# Title I Neg

## Inequality Advantage Answers

### 1NC — Inequality Advantage Answers

#### 1. No inequity – spending is higher in high-poverty districts

Dynarski and Kainz, 16 – Nonresident Senior Fellow - Economic Studies, Center on Children and Families at Brookings (Mark and Kirsten, “Requiring school districts to spend comparable amounts on Title I schools is pushing on a string”, 7/8, <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/title-I-spending.pdf>

We first estimated a simple correlation between teacher spending per student and school poverty rates for all the elementary schools in our data. We used the percent of students enrolled in the free-lunch program as a proxy for a school’s poverty rate, a common if not entirely satisfactory procedure.iii We found a negative correlation: teacher spending was lower when schools had higher poverty rates. An increase in the school poverty rate of ten percentage points reduced teacher spending per student by about $100.

This correlation is consistent with conventional wisdom but it ignores a key aspect of the data: schools are in districts and districts are in states. From a statistical perspective, states, districts, and schools form ‘levels,’ and it is within those levels that people are taxed for schools and decisions are made about how to distribute funds among schools. Correlations should be estimated accounting for these levels if the findings are to be relevant to practical policy and management issues.

When we account for levels, the correlation is reversed. An increase in the poverty rate of ten percentage points increased teacher spending per student by about $30, and the correlation was not statistically significant at conventional levels.iv Teacher spending is about the same regardless of school poverty.

#### 2. Multiple other factors ensures inequality continues – Trump, economic conditions, empirics

**Ballard 17** – Prof. @ MSU Department of Economics specializing in analyzing income inequality (Charles L., written 2-10-17, <http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/economy-budget/318941-many-of-trumps-policies-will-further-intensify-income>, accessed 6-30-17)

On a per-capita basis, the U.S. economy is more than twice as large as it was in 1973. But the average man, who works full time, year-round, earns less now than in 1973, after adjusting for inflation.

Meanwhile, the share of income going to the most affluent one percent of American households has skyrocketed from about nine percent in the 1970s to more than 20 percent in recent years. That’s a redistribution of more than one trillion dollars per year.

This unprecedented disconnect between the average family and those at the top of the economic pile has generated tremendous discontent. Both [Donald Trump](http://thehill.com/people/donald-trump) and [Bernie Sanders](http://thehill.com/people/bernie-sanders) tapped into that discontent during the 2016 presidential campaign.

Since Trump has now moved from campaign rhetoric to policy making, this is a good time to assess which of his policies are likely to help working Americans, and which are likely to hurt.

Trump’s appeal to working Americans has overwhelmingly emphasized the effects of import competition and immigration. This has clearly been effective politically, but the economics behind these arguments are another story. It is certainly true that many American workers have suffered from import competition and/or immigration.

However, other factors are more important than either imports or immigration, in terms of explaining the rise of inequality. On the campaign trail, job losses in the American manufacturing sector are often blamed exclusively on imports, but changing technologies actually play a bigger role. In yesterday’s factory, large numbers of workers performed simple, repetitive tasks. Today, computer-driven robots do a lot of the work.

Also, some proposed “solutions” run the risk of making things worse. If we slap high tariffs on imports, history suggests that other countries will retaliate by imposing tariffs on American exports. Based on the campaign rhetoric, it would be easy to conclude that trade is strictly a one-way street.

In fact, American exports are substantially more than $2 trillion per year. A full-scale trade war could lead to a global recession, and that’s not good for American workers. Finally, it’s worth noting that tariffs raise prices for American consumers.

When we look to other, more important sources of rising inequality, the Trump administration appears likely to do little, or to push for policies that will exacerbate the divergence between those at the top and those in the middle and at the bottom.

One of the biggest sources of increased income inequality is the financialization of the U.S. economy, described in Rana Foroohar’s excellent book, "Makers and Takers." Deregulation of the financial-services sector transferred trillions of dollars to a small number of financiers, and it set the stage for the worst economic downturn since the Great Depression.

The Dodd-Frank bill, while imperfect, established some common-sense protections for consumers, and it reduced the risk of another financial crisis. The Trump administration appears eager to rip out much of Dodd-Frank. This will be fabulous for Wall Street, at least for a while, but the average citizen could be forgiven for wondering what’s in it for him or her.

If enough regulations are removed, another financial crisis will become nearly inevitable, although it’s hard to predict when it will hit. When it comes, a repeat of the meltdown of 2008-09 won’t be good for the average American.

#### 3. The Achievement gap is shrinking now

Carnoy and Garcia 17 (Martin Carnoy and Emma García, Economic Policy Institute, “Five key trends in U.S. student performance” 1/12/17, Martin Carnoy is a labor economist with a special interest in the relation between the economy and the educational system, Emma García specializes in the economics of education and education policy. Ph.D., Economics and Education, Teachers College, Columbia University http://www.epi.org/publication/five-key-trends-in-u-s-student-performance-progress-by-blacks-and-hispanics-the-takeoff-of-asians-the-stall-of-non-english-speakers-the-persistence-of-socioeconomic-gaps-and-the-damaging-effect/#epi-toc-4) GG

A founding ideal of American democracy is that merit, not accident of birth, should determine individuals’ income and social status. Schools have assumed a major role in judging key elements of merit among young people—namely, academic skills, hard work, self-discipline, and cooperative behavior. Schools do so mainly by evaluating students in a variety of subjects deemed important for success later in life. No one expects outcomes at the end of the schooling process to be the same for every student, since initial ability varies, and some young people are more disciplined and willing to work harder in school than others. Yet, when students’ inherent characteristics—such as race, gender, or parents’ economic and social capital—rather than their innate ability, hard work, and discipline systematically affect their school outcomes, this threatens democratic ideals. These apparent contradictions between the ideals and reality of U.S. schools have led analysts over the last few decades to study and try to explain persistent gaps in student achievement. Particular attention has been given to the gap between blacks and Hispanics versus whites, across social-class groups, and by gender. Research has provided evidence that race and ethnicity continue to be important factors in explaining achievement differences. However, much of the black-white and Hispanic-white achievement gaps are accounted for by social-class differences. That is, in the United States, race and often ethnicity are closely intertwined with social class. Minority children, particularly African-Americans and Hispanics, are more likely to be poor than white children because of the ways that race and ethnicity shape opportunity and economic outcomes. Black and Hispanic children are also more likely than their white or Asian-American counterparts to live in low-income, racially segregated neighborhoods and to attend schools with high concentrations of low-income, nonwhite students. Notwithstanding these troubling realities, achievement differences between blacks and whites and between Hispanics and whites have shrunk in recent decades. The bad news is that until recently gaps between the higher and lower social-class groups were increasing, particularly between children in the highest income group and everyone else (Reardon 2011; Reardon, Waldfogel, and Bassok 2016; Putnam 2015). This paper advances the discussion of these issues by analyzing trends in the influence of race/ethnicity, social class, and gender on students’ academic performance in the United States. It focuses on trends for two different grade levels—eighth and fourth—and two different subjects—mathematics and reading—over the past decade. Trends in eighth-grade mathematics since the mid-1990s are also examined. This paper also explores the ways in which English language ability relates to Hispanics’ and Asian Americans’ academic performance over time (Nores and Barnett 2014). We use individual student microdata gathered from the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) to estimate the math and reading performance of students in the fourth and eighth grades from 2003 to 2013, and the math performance of eighth-graders from 1996 to 2013. Our study has six objectives: To describe changes in the racial characteristics and socioeconomic status (SES) of the student population, and in the composition of student bodies in U.S. schools over the past two decades in the periods 1996–2003 and 2003–2013 To describe the types of schools (high- and low-poverty, high and low concentrations of blacks plus Hispanics) that black, Hispanic, white, and Asian children attend and how these have changed over the past 10 and 20 years To estimate changes in students’ achievement gaps by social class and race/ethnicity, including gaps for students designated as English language learners (ELLs), over the past 10 and 20 years To estimate changes over the past decade in the influence of school composition—such as concentration of students by poverty, race, and ethnic status—on students’ achievement gaps by social class and race/ethnicity To estimate whether and how much the trajectories of social class and race/ethnicity achievement gaps differed over the past 10 years for male and female students To estimate whether and how much these trajectories differed over the past 10 years for lower-achieving students and higher-achieving students Our unique approach, which uses individual student microdata gathered from NAEP over a substantial period of time (10 to 17 years, depending on the subject and grade), allows us to estimate changes in race/ethnic gaps, controlling for English-language learner designation, gender, and socioeconomic status. The approach also lets us estimate changes in socioeconomic gaps, controlling for race/ethnicity, gender, and ELL designation. Moreover, we can assess changes over time with regard to the sensitivity of race/ethnic and socioeconomic gaps to the inclusion of controls for school characteristics in terms of the proportion of poor and minority children in the student body. The percentage of students receiving free or reduced-price lunch (FRPL) is used as a proxy measure for the poor children in the student body.1 We characterize a school as high-poverty when more than 75 percent of its students are eligible for FRPL. Importantly, because we use individual student data from large-scale assessments for our analysis, we can identify those students assigned to the English language learner track. We can therefore separate Hispanic and Asian ELL students from their non-ELL ethnic counterparts and examine their distinct performance and trends. Finally, our approach enables us to show how estimates of race/ethnic achievement gaps are affected by the unequal share of race/ethnic groups across those states in which students have systematically performed better or worse on the NAEP. The results of our analysis yield important insights into the changing nature of inequality in the U.S. education system. We find that between the mid-1990s and 2013, the proportion of low-income students in U.S. schools—those eligible for free or reduced-price lunch (FRPL)—increased rapidly. By 2013, more than half of eighth-grade mathematics students were eligible for FRPL (52.1 percent), up from 35.1 percent in 2000. In addition, the proportion of Hispanic and Asian students increased, in contrast to a steady decline in the percentage of non-Hispanic white and black students. As the overall proportion of low-income students (those eligible for FRPL) increased in U.S. schools, the percentage of all students attending high-poverty schools (those with more than 75 percent of students eligible for FRPL)2 rose substantially from 2003 to 2013. The proportion of black and Hispanic students in these high-poverty schools was much higher than for white or Asian students. By 2013, more than 40 percent of black and Hispanic students attended a high-poverty school (43.5 percent of blacks, 40.3 percent of Hispanic non-ELLs, and 55.8 percent of Hispanic ELLs, respectively). In contrast, only about 7 percent of white students (6.9 percent) attended such schools. At least one in five black and Hispanic students (20.7 percent of blacks, 15.1 percent of Hispanic non-ELLs, and 33.9 percent of Hispanic ELLs, respectively) who were not eligible for free or reduced-price lunch attended a high-poverty school compared with just 3.2 percent of non-eligible white students. Asian non-ELLs generally attended schools that had even lower levels of poverty than those attended by white students, although poor Asian non-ELL students were much more likely to attend high-poverty schools than poor white students. We confirm earlier studies showing that although the black/white test-score gap remains large, it has declined substantially in the past two decades. The achievement gap between white students and Hispanic non-ELL students also closed substantially in this period. The achievement gap between white students and Asian non-ELLs greatly increased in favor of Asians. By 2013, Asian non-ELL students scored almost half a standard deviation (SD) higher than white students in math. Moreover, the gap between Asians and whites in math was even larger among higher-scoring students. In stark contrast to the shrinking achievement gap between white students and Hispanic non-ELL students and the expanding achievement gap between Asian non-ELL students and whites, we find that Hispanic ELL and Asian ELL students are falling further behind white students in mathematics and reading achievement.3 Adjusting for the higher concentration of Asian non-English language learner students in California and Hawaii, two low-scoring states, reduces our estimates of Asian students’ scores compared to what they would have been had they lived in higher-scoring states. This “state effect” also tends to be true for our estimates of the scores of Hispanic non-ELL students (who are concentrated in California and the Southwest), and for the estimated scores of African Americans (who are concentrated in southern states, which generally score lower on the NAEP). Attending a higher-poverty school had a negative influence on the math and reading achievement of students from all racial/ethnic groups in both fourth and eighth grades. This negative influence was smaller for Hispanic non-English language learners than for whites and blacks, and it was larger for Asians than for other groups. In contrast, attending a school with more than 75 percent black plus Hispanic students had a larger negative effect on black, Hispanic, and Asian students than on white students. Attending the highest-poverty school (with a high proportion of poor students, meaning more than 75 percent of students eligible for FRPL) continues to have a strong negative impact on individual students across racial/ethnic groups, but that impact has not changed over the period 1996–2013. (Note that this is also true for schools with more than 50 percent of students who are FRPL-eligible.) We do not find clear evidence that either the black-white or the Hispanic-white achievement gap is increasing more among those students who attend higher- versus lower-poverty schools, or among those who attend schools with higher concentrations of black plus Hispanic students versus those students who do not attend such schools. Our results are also inconclusive about changes in the achievement gap between higher- and lower-income students. We find that changes in the gap vary by subject and grade. Our data are limited to measuring the gap between students who are “not poor,” “somewhat poor,” and “very poor,” but not between students at the top of the income distribution and low- and middle-income students. The divisions used in this analysis are useful for testing differences in student achievement between middle-income and lower-income students, but not between the very highest-income students and those in the rest of the income distribution. It is at the very top of the income distribution (the top 10 percent) where analysts have found student achievement rising compared to everyone else. In terms of gender differences in performance, the advantage of male students over females in mathematics decreased, as did female students’ advantage over their male peers in reading, when controlling for race/ethnicity and social class. The gender gaps are now small compared to race/ethnicity differences, but are still significant. We argue that these patterns of change (or lack of change) have important implications for what is happening in U.S. schools and American society. The decline in the gap between whites and Hispanic non-English language learners may help explain the sense among white workers in lower socioeconomic levels that Hispanics are increasingly competing for their jobs. Although the 2016 presidential campaign has put the focus on undocumented immigrants, the real issue may be that there are increasing numbers of second- and third-generation Hispanic Americans with achievement levels similar to those of whites when adjustments are made for socioeconomic background. Among high-achieving students competing for places in elite universities, the major increase in Asian students’ achievement relative to whites’ (and everyone else’s), especially in mathematics, has probably increased the pressure on upper-middle-class white families to invest even more in their children’s tutoring and outside-of-school academic activities. The percentage of Asian students in the top-25 U.S. universities (as defined by U.S. News and World Report) reached 21 percent of the undergraduate student body in 2007, and has remained at that level. Over the same period, the percentage of whites in those universities fell from 48 percent to 43 percent. As Reardon (2011) argues, increasing inequality in incomes over the past three decades seemed to be a major driver of the widening achievement gap between pupils from the highest 10 percent-income families and everyone else (note that very recent research by Reardon, Waldfogel, and Bassok (2016) indicates that this trend may have been reversed in the last decade).

#### 4. Greater access to preschool and technology is decreasing the racial achievement gap

Reardon et al. 16 (Sean F. Reardon, Jane Waldfogel, Daphina Bassok, NYT, “The Good News About Educational Inequality, 8/28/16, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/28/opinion/sunday/the-good-news-about-educational-inequality.html) GG

When inequality is the topic, it can seem as if all the news is bad. Income inequality continues to rise. Economic segregation is growing. Racial gaps in education, employment and health endure. Our society is not particularly fair. But here is some good news about educational inequality: The enormous gap in academic performance between high- and low-income children has begun to narrow. Children entering kindergarten today are more equally prepared than they were in the late 1990s. We know this from information collected over the last two decades by the National Center for Education Statistics. In the fall of 1998 and again in 2010. the N.C.E.S. sent early childhood assessors to roughly 1.000 public and private kindergartens across the United States. They sat down one-on- one with 15 to 25 children in each school to measure their reading and math skills. They asked children to identify shapes and colors, to count, to identify letters and to sound out words. They also surveyed parents to learn about the children's experiences before entering kindergarten. Working with the social scientist Ximena Portilla, we used this data to track changes over time in "school readiness gaps" — the differences in academic skills between low-income and high-income children entering kindergarten. What we found is surprising. From 1998 to 2010, the school readiness gap narrowed by 10 percent in math and 16 percent in reading. The gaps that remain are still vast. But even this modest improvement represents a sharp reversal of the trend over the preceding decades. It’s worth noting that the gap in school readiness narrowed because of relatively rapid improvements in the skills of low-income children, not because the skills of children from high-income families declined. Research one of us did with Scott Latham at the University of Virginia showed that both poor and affluent children entered kindergarten in 2010 with stronger reading and math skills than they did in the late 1990s. School readiness gaps between racial groups have also improved: Both the white-black and white-Hispanic gaps narrowed by roughly 15 percent from 1998 to 2010. These improvements appear to persist at least into fourth grade. Data from the National Assessment of Educational Progress show that by 2015, when those kindergartners were in fourth grade; their math and reading skills were roughly two-thirds of a grade level higher than those of their counterparts 12 years earlier. This was true for children of all racial and ethnic groups and for poor and nonpoor children alike. What’s behind these surprising developments? One possibility is that school readiness gaps have narrowed because it is easier now for poor families to find high-quality, publicly funded preschool programs for their children. Today 20 percent of 4-year-olds are enrolled in state-funded preschools, up from 14 percent in 2002. Greater availability of affordable preschool programs — particularly if they are high quality — may be part of the reason poor children are starting to catch up to their affluent peers. It is unlikely, however,, that preschool enrollment is the primary explanation. Although more poor children today attend preschool than in the 1990s,, enrollment rates dipped in 2010, perhaps because of rising unemployment after the Great Recession. And while the quality of the typical preschool program may have improved, as recently as 2004 most poor children attended public preschools that were far inferior to those available in affluent communities. It may be changes in children's homes that have mattered most. Tracking the experiences of young children over time, we found that both rich and poor children today have more books and read with their parents more often than they did in the '90s. They are for more likely to have computers, internet access and computer games focused on reading and math skills. Their parents are more likely to spend time with them, taking them to the library or doing activities at home. The children of the rich have always had more of these opportunities than poor children. What has changed is that low-income children are now- getting more of what the political scientist Robert Putnam calls " 'Goodnight Moon' time" than they did in the 1990s. That’s excellent news.

#### 5. Education won’t change overall social inequality

Backer, 16 – professor of education at Cleveland State University (David, “The False Promise of Education” Jacobin Magazine, 11/16, <https://www.jacobinmag.com/2016/11/education-reform-inequality-jobs-economy/>

But education cannot guarantee opportunity — it’s government policy and economic practices that increase or decrease the likelihood of success. The centrist promise of education is a false promise. This doesn’t mean education cannot be a force of positive social change, just that in its current incarnation, US education discourse simply works to release those with influence from the responsibility of making a social system that supports working people.

The Numbers Don’t Add Up

The positive relationship between schooling and success is widely considered a given in US society. For example, a recent FiveThirtyEight article uses 2014 data on average annual wages between 1970–2013 to claim that: “A more educated workforce would be a great boon to the economy: Scholars say more employees would earn higher wages [if they went to school], which leads to more taxes being collected and fewer Americans grappling with the challenges of poverty, among other benefits.”

But just a few weeks prior to the article’s publication the job numbers came out; they were the worst since 2010. “The US economy only added 38,000 jobs in May, according to the Labor Department. It was the worst monthly job gain since 2010.” Not only that, but the majority of jobs added were service jobs. August wasn’t much better. In September, more new jobs were available, but less than expected.

According to the National Center for Educational Statistics, “about 3.5 million students are expected to graduate from high school in 2016–17, including 3.2 million students from public high schools and 0.3 million students from private high schools,” and “during the 2016–17 school year, colleges and universities are expected to award 1,018,000 associate’s degrees; 1.9 million bachelor’s degrees; 798,000 master’s degrees; and 181,000 doctoral degrees.”

Millions of new workers will enter the job market in 2017, graduating from their “paths to opportunity.” Yet the path to opportunity might not end up anywhere in the face of sluggish to moderate job creation. The number of graduates doesn’t correlate with the number of available jobs. It’s like saying if we teach people how to play musical chairs well enough, everyone will get a seat.

As scholars like Peter Kappelli at University of Pennsylvania’s School of Management warn, having a degree will do nothing to protect you against the sometimes violent and unpredictable patterns of market activity in a capitalist economy. Kapelli’s comment sits within a long debate about the role of education in American society. Henry J. Perkinson, in The Imperfect Panacea, American Faith in Education 1865–1965, traces the centrist’s promise of education from Horace Mann to John Dewey to Lyndon B. Johnson. Summarizing this history, economists Herbert Bowles and Samuel Gintis set out two versions of the promise: democracy and technocratic meritocracy.

### Extend: “No Inequity”

#### Teacher spending doesn’t correlate with poverty – their evidence doesn’t account for different levels of spending between states

Dynarski and Kainz, 16 – Nonresident Senior Fellow - Economic Studies, Center on Children and Families at Brookings (Mark and Kirsten, “Requiring school districts to spend comparable

amounts on Title I schools is pushing on a string”, 7/8, <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/title-I-spending.pdf>

This reversal is a symptom of what is known as Simpson’s paradox, or, in some settings, the ‘ecological fallacy.’ Think of it this way—if we had only two states, say, New Jersey and Mississippi, we would notice that New Jersey has a low poverty rate (it’s 38 percent) and spends a lot on its teachers per student ($5,206). Mississippi has a higher poverty rate (78 percent) and does not spend a lot on its teachers per student ($2,400). It would appear that poverty is negatively correlated with teacher spending.

From this information, what can we infer about the relationship between poverty and teacher spending within each state? The answer is—nothing. Both states might have exactly equal spending on teachers regardless of school-level poverty. In fact, when we estimated correlations within the two states, that’s what we found—both states had a statistically insignificant correlation between teacher spending at individual schools and the poverty rate of those schools’ student populations.

### Extend: “Other Factors”

#### The problem is a lack of social services, not educational opportunity

REBELL and WOLFF ‘08 (Michael A.; Executive Director of the Campaign for Educational Equity – Teachers College and Professor of Law and Educational Practice – Columbia Law School, and Jessica R.; Director of Policy and Research – Teachers College, “Equal Educational Opportunity: An American Imperative” in Moving Every Child Ahead: From NCLB Hype to Meaningful Educational Opportunity, p. 13-14)ww

In large part, the persistent gap between the American ideal of equality in education and the reality of starkly inadequate schooling for low-income and minority children stems from the irony that although America’s dedication to educational equity has surpassed that of any other nation, its commitment to equality in related areas of social welfare has lagged far behind that of other industrialized countries (Anyon & Greene, 2007; Wells, 2006). "As other industrialized countries built and enlarged comprehensive welfare systems to help create more equality among their citizens, policymakers in the United States invested in public schools and relatively few other supportive social services" (Wells, 2006, p. 2). The "American dream" and much of our political ideology has been based on the premise that, if given an opportunity for schooling, any individual, through hard work and perseverance, will be able to succeed (Hochschild, 1995). Unfortunately, this vision of universal and unlimited possibility has not proved true for the millions of low-income and minority children who must overcome enormous barriers posed by bad health, poor nutrition, inadequate housing, economic instability, and racism—and who are not, in fact, actually provided with the equal or adequate educational opportunities that the American dream ideology has promised them.

#### Race and Ethnicity drive inequality more than education

NICOLACI da COSTA ’17 (Pedro; Business Insider, “There's a large group of Americans missing out on the American dream,” http://www.businessinsider.com/fed-report-shows-race-not-just-education-a-major-determinant-of-inequality-2017-7)ww

There's a growing tendency for mainstream economists, including several of those at the Federal Reserve, to dismiss all income disparities as the product of a skills- or education gap, a misleading explanation given weak wage growth that points to ongoing weakness in the job market.

