe, China, and Mexico started arriving.

Setting Goals

Is it so scary or morally fraught to start advocating for a smaller global population—or at the very least start talking openly about population challenges? Is it impossible to imagine nurturing a one-child family size norm in the US and Europe (where each child’s impact is many times greater than a child’s in a developing country)? One is good. Two is enough. Three is too many.

As Roberts notes, momentum is already bringing us toward smaller family sizes—but that same momentum is also bringing us toward higher consumption rates. Some smart social marketing and celebrity modeling could bring us toward reductions in population (as well as consumption) quicker. Breaking the myth that sole children are spoiled and lonely—as Bill McKibben did in his great book Maybe One—would be a good place to start. As would showing the economic and environmental benefits of having one child. And so would making it cool to have one child. Perhaps that’s the marketing slogan we use: “It’s Hip to Have One.”

And let developing countries shape their own population targets so as to avoid the obvious criticisms of imperialism (maybe it’s even time for a Framework Convention on Population Growth to go along with the Framework Convention on Climate Change—so all countries can feel ownership in this effort). But clearly, population stabilization is as important in developing countries—not because of the immediate effects on human impact (I), but because as Earth systems finally break down after the decades of abuse we’ve delivered, people are going to retreat from their flooding towns, their drought stricken lands, their war-torn regions, and they’re going to have to go somewhere. And then the right-wing extremists will say “we told you so,” waving their copies of Camp of Saints in their hands as they do, and be perfectly poised to take over more government institutions—and that may be the population crisis’ scariest outcome of all.

#### Preserving sustainability is a moral obligation — aff ethics are anthropocentric.

Cafaro and Staples 9 — Philip Cafaro, Senior Researcher at The Overpopulation Project, Professor of Philosophy at Colorado State, former president of the International Society for Environmental Ethics, and Winthrop Staples, MA from Colorado State, 2009 (“The Environmental Argument for Reducing Immigration into the United States,” Environmental Ethics, Vol. 31, March)

That we are good environmentalists is captured by premise (5) that we are morally obligated to address our environmental problems and become good global environmental citizens. We will not argue for this premise here, or provide a detailed statement of what it amounts to in practice. Environmentalism means many things to many people. Still, there are two general goals to which most environmentalists subscribe: (1) creating societies that leave sufficient natural resources for future human generations to live good lives; and (2) sharing the landscape generously with nonhuman beings. Let’s call this “generous sustainability,” to differentiate it from more selfish, narrow, economically-defined conceptions of sustainability. We believe a moral commitment to “generous sustainability” captures the core of environmentalism. Such a commitment is explicitly endorsed by all the main environmental philosophies espoused today, including Rolston and Callicott’s intrinsic value theory, Norton’s enlightened anthropocentrism, Naess’ deep ecology, Warren and Plumwood’s ecofeminism, and Cafaro and Sandler’s environmental virtue ethics. We therefore take it as true, for the purpose of our argument. (15-16)

### They Say: “Technology Solves”

#### Technology changes too uncertain — we can’t risk it.

Cafaro and Staples 9 — Philip Cafaro, Senior Researcher at The Overpopulation Project, Professor of Philosophy at Colorado State, former president of the International Society for Environmental Ethics, and Winthrop Staples, MA from Colorado State, 2009 (“The Environmental Argument for Reducing Immigration into the United States,” Environmental Ethics, Vol. 31, March)

