## Explanation/Guide

### File Description and General Tips

This file contains a counterplan that can be read against any of the affirmatives in the novice packet.

A counterplan is a type of negative argument that proposes a different policy than the plan. It is introduced as an off-case position in the 1NC. The 1NC shell for the counterplan is included in this file. To extend the counterplan in the negative block, the negative should prepare blocks to each affirmative response. When doing so, the negative can make use of the backline evidence contained in this file. Students should carefully choose which extension evidence to read; it is very unlikely that students will be able to read *all* extension cards in any 2NC or 1NR.

When answering this counterplan, the affirmative should use the materials in this file to construct a 2AC. For some of the 2AC arguments, the affirmative is provided with additional extension cards that could be useful for the 1AR. Due to the intense time constraints of that speech, students should carefully choose which (if any) extension evidence to read.

### Explanation of the Negative

The counterplan argues that the affirmative plan should only be done if China takes measures to improve its human rights. According to the negative, pressuring China by refusing to engage them unless they improve human rights will lead to an increase in human rights protections in China.

The net benefit is that improving human rights in China leads to global human rights promotion. Without being able to point to China as a place that has improved human rights, the US has much worse credibility to persuade other countries to do the same. The impact is that global human rights protections develop an understanding of our shared humanity worldwide, which prevents war.

### Explanation of the Affirmative

The affirmative has a number of responses to the counterplan:

* They argue that the counterplan does not compete. They have a permutation to do both the plan and the counterplan and a permutation to do the counterplan.
* They also have substantive responses to the counterplan, arguing that China says no, that pressure is unsuccessful and may even backfire by reducing human rights protections, and that China won’t comply with the counterplan.
* Finally, the affirmative can make theoretical objections to the counterplan — arguing that plan contingent counterplans or conditional counterplans are unfair to the affirmative.

### Explanation of Plan-Contingent Counterplans

A “plan-contingent counterplan” competes with the affirmative based on the fact that the affirmative is certain. In this debate, the negative will argue that the counterplan competes because the plan is done in all cases, whereas the counterplan may not be done (because China has the option to say no). Even if China will say yes in the vast majority of cases, the possibility of the plan not being done means the counterplan is an opportunity cost of the affirmative.

The affirmative will argue that these counterplans are generic (can be read against every affirmative), discouraging research and preventing education. They will also argue that they distort debates by moving the debate away from whether the plan is a good idea to whether an entirely separate policy is a good idea.

The negative will respond that these types of counterplans are essential for debates about engagement — whether the plan should be done in all circumstances or only done if China does something in response is an essential part of crafting foreign policy strategies. They will also argue that the size of the topic necessitates these types of negative strategies.

This type of argument is called a “theory” argument.

### Explanation of Conditionality

Conditionality refers to the “status” or “disposition” of the counterplan: is the negative defending only the counterplan or can they “kick” the counterplan at any time and revert to defending the status quo? When the negative defends a counterplan but reserves the right to revert to defending the status quo, they are defending the counterplan conditionally. In response, the affirmative can argue that conditionality should not be allowed. When the affirmative makes this argument, the negative must respond by defending the desirability of conditionality. This is called a theory argument.

## 2AC

### 2AC — Human Rights Counterplan

#### 1. Permutation — do both. The permutation demonstrates commitment to human rights even if it fails to materially address Chinese human rights violations. The net benefit is about perception, not substantive outcomes.

#### 2. Permutation — do the counterplan. The counterplan adds an additional requirement to the plan — that’s not competitive.

#### 3. China Says No — past pressure proves linking human rights to other issues fails. Prefer experienced State Department officials.