So it was relieving to see, tucked in the US central bank’s latest semi-annual report to Congress on monetary policy, an analysis of recent inequality research that refutes the idea that education is the only factor behind income inequality. Race, unsurprisingly, also plays a major role, as do social and economic measures, including taxation, interest rates, and labor policies. The Fed states:

"The persistent gaps in economic outcomes by race and ethnicity in the United States raise important questions about how people ascend the economic ladder. Education, particularly a college degree, is often seen as a path to improved economic opportunities.

"However, while education continues to be an important determinant of whether one can climb the economic ladder, sizable differences in economic outcomes across race and ethnicity remain even after controlling for educational attainment. Data on earnings for two cohorts of young adult workers (aged 25 to 34) approximately a generation apart confirm both the gaps in economic outcomes and the lack of substantial upward progress for disadvantaged groups over the past quarter-century."

The chart below shows the proportion of young US workers in each ethnicity whose income ranks among the top 25% of the population. Whites are more than twice as likely as blacks to make it into that category, with about 30% of young white adults in the top quartile, compared to just approximately 15% of young black adults.

"Overall, the representation of black and Hispanic workers in the top earnings quartile continues to lag in the later period," the report adds.

"This lag in representation occurs despite the gains in educational attainment — the critical driver of improved incomes — that blacks and Hispanics have achieved over time. For both blacks and Hispanics, the share achieving a bachelor’s degree or higher has doubled over the period of study," as can be seen in the following chart:

Moreover, as the Fed report notes, "increased levels of educational attainment across all groups have created greater competition for positions at the top of the economic ladder. Even among those with college degrees, important differences remain in representation at the top of the income distribution by race and ethnicity."

That's shown in this chart revealing the apparent returns on a college education is substantially higher for whites and Asians than blacks and Hispanics. Some 45% of whites with a college degree make it into the top quartile of earnings among young adults, compared with just 35% for black Americans and just slightly higher for Hispanics.

#### Residential segregation and income inequality are alternate causes

Fahle 17 (Erin M. Fahle and Sean F. Reardon, The Stanford Center on Poverty and Inequality, PATHWAYS • The Poverty and Inequality Report • Race and Ethnicity, Sean F. Reardon is Professor of Poverty and Inequality in Education (and Sociology, by courtesy) at Stanford University. He leads the education research group at the Stanford Center on Poverty and Inequality. Erin M. Fahle is a doctoral student in education policy at the Stanford Graduate School of Education, http://inequality.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/Pathways\_SOTU\_2017\_education.pdf) GG

Why, then, do large racial and ethnic achievement gaps persist? Research consistently points to two main contributors: (a) disparities in family socioeconomic background and (b) residential segregation. White, black, and Hispanic children have very different family resources (e.g., parental income and education). They also grow up in neighborhoods of unequal KEY FINDINGS • Between 1990 and 2015, average academic performance improved for students of all racial and ethnic groups, but grew fastest among black and Hispanic students. As a result, white-black and white-Hispanic achievement gaps have declined by 15 to 25 percent. • But achievement gaps remain large: Hispanic students lag almost two grade levels, and black students lag roughly two to two-and-a-half grade levels behind whites. • Two nonschooling factors—persistent racial and ethnic disparities in family resources and segregation patterns— are fundamental determinants of unequal educational opportunity for minority students. education PATHWAYS • The Poverty and Inequality Report • Race and Ethnicity education 21 quality. Given the importance of early childhood experiences6 and neighborhood conditions7 in shaping educational outcomes, it is these two key differences in nonschooling factors that drive racial and ethnic academic achievement gaps. The effects of parental resources are evident in Figure 2, which shows white-black and white-Hispanic achievement gaps as a function of the white-minority socioeconomic gaps in U.S. school districts. As the red lines indicate, the achievement gaps are larger where socioeconomic disparities are larger. However, there is evidence that educational opportunities (and consequently achievement gaps) are shaped by more than the socioeconomic status differences that frequently obtain between racial and ethnic groups. Even in school districts with no white-minority difference in socioeconomic status, achievement gaps are still roughly one-third of a standard deviation (i.e., approximately one grade level). Additionally, there is substantial variation in the size of the achievement gap among school districts with a similar level of socioeconomic disparity. What explains the racial and ethnic gaps among children of similar socioeconomic backgrounds? Residential and school segregation are key drivers of unequal educational opportunity. Even among families with the same income, black and Hispanic students live in much poorer neighborhoods than white children and attend schools with greater concentrations of poverty, a result of the long legacy of racial housing discrimination and exclusion in the U.S.8 High-poverty schools typically have fewer resources, poorer facilities, a harder time attracting and retaining skilled teachers, and more students in need of remediation and additional services. In addition, high poverty schools typically have fewer students whose parents have economic, social, and political resources to invest in schools. As a result, segregation is strongly correlated with academic achievement gaps, even after accounting for racial and ethnic differences in socioeconomic family characteristics. Indeed, metropolitan-area achievement gaps are more strongly correlated with segregation than they are with racial and ethnic disparities in socioeconomic status.9 Although we have made some progress in improving the equality of educational outcomes over the last few decades— as evidenced by narrowing achievement gaps—we have done little to change the fundamental sources of inequality of educational opportunity. Racial and ethnic differences in family income, wealth, and parental education remain very large and have changed very little: black and Hispanic households’ median incomes today are roughly 60 percent as large as white households’, up only slightly from 55 percent in 1967.10 And although residential segregation has declined slowly, school segregation has not declined since the 1970s—and has actually grown by some measures.11 Unless we change the fundamental sources of unequal educational opportunity—socioeconomic disparity and segregation between racial and ethnic groups—we are unlikely to eliminate racial and ethnic educational inequality. The narrowing of achievement gaps over the last 25 years has likely been driven by early childhood interventions. The expansion of preschool, particularly publicly-funded preschool programs accessible to low- and middle-income children, coupled with increased parental focus on young children’s cognitive development, appear to have led to some equalization in lowincome and minority students’ early childhood educational opportunities.12 However, the benefits of such investments will remain limited in the face of persistently high levels of socioeconomic and neighborhood inequality. Racial and ethnic equality of educational opportunity requires eliminating these fundamental disparities.

#### Too many environmental factors prevent the plan from solving

Klundt 15 (Chris Klundt, Forbes, “Education Alone Will Not Solve Income Inequality” 7/6/15 https://www.forbes.com/sites/chrisklundt/2015/07/06/education-alone-will-not-solve-income-inequality/#770ab41e6c90) GG

We often reference the “achievement gap” when discussing how certain student groups perform better than others. For instance, low-income students are graduating at a rate of 15 percentage points behind their more affluent peers, according to a recent GradNation report. Or that the graduation rate for Hispanic/Latino students in New York is nearly 20 points below the national average among all students. These standardized measurements of achievement, like graduation rates and test scores, only examine student outcomes. What we need to do is explore what’s causing this opportunity gap – and low-income students to fall behind – so we can remold our school systems into environments conducive to student success for all. That means reimagining an educational system that best equips students for the workforce of the future and not the assembly lines of the Industrial Revolution, when our current educational system was first formed. Opportunities Out of Reach We first have to understand the challenge of rising out of poverty. Students are often stuck in a vicious cycle, suggests Harvard professor Robert Putnam, who analyzed decades of research on families from both sides of the economic scale. He found familial situations can determine much in life, with parental characteristics – such as level of education – being more influential today than they were several decades ago. Additionally, researchers like University of California-Irvine professor Greg Duncan are seeing more affluent families heavily investing in extra educational opportunities – nearly $10,000 per child per year, compared to lower-income parents' $1,300 per child per year. “It’s no wonder that schools are having a difficult time closing gaps…because of things that are happening at home,” Greg tells me. Many families rely on public school and can’t afford to supplement their child’s education. Earlier this year, a Southern Education Foundation report showed a majority of public school students nationwide come from low-income families, with high-poverty schools clustered unevenly across the country. These geographic disparities are amplified for children of color, in areas like the South. Part of this is due to economic and social policies that live outside education, explains SEF President Kent McGuire. It’s these instances of geographic disparity and policies that not only reflect the challenges public school students in poverty face, but the overwhelming burden placed on teachers ill-equipped to help them. Living in poverty includes numerous instabilities – housing, food scarcity, familial connections – that students inevitably bring with them into the classroom. These stressful situations are traumatic for students and undermine their ability to learn, Pamela Cantor, child psychiatrist and president of Turnaround for Children, found after her own interactions and research with children. It’s what prompted her to launch Turnaround, an organization aimed at helping schools in high-poverty areas, and its educators, establish an environment conducive to successful learning. To best foster student success, these learning environments need to be more flexible and function as support systems for teachers. Thankfully, organizations like Cantor’s and McGuire’s are helping schools construct these foundational environments by promoting personalized learning experiences that stimulate academic growth. Turnaround’s New York City partner schools saw a 39 percent reduction in detentions, along with lower absenteeism and bad behavior. Similarly, comprehensive school reform programs like Expeditionary Learning provide malleable curriculum so teachers can adapt lessons to help all types of learners catch up and get ahead. Building Achievement Bridges Although these efforts are commendable, we have to keep in mind it’s only one piece of the puzzle. On top of curriculum-based efforts, schools need to help provide poverty-stricken students with access to important necessities they aren’t getting outside the school day. Opportunities like health and nutrition education, offering free breakfast options or providing mental health services can serve as achievement bridges for students who’d normally fall through the cracks. Because if a student is hungry, tired, or homeless, they’re already at a massive disadvantage for being able to “do well” in school no matter how engaging the curriculum. We need to continue fostering ways to help fulfill these basic needs and ensure school is a safe haven for all children to learn and grow. Education reform can’t be self-contained. Battling the effects of income inequality in our schools require changes in sectors ranging from economic and employment policies to better health initiatives. The achievement gap will remain unless we attempt to reform the broader environment surrounding education.

### Extend: “Achievement Gap Decreasing Now”

#### Their studies are wrong on the magnitude of income inequality – government transfers and tax compensations significantly reduce the gap

Tanner 16 (Michael D. Tanner, Cato Institute senior fellow, “Five Myths about Economic Inequality in America” 9/7/16 https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/five-myths-about-economic-inequality-america) GG

Most claims that income inequality is at a record high in the United States, including Piketty’s, are based on a measure of “market income,” which does not take into account taxes or transfer payments (or changes in household size or composition). The failure to consider those factors considerably overstates effective levels of inequality.23 What the pundits, politicians, and others fail to understand is that the U.S. tax and transfer system is already highly redistributive. Taxes are progressive, significantly so. The top 1 percent of tax filers earn 19 percent of U.S. income, but in 2013 they paid 37.8 percent of federal income taxes.24 The inclusion of other taxes (payroll, sales, property, and so on) reduces this disparity, but does not eliminate it: a report from the Congressional Budget Office estimates that the top 1 percent paid 25.4 percent of all federal taxes in 2013, compared to 15 percent of pre-tax income.25 The wealthy pay a disproportionate amount of taxes. At the same time, lower-income earners benefit disproportionately from a variety of wealth transfer programs. The federal government alone, for example, currently funds more than 100 anti-poverty programs, dozens of which provide either cash or in-kind benefits directly to individuals. Federal spending on those programs approached $700 billion in 2015, and state and local governments added another $300 billion.26 Figure 2 shows the amount of redistribution taking place within the current tax and transfer system. In 2012, individuals in the bottom quintile (that is, the bottom 20 percent) of incomes (families with less than $17,104 in market income) received $27,171 on average in net benefits through all levels of government, while on average those in the top quintile (families with market incomes above $119,695) pay $87,076 more than they receive. The top 1 percent paid some $812,000 more. Taking this existing redistribution into account significantly reduces inequality. According to the CBO, accounting for taxes reduces the amount of inequality in the United States by more than 8 percent, while including transfer payments reduces inequality by slightly more than 18 percent. By fully accounting for redistribution from taxes and transfers, true inequality is almost 26 percent less than it initially appears. (Figure 3.) A new study from the Brookings Institution reaches similar conclusions. The study, by Jesse Bricker, Alice Henriques, and John Sabelhaus of the Federal Reserve Board and Jacob Krimmel of the University of Pennsylvania, found that while the concentration of wealth and income of the top 1 percent has indeed increased since 1992, it increased far less than prior research, including Piketty’s, has claimed. By including government transfers and in-kind compensation in their calculations, the study’s authors found that the share of income earned by the top 1 percent rose from 11 percent in 1991 to 18 percent in 2012, substantially less than, for instance, the 23 percent estimated by Piketty and his colleague Emmanuel Saez in their updated work on the issue.27 In another study in the American Economic Review, Philip Armour, Richard Burkhauser, and Jeff Larrimore controlled for changes in household composition (that is, adjusting for size and dependency) and transfers (both cash and in-kind), and found that there were significant gains across the income spectrum from 1979 to 2007 and for the period 1989-2007. However, gains at the top were smaller than gains at the bottom, meaning by this measure, inequality actually decreased from 1989 to the Great Recession.28 Given these problems, a better way to measure inequality might be to look at differences in consumption between income groups. A study by Hassett and Aparna Mathur, also of the American Enterprise Institute, found that the “consumption gap across income groups has remained remarkably stable over time. If you sort households according to their pretax income, in 2010 the bottom fifth accounted for 8.7% of overall consumption, the middle fifth for 17.1%, and the top fifth for about 38.6%. Go back 10 years to 2000—before two recessions, the Bush tax cuts, and continuing expansions of globalization and computerization—and the numbers are similar. The bottom fifth accounted for 8.9% of consumption, the middle fifth for 17.3%, and the top fifth for 37.3%” (Figure 4).29 Although Hassett and Mathur did not specifically look at the top 1 percent of incomes, their study does demonstrate that, even if there have been gains at the top, it has not resulted in adverse consumption effects for those further down the income ladder. Of course, these different conclusions depend in part on different measures of economic inequality. Piketty and others are more concerned about the disparity in accumulated wealth, the residue of year after year of income. The highest quintile, after all, may be saving their increased wealth rather than spending it. Over time, this can lead to increasing disparity. But even here, the evidence shows that the disparity in wealth distribution has not increased nearly as fast as Piketty and his supporters believe. For example, Bricker and his colleagues also found that the share of total wealth held by the top 1 percent increased from roughly 27 percent to 33 percent over that period, compared to the 42 percent share estimated by Saez and Gabriel Zucman in updated work related to Piketty’s.30 Bricker’s study actually shows a larger increase in wealth disparity than some others. For example, according to research using the Federal Reserve’s Survey of Consumer Finances, the wealthiest 1 percent of Americans held 34.4 percent of the country’s wealth in 1969. By 2013, the last year for which data are available, that proportion had barely risen, to roughly 36 percent.31 Moreover, the recent recession hit the wealthy especially hard. Indeed, the Tax Foundation has found that from 2007 to 2009 there was a 40 percent decline in the number of tax returns with at least $1 million in earnings. Among the “super-rich,” the decline was even sharper: the number of tax returns reporting more than $10 million in earnings fell by 54 percent.32 In fact, while in 2006 the top 1 percent earned almost 20 percent of all income in America, that figure declined to just over 15 percent in 2009.33 Such volatility reflects the greater exposure that the wealthy face to risks associated with investment income. The stock market, for example, declined sharply during the recession, as did, obviously, the value of real estate. If inequality is your big concern, you should have been delighted by the recession. Inequality declined. It appears, then, that inequality may not be as big a problem as commonly portrayed. After considering taxes, transfers, and other factors, the gap between rich and poor is neither as large nor growing as rapidly as Piketty and others have alleged. But even if it were, the question arises as to why that should be condemned. Why is inequality ipso facto bad?

#### Educational inequality is declining

REARDON ’16 (Sean F.; Professor of Education – Stanford University, New York Times, “The Good News About Educational Inequality,” 8/26, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/28/opinion/sunday/the-good-news-about-educational-inequality.html#story-continues-1)ww

When inequality is the topic, it can seem as if all the news is bad. Income inequality continues to rise. Economic segregation is growing. Racial gaps in education, employment and health endure. Our society is not particularly fair.

But here is some good news about educational inequality: The enormous gap in academic performance between high- and low-income children has begun to narrow. Children entering kindergarten today are more equally prepared than they were in the late 1990s.

We know this from information collected over the last two decades by the National Center for Education Statistics. In the fall of 1998 and again in 2010, the N.C.E.S. sent early childhood assessors to roughly 1,000 public and private kindergartens across the United States. They sat down one-on-one with 15 to 25 children in each school to measure their reading and math skills. They asked children to identify shapes and colors, to count, to identify letters and to sound out words. They also surveyed parents to learn about the children’s experiences before entering kindergarten.

Working with the social scientist Ximena Portilla, we used this data to track changes over time in “school readiness gaps” — the differences in academic skills between low-income and high-income children entering kindergarten. What we found is surprising. From 1998 to 2010, the school readiness gap narrowed by 10 percent in math and 16 percent in reading. The gaps that remain are still vast. But even this modest improvement represents a sharp reversal of the trend over the preceding decades.

It’s worth noting that the gap in school readiness narrowed because of relatively rapid improvements in the skills of low-income children, not because the skills of children from high-income families declined. Research one of us did with Scott Latham at the University of Virginia showed that both poor and affluent children entered kindergarten in 2010 with stronger reading and math skills than they did in the late 1990s. School readiness gaps between racial groups have also improved: Both the white-black and white-Hispanic gaps narrowed by roughly 15 percent from 1998 to 2010.

These improvements appear to persist at least into fourth grade. Data from the National Assessment of Educational Progress show that by 2015, when those kindergartners were in fourth grade, their math and reading skills were roughly two-thirds of a grade level higher than those of their counterparts 12 years earlier. This was true for children of all racial and ethnic groups and for poor and nonpoor children alike.

#### Even if there’s inequality, it doesn’t correlate with poverty or lower living conditions

Tanner 16 (Michael D. Tanner, Cato Institute senior fellow, “Five Myths about Economic Inequality in America” 9/7/16 https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/five-myths-about-economic-inequality-america) GG

Perhaps the reason that there is so much concern over economic inequality is that we instinctively associate it with poverty. After all, poverty is the flip side of wealth. And, despite across-the-board gains in standards of living, too many Americans remain poor (at least by conventional measures). Slightly less than 15 percent of Americans lived in poverty in 2014, including 16 percent of women, 26.2 percent of African-Americans, and 21.1 percent of children.61 But, it is important to note that poverty and inequality are not the same thing. Indeed, if we were to double everyone’s income tomorrow, we would do much to reduce poverty, but the gap between rich and poor would grow larger. Would this be a bad thing? There is little demonstrable relationship between inequality and poverty. Poverty rates have sometimes risen during periods of relatively stable levels of inequality and declined during times of rising inequality. The idea that gains by one person necessarily mean losses by another reflects a zero-sum view of the economy that is simply untethered to history or economics. The economy is not fixed in size, with the only question being one of distribution. Rather, the entire pie can grow, with more resources available to all. Comparing the Gini coefficient, the official poverty measure, and two additional poverty measures (one based on income and accounting for taxes and transfers, and one based on consumption) developed by economists Bruce D. Meyer of the University of Chicago and James X. Sullivan of Notre Dame reveals no clear relationship between poverty and inequality (Figure 9).62 While the Gini coefficient has increased almost without interruption, the official poverty rate has fluctuated mostly in the 13-15 percent range and the two measures from Meyer and Sullivan have both decreased markedly since 1980.63 Again, the mid-1990s was an interesting period because the inequality was markedly higher than previously, but both the supplemental poverty measure (SPM) and the official rate saw significant decreases. Comparison with the consumption-based poverty measure is especially interesting, with poverty showing a substantial decline despite rising inequality. Since many observers believe that consumption is the best measure of the poor’s actual standard of living, this suggests that not only does rising inequality not correlate with greater poverty, but a rising tide may truly lift all boats. That is, those same economic factors that make it possible for the rich to become rich may make life better for the poor as well. One can see similar results from comparing the poverty rate to the share of after-tax income earned by the wealthiest 1 percent. There is no discernable correlation (Figure 10).64 The relationship between poverty and inequality remains unclear, in part because the number of confounding variables and broader societal changes make any kind of determination difficult. But what research there is generally finds that poverty cannot be tied to inequality. For instance, a recent paper by Dierdre Bloome of Harvard finds “little evidence of a relationship between individuals’ economic mobility and the income inequality they experienced when growing up… . Over a twenty year period in which income inequality rose continuously, the intergenerational income elasticity showed no consistent trend.” While most studies examine these trends at the national level, she delves into state-level variation in inequality and social mobility. Again, she finds no evidence of a relationship, as “the inequality to which children were exposed in their state when growing up provides no information about the mobility they experienced as adults.”65 We should also note that international experience parallels the United States. Using World Bank data, which puts the Gini coefficient on a scale of 100, we can see that there are multiple countries where this has been the case recently.66 For example, China had a Gini coefficient of 32.43 in 1990 and it rose to 42.06 in 2009, meaning China became much more unequal. At the same time, the proportion of the population living below $1.25 a day (adjusted for purchasing power parity), the measure usually used for international poverty lines, fell from 60.18 percent in 1990 to only 11.8 percent in 2009. Moreover, in discussing poverty and inequality, we should keep in mind that while the official poverty rate in the United States has been relatively stable since the mid-1970s, the sort of deep poverty that was once common among poor Americans has been largely eliminated despite whatever increase in inequality has occurred over the last 50 years. Take hunger, for example. In the 1960s, as much as a fifth of the U.S. population and more than a third of poor people had diets that did not meet the Recommended Dietary Allowance for key nutrients. Conditions in 266 U.S. counties were so bad that they were officially designated as “hunger areas.”67 Today, malnutrition has been significantly reduced. According to the U.S. Department of Agriculture, just 5.6 percent of U.S. households had “very low food security” in 2013, a category roughly comparable to the 1960s measurements.68 Even among people below the poverty level, only 18.5 percent report very low food security.69 Housing provides another example. As recently as 1975, more than 2.8 million renter households (roughly 11 percent of renter households and 4 percent of all households) lived in what was considered “severely inadequate” housing, defined as “units with physical defects or faulty plumbing, electricity, or heating.” Today that number is down to roughly 1.2 million renter households (1 percent of all households).70 In 1970, fully 17.5 percent of households did not have fully functioning plumbing; today, just 2 percent do not.71 And if you look at material goods, the case is even starker. In the 1960s, for instance, nearly a third of poor households had no telephone. Today, not only are telephones nearly universal, but roughly half of poor households own a computer. More than 98 percent have a television, and two-thirds have two or more TVs. In 1970, less than half of all poor people had a car; today, two-thirds do.72 Clearly, the material circumstances of poor families have improved significantly despite any possible increase in inequality. Not only do more people across the income distribution have access to more of these things, but adoption of new technologies and products is speeding up. Whereas it took decades for the telephone and electricity to make their way into the majority of American homes, new products, such as the cellphone and Internet, have a much faster adoption rate, as indicated in Thus, even as inequality, as measured by Piketty and others, has risen, people at the bottom of the income scale have better standards of living. It becomes an open question, therefore, whether inequality matters as long as everyone is becoming better off. In other words, if the poor are richer, do we care if the rich are even richer?