Clearly premises two and three are true: U.S. population growth contributes seriously to both domestic and global environmental problems. Can we go further and state, with premise (4) that in order to seriously address environmental problems at home and become good global environmental citizens, we must stop U.S. population growth? Yes, we can. It is of course possible to spin out scenarios in which America’s population doubles, triples, or quadruples, and yet we still manage, through miracles of technological creativity or ethical self-sacrifice, to become ecologically sustainable. But these fantasies are implausible, and therefore morally suspect as a basis for action (or inaction). Given the difficulties of getting 300 million Americans to curb their consumption, there is no reason to think we will be able to achieve sustainability with two, three, or four times as many Americans.14 Consider global warming again. Most readers will be familiar with a version of Pacala and Socolow’s “wedge diagram” below, a heuristic designed to help us think about the steps needed to address global warming. Each “wedge” in the “stabilization triangles” (fig. 3a and fig. 3b) above represent a technological change or (much less frequently) a decrease in consumption which, if fully implemented, would keep one billion metric tons of carbon from being pumped into the air fifty years from now. The authors reckon eight such wedges must be implemented—not to reduce atmospheric CO2; not to stabilize CO2 levels—but simply to keep atmospheric carbon from pushing past potentially catastrophic levels during this period.15 Following on this work, scientists with the Natural Resources Defense Council produced a similar analysis for potential U.S. climate action. Since U.S. emissions are almost twenty-five percent of global emissions, a “U.S. wedge” can be defined as an emission reduction of a quarter billion metric tons of carbon fifty years from now. Assuming we do our part, they also believe eight U.S. wedges are needed to avert a possible climate catastrophe.16 Potential wedges include: • Passenger vehicle efficiency, 1.1 Wedges (0.27 billion ton reduction): Increase the average fuel economy of vehicles to fifty-four miles per gallon, compared with twenty-four miles per gallon under business as usual. • Renewable energy, 1.6 Wedges (0.39 billion ton reduction): Increase renewable energy (e.g., wind and biomass) to thirty percent of total electricity generation by 2050, compared with less than five percent under business as usual. This much electricity could be supplied by 250,000 2-MW-turbines, spread over 20 million acres of land. • Carbon capture and storage, 1.3 Wedges (0.32 billion ton reduction): Unproven, yet-to-be-developed technology is applied to state-of-the-art coal-fired power plants generating 160 GW of electricity. Additional CO2 captured from natural gas production facilities, large industrial sources, and ethanol plants. We can probably agree that convincing Americans to implement such sweeping, expensive changes will be difficult. Some of these wedges might not pan out technically; most of them have their own environmental costs. Remember: we need eight wedges to do our part. Now compare these figures with two U.S. population wedges that we’ve calculated, one positive and one negative. First the positive wedge: • Population increase slowed, 1.2 Wedges (0.31 billion ton reduction): Immigration is halted, resulting in 57.3 million less U.S. citizens fifty years from now. According to the U.S. Department of Energy, in 2005 Americans averaged 5.4 metric tons of carbon generated per capita. That means that each 46.2 million people added to the U.S. population adds one more wedge of a quarter billion tons of carbon into the atmosphere. Immigration is set to add 57.3 million more people to the U.S. population in the next fifty years; preventing that population increase would provide over one full U.S. wedge. Remember, though, that immigration can go up as well as down. So here is a second, de-stabilization wedge: • Population increase accelerated, 1.4 wedges (0.34 billion tons): Immigration is increased from 1.5 million to 2.25 million per year, resulting in 63.2 million more U.S. citizens fifty years from now. If the 2007 Bush/Kennedy immigration “reform” bill had passed Congress, immigration might have increased from 1.5 to 2.25 million annually.17 By our calculations, it would have increased America’s population by 63.2 million more people over the next fifty years—pumping another 0.34 billion tons more carbon into the air annually. Adding that many more people would equal almost one and a half U.S. wedges18 Such considerations suggest that while we cannot prove that premise (4) is true, it is highly probable: we must stop U.S. population growth in order to meet our environmental responsibilities. If we are good environmentalists, that should be enough. (12-15)