Shirk 16 (Research prof of poli sci at UCSD (Susan, It's Official: Washington Thinks Chinese Internet Censorship Is a 'Trade Barrier,' foreignpolicy.com/2016/04/14/chinese-censorship-trade-barrier-great-firewall-ustr-business-trade-internet/?wp\_login\_redirect=0)

Foreign governments have frustratingly few tools with which to influence domestic human rights practices in China. Our public statements criticizing the worsening repression of civil society and the mass media have little effect. When China bans Western newspapers or denies visas to journalists and scholars whose views it dislikes, we are reluctant to retaliate against Chinese journalists and scholars because we don’t want to further impede the free flow of information to Chinese people. My own experience working in the State Department from 1997 to 2000 taught me that U.S. efforts to induce improvement in human rights by shaming China in international forums such as the U.N. Human Rights Commission, or linking human rights to other issues in the U.S.-China bilateral relationship, don’t succeed.

#### 4. No Solvency — Beijing will strategically comply without improving human rights.

Inboden & Chen 12 (Rana, doctoral candidate in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Oxford, & Titus, Assistant Research Fellow at the Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University, “China’s Response to International Normative Pressure: The Case of Human Rights”, https://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/21049/uploads)

This article examines the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) response to international human rights pressure. The Chinese Communist regime has adopted an understanding of human rights that emphasizes the predominant role of the state in the definition, provision and constriction of human rights in domestic politics. This statist notion of human rights, which emerged in the early 1980s as a result of a change in China’s state identity, not only facilitated China’s initial engagement with international human rights institutions, but also planted a seed of tension and pressure in China’s international relations in the post-Tiananmen era. Despite international efforts to hold China to human rights norms, during the past two decades Beijing has effectively weathered human rights pressure by erratically making concessions, and strategically adapting and applying economic and political leverage to reshape the UN human rights regime. The article begins with a brief explication of the conceptual evolution of the official Chinese understanding of human rights, which took shape concomitantly to the change in China’s state identity in the early stage of reform and opening-up.2 It then discusses the evolution of China’s initial participation in the United Nations human rights regime in the 1980s. China joined the human rights regime mostly for diplomatic and strategic gains, and much less for human rights per se. Once embedded in the regime, China concluded that the fundamental attributes of its political system were partially compatible with international human rights norms. The third section presents a China that was jolted by international opprobrium and greater human rights scrutiny in the wake of the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests. Beijing applied both reactive and proactive measures to resist international sanctions and censure: employing no-action motions in the UN human rights body to avoid condemnatory resolutions, working with a coalition of like-minded states to challenge the country-specific mechanisms and press for institutional reform of the UN human rights regime, selectively approving international human rights covenants, and promoting bilateral, closed-door human rights dialogue. Beijing was largely successful: international criticism of China’s human rights violations dissipated after the mid-1990s, and foreign governments expressed human rights concerns mainly through ‘quiet diplomacy’. The last section investigates how China has effectively resisted and reshaped the UN human rights regime after 2005.

#### 5. Not reverse causal — even if we can’t solve global human rights without China, there’s no evidence that improving human rights in China improves other areas.

#### 6. Pressure backfires — reduces overall political concerns for human rights.

Gruffydd-Jones 16 (Jamie, PhD Candidate, Princeton U., “When human rights pressure is counterproductive: A survey experiment on women's rights in China”, http://web.isanet.org/Web/Conferences/AP%20Hong%20Kong%202016/Archive/2f67a945-faed-4427-83a2-7789fe356480.pdf)