#### States are improving now

GROSS and HILL ’16 (Bethany; Research Director at the Center on Reinventing Public Education at the University of Washington Bothell and Paul T.; Research Professor of Public Affairs, University of Washington Bothell and Founder of the Center on Reinventing Public Education, “The State Role in K--12 Education: From Issuing Mandates to Experimentation,” Summer, 10 Harv. L. & Pol'y Rev. 299, l/n)ww

We have shown that states, with lingering influence of federal policy and greater analytic, bureaucratic, and policy capacity, are taking a great deal of initiative and borrowing ideas from one another. This is consistent with the ideal of cooperative federalism, which argues that states act independently but pay attention to one another's initiatives and imitate the most appealing ones. Of course, what is appealing can be defined in many ways; cooperative federalism can lead to the spread of ideas based on the politics or dominant ideology of the time rather than their ability to support improvements in student learning or reduce achievement gaps.

Based on the foregoing observations about policy feedback, we think it is safe to say that in the future few, if any, states will confine their roles to setting input requirements and funding levels. Consistent with the zeitgeist [\*319] of NCLB, at least some states will adopt positive leadership roles focused on improving education for all and reducing achievement gaps.

### Extend: “Education Doesn’t Solve”

#### Equal funding won’t solve for racial disparities

HERNANDEZ ’05 (Tanya Kateri; Professor of Law and Justice Frederick Hall Scholar – Rutgers-Newark, “To Be Brown in Brazil: Education and Segregation Latin American Style,” 29 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 683, l/n)ww

The advantage of using Brown to assist the efforts of educational reform rather than simply lobbying for color-blind equal financing is that, as examples in the United States have shown, equal funding does not necessarily equalize opportunity. n190 Severing race from class in the analysis and consideration of [\*713] policies to the persistent social exclusion of people of color inherently hampers the construction of an adequate policy solution. n191 That is why it is necessary to analyze the public school context in Brazil as a problem of both race and class. Merely seeking additional funding and resources for public schools leaves unaddressed the ways in which racialized reasoning can continue to inform financing priorities and the resulting construction of racially exclusive institutions of higher learning. Engaging in a holistic race and class analysis can provide a more accurate picture of the social problem and hopefully lead to a more effective solution than one based solely in a race-neutral class analysis.

#### Increasing educational opportunity merely replicates social inequality

Backer, 16 – professor of education at Cleveland State University (David, “The False Promise of Education” Jacobin Magazine, 11/16, <https://www.jacobinmag.com/2016/11/education-reform-inequality-jobs-economy/>

Whether rooted in notions of democracy or technology, both versions of the promise promote the notion of a compensatory education: that schools can compensate for unequal distribution of resources, rights, and recognition in American society.

But not everyone was convinced by the compensatory view. Bowles and Gintis critiqued the centrist promise in their landmark Schooling in Capitalist America. They articulated a more critical position on education, arguing that public education is part of a broader process of social reproduction: schooling activities correspond to existing echelons of social hierarchy and opportunity, preparing students for positions within that hierarchy. Schooling does not lead to opportunity in the sense that it creates opportunity; it simply prepares students to exist (or not exist) within the opportunity structure that the government and economy create.

Bowles and Gintis called this process “correspondence.” Race and class, they argued, define the positions students come to occupy in society, which largely correspond with their parents’ social positions and available opportunity. Overall, more and better schooling in an unequal society reproduces those inequalities, acting as a neutral institution, rather than a compensatory institution that equalizes them. (Some like Jonathan Kozol have argued that schooling exacerbates inequalities, though the reproductive view is more committed to schooling’s neutrality.)

Consider the job market numbers above. Schooling cannot control the number or kind of jobs available in an economy. For the last decade, for example, it was probably a good idea (in terms of potential income) to study petroleum engineering as an undergraduate. Today, given the dramatic fluctuations in oil prices, it’s perhaps not such a great idea. No matter how many people study petroleum engineering, or how good petroleum engineering education gets, it’s the petroleum industry and its fluctuations that determine how many jobs will be available and their respective salaries.

#### Empirically – increasing education won’t decrease social inequality

Backer, 16 – professor of education at Cleveland State University (David, “The False Promise of Education” Jacobin Magazine, 11/16, <https://www.jacobinmag.com/2016/11/education-reform-inequality-jobs-economy/>

Everyone knows that income inequality has increased exponentially between the 1970s and today. Yet at the same time that income inequality has skyrocketed, so has schooling. United States citizens are more educated than they ever have been. More people have graduated from more kinds of schools than at any point in history.

If the centrist promise were true, then greater educational attainment for the broader US population should have coincided with more economic success for more people. If schools create real opportunities for socioeconomic success, there should have been decreasing income inequality as the general population became more educated.

This is clearly not the case. As economists Thomas Piketty, Emmanuel Saez, and others have shown, the share of the top 1 percent increased exponentially in the second half of the twentieth century. Consider this in relation to the following graph, which charts educational attainment in the United States between 1940 and 2014.

The graph shows the opposite: educational attainment increased markedly, even during the moments where economic inequality also greatly increased. These data show that wealth goes to the wealthy, not the educated. At the macro-level, there is no relationship between socioeconomic success and schooling.

#### Education can’t solve economic inequality

Irwin 15 (Neil Irwin, New York Times, “Why More Education Won’t Fix Economic Equality” 3/31/15, Neil Irwin is a senior economics correspondent for The New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/01/upshot/why-more-education-wont-fix-economic-inequality.html) GG

Suppose you accept the persuasive data that inequality has been rising in the United States and most advanced nations in recent decades. But suppose you don't want to fight inequality through politically polarizing steps like higher taxes on the wealthy or a more generous social welfare system. There remains a plausible solution to rising inequality that avoids those polarizing ideas: strengthening education so that more Americans can benefit from the advances of the 21st-century economy. This is a solution that conservatives, centrists and liberals alike can comfortably get behind. After all, who doesn't favor a stronger educational system? But a new paper shows why the math just doesn't add up, at least if the goal is addressing the gap between the very rich and everyone else. Brad Hershbein. Melissa Kearney and Lawrence Summers offer a simple little simulation that shows the limits of education as an inequality-fighter. In short, more education would be great news for middle and lower-income Americans, increasing their pay and economic security. It just isn't up to the task of meaningfully reducing inequality, which is being driven by the sharp upward movement of the very top of the income distribution. It is all the more interesting that the research comes from Mr. Summers, a former Treasury secretary who is hardly known as a soak-the-rich class warrior. It is published by the Hamilton Project, a centrist research group operating with Wall Street funding and seeking to find third-way-style solutions to America's problems that can unite left and right. In their simulation, they assume that 10 percent of non-college-educated men of prime working age suddenly obtained a college degree or higher, which would be an unprecedented rise in the proportion of the work force with advanced education. They assume that these more educated men go from their current pay levels to pay that is in line with current college graduates, minus an adjustment for the fact that more college grads in the work force could depress their wages a bit. There is no doubt that in this simulated world with a more educated labor force, middle-income workers earn more — S37.060 in simulated 2013 earnings for a person at the 50th percentile, compared with 834,000 in the real world, a 9 percent improvement. But that improvement brings that 50th-percentile worker only back closer to the inflation-adjusted level of income he enjoyed in 1979. which was 537.838. Meanwhile, the 9oth-percentile worker in this simulation holds onto (and indeed improves upon) the sharp income gains of the past 34 years. Annual earnings at the 90th percentile climbed from 875,700 in 1979 to more than 1oo.ooo in both the actual 2013 data and the simulation with higher education levels. Add it all up, and the Gini ratio, a frequently used measure of income inequality, would decrease only to 0.55 from 0.57 in this scenario of drastic educational improvement. It would still be far higher than the 0.43 recorded in 1979. None of this is to say that a better educational system isn't desirable. The 9 percent income gain for middle-income men evident in the authors' simulation is a big deal. "Increasing the educational attainment of men without a college degree will increase their average earnings and their likelihood of being employed," the authors write. And even if it doesn't do much to reduce overall inequality, they find it does reduce inequality within the bottom half of the income distribution, by increasing the earnings of those near the 25th percentile of earnings (in 2013, those making S6.100 a year, compared with $8,720 in the simulation with higher education). In other words, it's worth pursuing more and better education for working- class Americans on its own terms, because it will improve their lives and economic potential. Inequality, meanwhile, is a deeper problem, and its potential solutions remain ideologically divisive.

#### No solvency – their scholarship conflates earnings inequality from overall inequality

Pathe 15 (Simone Pathe, PBS, “Why education won’t solve America’s inequality crisis” 4/2/15, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/making-sense/why-education-wont-solve-americas-inequality-crisis/) GG

Earnings inequality in America has increased since 1979 — that much we know. But why and what to do about it is murky — in part because we’re not all talking about the same group of people when we talk about inequality. “Many of us are talking past each other in public,” said Melissa Kearney, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and professor at the University of Maryland. She’s also the director of the Hamilton Project, which just released a new paper cutting through some of inequality’s monolithism by making an important distinction between what’s going on above and below the median wage distribution. There are really two separate, but often conflated, issues at play in America’s inequality story. The first is that Americans at the bottom end of the distribution face poor employment prospects and don’t earn enough money. That’s different from the second issue of overall inequality, which is largely driven by outsized earnings at the top of the distribution. The takeaway? Increased educational attainment can help address the first problem, but not the second. Using Current Population Survey data, Kearney, along with Hamilton co-author Brad Hershbein and former Treasury Secretary Larry Summers, simulated what the earnings distribution would look like if one out of every 10 men (between the ages of 25-64) who did not have a bachelor’s degree got one. In other words, they inflated the share of the population with a bachelor’s degree from about 32 percent to 39 percent, then looked at how that affects inequality. (They justify their exclusion of women, the predominant low-wage workers, by pointing to low-skilled men’s sharp decreases in employment and college attendance in the recent past.) The first take-away from their research is that higher education is still worth it. The college wage premium may have stagnated, Kearney said, but if men without bachelor’s degrees got them, their average earnings and employment prospects would increase. If college attainment elevated those workers, inequality in the bottom half of the earnings distribution would fall too. (Remember, though, this is a data simulation; it doesn’t take into account whether low-skilled men have the money or institutional support to complete a four-year degree in reality.) It’s easy to count that first conclusion as validation of skills-based-technological change. According to this structural interpretation of the labor market, Americans are unemployed and low-wage workers don’t earn enough because they don’t have the skills employers demand. (That’s different from plain-old skills-mismatch, which is a more cyclical problem.) If American workers can’t keep up with technology, the obvious remedy would be to bring them up to speed. That perspective was on full display at a February Hamilton Project forum and related paper — a kind of antecedent to this paper — called “The Future of Work in the Age of the Machine.” (Read our coverage of the event.) In today’s “second machine age,” robots not only replace manual workers; they’re coming after white-collar workers, too, which would seem to increase the education premium. But the authors’ second conclusion is far more depressing than knowing that a bunch of automated giants are after your job: increasing educational attainment really doesn’t reduce overall earnings inequality. Actually, no one thought it would, Kearney said. That’s because high overall inequality is a reflection of what’s going on at the top of the earnings distribution. Fragmentations between the 90th and 99th percentiles, for example, have nothing to do with differences in educational attainment, so boosting the share of the population receiving bachelor’s degrees is a moot point. The chart below shows the Gini and Theil coefficients, where 0 represents the most equitable distribution of earnings and 1 represents the most unequal. Note that the simulation (in both indices) doesn’t do much to return inequality to its 1979 levels. So improving education can help address one inequality problem, but certainly not all of the problem. In fact, at Hamilton’s February forum, Summers said — now somewhat famously — that skills training is “an evasion” of the problem. In Summers’ view, what’s in short supply today is work, not workers. Likewise, this recovery’s lousy productivity growth has convinced some economists, like the Center for Economic and Policy Research’s Dean Baker, that robots aren’t taking our jobs the way we’ve heard they are, calling into question the cry for more skills and training as a blanket solution. It’s worth noting, though, that training could mean many different things. Encouraging low-wage workers to complete vocational apprenticeships, for example, could have a different effect from pushing them to take on debt to study for a four-year degree. But regardless, that’s still the lower end of the earnings distribution we’re talking about. It will take stronger policy prescriptions than higher educational attainment, the authors write, to tackle the changes at the upper end of the earnings scale. Just what it’ll take though, is a matter of debate depending on why you believe earnings accrue toward the top. “It’s not immediately obvious, even to me,” what’s going on, Kearney said. Get ready for a whole lot more talking past each other.

#### Separate but equal fails

KELLY ’15 (James J., Jr.; Clinical Professor of Law – Notre Dame, “Sustaining Neighborhoods of Choice: From Land Bank(ing) to Land Trust(ing),” 54 Washburn L.J. 613, Summer, l/n)ww

As important as primary education is to personal development and economic opportunity, it is not at all clear that equality in basic education requires neighborhoods to be integrated socioeconomically. Elementary school student populations need not be integrated across class to be equal in their resources. For decades, advocates of educational equality have fought for school funding reforms that would even out differences among local school district budgets. n6 While parity in resources is absolutely essential for any intelligible claim of equality in educational opportunity, a "separate but equal" approach to the schooling of children from different socioeconomic groups fails for many of the same reasons that it did when used to justify racially segregated schools. n7

## Competitiveness Advantage Answers

### 1NC — Competitiveness Advantage Answers

#### 1. Education not key to competitiveness — alternate causes outweigh.

Artigiani, 12 - ‎Founder, President Emerita, and Member of Board of Directors of Global Kids (U.S. Education Reform and National Security, Independent Task Force Report of the Council on Foreign Relations, https://www.cfr.org/report/us-education-reform-and-national-security

National security requires a healthy economy, energy independence, investments in research and development, strong defense, a thriving civil society, a respected and involved diplomatic corps, and, most of all, a healthy and high-functioning political system. (The current political environment is a clear demonstration of what happens when we have a public—and public officials—who are uninformed and/or ill-informed about our nation’s history, our political system, and the values upon which it was built.)

Certainly schools must play a critical role in assuring that these needs of national security can be met. Yet, while some of the data are disturbing, nothing in this report convinces me that that our public schools “constitute a very grave national security threat facing this country.” Indeed, claims of alarm can only set the stage for dramatic actions unsupported by evidence: in this case, market-based approaches to school reform, that, overall, have not demonstrated their effectiveness. Indeed, charter schools and vouchers are diverting funds and energy away from neighborhood schools, and the more successful ones rely on additional support from private sources (“voluntary taxation”), a situation that is neither sustainable nor scalable. Moreover, the drive toward “competition” can diminish individual commitment to the common good, thus undermining the very nature and purpose of public education: preparing young people of all backgrounds to become informed and active citizens who understand their rights and responsibilities to contribute to society and participate in the shaping of policies that affect their communities and the larger world.

#### 2. No impact — loss of competitiveness only occurs against allied nations

Walt, 12 – Stephen Walt is a professor of international affairs at Harvard (U.S. Education Reform and National Security, Independent Task Force Report of the Council on Foreign Relations, <https://www.cfr.org/report/us-education-reform-and-national-security>

First, the report exaggerates the national security rationale for reforming U.S. K-12 education. It says a troubled public education system is a “very grave national security threat facing this country,” but it offers only anecdotal evidence to support this unconvincing claim. The United States spends more on national security than the next twenty nations combined, has an array of powerful allies around the world, and remains the world leader in science and technology. It also ranks in the top 10 percent of the world’s 193 countries in educational performance, and none of the states whose children outperform U.S. students is a potential rival. Barring major foreign policy blunders unrelated to K-12 education, no country is likely to match U.S. military power or overall technological supremacy for decades. There are good reasons to improve K-12 education, but an imminent threat to our national security is not high among them.

#### 3. The US is not falling behind educationally — data proves

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Because social class inequality is greater in the United States than in any of the countries with which we can reasonably be compared, the relative performance of U.S. adolescents is better than it appears when countries' national average performance is conventionally compared.

Because in every country, students at the bottom of the social class distribution perform worse than students higher in that distribution, U.S. average performance appears to be relatively low partly because we have so many more test takers from the bottom of the social class distribution.

■ A sampling error in the U.S. administration of the most recent international (PISA) test resulted in students from the most disadvantaged schools being over-represented in the overall U.S. test-taker sample. This error further depressed the reported average U.S. test score.

If U.S. adolescents had a social class distribution that was similar to the distribution in countries to which the United States is frequently compared, average reading scores in the United States would be higher than average reading scores in the similar post-industrial countries we examined (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom), and average math scores in the United States would be about the same as average math scores in similar post-industrial countries.

■ A re-estimated U.S. average PISA score that adjusted for a student population in the United States that is more disadvantaged than populations in otherwise similar post-industrial countries, and for the over-sampling of students from the most-disadvantaged schools in a recent U.S. international assessment sample, finds that the U.S. average score in both reading and mathematics would be higher than official reports indicate (in the case ofmathematics, substantially higher).

This re-estimate would also improve the U.S. place in the international ranking of all OECD countries, bringing the U.S. average score to sixth in reading and 13th in math. Conventional ranking reports based on PISA, which make no adjustments for social class composition or for sampling errors, and which rank countries irrespective of whether score differences are large enough to be meaningful, report that the U.S. average score is 14th in reading and 25th in math.

Disadvantaged and lower-middle-class U.S. students perform better (and in most cases, substantially better) than comparable students in similar post-industrial countries in reading. In math, disadvantaged and lower-middle-class U.S. students perform about the same as comparable students in similar post-industrial countries.

#### 4. No link between education and the economy — evidence inconclusive at best

OECD 10 – International economic forum with 35 member countries (The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, “The High Cost of Low Educational Performance”, OECD publication, 2010, http://www.oecd.org/pisa/44417824.pdf)//JSL

The consistency of growth with test scores seen here with the previous regional picture is quite remarkable. Moreover, once information is included on cognitive skills, school attainment bears no relation to economic growth. In other words, added years of schooling do not affect growth unless they yield greater achievement.17 Of course, much of the observed cognitive skill is developed in schools, so this does not say that schools are irrelevant. It does say that the quality of schools, as determined by increases in student achievement, is very important. Whether or not this is a causal relationship is indeed a very important issue from a policy standpoint. It is essential to know that, if a country managed to improve its achievement in some manner, it would see a commensurate improvement in its long-run growth rate. Said differently, if the figures simply reflect other factors that are correlated with test scores, a change in test scores may have little or no impact on the economy (unless the other factors also changed). Indeed, analysis of prior estimates of school attainment have been identified as possibly reflecting reverse causality; i.e., improved growth leads to more schooling rather than the reverse (Bils and Klenow, 2000).

It is difficult to develop conclusive tests of causality issues within the limited sample of countries included in the analysis. Nonetheless, Hanushek and Woessmann (2009) pursue a number of different approaches to ruling out major factors that could confound the results and that could lead to incorrect conclusions about the potential impact. In the end, none of the approaches addresses all of the important issues. Each approach fails to be conclusive for easily identified reasons. However, the combination of approaches, with similar support for the underlying growth models, provides some assurance that the most obvious problematic issues are not driving the results. First, this estimated relationship is little affected by including other possible determinants of economic growth. In an extensive investigation of alternative model specifications, different measures of cognitive skills, various groupings of countries including eliminating regional differences, and specific sub-periods of economic growth, Hanushek and Woessmann (2009) show a consistency of the alternative estimates - both in terms of quantitative impacts and statistical significance - that is uncommon to most cross-country growth modelling. Moreover, these estimates complement prior findings that measures of geographical location, political stability, capital stock, population growth, and school inputs (pupil-teacher ratios and various measures of spending) do not significantly affect the estimated impact of cognitive skills.18 The only substantial effect on the estimates is the inclusion of various measures of economic institutions (security of property rights and openness of the economy) which reduces the estimated impact of cognitive skills by 15%.19 These specification tests rule out some basic problems of omitted causal factors that have been seen in other work, but of course there are other possible omitted factors.20

Second, to tackle the most obvious reverse-causality issues, Hanushek and Woessmann (2009) separate the timing of the analysis by estimating the effect of scores on tests conducted until the early 1980s on economic growth in 1980-2000. In this analysis, available for a smaller sample of countries only, test scores pre-date the growth period. The estimate shows a significant positive effect that is about twice as large as the coefficient used in the simulations here. In addition, reverse causality from growth to test scores is also unlikely because additional resource in the school system (which might become affordable with increased growth) do not relate systematically to improved test scores (e.g. Hanushek, 2002).

Third, the analysis traces the impact on growth of just the variations in achievement that arise from institutional characteristics of each country's school system (exit examinations, autonomy, and private schooling).21 This estimated impact is essentially the same as previously reported, lending support both to the causal impact of more cognitive skills and to the conclusion that schooling policies can have direct economic returns. Nonetheless, countries that have good economic institutions may have good schooling 19 institutions, so that this approach, while guarding against simple reverse causality, cannot eliminate a variety of issues of omitted factors in the growth regressions.22

Fourth, one major concern is that countries with good economies also have good school systems - implying that those that grow faster because of the basic economic factors also have high achievement. To deal with this, immigrants to the United States who have been educated in their home countries are compared to those who were educated in the United States. Since it is the single labour market of the United States, any differences in labour-market returns associated with cognitive skills cannot arise because of differences in the economies of their home country. Looking at labour-market returns, the cognitive skills seen in the immigrant's home country lead to higher incomes - but only if the immigrant was educated at home. Immigrants from the same home country schooled in the United States see no economic return to home-country quality, thus pinpointing the value of better schools.23 While not free from problems, this difference-in-differences approach rules out the possibility that test scores simply reflect cultural factors or economic institutions of the home country.24 It also provides further support to the potential role of schools to change the cognitive skills of citizens in economically meaningful ways.

#### 5. Trump makes the impact inevitable

Klion, 17 --- Former Editor for Al Jazeera America and World Politics Review, (David Klion, Alternet, 06.09.17, “Donald Trump’s Foreign Policy Is So Much More Corrupt and Dangerous Than His Possible Ties to Putin,” <http://www.alternet.org/news-amp-politics/donald-trumps-foreign-policy-so-much-more-corrupt-and-dangerous-his-possible-ties>)

How to make sense of Donald Trump’s foreign policy? Is Trump an “America First” Jacksonian nationalist? An isolationist? A neoconservative? A conventional captive of the DC foreign policy establishment? A Russian puppet? An unhinged warmonger?

At any given moment he might appear to be any of these. But none of these labels quite capture Trump’s most distinguishing foreign policy characteristic: he’s a rube.

Consider what might be the most dramatic international development of Trump’s still-young presidency: the crisis in the Persian Gulf that broke out over the past week. Qatar, the tiny Arab kingdom where more than 10,000 U.S. troops are stationed, is suddenly a pariah within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), a six-member regional body dominated by neighboring Saudi Arabia. The Saudis and their allies, all of which the U.S. shares, are accusing Qatar of supporting extremist groups and of being a conduit for Iranian influence. Qatar is currently being blockaded and may run out of food, while regional affiliates of its state-backed TV network, Al Jazeera, are being shut down. (Disclosure: I am a former employee of the now-defunct Al Jazeera America, but have no current ties to that organization or to Qatar).

However this crisis plays out, it is surely not a coincidence that it comes on the heels of Trump’s high-profile visit to the Saudi capital of Riyadh, where he posed with a glowing orb alongside the Saudi king and the Egyptian dictator after signing off on a $100 billion arms deal (maybe). Since the blockade began, Trump has voiced support for the Saudis, as have officials in Israel, which was Trump’s next stop on his foreign trip. It certainly appears Trump gave the go-ahead, implicitly or explicitly, for a crackdown on Qatar, despite the aforementioned U.S. troop presence there.