### They Say: “US Not Key”

#### Population is not exclusively an international issue: environmentalism is the buildup of local efforts.

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Another argument made by many American environmentalists is that overpopulation is important, but that it is a global, not national issue that can only be solved through international action. The world’s population increased by seventy-six million people in 2006 and ninety-five percent of that increase occurred in the developing world. Rather than cutting immigration to keep our own population from growing, they argue, we should fund family planning overseas. We should provide more foreign aid, and redirect trade and other government policies to help the poor, so fewer of them will feel compelled to leave their countries in order to live decent lives. If we do these things, we will act humanely and help both poor people and the environment. Before analyzing this argument, we should pause for a moment to appreciate its oddity. No one argues that “deforestation is a global problem; therefore, we shouldn’t worry about deforestation in our own country, or on the local landscape.” Or “species loss is a global problem, therefore we should fund species protection efforts elsewhere, to the exclusion of efforts where we live.” Those who care about deforestation or species extinction often work especially hard to prevent them in the places they know best, and are applauded for doing so. Besides, “global” efforts to halt deforestation and species loss are largely a summing up of local and national efforts focused on particular forests and species. This is how environmentalism works, when it works. Advocates for an exclusively global approach to overpopulation owe us explanations for why this one issue should play out differently and how it could play out differently, while still leading to environmentally acceptable results. But no such arguments are forthcoming, and none seem remotely plausible. Comforting as it is, the “globalist” argument fails, partly because it mischaracterizes overpopulation, which in fact can occur at various scales. It makes sense to say that “the world is overpopulated; we do not know whether essential global ecosystem services can be sustained at these numbers over the long haul.” But it also makes sense to say that “Tokyo is overpopulated; its sidewalks, streets, and trains are so crowded that there is no room to move.” Or “Nigeria is overpopulated; its population is so large and is growing so fast that it has trouble providing jobs for its young adults, or building sufficient water and sewer facilities for its cities.” Just as Tokyo’s citizens may try to alleviate local air pollution and Nigeria’s citizens may try to protect their remnant forests, so they may try to address local or national overpopulation. After all, they will have to live directly with their failure to do so and they cannot wait for the world to solve all its problems before they act to solve their own. (24)

#### US is already overpopulated.

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Returning to the United States, a strong case can be made that we are overpopulated right now. Signs of stressed ecosystems and lost biodiversity abound. Certainly we have not yet found a way to bring air and water pollution within limits acceptable to human health, nor have we stemmed the loss of productive farmlands and wildlife habitat, nor have we recovered more than a handful of the hundreds of species we have endangered. As we have seen when considering global warming, a large and growing population also makes it much harder for Americans to live up to our environmental responsibilities as global citizens. Let us be clear: advocates for international action are correct that wealthy countries should help poor countries stabilize their populations. However, “think globally, don’t act locally” is terrible advice. It is possible and necessary to work on multiple levels at once. We can make more generous contributions to the United Nations Population Fund and cut back on national immigration levels and limit local building permits. Efforts at one level and in one place can only strengthen efforts at other levels and in other places. Meanwhile, population growth is a problem in America right now. If you live in the United States, the chances are good that your community is threatened by environmentally damaging development that is being caused (or justified, in the planning stages) by population growth. (25)

#### Consumption can’t be divorced from population growth because per capita consumption is what matters. The US is enormous.

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Environmentalists sometimes give specifically environmental reasons for supporting—or at least tolerating—high levels of immigration. One common argument says that we should focus on consumption, not population as the root cause of our environmental problems. “Don’t buy big suburban houses; don’t buy gas guzzlers; don’t put air conditioners in those houses and cars. Americans’ high level of consumption is the problem—not our population.” This argument is appealing because it seems to put the responsibility for change where it belongs: not on poor immigrants but on average Americans, who do consume too much and who could consume less without harming their quality of life. But as we have seen, it is Americans’ overall consumption that determines our environmental impact. Overall consumption equals per capita consumption multiplied by population. So if high consumption is a problem, population growth must be, too. In a variation on this theme, immigrant advocates sometimes assert that immigrants (or perhaps “recent immigrants,” or “most recent immigrants”) consume less than the average American. One problem with this argument is that there are apparently no good figures comparing immigrants’ and native-born Americans’ consumption patterns. But the main problem is that it focuses on a moment in time, rather than thinking through the long-term effects of population growth. Immigrants’ lower consumption levels, if they exist, are presumably a function of their relative poverty. But immigrants are not coming to America to live in poverty, but to achieve “the American dream” and pass greater opportunities on to their children and grandchildren. Two million more immigrants this year may mean ten million more Americans one hundred years from now—and if history is any guide, those ten million Americans will live pretty much like other Americans. The descendants of last century’s Jewish and Italian immigrants do not seem to consume less than the average American today; there is no reason to think that the descendants of today’s Mexican and Chinese immigrants will consume less than the average American one hundred years from now. Bottom line: if American consumption levels are too high, the problem is only made worse by population growth. (23-4)