In this article I argue that the public impact of information about international pressure on a country’s human rights conditions will depend on the perceived hostility of the source of the pressure to the target nation. Critical information about human rights that comes from a ‘benign’ source may have the positive effect on public grievances that naming and shaming theorists expect5 . However when members of the public hear condemnation from a source that they believe has nefarious intentions, for example to use human rights to achieve some kind of geopolitical advantage, they will react defensively, strengthening their belief that human rights are good enough in their country. As a result I hypothesise that international pressure that comes from a threatening geopolitical opponent, especially when public nationalism is high, will have counterproductive effects on public grievances. Criticism at peaceful times from a neutral source, or that explicitly targets the elites of the country rather than the nation as a whole, will be much more effective. I test my argument using a survey experiment representative of the online population on women’s rights in China in early 2016, immediately following the high profile closure of a centre for women’s rights in Beijing, which garnered domestic and international attention. The experiment randomly exposed respondents to criticism of women’s rights in China from either the United States, a geopolitical opponent, or the African Union, a neutral organisation and nominal ‘third world’ ally to Beijing. The experiment also manipulated the salience of the national identity in the respondents, by randomly exposing them to a Chinese flag, before then measuring their grievances towards women’s rights in China. I find that, as expected, criticism from the United States significantly reduces Chinese citizens’ grievances about women’s rights conditions in their country. US criticism makes respondents 28.6% more likely to believe that women’s rights are well enough respected, as well as less willing to sign petitions to improve women’s rights. Criticism from the African Union on the other hand sees no effects in either direction. I also show that these effects can be reversed when the criticism targets the Chinese government specifically, rather than the country as a whole - suggesting that the bind between the elites and the nation is central to the counterproductive effect of criticism. These findings have important implications for how we think about the impacts of international pressure on human rights in authoritarian regimes. Firstly, they challenge a central assumption of the literature on transnational activism - that pressure from foreign actors will dovetail with pressure from domestic actors to force changes in government behaviour. The study suggests instead that such a smooth interaction may be overambitious - and that when it appears to be threatening, foreign pressure may in fact make domestic pressure more difficult. Secondly, the findings redirect attention to how a target country’s public respond to international efforts to change behaviour on human rights. If foreign countries and organisations find success in securing prisoner releases and other short-term concessions, these are of little use without meaningful long-term policy changes, which depend strongly on societal pressures. Finally the results demonstrate the need to look more carefully at who exerts human rights pressure. If we care about public responses, geopolitical relationships matter, and pressure from the United States on its allies is likely to be much less successful than pressure on its competitors.

#### 7. Pressure causes Chinese nationalism. That leads to a long term increase in human rights violations.

Deng 2k (Yong, professor in the Department of Political Science at the United States Naval Academy, In the Eyes of the Dragon: China Views the World, p. 98-99)

The concluding section highlights the implications of this discussion for Sino-American relations. Given the views held by ordinary Chinese and the current relationship between the government and society, human rights has become largely a foreign policy issue for a majority of Chinese. Human rights in China will remain an issue in the United States due to American political traditions and domestic politics, a fact of life acknowledged and increasingly understood by China. But if the U.S. government goes beyond a baseline of just speaking up about human rights issues and instead imposes severe pressure on China over human rights or makes explicit linkage with other issues, such policies now find an unresponsive Chinese audience and invite nationalist reactions. An interventionist policy works only when the society of the target nation seeks and appreciates such intervention. But there does not exist a broad support base in China at this historical moment for U.S. human rights intervention and pressure.

#### 8. Reject plan-contingent counterplans — hypergeneric process args distort the topic, hurting depth and clash over core controversies. Debatability trumps “literature” — no enforceable standard for solvency evidence. Disads are sufficient to “test” unconditional engagement.

### 2AC — Conditionality [Optional]

#### ( ) Conditionality is a Voting Issue — the neg should get the status quo or an unconditional counterplan, not both. Conditionality creates an unproductive argument culture because it values coverage more than engagement. This discourages in-depth clash and argument resolution (because less time is spent on each position) and lowers the barrier of entry for low-quality arguments (because the neg is trying to distract the 2AC). Different advocacies should be debated in different debates, not crammed into this one. Vote for the theoretical position that best encourages high-quality debates.