One might conclude Trump is a strong supporter of Israel and Saudi Arabia, like many neoconservative policymakers, and earnestly believes that Qatar is the main source of extremism in the Middle East. But as Trump himself accurately pointed out not so long ago, Saudi Arabia is a major offender in this regard too. And even if he did hold this view, the neocon-dominated George W. Bush administration is responsible for building up the U.S. presence in Qatar. For better or worse, they didn’t let their distaste for the Qataris get in the way of their grand imperial strategy in the region.

What seems likelier is that Trump is getting played. He enjoyed being feted by the Saudis and the Israelis, believed whatever they told him, and has now signed off on a profoundly destabilizing course of events that undermines basic U.S. interests in the Gulf. On top of that, on Friday Secretary of State Rex Tillerson affirmed the alliance with Qatar and was contradicted by Trump, which is an almost unprecedented level of dysfunction in setting the basic terms of foreign policy. Staffing shortages at the State Department mean that Trump, who knows almost nothing about the nuances of international affairs, is not getting informed perspectives to compensate for his ignorance. Whereas a better-advised and more competent president, regardless of ideological orientation, would want the U.S. to manage a feud between its allies, Trump was happy to take the Saudi side, thereby exacerbating the crisis he helped set off in the first place.

Trump’s behavior regarding Qatar also helps account for the Russia scandal slowly eating away at his presidency. Various theories have been put forward for Trump’s warm feelings toward Russian President Vladimir Putin, ranging from a deep ideological affinity, to the alleged existence of kompromat that could be used as leverage against him, to his willingness to accommodate energy companies looking to extract billions of dollars in crude oil from the Arctic Circle. But the simplest explanation may be that Trump, again, was duped. He trusted Michael Flynn, who was happy to take money from the Russian government and to attend RT’s gala seated opposite Putin, whereas an even modestly well-advised presidential candidate would have shunned Flynn. (During Flynn’s brief tenure in the Trump administration, he also pushed for a policy shift favoring Turkey, from which he had also taken a large sum of money).

Trump savored Putin’s contempt for Hillary Clinton, and while anyone else might have been disturbed by the possibility of Russian hackers interfering in the U.S. election, he openly encouraged it. There may or may not be a deeper conspiracy at work here, but either way, Trump’s ignorance, credulity, and casual willingness to be used by a foreign power at the expense of U.S. interests are what made any of this possible.

Sometimes, Trump’s incompetence serves as a check on his most volatile instincts. For instance, after engaging in saber-rattling with North Korea and suggesting that the U.S. might act unilaterally without regard to Chinese interests, he actually spoke to Chinese President Xi Jinping and came away with a sober, mainstream approach to North Korea. On the one hand, this helped avert what could have been a very dangerous situation. On the other hand, it established that Xi, like his counterparts in Russia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and elsewhere, can easily manipulate the U.S. president to serve his interests.

At best, this means that the American Empire is going into accelerated and perhaps overdue decline under Trump. But the more disturbing implication is that it will encourage instability and regional wars. Trump may not be a puppet of any one country, but he’s also not the puppet of every country; there will be winners and losers in an international system where the U.S. has no strategic vision. Qatar, an authoritarian monarchy with a terrible human rights record, might not be the most sympathetic example, but its current plight demonstrates just how unreliable the U.S. is under Trump.

#### 6. Economic decline doesn’t cause conflict

DREZNER ’14 (Daniel, Professor of International Relations – Tufts University, “The System Worked: Global Economic Governance during the Great Recession,” World Politics, v. 66 n. 1, January)ww

The final significant outcome addresses a dog that hasn't barked: the effect of the Great Recession on cross-border conflict and violence. During the initial stages of the crisis, multiple analysts asserted that the financial crisis would lead states to increase their use of force as a tool for staying in power.42 They voiced genuine concern that the global economic downturn would lead to an increase in conflict—whether through greater internal repression, diversionary wars, arms races, or a ratcheting up of great power conflict. Violence in the Middle East, border disputes in the South China Sea, and even the disruptions of the Occupy movement fueled impressions of a surge in global public disorder. The aggregate data suggest otherwise, however. The Institute for Economics and Peace has concluded that "the average level of peacefulness in 2012 is approximately the same as it was in 2007."43 Interstate violence in particular has declined since the start of the financial crisis, as have military expenditures in most sampled countries. Other studies confirm that the Great Recession has not triggered any increase in violent conflict, as Lotta Themner and Peter Wallensteen conclude: "[T]he pattern is one of relative stability when we consider the trend for the past five years."44 The secular decline in violence that started with the end of the Cold War has not been reversed. Rogers Brubaker observes that "the crisis has not to date generated the surge in protectionist nationalism or ethnic exclusion that might have been expected."43

### Extend: “Education Not Key”

#### No measure of competitiveness depends upon education and the thesis of the advantage is empirically false

Cuban, 4 – professor of education at Stanford (Larry, “Centralized Policymaking and Classroom Gains”, Who's in Charge Here? : The Tangled Web of School Governance and Policy p. 108-109)

Finally, the central claim is that insufficiently educated workers have slowed U.S. productivity and threatened America's position in global markets. This argument is beset with several problems. For one, it does not explain how the United States enjoyed nearly a decade of unbroken prosperity in the 1990s. For another, U.S. productivity rates have increased (not decreased) during the past fifteen years. For a third, even with the weaker U.S. economy of 2000-02, the World Economic Forum found that the United States had the world's second most competitive economy, after Finland's (thankfully, nobody is warning that the Finns are coming). In short, few economists or public officials doubt the predominance of the U.S. economy today.11

In light of such prosperity and competitiveness and the pivotal role that student achievement is supposed to play in U.S. economic performance, one might reasonably have expected public schools to be commended for producing the graduates who contributed so much to this remarkable record. Yet corporate leaders, governors, policy analysts, and Oval Office occupants have uttered no such praise. Why? Could it be that economic gains do not depend so heavily on student test scores as public school critics contend? This has, indeed, dawned on various observers. As economist Kevin Hollenbeck of the W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research has put it, "The evidence seems to suggest that mediocre educational results do not threaten economic performance."12

It is worth bearing in mind what historian Lawrence Cremin wrote in 1990:

American economic competitiveness with Japan and other nations is to a considerable degree a function of monetary, trade and industrial policy, and of decisions made by the President and Congress, the Federal Reserve Board, and the federal Departments of the Treasury and Commerce and Labor. Therefore, to contend that problems of international competitiveness can be solved by education reform, especially education reform defined solely as school reform, is not merely Utopian and millennialist, it is at best foolish and at worst a crass effort to direct attention away from those truly responsible for doing something about competitiveness and to lay the burden instead on the schools.13

#### Education isn’t key to national security – too many other factors

ARTIGIANI ‘12 (Founder, President Emerita, and Member of Board of Directors of Global Kids, “U.S. Education Reform and National Security, Independent Task Force Report of the Council on Foreign Relations,” https://www.cfr.org/report/us-education-reform-and-national-security)ww

National security requires a healthy economy, energy independence, investments in research and development, strong defense, a thriving civil society, a respected and involved diplomatic corps, and, most of all, a healthy and high-functioning political system. (The current political environment is a clear demonstration of what happens when we have a public—and public officials—who are uninformed and/or ill-informed about our nation’s history, our political system, and the values upon which it was built.)

Certainly schools must play a critical role in assuring that these needs of national security can be met. Yet, while some of the data are disturbing, nothing in this report convinces me that that our public schools “constitute a very grave national security threat facing this country.” Indeed, claims of alarm can only set the stage for dramatic actions unsupported by evidence: in this case, market-based approaches to school reform, that, overall, have not demonstrated their effectiveness. Indeed, charter schools and vouchers are diverting funds and energy away from neighborhood schools, and the more successful ones rely on additional support from private sources (“voluntary taxation”), a situation that is neither sustainable nor scalable. Moreover, the drive toward “competition” can diminish individual commitment to the common good, thus undermining the very nature and purpose of public education: preparing young people of all backgrounds to become informed and active citizens who understand their rights and responsibilities to contribute to society and participate in the shaping of policies that affect their communities and the larger world.

### Extend: “No Impact to Competitiveness”

#### US leadership doesn’t cause peace

FETTWEIS ‘17 (Christopher J.-assistant professor of political science at Tulane University. “Unipolarity, Hegemony, and the New Peace” Published in Security Studies Vol 26 No 3. <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09636412.2017.1306394?src=recsys&journalCode=fsst20>)

Even the most ardent supporters of the hegemonic-stability explanation do not contend that US influence extends equally to all corners of the globe. The United States has concentrated its policing in what George Kennan used to call “strong points,” or the most important parts of the world: Western Europe, the Pacific Rim, and Persian Gulf.64 By doing so, Washington may well have contributed more to great power peace than the overall global decline in warfare. If the former phenomenon contributed to the latter, by essentially providing a behavioral model for weaker states to emulate, then perhaps this lends some support to the hegemonic-stability case.65 During the Cold War, the United States played referee to a few intra-West squabbles, especially between Greece and Turkey, and provided Hobbesian reassurance to Germany’s nervous neighbors. Other, equally plausible explanations exist for stability in the first world, including the presence of a common enemy, democracy, economic interdependence, general war aversion, etc. The looming presence of the leviathan is certainly among these plausible explanations, but only inside the US sphere of influence. Bipolarity was bad for the nonaligned world, where Soviet and Western intervention routinely exacerbated local conflicts. Unipolarity has generally been much better, but whether or not this was due to US action is again unclear. Overall US interest in the affairs of the Global South has dropped markedly since the end of the Cold War, as has the level of violence in almost all regions. There is less US intervention in the political and military affairs of Latin America compared to any time in the twentieth century, for instance, and also less conflict. Warfare in Africa is at an all-time low, as is relative US interest outside of counterterrorism and security assistance.66 **Regional peace and stability exist where there is US active intervention, as well as where there is not. No direct relationship seems to exist across regions**. If intervention can be considered a function of direct and indirect activity, of both political and military action, a regional picture might look like what is outlined in Table 1. These assessments of conflict are by necessity relative, because there has not been a “high” level of conflict in any region outside the Middle East during the period of the New Peace. Putting aside for the moment that important caveat, some points become clear. The great powers of the world are clustered in the upper right quadrant, where US intervention has been high, but conflict levels low. US intervention is imperfectly correlated with stability, however. Indeed, it is conceivable that the **relatively high level of US interest and activity has made the security situation in the Persian Gulf and broader Middle East worse**. In recent years, substantial hard power investments (Somalia, Afghanistan, Iraq), moderate intervention (Libya), and reliance on diplomacy (Syria) have been equally ineffective in stabilizing states torn by conflict. While it is possible that the region is essentially unpacifiable and no amount of police work would bring peace to its people, it remains hard to make the case that the US presence has improved matters. In this “strong point,” at least, US hegemony has failed to bring peace. In much of the rest of the world, the United States has not been especially eager to enforce any particular rules. Even rather incontrovertible evidence of genocide has not been enough to inspire action. Washington’s intervention choices have at best been erratic; Libya and Kosovo brought about action, but much more blood flowed uninterrupted in Rwanda, Darfur, Congo, Sri Lanka, and Syria. The US record of peacemaking is not exactly a long uninterrupted string of successes. During the turn-of-the-century conventional war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, a highlevel US delegation containing former and future National Security Advisors (Anthony Lake and Susan Rice) made a half-dozen trips to the region, but was unable to prevent either the outbreak or recurrence of the conflict. Lake and his team shuttled back and forth between the capitals with some frequency, and President Clinton made repeated phone calls to the leaders of the respective countries, offering to hold peace talks in the United States, all to no avail.67 The war ended in late 2000 when Ethiopia essentially won, and it controls the disputed territory to this day. The Horn of Africa is hardly the only region where states are free to fight one another today without fear of serious US involvement. Since they are choosing not to do so with increasing frequency, something else is probably affecting their calculations. Stability exists even in those places where the potential for intervention by the sheriff is minimal. Hegemonic stability can only take credit for influencing those decisions that would have ended in war without the presence, whether physical or psychological, of the United States. **It seems hard to make the case that the relative peace that has descended on so many regions is primarily due to the kind of heavy hand of the neoconservative leviathan,** or its lighter, more liberal cousin. Something else appears to be at work. Conflict and US Military Spending How does one measure polarity? Power is traditionally considered to be some combination of military and economic strength, but despite scores of efforts, no widely accepted formula exists. Perhaps overall military spending might be thought of as a proxy for hard power capabilities; perhaps too the amount of money the United States devotes to hard power is a reflection of the strength of the unipole. When compared to conflict levels, however, **there is no obvious correlation, and certainly not the kind of negative relationship between US spending and conflict that many hegemonic stability theorists would expect to see**. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on defense by about 25 percent, spending $100 billion less in real terms in 1998 that it did in 1990.68 To those believers in the neoconservative version of hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace,” argued Kristol and Kagan at the time.69 **The world grew dramatically more peaceful while the United States cut its forces**, however, and stayed just as peaceful while spending rebounded after the 9/11 terrorist attacks**. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the military budget was cut** under President Clinton, in other words, **and kept declining** (though more slowly, since levels were already low) as the Bush administration ramped it back up. Overall US military spending has varied during the period of the New Peace from a low in constant dollars of less than $400 billion to a high of more than $700 billion, but war does not seem to have noticed. The same nonrelationship exists between other potential proxy measurements for hegemony and conflict: **there does not seem to be much connection between warfare and fluctuations in US GDP, alliance commitments, and forward military presence**. There was very little fighting in Europe when there were 300,000 US troops stationed there, for example, and that has not changed as the number of Americans dwindled by 90 percent. Overall, **there does not seem to be much correlation between US actions and systemic stability**. Nothing the United States actually does seems to matter to the New Peace. It is possible that absolute military spending might not be as important to explain the phenomenon as relative. Although Washington cut back on spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. The United States has accounted for between 35 and 41 percent of global military spending every year since the collapse of the Soviet Union.70 The perception of relative US power might be the decisive factor in decisions made in other capitals. One cannot rule out the possibility that it is the perception of US power—and its willingness to use it—that keeps the peace. In other words, perhaps it is the grand strategy of the United States, rather than its absolute capability, that is decisive in maintaining stability. It is that to which we now turn. Conflict and US Grand Strategy The perception of US power, and the strength of its hegemony, is to some degree a function of grand strategy. If indeed US strategic choices are responsible for the New Peace, then variation in those choices ought to have consequences for the level of international conflict. A restrained United States is much less likely to play the role of sheriff than one following a more activist approach. Were the unipole to follow such a path, hegemonic-stability theorists warn, disaster would follow. Former National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski spoke for many when he warned that “outright chaos” could be expected to follow a loss of hegemony, including a string of quite specific issues, including new or renewed attempts to build regional empires (by China, Turkey, Russia, and Brazil) and the collapse of the US relationship with Mexico, as emboldened nationalists south of the border reassert 150-year-old territorial claims. Overall, without US dominance, today’s relatively peaceful world would turn “violent and bloodthirsty.” 71 Niall Ferguson foresees a post-hegemonic “Dark Age” in which “plunderers and pirates” target the big coastal cities like New York and Rotterdam, terrorists attack cruise liners and aircraft carriers alike, and the “wretchedly poor citizens” of Latin America are unable to resist the Protestantism brought to them by US evangelicals. Following the multiple (regional, fortunately) nuclear wars and plagues, the few remaining airlines would be forced to suspend service to all but the very richest cities.72 These are somewhat extreme versions of a central assumption of all hegemonic-stability theorists: a restrained United States would be accompanied by utter disaster. The “present danger” of which Kristol, Kagan, and their fellow travelers warn is that the United States “will shrink its responsibilities and—in a fit of absentmindedness, or parsimony, or indifference— allow the international order that it created and sustains to collapse.” 73 Liberals fear restraint as well, and also warn that a militarized version of primacy would be counterproductive in the long run. Although they believe that the rule-based order established by United States is more durable than the relatively fragile order discussed by the neoconservatives, liberals argue that Washington can undermine its creation over time through thoughtless unilateral actions that violate those rules. Many predicted that the invasion of Iraq and its general contempt for international institutions and law would call the legitimacy of the order into question. G. John Ikenberry worried that Bush’s “geostrategic wrecking ball” would lead to a more hostile, divided, and dangerous world.74 Thus while all hegemonicstability theorists expect a rise of chaos during a restrained presidency, liberals also have grave concerns regarding primacy. Overall, if either version is correct and global stability is provided by US hegemony, then maintaining that stability through a grand strategy based on either primacy (to neoconservatives) or “deep engagement” (to liberals) is clearly a wise choice.75 If, however, US actions are only tangentially related to the outbreak of the New Peace, or if any of the other proposed explanations are decisive, then the United States can retrench without fear of negative consequences. The grand strategy of the United States is therefore crucial to beliefs in hegemonic stability Although few observers would agree on the details, most would probably acknowledge that post-Cold War grand strategies of American presidents have differed in some important ways. The four administrations are reasonable representations of the four ideal types outlined by Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross in 1996.76 Under George H. W. Bush, the United States followed the path of “selective engagement,” which is sometimes referred to as “balance-of-power realism”; Bill Clinton’s grand strategy looks a great deal like what Posen and Ross call “cooperative security,” and others call “liberal internationalism”; George W. Bush, especially in his first term, forged a strategy that was as close to “primacy” as any president is likely to get; and Barack Obama, despite some early flirtation with liberalism, has followed a restrained realist path, which Posen and Ross label “neo-isolationism” but its proponents refer to as “strategic restraint.” 77 In no case did the various anticipated disorders materialize**.** As Table 2 demonstrates, **armed conflict levels fell steadily, irrespective of the grand strategic path Washington chose.** Neither the primacy of George W. Bush nor the restraint of Barack Obama had much effect on the level of global violence. Despite continued warnings (and the high-profile mess in Syria), the world has not experienced an increase in violence while the United States chose uninvolvement. If the grand strategy of the United States is responsible for the New Peace, it is leaving no trace in the evidence. Perhaps we should not expect a correlation to show up in this kind of analysis. While US behavior might have varied in the margins during this period, nether its relative advantage over its nearest rivals nor its commitments waivered in any important way. However, it is surely worth noting that if trends opposite to those discussed in the previous two sections had unfolded, if other states had reacted differently to fluctuations in either US military spending or grand strategy, then surely hegemonic stability theorists would argue that their expectations had been fulfilled. Many liberals were on the lookout for chaos while George W. Bush was in the White House, just as neoconservatives have been quick to identify apparent worldwide catastrophe under President Obama.78 If increases in violence would have been evidence for the wisdom of hegemonic strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the only evidence we have regarding the relationship between US power and international stability suggests that the two are unrelated. The rest of the world appears quite capable and willing to operate effectively without the presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise have precious little empirical support upon which to build their case. Hegemonic stability is a belief, in other words, rather than an established fact, and as such deserves a different kind of examination. The Political Psychology of Unipolarity Evidence supporting the notion that US power is primarily responsible for the New Peace is slim, but belief in the connection is quite strong, especially in policy circles. The best arena to examine the proposition is therefore not the world of measurable rationality, but rather that of the human mind. **Political psychology can shed more light on unipolarity than can any collection of data or evidence**. Just because an outcome is primarily psychological does not mean that it is less real; perception quickly becomes reality for both the unipolar state and those in the periphery. If all actors believe that the United States provides security and stability for the system, then behavior can be affected. Beliefs have deep explanatory power in international politics whether they have a firm foundation in empirical reality or not. Like all beliefs, faith in the stability provided by hegemony is rarely subjected to much analysis.79 Although they almost always have some basis in reality, beliefs need not pass rigorous tests to prove that they match it. No amount of evidence has been able to convince some people that vaccines do not cause autism, for example, or that the world is more peaceful than at any time before, or that the climate is changing due to human activity. Ultimately, as Robert Jervis explains, “we often believe as much in the face of evidence as because of it.” 80 Facts may change, but beliefs remain the same. When leaders are motivated to act based on unjustified, inaccurate beliefs, folly often follows. The person who decides to take a big risk because of astrological advice in the morning’s horoscope can benefit from baseless superstition if the risk pays off. Probability and luck suggest that successful policy choices can sometimes flow from incorrect beliefs. Far more often, however, poor intellectual foundations lead to suboptimal or even disastrous outcomes. It is worthwhile to analyze the foundations of even our most deeply held beliefs to determine which ones are good candidates to inspire poor policy choices in those who hold them. People are wonderful rationalizers. There is much to be said for being the strongest country in the world; their status provides Americans both security and psychological rewards, as well as strong incentives to construct a rationale for preserving the unipolar moment that goes beyond mere selfishness. Since people enjoy being “number one,” they are susceptible to perceiving reality in ways that brings the data in line with their desires. It is no coincidence that most hegemonic stability theorists are American.81 Perhaps the satisfaction that comes with being the unipolar power has inspired Americans to misperceive the positive role that their status plays in the world. Three findings from political psychology can shed light on perceptions of hegemonic stability. They are mutually supportive, and, when taken together, suggest that it is likely that US policymakers overestimate the extent to which their actions are responsible for the choices of others. The belief in the major US contribution to world peace is probably unjustified. The Illusion of Control Could 5 percent of the world’s population hope to enforce rules upon the rest? Would even an internationally hegemonic United States be capable of producing the New Peace? Perhaps, but it also may be true that believers in hegemonic stability may be affected by the very common tendency of people to overestimate their ability to control events. A variety of evidence has accumulated over the past forty years to support Ellen J. Langer’s original observations about the “illusion of control” that routinely distorts perception.82 Even in situations where outcomes are clearly generated by pure chance, people tend to believe that they can exert control over events.83 There is little reason to believe that leaders are somehow less susceptible to such illusions than subjects in controlled experiments. The extensive research on the illusion of control has revealed two further findings that suggest US illusions might be even stronger than average. First, misperceptions of control appear to be correlated with power: individuals with higher socioeconomic status, as well as those who are members of dominant groups, are more likely to overestimate their ability to control events.84 Powerful people tend to be far more confident than others, often overly so, and that confidence leads them to inflate their own importance.85 Leaders of superpowers are thus particularly vulnerable to distorted perceptions regarding their ability to affect the course of events. **US observers had a greater structural predisposition** than others, for example, **to believe that they would have been able to control events** in the Persian Gulf following an injection of creative instability in 2003. The skepticism of less powerful allies was easily discounted. Second, there is reason to believe that culture matters as well as power. People from societies that value individualism are more likely to harbor illusions of control than those from collectivist societies, where assumptions of group agency are more common. When compared to people from other parts of the world, Westerners tend to view the world as “highly subject to personal control,” in the words of Richard Nisbett.86 North Americans appear particularly vulnerable in this regard.87 Those who come from relatively powerful countries with individualistic societies are therefore at high risk for misperceiving their ability to influence events. For the United States, the illusion of control extends beyond the water’s edge. An oft-discussed public good supposedly conferred by US hegemony is order in those parts of the world uncontrolled by sovereign states, or the “global commons.” 88 One such common area is the sea, where the United States maintains the only true blue-water navy in the world. That the United States has brought this peace to the high seas is a central belief of hegemonic-stability theorists, one rarely examined in any serious way. Indeed the maritime environment has been unusually peaceful for decades; the biggest naval battles since Okinawa took place during the Falklands conflict in 1982, and they were fairly minor.89 If hegemony is the key variable explaining stability at sea, maritime security would have to be far more chaotic without the US Navy. It is equally if not more plausible to suggest, however, that the reason other states are not building blue-water navies is not because the United States dissuades them from doing so but rather because none feels that trade is imperiled.90 In earlier times, and certainly during the age of mercantilism, zero-sum economics inspired efforts to cut off the trade of opponents on occasion, making control the sea extremely important. Today the free flow of goods is vital to all economies, and it would be in the interest of no state to interrupt it.91 Free trade at sea may no longer need protection, in other words, because it essentially has no enemies; the sheriff may be patrolling a crime-free neighborhood. The threat from the few remaining pirates hardly requires a robust naval presence, and is certainly not what hegemonic-stability advocates mean when they compare the role played by the US Navy in 2016 to that of the Royal Navy in 1816. It is at least possible that shared interest in open, free commons keeps the peace at sea rather than the United States. Oceans unpatrolled by the US Navy may be about as stable as they are with the presence of its carriers. The degree to which 273 active-duty ships exert control over vast common parts is not at all clear. People overestimate the degree to which they control events in their lives. Furthermore, if these observations from political psychology are right about the factors that influence the growth of illusions of power, then **US leaders and analysts are particularly susceptible to misperception**. They may well be overestimating the degree to which the United States can affect the behavior of others. The rest of the world may be able to get along just fine, on land and at sea, without US attempts to control it. Ego-Centric and Self-Serving Biases in Attribution It is natural for people, whether presidents or commoners, to misperceive the role they play in the thinking process of others. Jervis was the first to discuss this phenomenon, now known as the “ego-centric bias,” which has been put to the test many times since he wrote four decades ago. Building on what was known as “attribution theory,” Jervis observed that actors tend to overestimate their importance in the decisions of others. Rarely are our actions as consequential upon their behavior as we believe them to be.92 This is not merely ego gratification, though that plays a role; actors are simply more conscious of their own actions than the other factors central to the internal deliberations in other capitals. Because people are more likely to remember their contributions to an outcome, they naturally grant themselves more causal weight.93 **Two further aspects of the ego-centric bias make US analysts even more susceptible to its effects.** First, the bias is magnified when the behavior of others is desirable. People generally take credit for positive outcomes and deflect responsibility for negative ones. This “self-serving bias” is one of the best-established findings in modern psychology, supported by many hundreds of studies.94 Supporters of Ronald Reagan are happy to give him credit for ending the Cold War, for instance, even though evidence that the United States had much influence on Premier Gorbachev’s decision making is scant at best.95 Today, since few outcomes are more desirable than global stability, it stands to reason that perceptions of the New Peace are prime candidates for distortion by ego-centric, self-serving biases. When war breaks out, it is not the fault of US leaders; when peace comes to a region, Washington is happy to take credit. There was for some time a debate among psychologists over just how universal self-serving biases were, or whether their effects varied across cultures. Extensive research has essentially settled the matter, to the extent that academic questions can ever be settled: a direct relationship appears to exist between cultural individualism and susceptibility to the bias, perhaps because of the value individualistic societies place on self-enhancement (as opposed to self-effacement).96 Actors from more collectivist societies tend to have their egos rewarded in different ways, such as through contributions to the community and connections to others. People from Western countries are far more likely to take credit for positive outcomes than those from Eastern, in other words, and subjects in the United States tower over the rest of the West. US leaders are therefore more culturally predisposed to believe that their actions are responsible for positive outcomes like peace. Second, self-perception is directly related to egocentric attributions. Individuals with high self-esteem are more likely to believe that they are at the center of the decision-making process of others than those who think somewhat more modestly.97 Leaders of any unipolar state may well be more likely to hold their country in high regard, and therefore are more vulnerable to exaggerated egocentric perceptions, than their contemporaries in smaller states. It might not occur to the lead diplomat of other counties to claim, as did Madeleine Albright, that “if we have to use force, it is because we are America; we are the indispensable nation. We stand tall and we see further than other countries into the future.” 98 It is not unreasonable to suspect that the US security community may be even more vulnerable to this misperception than the average group of people. For example, many in that community believed that the United States played a decisive role in Vladimir Putin’s decisions regarding Crimea and eastern Ukraine. President Obama’s various critics argued that perceptions of American weakness inspired or even invited Russian aggression. The refusal to act in Syria in particular emboldened Moscow (despite the fact that in 2008, in the face of ample displays of US action in the Middle East, Moscow had proven sufficiently bold to invade Georgia). Other critics suggested that a variety of provocative US behaviors since the end of the Cold War, especially the expansion of NATO and dissolution of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, poisoned US–Russian relations and led to an increase in Kremlin paranoia and eventually to the invasion.99 So, either through provocative weakness or bullying, we were responsible for their actions. Egocentric misperceptions are so ubiquitous and pervasive that they generate something of a law of political psychology: we are probably less influential in others’ decision making than we think we are. This extends to their decisions to resolve contentious issues peacefully. While it may be natural for US policymakers to interpret their role as crucial in the maintenance of world peace, it is very likely that Washington exaggerates its importance in the decision making of others, and in the maintenance of international stability. The effect of the ego-centric bias may be especially difficult for the unipolar United States to resist, because other countries do regularly take Washington’s position into account before acting. But US leaders—and the people who analyze them—should keep in mind that they are still probably less important to calculations made in other capitals than they believe. They may well be especially unlikely to recognize the possibility that hegemony is epiphenomenal, that it exists alongside, but does not affect, global stability and the New Peace. Overestimated Benevolence After three years in the White House, Ronald Reagan had learned something surprising: “Many people at the top of the Soviet hierarchy were genuinely afraid of America and Americans,” he wrote in his autobiography. He continued: “Perhaps this shouldn’t have surprised me, but it did … I’d always felt that from our deeds it must be clear to anyone that Americans were a moral people who starting at the birth of our nation had always used our power only as a force for good in the world…. During my first years in Washington, I think many of us took it for granted that the Russians, like ourselves, considered it unthinkable that the United States would launch a first strike against them.” 100 Reagan is certainly not alone in believing in the essential benevolent image of his nation. While it is common for actors to attribute negative motivations to the behavior of others, it is exceedingly difficult for them to accept that anyone could interpret their actions in negative ways. Leaders are well aware of their own motives and tend to assume that their peaceful intentions are obvious and transparent. Both strains of the hegemonic-stability explanation assume not only that US power is benevolent, but that others perceive it that way. Hegemonic stability depends on the perceptions of other states to be successful; it has no hope to succeed if it encounters resistance from the less powerful members of the system, or even if they simply refuse to follow the rules. Relatively small police forces require the general cooperation of large communities to have any chance of establishing order. They must perceive the sheriff as just, rational, and essentially nonthreatening. The lack of balancing behavior in the system, which has been puzzling to many realists, seems to support the notion of widespread perceptions of benevolent hegemony.101 Were they threatened by the order constructed by the United States, the argument goes, smaller states would react in ways that reflected their fears. Since internal and external balancing accompanied previous attempts to achieve hegemony, the absence of such behavior today suggests that something is different about the US version. Hegemonic-stability theorists purport to understand the perceptions of others, at times better than those others understand themselves. Complain as they may at times, other countries know that the United States is acting in the common interest. Objections to unipolarity, though widespread, are not “very seriously intended,” wrote Kagan, since “the truth about America’s dominant role in the world is known to most observers. And the truth is that the benevolent hegemony exercised by the United States is good for a vast portion of the world’s population.” 102 In the 1990s, Russian protests regarding NATO expansion—though nearly universal—were not taken seriously, since US planners believed the alliance’s benevolent intentions were apparent to all. Sagacious Russians understood that expansion would actually be beneficial, since it would bring stability to their western border.103 President Clinton and Secretary of State Warren Christopher were caught off guard by the hostility of their counterparts regarding the issue at a summit in Budapest in December 1994.104 Despite warnings from the vast majority of academic and policy experts about the likely Russian reaction and overall wisdom of expansion itself, the administration failed to anticipate Moscow’s position.105 The Russians did not seem to believe American assurances that expansion would actually be good for them**. The United States overestimated the degree to which others saw it as benevolent**. Once again, the culture of the United States might make its leaders more vulnerable to this misperception. The need for positive self-regard appears to be particularly strong in North American societies compared to elsewhere.106 Western egos tend to be gratified through self-promotion rather than humility, and independence rather than interdependence. Americans are more likely to feel good if they are unique rather than a good cog in society’s wheel, and uniquely good. The need to be perceived as benevolent, though universal, may well exert stronger encouragement for US observers to project their perceptions onto others. The United States almost certainly frightens others more than its leaders perceive. **A quarter of the 68,000 respondents to a 2013 Gallup poll in sixty-five countries identified the United States as the “greatest threat to world peace**,” which was more than three times the total for the second-place country (Pakistan).107 The international community always has to worry about the potential for police brutality, even if it occurs rarely. Such ungratefulness tends to come as a surprise to US leaders. In 2003, Condoleezza Rice was dismayed to discover resistance to US initiatives in Iraq: “There were times,” she said later, “that it appeared that American power was seen to be more dangerous than, perhaps, Saddam Hussein.” 108 Both liberals and neoconservatives probably exaggerate the extent to which US hegemony is everywhere secretly welcomed; it is not just petulant resentment, but understandable disagreement with US policies, that motivates counterhegemonic beliefs and behavior. To review, assuming for a moment that US leaders are subject to the same forces that affect every human being, they overestimate the amount of control they have over other actors, and are not as important to decisions made elsewhere as they believe themselves to be. And they probably perceive their own benevolence to be much greater than do others. These common phenomena all influence US beliefs in the same direction, and may well increase the apparent explanatory power of hegemony beyond what the facts would otherwise support. The United States is probably not as central to the New Peace as either liberals or neoconservatives believe. In the end, what can be said about the relationship between US power and international stability? Probably not much that will satisfy partisans, and the pacifying virtue of US hegemony will remain largely an article of faith in some circles in the policy world. Like most beliefs, it will remain immune to alteration by logic and evidence. Beliefs rarely change, so debates rarely end. For those not yet fully converted, however, perhaps it will be significant that corroborating evidence for the relationship is extremely hard to identify. If indeed hegemonic stability exists, it does so without leaving much of a trace. **Neither Washington’s spending, nor its interventions, nor its overall grand strategy seem to matter much to the levels of armed conflict around the world** (apart from those wars that Uncle Sam starts). The empirical record does not contain strong reasons to believe that unipolarity and the New Peace are related, and insights from political psychology suggest that hegemonic stability is a belief particularly susceptible to misperception. US leaders probably exaggerate the degree to which their power matters, and could retrench without much risk to themselves or the world around them. Researchers will need to look elsewhere to explain why the world has entered into the most peaceful period in its history. The good news from this is that the New Peace will probably persist for quite some time, no matter how dominant the United States is, or what policies President Trump follows, or how much resentment its actions cause in the periphery. The people of the twenty-first century are likely to be much safer and more secure than any of their predecessors, even if many of them do not always believe it..