### They Say: “It’s About Consumption Not Population”

#### Addressing population through immigration tackles “low hanging fruit” — it’s the least intractable element.

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As environmentalists, though, we need to “think globally.” So what of premise (3) that a growing population increases America’s large environmental footprint beyond our borders and our disproportionate role in stressing global environmental systems? Consider global warming, arguably the most important environmental challenge facing the world in the twenty-first century. Nothing mortifies American environmentalists more than our country’s failure to show leadership in combating global warming. As the world’s largest economy and historically largest greenhouse gas emitter, the United States has a moral obligation to lead the world in meeting this challenge. A good start would be striving to stabilize greenhouse gas emissions at 1990 levels (the Kyoto protocol, rejected by the U.S., calls for an initial reduction of five percent below 1990 levels). Meeting even this modest objective will prove difficult, however, if our population continues to grow. Look at the numbers. U.S. CO2 emissions increased 20.4 percent between 1990 and 2005, from 4,991 to 6,009 million metric tons,9 which means that we would have to decrease our emissions 20.4 percent per person to get back to 1990 levels, at our current population. But if we double our population, as we are on track to do in six decades, we will have to decrease per capita emissions 58.5 percent in order to reduce CO2 emissions to 1990 levels—almost three times as great a per capita reduction. Such reductions will be much more expensive and demand greater sacrifice from Americans. They are thus less likely to happen. “Hold on a minute,” critics may respond. “We can and should cut our carbon emissions sixty percent or even more. The technologies exist and America is wealthy enough to meet our moral obligation to address global warming. The problem, above all, is Americans’ hoggish overconsumption.” We agree.10 Limiting consumption must play an important role in addressing global warming. American environmentalists should work to enact policies that reduce our fossil fuel consumption as much as possible. Such policies should include increased taxes on fossil fuels; redirecting transportation funding from highway construction to mass transit; heavy subsidies for wind and solar power; large increases in auto fuel standards; improved building codes that reduce the energy needed for heating and cooling; and more. However, re-engineering the world’s largest economy and changing the consumption patterns of hundreds of millions of people are immense undertakings that will be difficult, expensive and (we may assume) only partly successful. Al Gore has stated that global warming is “the moral challenge of our time”; many of us agree with him. But if Americans are serious about doing our part to limit global warming, the “multiplier effect” of population growth is too important to ignore. Again, look at the numbers. Between 1990 and 2003, U.S. per capita CO2 emissions increased 3.2 percent, while total U.S. CO2 emissions increased 20.2 percent.11 Why the discrepancy? During that same period, America’s population increased 16.1 percent.12 More people drove more cars, built more houses, etc. Population growth greatly increased total emissions, and it is total emissions, not per capita emissions, which quantify our full contribution to global warming. Before we go on, please note: we do not claim that by itself, halting U.S. population growth will solve sprawl or meet our global-warming responsibilities. On the contrary, Americans must reduce our per capita consumption of land and energy in order to meet these challenges. On the other hand, the evidence clearly shows that recent population growth has increased Americans’ total land and energy consumption and made these problems even worse. Americans must address both overconsumption and overpopulation if we hope to create a sustainable society and contribute to a sustainable world.13 (11-12)