### 2AC — Relations Turn [Optional]

#### Human rights pressure undermines Sino-US relations.

Niu 14 (Xinchun, Dir of the Inst of West Asian & African Studies, CICIR, *The World in 2020 According to China*, edited by Shao Binhong, p. 297)

Samuel Huntington generalized American values as "liberty, equality, democracy, individualism and rule of law?" These values are cherished to a certain extent by other states as well. However, when the United States imposes its views about human rights and democracy on others, no one is willing to accept. America's human rights diplomacy seriously disrupts its diplomatic agenda and undermines Sino-U.S. relations as well. Its current development level and the social reality China is now lacing determine that stability is its number-one priority; any foreign intervention endangering China's social stability, no matter what kind of banner it goes under, is not tolerable for China. As Chinese scholar Wang Jisi noted, "A unique feature of Chinese leaders' understanding of their country's history is their persistent sensitivity to domestic disorder caused by foreign threats."9 The United States will not completely understand China's basic position on issues like sovereignty, human rights, development, and stability unless it comprehensively understands the founding history of the People's Republic while analyzing the reality of the development of Chinese society. The United States has difficulty understanding other states' situations and viewpoints, since it has a relatively uninterrupted history. As renowned American political scientist Louis Hartz has asked: “Can a people 'born equal' ever understand peoples elsewhere that have to become so? Can it ever understand itself?"

## 1AR

### Extend: “China Says No”

#### China says no — they are super sensitive about human rights.

Ide 16 (Reporter for Voice of America (6/6, William, Activists Urge Discussion of Rights at High-level US-China Talks, www.voanews.com/content/china-human-rights/3363652.html)

China, however, seems increasingly sensitive about efforts to discuss human rights. Just last week, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi sparked an international incident when he berated a Canadian journalist for asking a question about human rights. At home on Chinese social media, Wang Yi has been widely derided for his remarks that the Chinese people were best fit to speak about their human rights situation with many noting that the reality is that those who do end up in jail or worse. In an editorial Monday on the talks entitled “S&ED Should Be Platform for Frank Dialogue,” the Communist Party-backed and popular nationalistic tabloid, the Global Times said: “More Chinese are tired of U.S. rhetoric against China’s human rights issue and believe it is just a tool used by Washington to compete with China.”

#### Pressure fails.

Drury & Li 3 (professor and chair of Political Science at the University of Missouri. He is also editor-in-chief of Foreign Policy Analysis. Yitan Li, Ph.D is the Associate Professor of Political Science, Seattle University. [“U.S. ECONOMIC SANCTION THREATS AGAINST CHINA: FAILING TO LEVERAGE BETTER HUMAN RIGHTS” University of Missouri, A. Cooper Drury, Yetan Li URL: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download;jsessionid=0EEAEBABD438D2098A6A201B550C2B14?doi=10.1.1.484.7309&rep=rep1&type=pdf)