#### U.S. leadership doesn’t contribute to global peace

FRIEDMAN et al. 13 (Benjamin H., research fellow in defense and homeland security studies; Brendan Rittenhouse Green, the Stanley Kaplan Postdoctoral Fellow in Political Science and Leadership Studies at Williams College; Justin Logan, Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute Fall 2013, “Correspondence: Debating American Engagement: The Future of U.S. Grand Strategy,” International Security, Vol. 38, No. 2, p. 181-199)

Brooks et al. argue that the specter of U.S. power eliminates some of the most baleful consequences of anarchy, producing a more peaceful world. U.S. security guarantees deter aggressors, reassure allies, and dampen security dilemmas (p. 34). “By supplying reassurance, deterrence, and active management,” Brooks et al. write, primacy “reduces security competition and does so in a way that slows the diffusion of power away from the United States” (pp. 39–40). There are three reasons to reject this logic: security competition is declining anyway; if competition increases, primacy will have difficulty stopping it; and even if competition occurred, it would pose little threat to the United States. An increasingly peaceful world. An array of research, some of which Brooks et al. cite, indicates that factors other than U.S. power are diminishing interstate war and security competition.2 These factors combine to make the costs of military aggression very high, and its benefits low.3 A major reason for peace is that conquest has grown more costly. Nuclear weapons make it nearly suicidal in some cases.4 Asia, the region where future great power competition is most likely, has a “geography of peace”: its maritime and mountainous regions are formidable barriers to conflict.5 Conquest also yields lower economic returns than in the past. Post-industrial economies that rely heavily on human capital and information are more difficult to exploit.6 Communications and transport technologies aid nationalism and other identity politics that make foreigners harder to manage. The lowering of trade barriers limits the returns from their forcible opening.7 Although states are slow learners, they increasingly appreciate these trends. That should not surprise structural realists. Through two world wars, the international system "selected against" hyperaggressive states and demonstrated even to victors the costs of major war. Others adapt to the changed calculus of military aggression through socialization.8 managing revisionist states. Brooks et al. caution against betting on these positive trends. They worry that if states behave the way offensive realism predicts, then security competition will be fierce even if its costs are high. Or, if nonsecurity preferences such as prestige, status, or glory motivate states, even secure states may become aggressive (pp. 36-37).9 These scenarios, however, are a bigger problem for primacy than for restraint. Offensive realist security paranoia stems from states' uncertainty about intentions; such states see alliances as temporary expedients of last resort, and U.S. military commitments are unlikely to comfort or deter them.10 Nonsecurity preferences are, by definition, resistant to the security blandishments that the United States can offer under primacy Brooks et al.'s revisionist actors are unlikely to find additional costs sufficient reason to hold back, or the threat of those costs to be particularly credible. The literature that Brooks et al. cite in arguing that the United States restrains allies actually suggests that offensive realist and prestige-oriented states will be the most resistant to the restraining effects of U.S. power. These studies suggest that it is most difficult for strong states to prevent conflict between weaker allies and their rivals when the restraining state is defending nonvital interests; when potential adversaries and allies have other alignment options;11 when the stronger state struggles to mobilize power domestically12; when the stronger state perceives reputational costs for non-involvement;13 and when allies have hawkish interests and the stronger state has only moderately dovish interests.14 In other words, the cases where it would be most important to restrain U.S. allies are those in which Washington's efforts at restraint would be least effective. Highly motivated actors, by definition, have strong hawkish interests. Primacy puts limits on U.S. dovishness, lest its commitments lack the credibility to deter or reassure. Such credibility concerns create perceived reputational costs for restraining or not bailing out allies. The United States will be defending secondary interests, which will create domestic obstacles to mobilizing power. U.S. allies have other alliance options, especially in Asia. In short, if states are insensitive to the factors incentivizing peace, then the United States' ability to manage global security will be doubtful. Third-party security competition will likely ensue anyway. costs for whom? Fortunately, foreign security competition poses little risk to the United States. Its wealth and geography create natural security. Historically, the only threats to U.S. sovereignty, territorial integrity, safety, or power position have been potential regional hegemons that could mobilize their resources to project political and military power into the Western Hemisphere. Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union arguably posed such threats. None exist today. Brooks et al. argue that "China's rise puts the possibility of its attaining regional hegemony on the table, at least in the medium to long term" (p. 38). That possibility is remote, even assuming that China sustains its rapid wealth creation. Regional hegemony requires China to develop the capacity to conquer Asia's other regional powers. India lies across the Himalayas and has nuclear weapons. Japan is across a sea and has the wealth to quickly build up its military and develop nuclear weapons. A disengaged United States would have ample warning and time to form alliances or regenerate forces before China realizes such vast ambitions. Brooks et al. warn that a variety of states would develop nuclear weapons absent U.S. protection. We agree that a proliferation cascade would create danger and that restraint may cause some new states to seek nuclear weapons. Proliferation cascades are nonetheless an unconvincing rationale for primacy. Primacy likely causes more proliferation among adversaries than it prevents among allies. States crosswise with the United States realize that nuclear arsenals deter U.S. attack and diminish its coercive power. U.S. protection, meanwhile, does not reliably stop allied and friendly states from building nuclear weapons. Witness British, French, and Israeli decisionmaking. Proliferation cascades were frequently predicted but never realized during the Cold War, when security was scarcer.15 New research argues that security considerations are often a secondary factor in the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and that states with the strongest appetites for proliferation often lack the technical and managerial capacities to acquire the bomb.16 Finally, even if proliferation cascades occur, they do not threaten U.S. security. Few, if any, states would be irrational enough to court destruction at the hands of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, especially if the United States is not enmeshed in their conflicts.

### Extend: “US Not Falling Behind”

#### Claims that the US is falling behind are exaggerated and misleading

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A 2009 international test of reading and math showed that American 15-year-olds perform more poorly, on average, than 15-year-olds in many other countries. This finding, from the Program for International Student Assessment (PISA),1 is consistent with previous PISA results, as well as with results from another international assessment of 8th-graders, the Trends in International Mathematics and Science Survey (TIMSS).2

From such tests, many journalists and policymakers have concluded that American student achievement lags woefully behind that in many comparable industrialized nations, that this shortcoming threatens the nation's economic future, and that these test results therefore suggest an urgent need for radical school reform.

Upon release of the 2011 TIMSS results, for example, U.S. Secretary of Education Arne Duncan called them "unacceptable," saying that they "underscore the urgency of accelerating achievement in secondary school and the need to close large and persistent achievement gaps" (Duncan 2012). Two years before, upon release of 2009 PISA scores, Duncan said that "...the 2009 PISA results show that American students are poorly prepared to compete in today's knowledge economy. . Americans need to wake up to this educational reality—instead of napping at the wheel while emerging competitors prepare their students for economic leadership." In particular, Duncan stressed the PISA results for disadvantaged U.S. students: "As disturbing as these national trends are for America, enormous achievement gaps among black and Hispanic students portend even more trouble for the U.S. in the years ahead. Last year, McKinsey & Company released an analysis which concluded that America's failure to close achievement gaps had imposed—and here I quote—'the economic equivalent of a permanent national recession.'" The PISA results, Duncan concluded, justify the reform policies he has been pursuing: "I was struck by the convergence between the practices of high-performing coun-tries and many of the reforms that state and local leaders have pursued in the last two years" (Duncan 2010).

This conclusion, however, is oversimplified, exaggerated, and misleading. It ignores the complexity of the content of test results and may well be leading policymakers to pursue inappropriate and even harmful reforms that change aspects of the U.S. education system that may be working well and neglect aspects that may be working poorly.

For example, as Secretary Duncan said, U.S. educational reform policy is motivated by a belief that the U.S. educational system is particularly failing disadvantaged children. Yet an analysis of international test score levels and trends shows that in important ways disadvantaged U.S. children perform better, relative to children in comparable nations, than do middle-class and advantaged children. More careful analysis of these levels and trends may lead policymakers to reconsider their assumption that almost all improvement efforts should be directed to the education of disadvantaged children and few such efforts to the education of middle-class and advantaged children.

Education analysts in the United States pay close attention to the level and trends of test scores disaggregated by socioeconomic groupings. Indeed, a central element of U.S. domestic education policy is the requirement that average scores be reported separately for racial and ethnic groups and for children who are from families whose incomes are low enough to qualify for the subsidized lunch program. We understand that a school with high proportions of disadvantaged children may be able to produce great "value-added" for its pupils, although its average test score levels may be low. It would be foolish to fail to apply this same understanding to comparisons of inter-national test scores.

Extensive educational research in the United States has demonstrated that students' family and community characteristics powerfully influence their school performance. Children whose parents read to them at home, whose health is good and can attend school regularly, who do not live in fear of crime and violence, who enjoy stable housing and continuous school attendance, whose parents' regular employment creates security, who are exposed to museums, libraries, music and art lessons, who travel outside their immediate neighborhoods, and who are surrounded by adults who model high educational achievement and attainment will, on average, achieve at higher levels than children without these educationally relevant advantages. We know much less about the extent to which similar factors affect achievement in other countries, but we should assume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that they do.

It is also the case that countries' educational effectiveness and their social class composition change over time. Consequently, comparisons of test score trends over time by social class group provide more useful information to policymakers than comparisons of total average test scores at one point in time or even of changes in total average test scores over time.

Unfortunately, our conversation about international test score comparisons has ignored such questions. It would be foolish, for example, to let international comparisons motivate radical changes in educational policies in a country whose social class subgroup average scores were below those of other nations, if that country's subgroups had been improving their performance at a more rapid rate than similar subgroups in other nations, even if the country's overall average still had not caught up. Just as a domestic U.S. school's average performance is influenced by its social class composition, so too might a country's average performance be influenced by its social class composition.

#### Sampling flaws mean the results of the tests can’t necessarily be trusted – major errors have happened

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None of the assessments to which we refer in this report, PISA, TIMSS, LTT, or Main NAEP, are universally administered to all students of the appropriate age or grade level in a country. Rather, the test is given to a small sample, but one that statisticians deem large enough to be representative of all students. The larger the sample, the more representative it can be. PISA, for example, constructed samples that were large enough for analysts to be confident of a 95 percent probability that results in the United States for reading are within about 7.5 points (two standard errors), and in mathematics about 7 points (two standard errors), of results that would be obtained if the test were given to all students.33

For each PISA test administration, it is necessary for each nation to determine a necessary sample size and then make a random selection of its 15-year-olds. If the sampling process is flawed, the reported results can be quite inaccurate. For example, if the proportion of low achievers in a country who take the test is higher than the proportion of low achievers in the nation as a whole, the reported "average" score will be artificially low, and not truly representative of that country's performance.

The sampling methodology is complex, and the possibility of sampling flaws is another reason why results should be treated with caution. Sampling requires selecting schools that are large enough to have a sufficient number of 15-year-olds and that seem to be representative of geographic regions; public and private schools; rural, suburban, and urban schools; schools with minority populations; and a few other characteristics.

Unfortunately, in 2009 a sampling flaw in the United States seems to have produced a PISA sample whose average score was lower than the average score would have been from an accurately representative U.S. sample.

#### Using international comparisons to shape educational policy should be avoided

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Other considerations, rarely considered in public debate, also influence the care we should take in the interpretation of international comparisons. One is how the curriculum is sampled in the framework for any particular test. Because the full range of knowledge and skills that we describe as "mathematics" cannot possibly be covered in a single brief test, policymakers should also carefully examine whether an assessment called a "mathematics" test necessarily covers knowledge and skills similar to those covered by other assessments also called "mathematics" tests, and whether performance on these different assessments can reasonably be compared. For example, American adolescents perform relatively well on algebra questions, and relatively poorly on geometry questions, compared to adolescents in other countries. Reports on how the United States compares to other countries show the United States in a more favorable light to the extent a test has more algebra items and fewer geometry items. Whether there is an appropriate balance between these topics on any particular international assessment is rarely considered by policymakers who draw conclusions about the relative performance of U.S. students from that assessment. Similar questions arise with regard to a "reading" test.

Whether U.S. policymakers want to reorient the curriculum to place more emphasis on geometry is a decision they should make without regard to whether such reorientation might influence comparative scores on an international test. It certainly might not be good public policy to reduce curricular emphasis on statistics and probability, skills essential to an educated citizenry in a democracy, in order to make more time available for geometry. There are undoubtedly other sub-skills covered by international reading and math tests on which some countries are relatively stronger and others are relatively weaker. Investigation of these differences should be undertaken before drawing policy conclusions from international test scores.

#### Basing educational policy off of international comparison data has severe flaws

Carnoy and Rothstein 13 - \*Vida Jacks Professor of Education and Economics at Stanford University and a research associate of the Economic Policy Institute with a Ph.D. in economics from the University of Chicago AND \*\*Research associate of the Economic Policy Institute and senior fellow of the Chief Justice Earl Warren Institute on Law and Social Policy at the University of California (Berkeley) School of Law (Martin and Richard, “What Do International Tests Really Show About U.S. Student Performance?”, Economic Policy Institute, 1/28/13, http://www.epi.org/files/2013/EPI-What-do-international-tests-really-show-about-US-student-performance.pdf)//JSL

In Parts V and VI, we described serious inconsistencies in the achievement trends for U. S. disadvantaged and advantaged students on several international and national tests. Such conflicting results suggest caution about drawing policy inferences without delving more deeply into what these tests measure. But beyond conflicting results among various evaluations of student learning, each test has its sampling peculiarities that can affect results. Some of these sampling peculiarities, such as the oversampling of U. S. disadvantaged students in high-poverty high schools in PISA, can bias the results to a degree that we can estimate. Other aspects of the tests, such as the greater tendency of students in some countries to random mark rather than leave answers blank, can also bias results in ways that we cannot estimate.

In most cases, it is not possible to re-estimate U.S. scores to account for elimination of such problems. But we can adjust for the effect on scores of the unusually disadvantaged sample of U.S. test takers and of a compounding of this effect by an oversampling of the most disadvantaged U.S. students in the PISA sample. We conclude that correcting for these two problems would improve the U.S. average score and international rank in both reading and mathematics; in the case of mathematics it improves the average score substantially.

Test makers also make decisions about how to sample the curriculum, and these decisions affect how countries' performances compare. For example, if one country's students do better in algebra than geometry, and another s do better in geometry than algebra, the first country will appear to have better math performance on a test that has a higher proportion of algebra questions and worse on a test that has a higher proportion of geometry questions. We have limited ability to make precise adjustments of international (or interstate) comparisons for these decisions, but we can show that they affect common judgments about relative national performance.

In this section, we review these various conflicts, flaws, and other possible biases in test results that suggest the need for caution in interpreting average national test score differences as valid measures of the comparative quality of U.S. schools.

#### International comparisons that show the US falling behind are flawed – no accounting for societal makeup

Carnoy and Rothstein 13 - \*Vida Jacks Professor of Education and Economics at Stanford University and a research associate of the Economic Policy Institute with a Ph.D. in economics from the University of Chicago AND \*\*Research associate of the Economic Policy Institute and senior fellow of the Chief Justice Earl Warren Institute on Law and Social Policy at the University of California (Berkeley) School of Law (Martin and Richard, “What Do International Tests Really Show About U.S. Student Performance?”, Economic Policy Institute, 1/28/13, <http://www.epi.org/files/2013/EPI-What-do-international-tests-really-show-about-US-student-performance.pdf)//JSL> \*\*Note: glib means shallow or superficial

Evidence-based policy has been a goal of American education policymakers for at least two decades. School reformers seek data about student knowledge and skills, hoping to use this information to improve schools. One category of such evidence, international test results, has seemingly permitted comparisons of student performance in the United States with that in other countries. Such comparisons have frequently been interpreted to show that American students perform poorly when compared to students internationally. From this, reformers conclude that U.S. public education is failing and that its failure imperils America's ability to compete with other nations economically.

This report, however, shows that such inferences are too glib. Comparative student performance on international tests should be interpreted with much greater care than policymakers typically give it. This care is essential for three reasons:

First, because academic performance differences are produced by home and community as well as school influences, there is an achievement gap between the relative average performance of students from higher and lower social classes in every industrialized nation. Thus, for a valid assessment of how well American schools perform, policymakers should compare the performance of U.S. students with that of students in other countries who have been and are being shaped by approximately similar home and community environments. Because the distribution of students between social classes varies from country to country, differences in overall average scores between countries reflect, to varying extents, differences in school quality and differences in the degree of social inequality. Likewise, because the social class distribution also varies within the United States by state, comparisons of students in particular U.S. states where international tests are administered should also compare students in these states with students in other states and countries who have similar social class characteristics. Policymakers and school reformers may acknowledge these realities, but frequently proceed to ignore them in practice, denouncing relative U.S. international test performance with sweeping generalizations that make no attempt to compare students from similar social class positions.

We have shown that U.S. student performance, in real terms and relative to other countries, improves considerably when we estimate average U.S. scores after adjusting for U.S. social class composition and for a lack of care in sampling disadvantaged students in particular. With these adjustments, U.S. scores would rank higher among OECD countries than commonly reported in reading—sixth best instead of 14th—and in mathematics—13th best instead of 25th.

Second, to be useful for policy purposes, information about student performance should include how this performance is changing over time. It is not evident what lessons policymakers should draw from a country whose student performance is higher than that in the United States, if that country's student performance has been declining while U.S student performance has been improving. Policy implications become especially challenging if relative U.S. performance has been improving for some social class groups but deteriorating for others. Because U.S. policy is especially concerned with the performance of disadvantaged children, it would be wise to focus attention on trends over time of similar children in other countries, whether their overall national averages are higher or lower than the overall U.S. average. It makes little sense to hold up as successful models for the United States educational policies for lower social class students in countries where their performance is in sharp decline, even if trends in the average performance of all students in such countries obscures the performance of disadvantaged students.

### Extend: “Trump Makes Inevitable”

#### Trump is the nail in the coffin for US leadership

Frum 17 [David Frum, senior editor at The Atlantic, was a speechwriter for George W. Bush, 5-31-2017, "The Death Knell for America's Global Leadership," Atlantic, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/05/mcmaster-cohn-trump/528609/]//Rank

H.R. McMaster and Gary Cohn may not be the most influential people in the Trump White House. But the national-security adviser and the director of the National Economic Council are surely the White House’s most presentable faces. When they sign their names to a statement of Trumpism at its most dangerous, we are warned: The so-called adults in the room are shirking their responsibilities.

On Tuesday, The Wall Street Journal published an op-ed bearing McMaster’s and Cohn’s names. It’s a good guess they did not actually write very much of it. However, they now own it—and the United States must bear the consequences.

The op-ed originates as an attempt to tell a story of success about Donald Trump’s catastrophic first trip abroad. During that trip the president spoke at the dedication of a monument to NATO’s Article 5 pledge of mutual defense—but notably omitted to endorse Article 5 itself. That omission was heard loud and clear. Its power was only amplified by the shadowy Russian connections of Donald Trump, his family, and his entourage. In private meetings, NATO leaders were dismayed by Trump’s behavior and bearing, so much so that the ultra-cautious chancellor of Germany declared in a major speech shortly after Trump’s departure that Europeans could no longer completely rely on the United States. Her chief political opponent in autumn elections agreed with her, and went further, comparing Donald Trump to an authoritarian leader.

So that’s the pig on which McMaster and Cohn tried to put lipstick. How’d they do it?

First step is the Trump administration’s fail-safe response to embarrassment: untruth.

This did not happen. You’ll find here examples of statements by President Bush and Obama that illustrate actual commitments to Article 5. Trump quite visibly veered away from saying anything like that. More to the point—since language is judged by what it communicates—none of his European hearers believe that he said it.

In any event, the WSJ op-ed confirms: He did not mean it.

This passage purports merely to describe. But in reality, it is recommending—and recommending something incompatible with American leadership. The United States leads an alliance of other wealthy and powerful states. Italy alone has an economy equal in size to Russia’s. This alliance defers to American leadership, to the extent that it does, because it trusts that leadership to be exercised with a view to something bigger than the selfish interests of the United States.

Since 1945, American leaders have based policy on two facts: a zone of cooperation encompassing democratic, rule-of-law states; a zone of competition between the group of democracies and other groups on this planet. Within the zone of cooperation, the usual frictions and disagreements of international life were to be managed by rules, especially trade rules, adjudicated by neutral arbiters. The ultimate expression of national power—military force—would be put utterly beyond the realm of things to be contemplated. But even such less-extreme manifestations of sovereignty as intelligence gathering would be done collectively, as if in this area the five closest democracies—the U.S., the U.K., Canada, Australia, and New Zealand—almost formed one government.

The national egoism that had inflicted so much suffering before 1945 would be suppressed on a new vision in which international politics would come to look more and more like domestic politics.

This vision was not always achieved of course. There were and are many disputes even between friends. But the theory of the case was that within the democratic world, cross-border cooperation would be regarded as the norm and the ideal; state-versus-state competition would be abnormal and unwelcome. All established democracies at least formally committed themselves to trade regimes based on the principle of gains from exchange.

This is the vision that the Cohn/McMaster op-ed rejects.

The rejection adds a sinister tint to these words:

There’s a lot to unpack here, and none of it is good.

First, those bold words about defending “interests and values” against adversaries sound ill in the mouth of administration officials who may owe their high offices in some degree to the clandestine assistance of a foreign adversary. So long as Russia’s attack on U.S. democracy in 2016 goes not only unpunished—but actively denied—by the Trump administration, they have no standing for this kind of robust language.

But they may attach a private meaning to that language. Trump himself and some of those who influence him pretty obviously regard the European Union, not Russia, as their most important adversary. Donald Trump has consistently refused to recognize even the existence of the EU, vainly attempting to negotiate trade agreements with individual member nations, despite their treaty obligations to each other. You can mark that attempt to Trump’s ignorance if you like, but according to German reports, Cohn himself—the former COO and president of Goldman Sachs!—tried the same gambit on the president’s trip.\*

But here is the truest tell. You can have friends. Or you can have people you work with only when your immediate interests align. Those are not the same thing. The Cohn/McMaster op-ed uses the word “friend”—without ever making clear who belongs to that category—but its logic is that of a nation friendless and alone. Perhaps the most terrifying thing about the Trump presidency is the way even its most worldly figures, in words composed for them by its deepest thinkers, have reimagined the United States in the image of their own chief: selfish, isolated, brutish, domineering, and driven by immediate appetites rather than ideals or even longer-term interests.

Like Trump himself, this general and this financier who speak for him know only the language of command, not of respect. They summon partners to join them "to enhance American security, promote American prosperity, and extend American influence around the world”—and never anticipate or answer the question, “Why should we British, French, Germans, Canadians, Australians, and on and on through the catalogue of your disrespected allies join that project?”

Under the slogan of restoring American greatness, they are destroying it. Promising readers that they want to “restore confidence in American leadership,” they instead threaten and bluster in ways that may persuade partners that America has ceased to be the leader they once respected—but an unpredictable and dangerous force in world affairs, itself to be contained and deterred by new coalitions of ex-friends.

#### Trump inevitably wrecks US leadership – leaving Paris accords proves

Horsey 17 [David Horsey, Two-time Pulitzer Prize-winning editorial cartoonist and columnist David Horsey is a political commentator for the Los Angeles Times, 6-2-2017, "Quitting Paris pact, Trump abdicates leadership of the free world," latimes, http://www.latimes.com/opinion/topoftheticket/la-na-tt-paris-trump-20170601-story.html]//Rank

Trump has turned the United States into a rogue nation. Only two other countries, Nicaragua and Syria, have refused to sign on to the Paris deal. The Department of Defense, major business leaders — including many in the oil and gas industry — Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, Energy Secretary Rick Perry and even Trump’s daughter, Ivanka, all urged Trump not to pull out of the climate change agreement, but he did it anyway. Apparently, Trump’s White House Rasputin, senior advisor Steve Bannon, and climate quacks like EPA Secretary Scott Pruitt sold him on the preposterous fallacy that the U.S. is a deeply aggrieved party in the deal.

Elon Musk, CEO of Tesla and SpaceX, announced on Thursday that he is carrying out his threat to leave the White House business advisory councils in reaction to Trump’s foolish move. In a tweet, Musk wrote, "Am departing presidential councils. Climate change is real. Leaving Paris is not good for America or the world.”

Unlike Trump, who played a master of business on TV while bankrupting his casinos and stiffing suppliers in real life, Musk is a real business genius who understands the future parameters of economic success. While Trump wheezes on about coal jobs, Musk and every other smart business leader in the world knows that alternative energy will be the driver of the global economy in the years to come. Even now, there are hundreds of thousands more Americans working in solar and wind power enterprises than in the grim and dirty coal mines.

The question is, how much will these growing sectors of the American economy be damaged by Trump’s bone-headed decision to fulfill a mindless campaign promise to abandon the climate deal? Will China become the leader in producing solar power hardware? Will Germany take the lead — and the profits — in wind energy? Part of the reason Brown is heading to China is to protect his state’s booming alternative energy enterprises.

In his speech announcing that he was pulling the U.S. out of the Paris agreement, Trump said he no longer wanted world leaders to be “laughing at us.” That is hilariously ironic. After his boorish, ignorant performance last week in meetings with European leaders, those leaders have been quite literally laughing at him. Trump imagines himself as a tough, savvy leader, but America’s allies and adversaries know a buffoon when they see one. Already, the Europeans have pledged to implement the Paris accords without America. There will be no new deal for Trump, the boastful dealmaker, to make.

The authoritarian regime in China will now be playing an even larger role in the world economy. Meanwhile, if anyone is the leader of the beleaguered free world, it is German Chancellor Angela Merkel. After Trump’s failure to reassert America’s commitment to come to the defense of fellow NATO members, Merkel said it is time for Europeans to “really take our fate into our own hands.”

In a campaign speech, Merkel said, “We have to know that we must fight for our future on our own, for our destiny as Europeans.”

Ukrainians may be experiencing similar feelings, given the latest revelation that, in the early days of his administration, Trump was eager to unilaterally drop economic sanctions against Russia that had been imposed as a punishment for the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Under Trump, the United States can no longer be counted on to back up free societies when they are threatened by aggressive autocrats like Vladimir Putin. Under Trump, human rights are off the foreign policy agenda and thuggish dictators, like Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte, have free rein to murder their citizens. Under Trump, the U.S. has quit a rational pact to address the looming threat of climate change that is endorsed by almost all other countries on the planet.

There will still be American officials like Brown and other governors and mayors taking the lead on climate change. In an MSNBC interview on Thursday, Brown said he is open to convening an international meeting to forge a climate agreement between California, Mexico and Canada.

There will still be business leaders like Musk building the new American economy on the foundation of sustainable energy. Of green power, Musk has said, "That's the vision for the future we think is the only sensible vision for the future — and the one we're building toward.”

Trump, though, has abdicated leadership. He will still be acting out the role of president the way he acted on “The Apprentice,” but he will not be leading. The rest of the world and the majority of Americans will not follow this ludicrous man.

#### Trump’s abandonment of international agreements makes decline in US leadership inevitable

Sherwood-Randall 17 [Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall served as the deputy secretary of energy from 2014-2017 and the White House coordinator for defense policy, countering WMD and arms control in 2013-2014, 6-8-2017, "Trump's foreign policy fantasies are eroding US leadership role," http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/foreign-policy/336912-trumps-foreign-policy-fantasies-are-eroding-us-leadership]//Rank

On June 1, President Trump announced his decision to withdraw the United States from the Paris climate agreement and immediately cease implementation of the commitments the United States had made in signing it in December 2015.

He claimed he had come to his decision for a variety of debunked rationales and added that he would be open to renegotiating U.S. climate commitments to be more favorable for U.S. interests. But that is not how diplomacy works, and instead of putting America first, the author of the "Art of the Deal" is actually putting America last.

America’s leadership of the world depends on its word, and our word is built on trust, follow-through and accountability. Since World War II, we have led the world by building alliances and partnerships in which predictability and continuity are essential to fielding the capabilities that deter threats and defend shared interests and values. Trump’s retrograde action threatens to destroy the trust in our word upon which our leadership and security depends.

On May 25, President Trump provided a stark example of just how damaging his disregard for upholding our commitments can be. He spoke to NATO leaders at the alliance’s new headquarters in Brussels, where he publicly chastised them for failing to spend more on defense and simultaneously failed to clearly reassert the solemn pledge of mutual defense that has undergirded the most successful alliance in human history for almost 70 years.

To strengthen the alliance and build solidarity to advance his global agenda, President Obama chose the opposite approach during his first meeting with NATO leaders in April 2009, observing that, “NATO was founded on the basis of a simple but solemn commitment: An attack on one is an attack on all. And from that foundation we forged the strongest alliance in history, an alliance that is stronger because it is made up of free nations”.

After Trump’s embarrassing NATO visit and his stubborn subsequent refusal to express support for the Paris Agreement to his G-7 colleagues at their meeting in Italy, German Chancellor Merkel declared that Europe “must really take our fate into our own hands. ”

The Paris climate agreement reflects a fundamental truth: We all must take action to meet the challenges of our times. America does not exist in a cocoon or a vacuum; the actions and reactions of humans across the globe are not contained by borders. That interdependence is fundamental to life on this planet in the 21st century.

Let’s set aside the multitude of environmental and economic reasons that the president made the wrong decision on the Paris Agreement and address the dangerous precedent he may be setting — and decisions he may be hinting at — regarding other major international agreements.

The risk is that this reversal is one in what may be a series of “undoings” that could profoundly damage America’s standing in the world, along with the security and health of the planet that we will leave to our children and grandchildren. For example, there is significant risk that the historic multinational agreement to stop Iran’s nuclear program — the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action — may be the next victim of a campaign promise.

With all other parties to the agreement in support of its continued implementation, pulling out of it or renegotiating its terms will put us on the wrong side of history, diminish our power, alienate our friends and embolden our adversaries.

Like the Paris Agreement, the JCPOA addresses a major threat to international security that brought together both allies and adversaries. President Trump seems to have little appreciation for how the JCPOA benefits the United States. He thinks both agreements were raw deals for us and evidently resents that other countries benefit at all from our participation.

As a participant in the policy process that led up to the conclusion of the JCPOA and as the former deputy secretary of a cabinet agency charged with holding the Iranian regime accountable for implementation of the agreement, I know that the agreement accomplished exactly what the U.S. wanted and needed it to do.

It dismantled Iran’s nuclear program and established intrusive enforcement mechanisms (via the International Atomic Energy Agency, backed by the technical support of many U.S. experts) that put the burden on Iran to prove its compliance.

Iran has already shipped 25,000 pounds of enriched uranium out of the country, dismantled and removed two-thirds of its centrifuges that would have produced uranium for nuclear weapons; removed the calandria from its heavy water reactor that would have produced plutonium for nuclear weapons and filled it with concrete; and provided unprecedented access to its nuclear facilities and supply chain that means we can verify its compliance at every step of the way.

Each of these actions make it harder for Iran to restart its large-scale enrichment program that is essential to building nuclear weapons — making the world measurably and verifiably safer.

President Trump seems to believe that a mythical better deal exists that addresses all Iranian destabilizing behaviors in the world. It doesn't. The president also seems to view these drastic decisions as bargaining tools that will induce the international community to give the U.S. exactly what it wants. They are not. Rather, his “America First” policy is an isolationist fantasy that will lead to an America that is alone and behind.

#### Trump leadership destroys U.S. influence in multilateral institutions

Demirel, 17 --- International Law and Governance Fellow at Young Professionals in Foreign Policy (Merve Demirel, 06.26.17, “President Trump and the Forfeiture of US Leadership,” Fair Observer, <https://www.fairobserver.com/region/north_america/donald-trump-us-foreign-policy-paris-agreement-news-analysis-61321/>)

President Donald Trump recently announced his intention to withdraw the United States from the Paris climate accord, marking the latest step in his gradual campaign to abdicate America’s traditional role as leader of the free world. In April of 2017, Trump withdrew $32.1 million from the United Nation Population Fund (UNPF). More recently, the administration proposed significant budget cuts to the United Nations, as well as to the UN peacekeeping mission, endangering the organization’s effectiveness and ability to function properly. It is now clear that the Trump administration’s America-centric rhetoric and isolationist policies are threatening US interests at home and abroad. But although it appears to be intensifying under his presidency, it is important to note that this trend did not actually start with Trump.

The United States has historically been at the front and center on the world stage, utilizing its powerful position to shape the structure of notable multilateral institutions, such as the UN, the International Atomic Energy Agency and the World Trade Organization. Nevertheless, the de-emphasis of US influence in global affairs started with the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and continued with the lack of US involvement in multilateral initiatives such as the International Criminal Court and the Kyoto Protocol.

Due to the Trump administration’s agenda, the decline in US influence throughout the international community is accelerating at an alarming pace. This is not surprising. Leading up to the election, the Trump campaign policy promoted an “America First” playbook to appeal to isolated voters that we now see become a reality.

Putting aside the alleged factors necessitating the decision to withdraw the United States from the Paris Agreement, President Trump pledged to “ensure that America remains the world leader on environmental issues” and stated that he would be open to renegotiating the deal. Unfortunately for Trump, significant signatories had already dismissed this idea. Remaining the world leader on environmental issues is no longer on the table.

Even though it will likely take years to withdraw from the Paris Agreement, the Trump administration’s intention is symbolic. The cumulative effect of these momentous steps is the forfeiture of US dominance in world affairs. This begs the question: Why should it matter to the United States if it is not the global leader it once was?

First, most of today’s challenges, from cybersecurity to climate change to free trade to religious extremism, are global issues that cannot be tackled alone or are too complex to isolate. An isolationist policy overlooks the interconnectedness of these issues with domestic ones, while an unilateralist policy overestimates the United States’ ability in dealing with such issues. Instead, a multilateral approach is required to not only confront and solve global issues, but also to do so in a manner that serves US interests.

Its position of leadership on the global stage allows the United States to influence international institutions and programs in beneficial ways, shaping policies catered to its own interests and values. For instance, after rejecting the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, the United States ironically played a central role in negotiating the Paris Agreement on more favourable terms. During his time in the Senate, Barack Obama observed about international governance systems that “instead of constraining our power, these institutions magnified it.”

Conversely, any vacuum left by the lack of US involvement will inevitably be filled by another nation that may or may not share the United States’ interests. For example, Chinese investment throughout Africa has been on the rise, and Russia continues to spread its sphere of influence across the Middle East and Eastern Europe as the US retreats. Europe is also stepping up its voice within the international community as it distances itself from the United States.

After President Trump blasted European leaders for not fulfilling their obligations under NATO, German Chancellor Merkel declared that Europe cannot rely on others and should be ready to take matters into its own hands. Further, during a joint press conference with Vladimir Putin, the newly elected French President Emmanuel Macron reprimanded Russian media outlets. He also offered France as a “second homeland” to Americans working on climate change. Based on these incidents, the United States is not only losing influence over international institutions, but it may have to watch as countries with differing interests play a much bigger role in shaping global policy and increase their share in the ever-changing global markets.

Finally, decreasing involvement on the multinational stage by cutting funding to international programs such as the UNPF will not serve US national security interests. The proposed cuts reduce US contribution to UN peacekeeping by about $1 billion, or 50% of what it currently contributes. This is in reality a negligible amount in terms of US military spending, yet it is crucial to the mission. While spending this money on creating peace abroad may seem irresponsible to some critics, the US unfortunately knows all too well how conflicts brewing in distant corners of the world can have dire consequences anywhere. Despite its weaknesses, the UN has been successful in working toward stability in conflict-ridden societies. In doing so, its missions have contributed to security globally and reduced the instances in which the United States may feel the need to intervene — at one-eighth the price tag of what it would cost the United States if it were to act alone.

US leadership is crucial to effectively influence multilateral institutions toward its domestic and global needs while keeping opposing interests at bay. The US government is turning its back on the international institutions and agreements it once lobbied to create. This will not help the United States achieve the greatness President Trump seeks to recapture. Instead, it will reduce its capability to single-handedly deal with the fundamental issues shaping our world.

## Solvency Answers

### 1NC — Solvency Answers

#### 1. Funding has no effect — statistical analyses and cross-national comparisons prove

Hanushek 5 [Eric A. Hanushek, was Professor of Economics and Political Science at the University of Rochester for two decades, and was recently appointed as a Senior Fellow of the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. He has held many senior government management and advisory positions related to education, and he is a member of the editorial boards of a number of the world’s most prestigious educational research journals. His books and research articles have become essential texts for professors and postgraduate students at major universities who are working in the fields of the economics of education and educational policy analysis, 2005, "Economic outcomes and school quality," The International Institute for Educational Planning and The International Academy of Education, http://hanushek.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/publications/Hanushek%202005%20IIEP%20EducPolSeries.pdf]//Rank

Much of school policy is traditionally thought of as an exercise in selecting and ensuring that the optimal set of resources, somehow defined, is available. Matched with this policy perspective has been a line of research considering the relationship between resource usage and student performance. If the effectiveness of different resources or combinations of resources were known, it would be straightforward to define an optimal set of resources. Moreover, we could often decide about policies that would move us toward such an optimal set of resources. Unfortunately, this alludes us.

Schools in the United States have been the focus of extensive research. Both aggregate data about performance of schools over time and more detailed school and classroom data point to a simple conclusion: There is a lack of any consistent or systematic effect of resources on student achievement. While controversial, partly because of the conflict with existing school policies, the evidence is very extensive (Hanushek, 2003).

Most other countries of the world have not tracked student performance over any length of time, making analyses comparable to the United States discussion impossible. Nonetheless, international testing over the past four decades permits an overview of spending across countries. Seven different mathematics and science tests (the data for the growth analysis) were given between the early 1960s and 1995 to students at different grade levels in a varying set of voluntarily participating nations. Performance bears little relationship to the patterns of expenditure across the countries. Hanushek and Kimko (2000) estimate models that relate spending, family backgrounds, and other characteristics of countries to student performance for the tests prior to 1995. This estimation consistently indicates a statistically significant negative effect of added resources on performance after controlling for other influences. Similar findings hold for the OECD countries.

Existing statistical analyses in less developed countries have shown a similar inconsistency of estimated resource effects as that found in the United States (Hanushek, 1995). In general, a minority of the available studies suggests much confidence that commonly identified resources – class size, teacher experience, and teacher salaries – positively influence student performance. There is generally somewhat stronger support for these resource policies than that existing in United States analyses, hinting that the importance of resources may vary with the level of resources. Nonetheless, the evidence does not indicate that pure resource policies can be expected to have a significant effect on student outcomes.

In sum, a wide range of analyses indicate that overall resource policies have not led to discernible improvements in student performance. It is important to understand what is and is not implied by this conclusion. First, it does not mean that money and resources never matter. There clearly are situations where small classes or added resources have an impact. It is just that no good description of when and where these situations occur is available, so that broad resource policies such as those legislated from central governments may hit some good uses but also hit bad uses that generally lead to offsetting outcomes. Second, this statement does not mean that money and resources cannot matter. Instead, as described below, altered sets of incentives could dramatically improve the use of resources.

The evidence on resources is remarkably consistent across countries, both developed and developing. Had there been distinctly different results for some subsets of countries, issues of what kinds of generalizations were possible would naturally arise. Such conflicts do not appear particularly important.

#### 2. Empirically – increases in education spending don’t create results

Robinson, 16 – Gerard, “A FEDERAL ROLE IN EDUCATION: ENCOURAGEMENT AS A GUIDING PHILOSOPHY FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING IN AMERICA” UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:919, http://lawreview.richmond.edu/files/2016/03/Robinson-503-.pdf

When assessing the growth of federal spending on education, it is important to note that the increase in federal spending has not resulted in improved student achievement on the National Assessment of Educational Progress (“NAEP”), referred to as “The Nation’s Report Card.” During testimony before a congressional education committee in 2012, Neal McClusky of the Cato Institute said, “the last 40-plus years of Federal involvement [in education] are a clear demonstration of futility.”23 In essence, education achievement remained flat for forty years while spending escalated. Two tables produced in conjunction with McClusky’s remarks illustrate this point.

#### 3. K-12 focus doesn’t solve—the first 5 years outweigh

Barnett & Lamy 13—Barnett: Board of Governors Professor and Director of the National Institute for Early Education Research (NIEER) at Rutgers University; Lamy: developmental and educational psychologist and research fellow with the National Institute for Early Education Research (NIEER) at Rutgers University (W. Steven Barnett and Cynthia E. Lamy, Closing the Opportunity Gap: What America Must Do to Give Every Child an Even Chance, “Achievement Gaps Start Early,” 4/23/13, chpt 7)//JLE

IN THE UNITED STATES, considerable public attention is focused on closing the achievement gap between children from poorer and wealthier families. 1 Typically, this gap ﬁrst becomes a highly visible public issue when children reach third or fourth grade and take state and national standardized tests for the ﬁ rst time. Concern intensiﬁes again during the high school years, when so many low-income and minority high school students drop out or fail to pass exit exams, and average achievement test scores continue to diﬀ er among socioeconomic groups. The achievement gap does not start at third or fourth grade, however. Signiﬁcant differences in the precursors of academic skills are evident from the earliest years of life and are associated with family circumstances, including income. Eﬀorts to close the achievement gap must begin with eﬀorts to close the opportunity gap that is the source of much of this early diﬀerence in abilities.

While group diﬀerences in children’s abilities and achievement typically are thought of as gaps, we approach this topic from a somewhat diﬀerent perspective. We recognize that what is commonly thought of as a vast gap between disparate groups—rich versus poor, Blacks and Hispanics versus Whites—can be seen upon closer inspection to be a gradient or gradual slope in which children’s abilities steadily increase over the entire family income range. Diﬀerences between minorities and Whites similarly can be seen to result from diﬀerences in economic and social circumstances and family characteristics that vary within as well as between groups. Recognition that the achievement gap is actually a steady, gradual change along an income or socioeconomic gradient allows us to see that the achievement and opportunity problem is not limited to children in poverty or to minority groups but aﬀects the vast majority of Americans.

To understand achievement gradients it helps to see them. Figures 7.1 and 7.2, based on data from the Early Childhood Longitudinal Study—Kindergarten cohort of 1999, display the gradients for children’s cognitive test scores and teacher ratings of children’s social abilities by income quintile at kindergarten entry. Viewed this way it is obvious that there is no sharp dividing line between the poor who are in the bottom quintile and everyone else. Instead we see a smooth, steady decline in scores moving from high to low income. Looking at achievement test scores, children at the median income are as far behind children in the top income quintile as poor children are behind those at the median income. Of course, not every child is at the average for their income level; some have higher abilities and others lower. These gradients are very persistent so that they look very much the same at tenth or twelfth grade as at kindergarten. Th is pattern recurs in the gradient for high school dropout rate by family income. 2

Ability gradients emerge very early in life. Sizeable diﬀerences in children’s abilities by family background appear before age ﬁve.3 Hart and Risley found that three-year-olds from low-income families knew only about half as many words as those from higher-income families.4 More recent studies ﬁnd Black children far behind their White peers in pre-academic skills by age three.5 By the time they enter kindergarten, children in poverty can be 12 or 18 months behind the average child.6 As we noted earlier, inadequate progress is not limited to children in poverty. Across the entire income spectrum, nearly 40 percent of American children at age ﬁve are classiﬁ ed as not ready for kindergarten, and most of these children are not poor.7

#### 4. Formal equity requirements aren’t enforceable – it creates a race to the bottom

Gordon, 16 - Nora Gordon is an Associate Professor of Public Policy at Georgetown University, and a Research Associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research (“Increasing Targeting, Flexibility, and Transparency in Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act to Help Disadvantaged Students” March, <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Full-Paper.pdf>

3. Eliminate Education Finance Incentive Grants. Education Finance Incentive Grants have the most complicated formula of the four Title I grants. These grants are a well-intentioned attempt to reward states for having a greater ratio of per-pupil spending to per-capita income (effort), and lower variance in per-pupil spending across districts (equity), but they have several critical flaws. First, even if Congress could get states to spend more and try to equalize fully, this could inadvertently penalize efficient spending, or encourage school finance regimes that result in a “race to the bottom.” Second, effort and equity are functions of budget decisions at the state and local levels; as difficult as it would be to incentivize state legislatures with this opaque formula, motivating the local school boards or voters who must approve tax changes is unrealistic. Finally, though political decisions affect equity and effort, so do other factors that cannot be readily manipulated by education policy (e.g., longstanding patterns of economic residential segregation within a state), so the formula bestows some rewards arbitrarily. Similar to my proposal for Concentration Grants, I propose to remove the Education Finance Incentive Grants funding mechanism from the law and redirect its budget share (nearly a quarter of Title I, Part A funds to LEAs in 2015) to Targeted Grants.

#### 5. Flexibility Turn — Equity regulations overcentralize decisionmaking – drives up costs, causes staffing instability and across the board cuts in programs

Gordon, 16 - NORA GORDON, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, McCOURT SCHOOL OF PUBLIC POLICY, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY, AND RESEARCH ASSOCIATE, NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH (“SUPPLANTING THE LAW AND LOCAL EDUCATION AUTHORITY THROUGH REGULATORY FIAT” 9/21, <https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-114hhrg21538/pdf/CHRG-114hhrg21538.pdf>

The goal of greater equity is critical, and school districts and states absolutely need to tackle improved spending equity head on. However, the approach that ED takes has important negative policy and practical implications for Title I and other low- income schools, as well as for public schools in general. These include:

o Less school-level decision-making. In order to comply, a district's central office will need to manage all spending decisions - such as hiring, purchasing, and other programming decisions that require money. School-level decisions on whom to hire and what to buy would have to be overturned by central office staff if those choices resulted in numbers that do not comply with the rule.

o Instability in school staffing in places that cannot raise additional state and local money. Because staffing costs are typically the largest cost center, the shifting of teachers and other school staff would likely be necessary in order to comply with the proposed rule

o More expensive but less effective teachers in Title I schools. In some districts, non-Title I schools will need to reduce costs, but will likely seek to keep their best teachers. This could mean more expensive, but worse teachers being assigned to Title I schools. This would comply with the proposed rule, but not promote equity.

o Cutting entire programs in a district - like music, art, or PE - in order to get the money to make the numbers meet the compliance requirement. Districts could also choose to cut programs with high cost variability that complicate compliance from year to year.

o Reducing local support for public schools and the taxes that support them. If programs that are important to a district are lost, and that impacts support for local levies or other taxes, the rule could level spending down, not up.

o Changing which Title I eligible schools get the federal funds, to meet compliance goals rather than programming goals. Depending on district finances, they could choose to spread federal funds more thinly to more schools, or to cut Title I from some currently participating schools—solely to pass the test.

o Possible loss of state and local funds for low-income schools that do not participate in Title I. It's a common misperception that Title I and non- Title I schools break down by poor vs. affluent status. However "affluent" is not a synonym for "non-Title I." Which schools participate in Title I varies greatly by district. Some districts choose to concentrate Title I funds in only their very highest poverty schools in order to give those schools more money. For example, a district may only serve schools at 90% poverty or above with Title I. This means that all other poor schools in that district that are Title I eligible - schools in the 35% to 89% poverty range - are not Title I schools. Most would agree that schools in this poverty range are not affluent. The proposed rule could result in these kinds of high-poverty, Title I eligible schools losing state and local funds, in order to make the numbers balance to meet the proposed rule.

### Extend: “Funding Not Key to Education”

#### Increased funding does nothing – latest data proves

Dorsey 17 (David Dorsey, “CENSUS DATA CONFIRMS NO CORRELATION BETWEEN SCHOOL SPENDING AND ACHIEVEMENT”, Kansas Policy Institute, 6/17/2017, accessed 7/6/17, https://kansaspolicy.org/census-data-no-spending-achievement-correlation/)//DGV

The U.S. Census Bureau recently released the 2014 education revenue and spending data for the fifty states and District of Columbia. The Census Bureau reports spending per-pupil using what they call “current spending,”\* which allows state-to-state comparisons. Having such data enables an updated look at spending levels and student achievement.

Education Week publishes the annual Quality Counts report, which is a report card on the state of education for all 50 states and District of Columbia. The current, 20th annual edition, released earlier this year, relies heavily on the 2015 National Assssment of Educational Progress (NAEP) results to calculate an achievement index for all 51 jurisdictions. Using 12 NAEP indicators (including how well low-income students performed), Quality Counts gives each state a score on a scale of 1 to 100.





Figure 1 is a scatterplot of the 50 states and D.C. for per-pupil spending (per the new census data) and 2015 NAEP index. It is yet another example of the absence of correlation between per-pupil spending and achievement. The trend line has virtually no slant, and the R2 value, a numeric representation of how close each plotted point is to the trend line, of 0.09 is lower than what is considered even a “weak” correlation. Evidence of a strong correlation would have a scatterplot with a much steeper trend line and a significantly higher R2 value. Here’s the best example of the disconnect between spending and achievement: New York, the state with the highest per-pupil spending, had a lower NAEP index than the state with the lowest per-pupil spending, Utah. Utah’s per-pupil spending is less than one-third of New York’s. The District of Columbia, which had the second highest spending, had the fifth lowest achievement. The Kansas data point is the red starburst.

An argument could be made that certainly states like New York, Alaska and Hawaii would spend much more per-pupil due to a higher cost of living in those states. The Missouri Economic Research and Information Center (MERIC), a division of the Missouri Department of Economic Development publishes a cost of living index for every state and D.C. When applying the most recent index (first quarter of 2016) to per-pupil spending the relationship between education spending and achievement is actually weaker. When making the cost of living adjustment Wyoming becomes the highest spending state and Hawaii is the lowest. Despite spending an adjusted amount nearly three times as much, Wyoming students barely exceed the performance of those in Hawaii. Conversely, Massachusetts, the highest performing state has an adjusted per-pupil spending only slightly higher than Mississippi, the lowest performing state. (Again, Kansas is the red starburst.)



This lack of correlation between spending and achievement is a virtual mirror image of the one reported in this blog, a response to the Quality Counts report, in which NAEP scores were paired with state education spending as a percentage of total taxable resources.

For those in the education community who continue to bang the drum for money, what’s the justification when it is clear that more money doesn’t lead to higher ending and outcomes, let alone a causal relationship?

#### Exogenous factors overwhelm extra funding

Darby and Levy, 11 – Derrick Darby is the Associate Professor of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Kansas. Richard E. Levy is a J.B. Smith Distinguished Professor of Constitutional Law at the University of Kansas School of Law. (Derrick Darby and Richard E. Levy, “SLAYING THE INEQUALITY VILLAIN IN SCHOOL FINANCE: IS THE RIGHT TO EDUCATION THE SILVER BULLET?,” 20 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 351, LexisNexis, SRA)

[\*370] It is overly simplistic to assume that there is a perfect correlation between educational funding and outcomes. To be sure, it seems clear that fully funded education will, overall, achieve better results than education not funded at all. It is also clear that educational inputs, such as teachers, facilities, and other learning resources - all of which cost money - will have some influence on educational outcomes. On the other hand, it is by no means clear that improving funding and inputs will alleviate persistent educational inequalities. Even assuming that the funding spent matters and that funding is devoted to the most effective educational inputs, n93 the educational and social science literature suggests that educational outcomes are dramatically affected by exogenous factors, such as a student's family background and neighborhood environment, not to mention individual choice, effort, and taste for education. n94 While there has been considerable debate within the literature about whether and how various factors affect educational outcomes, it is reasonably clear that efforts to improve educational outcomes must take into account many factors beyond funding and material resources.

#### Title I funding is misspent on irrelevant services

Dynarski and Kainz 15– Dynarski is a Nonresident Senior Fellow and Kainz is a Research Associate Professor, School of Education, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (Mark Dynarski and Kirsten Kainz, 11-20-2015, "Why federal spending on disadvantaged students (Title I) doesn’t work", https://www.brookings.edu/research/why-federal-spending-on-disadvantaged-students-title-i-doesnt-work/, MW)

What is purchased with Title I funds?

In 2010, the Government Accountability Office visited 12 school districts in four states to explore what happened to the money. The nation’s ‘watchdog’ agency could not simply check a database or spreadsheet to determine how Title I money was spent. They had to send investigators into the field. This is not a criticism of the GAO. There is no database they could have referenced, so they went to the field to learn what they could. They did note in their report that Education Department officials ‘want to allow schools to spend the money to meet their unique needs and to be free to spend the money creatively.’

The money might be spent creatively but what the GAO reported is not much cause for thinking the money is spent effectively.[vi] Most of the money—84 percent—is spent on ‘instruction,’ which is not surprising for a program that operates in schools. Some districts used funds for teacher professional development in the form of workshops or by hiring coaches to support regular classroom teachers, or funded smaller class sizes, provided after-school programs and summer-school programs, or bought technology hardware or software.

These findings are corroborated by recent data from the Early Childhood Longitudinal Study’s kindergarten cohort, which administered a survey to principals of schools that included a kindergarten. Principals were asked how they spent Title 1 funds. The survey did not ask dollar amounts or proportions, unfortunately. Principals checked off ways in which money was spent without indicating how much was spent. The table counts principals not receiving Title 1 funds as responding ‘no spending’ in each category.

The table shows that 81 percent of principals reported spending Title I money on professional development. The percent is higher—93 percent—in urban schools and in schools with high poverty rates (more than 75% free or reduced price lunch). How much is spent on professional development is hard to assess because the districts report spending in categories such as ‘instruction’ that includes teachers and teacher aides. If teachers hired through Title I are coaching other teachers, they are counted as teachers and not as professional developers, though that’s their role.

What works and what the money is spent on are different things

Evidence of effectiveness is lacking for nearly all these activities. For example, the New Teacher Project recently reviewed research on the effectiveness of professional development, and the title of its report provides the answer—‘The Mirage.”[vii] They found no evidence of effective professional development programs. They did find evidence of massive expenditures on professional development, even more than in other professional fields, and evidence that teachers mostly disliked professional development activities and did not feel the activities were tailored to their needs.

Two large and rigorous studies of professional development conducted by the Institute of Education Sciences—one focusing on reading[viii] and the other on math[ix]—likewise found no evidence that intensive professional development improved student achievement. And the professional-development programs the Institute studied were ones that were more expensive and required greater time commitments than ones likely to be supported by Title I.

Other ways in which Title I funds are spent also are not supported by evidence, or are too vaguely reported to know whether they are. After-school programs have been shown not to be effective.[x] The same is true of technology used in classrooms.[xi] In the late eighties, a study of class-size reduction in Tennessee showed effects, but to get these effects, class sizes were reduced from an average of 23 students to 15 students. Class-size reductions of this size and expense are not happening in Title I schools based on additional federal funding of a few hundred dollars per student.

#### Funding benefits are disproven through a multitude of studies

Dynarski and Kainz 15 – Dynarski is a Nonresident Senior Fellow and Kainz is a Research Associate Professor, School of Education, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (Mark Dynarski and Kirsten Kainz, 11-20-2015, "Why federal spending on disadvantaged students (Title I) doesn’t work", https://www.brookings.edu/research/why-federal-spending-on-disadvantaged-students-title-i-doesnt-work/, MW)

The Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) is being reauthorized. Its largest program, Title I, provides funding to states and districts to improve education for disadvantaged students. However, its funding per student is quite low, averaging about $500 to $600 a year. And there is little evidence that the overall program is effective or that its funds are used for effective services and activities. Large proportions of school principals report using Title I funds for teacher professional development, which many studies have shown to be ineffective and which teachers do not find valuable. Other services on which principals spent Title I funds include after-school and summer programs, technology purchases, and supplemental services, which also have been shown to be ineffective, and class-size reductions, which are unlikely to be of the size needed to generate effects found in previous research.

#### 50-year statistical analysis years shows weak correlation in resource funding and quality of education

Hanushek 3—senior fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University and research associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research (Eric A., “The Failure of Input-Based Schooling Policies,” The Economic Journal, 2/13/03, JSTORE. Vol. 113 No. 485)//JLE

1. School Inputs and Outcomes

Much of the policy discussion throughout the world concentrates on schooling inputs, a seemingly natural focus. And, with the longstanding importance that has been attached to schooling, considerable change has occurred in the levels of common inputs. Class sizes have fallen, qualifications of teachers have risen, and expenditures have increased. Unfortunately, little evidence exists to suggest that any significant changes in student outcomes have accompanied this growth in resources devoted to schools. Because many find the limited relationship between school inputs and student outcomes surprising and hard to believe, this section delves into the evidence available on this score in some detail.

These data on aggregate cost and performance provide strong prima facie evi- dence that simple resource policies are not generally effective. Much of the cur- rent policy discussion argues that with additional resources it would be possible to implement programmes or approaches that lift student achievement. Of course, these are precisely the same arguments made over the past decades. The validity of current proposals rests on these current proposals being notably superior to the policies of the past (which were hypothesised at the time also to be superior policies).

The simplest and perhaps clearest demonstration of the resource story is found in the aggregate US data over the past few decades. The US, operating under a system that is largely decentralised to the 50 separate states, has pursued the conven- tionally advocated resource policies vigorously. Table 1 tracks the patterns of pupil- teacher ratios, teacher education, and teacher experience. Between 1960 and 2000, pupil-teacher ratios fell by almost 40%. The proportion of teachers with a master's degree or more over doubled so that a majority of all US teachers today have at least a master's degree. Finally, median teacher experience - which is more driven by demographic cycles than active policy - increased significantly, almost doubling since its trough in 1970.

American teachers are heavily unionised, and the most common structure of teacher contracts identifies teacher education levels and teacher experience as the driving force behind salaries. Thus, as teacher inputs rise and as the numbers of students per teachers decline, expenditure per pupil rises. As seen in the bottom row of Table 1, real expenditures per pupil more than tripled over this period.4 In fact, this period is not special in US schools. Over the entire 100 years of 1890- 1990, real spending per pupil rose by at a remarkably steady pace of 31/2% per year (Hanushek and Rivkin, 1997). Over this longer period, real per student expen- diture in 1990 dollars goes from $164 in 1890 to $772 in 1940 to $4,622 in 1990 – roughly quintupling in each 50 year period.5

[\*CHART OMMITTED\*]

The question remains, what was obtained for these spending increases? Since the early 1970s, a random sample of students in the US has been given tests at differing ages in various subjects under the auspices of the National Assessment of Educational Progress, or NAEP. These tests have been designed to provide a consistent measure of performance over time. Figure 1 gives performance data for the same period as the previously described input data. In this Figure the pattern of average performance by 17-year-olds is traced for reading, mathematics, and science. The performance of students in mathematics and reading is ever so

[\*CHART OMITED\*]

slightly higher in 1999 than 30 years before when spending was dramatically low- er.6 The performance of students in science is significantly lower in 1999 than it was in 1970. Writing performance (not shown) was first tested in 1984 and declined steadily until 1996 when testing was discontinued.

The only other test that provides a national picture of performance over a long period of time is the Scholastic Aptitude Test, or SAT. This college admissions test has the advantage of providing data going back to the 1960s but the disadvantage of being a voluntary test taken by a selective subset of the population.7 Scores on this test actually plunged from the mid-1960s until the end of the 1970s, suggesting that the NAEP scores that begin in the 1970s may understate the magnitude of the performance problem.8

In simplest terms, input policies have been vigorously pursued over a long period of time, but there is no evidence that the added resources have improved student performance, at least for the most recent three decades when it has been possible to compare quantitative outcomes directly. This evidence suggests that the efficacy of further input-based policies depends crucially on improved use of re- sources compared to past history.

#### Prior funding increases disprove solvency

Lips & Watkins 8—Lips: Senior Policy Analyst in Education in the Domestic Policy Studies Department @ Heritage, Watkins: Ph.D., is Policy Analyst in Empirical Studies in the Center for Data Analysis @heritage (Dan Lips and Shanea Watkins, “Does Spending More on Education Improve Academic Achievement?,” Heritage Foundation, 8/0/08, http://www.heritage.org/education/report/does-spending-more-education-improve-academic-achievement)//JLE

Historical Trends in Public Education Spending

Many people believe that lack of funding is a problem in public education,[10] but historical trends show that American spending on public education is at an all-time high. Between 1994 and 2004, average per-pupil expenditures in American public schools have increased by 23.5 percent (adjusted for inflation). Between 1984 and 2004, real expenditures per pupil increased by 49 percent.[11] These increases follow the historical trend of ever-increasing real per-student expenditures in the nation's public schools. In fact, the per-pupil expenditures in 1970-1971 ($4,060) were less than half of per-pupil expenditures in 2005-2006 ($9,266) after adjusting for inflation.[12]

Appendix A presents the growth of per-pupil expenditures by state compared to the national average. Over the past decade, real expenditures per pupil have increased in all 50 states and the District of Columbia, increasing the most in Vermont (47.5 percent) and the least in Alaska(5.9 percent).

[OMITTED: B2179 Chart 2]

Federal spending on Education has also increased dramatically, as shown in Chart 2. Combined federal support and estimated federal tax expenditures for elementary and secondary education has increased by 138 percent (adjusted for inflation) since 1985. On a per-pupil basis, real federal spending on K-12 education has also increased significantly over time. (See Chart 3.) In 2005, the federal government spent $971 per pupil, more than three times its level of spending in 1970 ($311) after adjusting for inflation.

[OMITTED: B2179 Chart 3]

Education Spending and Academic Achievement

Given the significant increase in resources allocated to public Education, policymakers should consider whether government spending increases have led to improved student outcomes. This will help to determine whether future increases in education spending can be expected to yield tangible improvements for students.

A basic comparison of long-term spending trends with long-term measures of student academic achievement challenges the belief that spending is correlated with achievement. Chart 4 compares real per-pupil expenditures with American students test scores on the long-term National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) reading examination from 1970 to 2004. While spending per pupil has more than doubled, reading scores have remained relatively flat.

[OMITTED: B2179 Chart 4]

High school graduation rates provide another historical barometer of American educational performance. According to the National Center for Education Statistics, the average freshman graduation rate for American public schools has remained relatively flat over time. In 1990-1991, the average graduation rate was 73.7 percent. By 2004-2005, the rate had increased modestly to 74.7.[13] However, the most recent estimate for the 2005-2006 school year shows that the national freshman graduation rate has dipped to 73.4 percent.[14]

A key focus of Education reform efforts in recent decades has been to improve opportunities for disadvantaged students and to reduce the achievement gap between white students and ethnic minority children. Appendix B presents long-term NAEP 4th, 8th, and 12th grade reading and math scores of specific student groups, including white, black, and Hispanic children from the 1970s through 2004. Black and Hispanic students have improved test scores in both subjects across all student levels. However, the achievement gap persists, with black and Hispanic children still lagging behind their white peers despite decades of federal aid targeted at equalizing opportunities for all students.[15] Similarly, in 2005-2006, the national high school graduation rate for white students (80.6 percent) remained significantly higher than the graduation rates of black students (59.1 percent) and Hispanic students (61.4 percent).[16]

Academic Literature on Education Spending and Achievement

Academic researchers have sought to answer the question of whether Education expenditures are correlated with student performance. However, there is a lack of consistent evidence on whether Education expenditures are related to academic achievement. Eric Hanushek has studied the effect of per-pupil expenditures on academic outcomes, finding either no relationship or a relationship that is either weak or inconsistent.[17] However, researchers Larry V. Hedges and Rob Greenwald analyzed the same data used by Hanushek and concluded that increasing per-pupil expenditures has a significant positive impact on student achievement.[18]

Despite the lack of consistent findings, leading researchers in the area acknowledge that any effect of per-pupil expenditures on academic outcomes depends on how the money is spent, not on how much money is spent. According to Hanushek:

Few people…would recommend just dumping extra resources into existing schools. America has…followed that program for several decades, with no sign that student performance has improved.… …The issue is getting productive uses from current and added spending. The existing evidence simply indicates that the typical school system today does not use resources well (at least if promoting student achievement is their purpose).[19]

Hedges and Greenwald note that:

[T]he results do not provide detailed information on the educationally or economically efficient means to allocate existing and new dollars.… [D]iscussions of school reform… should instead incorporate an assessment of the current relation between inputs and outcomes and determine how to best allocate resources in specific contexts.[20]

What is clear from these competing findings is that policymakers should seriously consider improving how to allocate educational resources more effectively.

The evidence about Education spending and achievement leads to the following important lessons:

American spending on public K-12 education is at an all-time high and is still rising. Polls show that many people believe that a lack of resources is a primary problem facing public schools. Yet spending on American K-12 public Education is at an all-time high. Approximately $9,300 is spent per pupil. Real spending per student has increased by 23.5 percent over the past decade and by 49 percent over the past 20 years.

Continuous spending increases have not corresponded with equal improvement in American educational performance. Long-term measures of American students' academic achievement, such as long-term NAEP reading scale scores and high school graduation rates, show that the performance of American students has not improved dramatically in recent decades, despite substantial spending increases. The lack of a correlation between long-term Education spending and performance does not suggest that resources are not a factor in academic performance, but it does suggest that simply increasing spending is unlikely to improve educational performance.

Increasing federal funding on Education has not been followed by similar gains in student achievement. Federal spending on elementary and secondary Education has also increased significantly in recent decades. Since 1985, real federal spending on K-12 education has increased by 138 percent. On a per-student basis, federal spending on K-12 education has tripled since 1970. Yet, long-term measures of American students' academic achievement have not seen similar increases. Long-term test scores among specific student populations, including ethnic minorities that have been a main focus of federal Education policy, have improved some. However, the achievement gaps among white, black, and Hispanic students persist in test scores and graduation rates.

#### No evidence to support that an increase in funding raises student achievement

Hanushek 9—Hanushek: senior fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University and research associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research(Eric A, “The Effectiveness of Court-Ordered Funding of Schools ,” American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 4/09, http://hanushek.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/publications/Hanushek%2BLindseth%202009%20EducOutlook%206.pdf)//JLE

Since the late 1980s, state court judges in over twenty states, deriving their authority from the education clauses of their respective state constitutions, have struck down school finance systems as not “adequate.” Pointing to evidence of unacceptable student achievement outcomes, especially among poor and disadvantaged students, advocates of court intervention argue that student outcomes can be improved with additional funding; that is, all children can learn, given sufficient resources. Many courts have accepted this premise and have ordered legislatures to provide unprecedented increases in state appropriations for K–12 schools. Unfortunately, the track record of these judicial interventions suggests that increased funding without other more fundamental changes typically does not lead to improved student performance.

Although the premise underlying “educational adequacy” lawsuits—that more court-ordered resources will result in higher outcomes—is accepted by many in the education community, almost no one has seriously examined the empirical evidence to determine its validity. Several of the adequacy remedies ordered by the courts have been in place for a decade or more, yet no one, to our knowledge, has compared the pre- and postremedy student outcome data to determine whether student achievement has actually improved in response to the significantly increased funding and resources made available by virtue of the courts’ orders. Instead, most commentators point out the obvious—that increased funding has led to additional programs and personnel and new and improved facilities. The most important question— has student achievement improved as a result of the court interventions?—remains a subject barely addressed by the education research community.

Nor have the courts seemed too interested in this vital question. While courts are often guided in their decisions by what judges in other states have done, rarely has any court considered whether the remedies in other states have actually produced improved student achievement. Rather than examining the relevant achievement outcomes of other states, judges tend to rely on the testimony of expert witnesses and school personnel who tout their own pet programs and predict significantly better outcomes if such programs are funded and properly implemented. Indeed, even when judging the effectiveness of their own previously ordered remedies, courts rarely examine the remedy’s effect on student achievement. For example, the Wyoming Supreme Court, after more than a decade of unprecedented funding increases for Wyoming’s public schools, declared that the state legislature was in compliance with the state constitution. Yet, in its related lengthy 2008 opinion, the court barely discussed whether student performance had improved. The court’s only words on the subject were that “at the time of trial Wyoming ranked as one of the highest states in the nation for schools making adequate yearly progress under the federal No Child Left Behind programs.” This was hardly surprising, given Wyoming’s relatively advantaged student population. No inquiry was made to determine if achievement levels in Wyoming had actually improved during the course of the extensive remedy in any meaningful way.1

A few scholars have attempted to determine the effect of court remedies on student achievement, but these studies are handicapped by changing state tests and typically concentrate on only a relatively brief period when such remedies have been in place.2 No attention has been given to the obvious question: how are students doing now compared with their performance prior to the implementation of the remedy?

#### Education won’t solve for inequality

SUMMERS ’15 (Larry; Charles W. Eliot University Professor and President Emeritus – Harvard University, “Robots are hurting middle class workers, and education won’t solve the problem, Larry Summers says,” 3/3, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/03/03/robots-are-hurting-middle-class-workers-and-education-wont-solve-the-problem-larry-summers-says/?utm\_term=.707f1f7b5800)ww

It's important to be careful here. All of my reading of the evidence suggests that the returns to more and better education is very high. Raj Chetty's research demonstrates that having a better kindergarten or first-grade teacher can make an enormous difference of a few percentage points in wages across your lifetime. Eric Hanushek has presented calculations that suggest better teacher quality in American schools could be worth trillions of dollars down the road.

The evidence is that - just how it is trending may be a subject of debate - but the return to college education, as opposed to high school education, is vastly greater than ever before. So, education is an immensely worthwhile investment, and the project of improving education is hugely important for the United States. That said, the main way in which strengthening education is desirable is that it will raise productivity and raise overall incomes in our society. It is not likely, in my view, that any feasible program of improving education will have a large impact on inequality in any relevant horizon.

First, almost two-thirds of the labor force in 2030 is already out of school today. Second, most of the inequality we observe is within education group – within high school graduates or within college graduates, rather than between high school graduates and college graduates. Third, inequality within college graduates is actually somewhat greater than inequality within high school graduates. Fourth, changing patterns of education is unlikely to have much to do with a rising share of the top 1 percent, which is probably the most important inequality phenomenon. So I am all for improving education. But to suggest that improving education is the solution to inequality is, I think, an evasion.

### Extend: “K-12 Doesn’t Solve”

#### The majority of the achievement gap is explained by pre-K inequality

Barnett & Lamy 13—Barnett: Board of Governors Professor and Director of the National Institute for Early Education Research (NIEER) at Rutgers University; Lamy: developmental and educational psychologist and research fellow with the National Institute for Early Education Research (NIEER) at Rutgers University (W. Steven Barnett and Cynthia E. Lamy, Closing the Opportunity Gap: What America Must Do to Give Every Child an Even Chance, “Achievement Gaps Start Early,” 4/23/13, chpt 7)//JLE

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These very early ability diﬀerences emerge from a complex set of family circumstances that vary within and across racial and ethnic groups. The majority of the school readiness “gap” between White children and their African American and Hispanic counterparts can be explained by family background characteristics other than race or ethnicity, particularly family income, parental education, family structure, and the conditions of the neighborhood, as well as by indicators of home experiences that support early learning, such as the number of books or educational toys in the home. 8 When researchers look closely at family behavior, a portion of the diﬀerence in early abilities is explained by diﬀerences in early parenting, especially how parents talk, read, and play with their children (see also Rothstein, chapter 5, this volume). 9 Variations in children’s very early experiences with language—how many words are spoken to them, how often they are spoken to, the extent to which they are encouraged to use their own developing language abilities and emergent preliteracy skills—predict not just their earliest vocabulary but also their later vocabulary in elementary school. 10 A similar relationship is found between early home mathematics experiences and knowledge of mathematics. 11

Of course, many factors beyond parent-child interaction in the home inﬂ uence children’s early cognitive and social development, including their health, nutrition, exposure to environmental toxins, danger, violence, and emotional stress. Prenatal exposure to tobacco, alcohol, drugs, and maternal stress can aﬀ ect development before a child is born. Adverse eﬀ ects on early brain development may impair a child’s cognitive, social, and emotional development and mental and physical health over a lifetime. 12 Th e risk of exposure to these adverse eﬀ ects steadily increases as income and parental education decline. 13 Racial-ethnic group diﬀ erences in exposure are partly due to group diﬀ erences in income and education. However, discrimination itself also may adversely aﬀ ect maternal health in ways that harm children’s prenatal development.

Even very early ability diﬀ erences are strongly linked to later achievement. Language development before age three predicts reading comprehension in high school. 15 Early math skills also strongly predict achievement in elementary school and high school. 16 There is very little change in achievement gradients between age ﬁve and age eighteen. 17

In sum, those distressing, attention-grabbing diﬀerences in achievement test scores and high school graduation rates can be largely explained by diﬀerences in abilities that are evident well before children enter kindergarten. We wish it were otherwise, and it is possible that more equitable opportunities to learn within formal schooling could repair much of this early damage, but in the present situation children who begin school substantially behind are unlikely to ever catch up. 18 To be successful, eﬀorts to decrease inequality in achievement and reduce school dropout rates should begin in the ﬁrst ﬁve years, when the problem originates. Of course, such eﬀorts cannot end there as every year of a child’s life matters.

### Extend: “Regulatory Flexibility Turn”

#### Enforcing Title I regulations undermines equity – the plan’s narrow funding focus forces schools to cut quality based equity measures. Flexibility is vital to ensuring improvement in equity

Canavero, 16 - SUPERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION, NEVADA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION (Steve, Subcommittee on Early Childhood, Elementary, and Secondary Education (“SUPPLANTING THE LAW AND LOCAL EDUCATION AUTHORITY THROUGH REGULATORY FIAT” 9/21, <https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-114hhrg21538/pdf/CHRG-114hhrg21538.pdf>

The Department's goals are laudable. It is clear underperforming schools need more funding to support their students' needs. But imposing sweeping new federal mandates on how school districts must spend their state and local funds, in addition to the complicated way the proposed regulations approach equity and school funding, could actually hurt state and local efforts to provide equity for all students.

First, the regulations look only at the amount spent in Title I schools versus non-Title I schools. The total dollars spent in each school is certainly part of equity, but it is not the only measure. The proposed regulations do not take into account other equity measures, such as improved access to educational opportunities like Advanced Placement, career and technical education programs, the arts, and effective teachers, and they could in fact harm state and local efforts to promote these measures to benefit students.

Defining equity so narrowly also conflicts with a key principle of ESSA, which is to empower states and districts to set the best path for student achievement based on their needs. As you can see from the progress we are making in Nevada on equitable funding, we, like other states, are ready to take on that challenge. And we are also prepared to be held responsible for our students' results. But approaches to accountability and funding can and should vary depending on state, district, and student needs.

As a practical matter, I am concerned the proposed regulations could frustrate a number of equity and

school quality efforts in our state. For example:

• Curtailing state and locally-driven equity efforts. There exist a number of approaches across Nevada to promote equity for students. It is unclear from the proposed regulations the impact on non-Title I magnet or other choice programs like Career and Technical Academies. Recent efforts in our largest school district to expand access for high school students to attend specialized programs within non-magnet schools that include: Career Tech Education, Advanced Placement, National Academy Foundation, and Project Lead the Way. The proposed regulations could result in significant restructuring of these opportunities to all students and support a perverse incentive to lower the number of offerings to comply with fiscal rules.

• Hindering the move to more equitable funding formulas that appear to not fit the regulatory parameters. In 2013, Nevada began a transition to provide additional funding in the form of a "weight" to students that are: English language learners, in poverty, special education, and gifted and talented. Present law requires this transition to be complete in FY2022. The proposed regulations provide for some exclusions; however, the ambiguous language and deference to the U.S. Department of Education to make determinations may adversely impact my state's plan to provide additional resources. For example, funding for English language learners is entering into the fourth year of implementation. Eligibility of funding is not contingent upon Title status, rather funding follows the student. It is unclear to me whether or not the proposed regulations would impede the state's ability to carry out this concentrated funding plan.

• Exacerbating of teacher shortages and curtailing Nevada efforts to fill every classroom with an effective educator. We are experiencing a serious teacher shortage in Nevada and applied policy and funding to incentivize teachers to teach in Nevada, to schools with the highest vacancies, and classrooms serving our most vulnerable students. It is unclear if some of our solutions to address the teacher pipeline will comply with the rule, such as application of scholarship dollars to alternative routes to licensure and a clear emphasis on expanding teacher recruitment to diverse candidates.

#### Regulatory enforcement overrides local flexibility – that crushes educational innovation and shatters achievement

Owens, 16 - RYAN OWENS, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, COOPERATIVE COUNCIL FOR OKLAHOMA SCHOOL ADMINISTRATION (“SUPPLANTING THE LAW AND LOCAL EDUCATION AUTHORITY THROUGH REGULATORY FIAT” 9/21, <https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-114hhrg21538/pdf/CHRG-114hhrg21538.pdf>

The proposed regulations will result in districts consolidating budgetary decision-making within the central office. Currently in Oklahoma site level administrators are given the flexibility to assess student needs and determine the amount of resources necessary to facilitate instruction. Under the proposed regulation, in an effort to equalize spending among Title I schools and non-Title I schools, district administration will have to override school-level decisions to ensure that there is a balance between Title I and non-Title I schools. This is the antithesis of doing what is best for kids. Rather than looking at the needs of particular schools and budgeting accordingly, central office administrators will be devoting time to an arbitrary exercise of resource allocation, balancing, re-allocation of resources, re- balancing, etc. without regard to how the resources are to be used to benefit children.

What might this look like in Oklahoma?

Destroying stability within classrooms and among schools is a major concern. Last minute movement of staff and other resources is likely in districts with multiple sites, such as Oklahoma City and Tulsa.

The proposed rule is focused on teacher salaries as part of the calculation for equitable resource allocation among Title I and non-title I schools. How will districts in Oklahoma satisfy this requirement given that our state is in the midst of an unprecedented teacher shortage? Due to our state's budget crisis Oklahoma schools have eliminated over 1,500 teaching positions and still have over 500 vacancies. According to our state's school boards association, the majority of Oklahoma districts are indicating that Special Education, High School Science, and Elementary teaching positions are the most difficult to fill. How will districts using long-term substitute teachers, emergency certified teachers, or larger class sizes satisfy a requirement for equalized spending when the needed resource, teachers, do not exist?

The proposed rule would likely lead to the elimination of programs and initiatives that increase student and/or parent choice. Many of our best enrichment programs come with one common theme - variability of costs. If the proposed rule becomes law, cost variability will no longer be tolerable due to the need for uniform spending among Title I and non-Title I schools.

The proposed regulation becomes unworkable in a state like Oklahoma where we offer students and parents choices such as online coursework, concurrent enrollment, language immersion programs, advanced placement electives, and Career and Technology programs.

This proposed rule incentivizes a "one-size fits all" approach to district programming because uniformity will make compliance easier. This is detrimental to students as it leads to the elimination of specialized schools and specialized programs. These specialized programs exist for Title I and non-Title I schools in Oklahoma. For example, John Marshall Mid-High School in Oklahoma City Public Schools, a Title I school, offers students the opportunity to participate in a Finance Academy. Students learn about the finance industry and have an opportunity to work with accounting students to file income tax statements at no cost for eligible Oklahomans. In addition these students work at a credit union located inside the school. This is the type of specialized program that is at risk under the proposed rule.

#### Compliance costs subvert education – districts overcomply due to confusion that takes resources away from students

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For decades, compliance with supplement not supplant was tested by looking at each individual Title I expenditure. When this rule was in place, in 2014, in the course of my academic research, I interviewed district Title I managers across four States and found that compliance, not the effective use of funds, was their central concern. But despite their concern and attention to compliance, administrators were confused about what was and was not legal.

What districts did understand was that Title I should only support extra things that were different from the core curriculum. This led to districts purchasing staff or services with Title I that were often unaligned with a core curriculum because they were easy to audit under the old rule rather than because of student needs.

Meanwhile, research suggests that effective school improvement requires comprehensive strategies and alignment to good curriculum, not an assortment of add-ons.

#### Over-compliance concerns mean that school districts will spend Title I funds on administrative costs and add-ons – that undermine core curriculum

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In 2014,I interviewed district Title I managers across four states for my research, and several key themes emerged.1

1. Compliance, not the effective use of funds, is a central concern for school district Title I administrators.

States must approve districts' Title I spending plans, and districts quite rationally want the most straightforward path to state approval in order to get their federal funds on time. Because the old SNS rule was so complicated and misunderstood, however, compliance was difficult and required a great deal of administrative energy.

2. Despite their concern and attention to compliance, administrators were confused about what was and was not legal.

Confusion by both districts and states about what was permitted under SNS meant that districts often didn't propose costs because they didn't want to get into a fight with their states and hold up the delivery of their Title 1 funds.

3. The clearest message districts perceived under the old regime was that Title I should support supplemental, extra things and could not support core instruction.

School district personnel often felt pressured to use Title I for costs that were clearly extra, and different. In practice, this often meant unaligned from the core educational program. This often prevented districts from using Title I for comprehensive interventions, such as instituting dropout prevention programs, positive behavioral supports or arts integration programs - all of which are allowed under Title I - because they didn't look "different" enough to be extra. This promoted spending on add-ons, such as "extra" reading programs (which were often unaligned), or other pull out activities - because they were easy to audit under the old rule.

Meanwhile, research suggests that effective school improvement requires comprehensive strategies, not a hodge-podge of add-ons.

#### Enforcing new Title I regulations guts achievement programs across the board

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The department’s goals are laudable. It is clear underperforming schools need more funding to support their students’ needs. However, imposing sweeping new Federal mandates on how school districts must spend their State and local funds in addition to the complicated way the proposed regulations approach equity and school funding could actually hurt State and local efforts to provide equity for all students.

Here is a few reasons why. First, the regulations look only at the amount spent in Title I schools versus non-Title I schools. While the total dollars spent is important, it is not the only measure of how we support students. These regulations do not take into account other equity measures, such as improved access to educational opportunities like advanced placement, magnet schools, career and technical education programs, the arts, or effective educators. By ignoring these measures, the proposed regulations could harm State and local efforts to promote these measures to benefit students.

In Nevada, our schools are providing these types of opportunities for all kids, and we seek to expand them. I fear the proposed regulations could result in significant restructuring of these opportunities to allow students to support a perverse incentive to lower the number of offerings to make sure we are in compliance with the proposed fiscal rules.