The question of effectiveness of these sanction threats depends largely on how we conceptualize China’s behavior. If change in China’s behavior is measured by the level of repression, then there is no link between U.S. threats and Beijing’s behavior. Instead, repression is seemingly driven by the domestic situation in China. Beijing decides to repress in order to maintain its control of the population. It does not take cues from America—whether they are verbal or active threats. It is worth noting that positive or cooperative moves by Washington also have no impact. Beijing simply does not respond to external factors when deciding to repress. The same is not true for Chinese accommodations. In this case, American threats do influence Chinese behavior, but not in the manner intended by the sender. Both threatening actions and rhetoric are significantly associated with fewer, not more, accommodations. Alternatively, Beijing responds favorably to positive, cooperative U.S. rhetoric and behavior, and this relationship is reciprocal. Positive rhetoric and increased accommodations lead to positive behavior by Washington. China is able to sell (and America buys) the idea that releasing a few prisoners or relaxing some restrictions can compensate for higher levels of Chinese repression and ameliorate Washington’s concerns.21 In the end, the U.S. threats to revoke or condition MFN status for China had a paradoxical effect. Actual repression levels were unaffected by all of Washington’s gyrations, while accommodations decreased as the threats became more intense. Only cooperative actions and rhetoric lead to more positive behavior by China. These results raise questions about the effectiveness of sanction threats, the importance of conflict expectations, and target responses affecting the sender’s behavior. They also raise questions about whether coercion or engagement is better suited to making gains on human rights issues in China and perhaps elsewhere. As a conclusion, we turn to these questions now. Our analysis suggests that the MFN threats were not only ineffective but also counterproductive. We argued earlier that these results could be generalized to other sanction threats, at least those targeting human rights abuses. We hold that the findings herein do speak to other human rights sanctions, but we do not dispute the other findings that conclude sanction threats are most successful (Morgan and Miers, 1999; Nooruddin, 2002; Drezner, 2003). As we argued above, the communication, capability, willingness, and intentions of the American threats were very murky, and so they could be expected to ultimately fail. However, this result does not explain the inverse reaction from Beijing to the intensity of the U.S. threats—that fewer accommodations were offered. We believe that the public nature of the threats helps explain the counter-intuitive findings. The American MFN threats were extremely public; they were mostly constituted in public debates and open votes in Washington. For Beijing to comply, even with trivial accommodations, meant that it was publicly bowing to U.S. pressure. Thus, China had a disincentive to offer any positive behavior to the U.S. (Li and Drury, 2004) This conclusion raises the question of why China’s expectation of future cooperation, not conflict, did not lead them to acquiesce to some degree. Drezner (1999) argues that targets that expect future conflict with the sender will resist any economic pressure for fear that it will decrease their future position vis-à-vis the sender. Using Drezner’s data and coding rules, as well as a simple understanding of U.S.-Sino relations, China clearly has no expectation of significant, general future conflict with Washington. Just the opposite is true—China wanted increased trade and financial ties with the U.S. and crucial American support needed to gain entrance into the WTO. The most likely explanation focuses on the nature of the demand. While China wanted and expected positive future relations with the U.S., it was cognizant of America’s concern for human rights and disapproval of Beijing’s policies. Therefore, Beijing expected future conflict with the U.S. over human rights issues, and therefore was unwilling to give any ground.

### Extend: “No Compliance”

#### China will evade human rights pressure & the U.S won’t enforce it.

UPP 13 (University of Penn Press, Ming Wan is Associate Professor of Public and International Affairs at George Mason University, “Human Rights in Chinese Foreign Relations Defining and Defending National Interests”, http://www.upenn.edu/pennpress/book/13504.html)

Few issues in the relations between China and the West invoke as much passion as human rights. At stake, however, are much more than moral concerns and hurt national feelings. To Washington, the undemocratic nature of the Chinese government makes it ultimately suspect on all issues. To Beijing, the human rights pressure exerted by the West on China seems designed to compromise its legitimacy. As China's economic power grows and its influence on the politics of developing countries continues, an understanding of the place of human rights in China's foreign relations is crucial to the implementation of an effective international human rights agenda. In Human Rights in Chinese Foreign Relations, Ming Wan examines China's relations with the United States, Western Europe, Japan, and the United Nations human rights institutions. Wan shows that, after a decade of persistent external pressure to reform its practices, China still plays human rights diplomacy as traditional power politics and deflects pressure by mobilizing its propaganda machine to neutralize Western criticism, by making compromises that do not threaten core interests, and by offering commercial incentives to important nations to help prevent a unified Western front. Furthermore, at the UN, China has largely succeeded in rallying developing nation members to defeat Western efforts at censure. In turn, it is apparent to Wan that, while the idea of human rights matters in Western policy, it has seldom prevailed over economic considerations or concerns about national security. Western governments have not committed as many policy resources to pressuring Beijing on human rights as to other issues, and the differing degrees of commitment to human rights-related foreign policy explain why Japan, Western Europe, and the United States, in that order, have gradually retreated from confronting China on human rights issues.

### Extend: “Pressure Backfires”

#### Pressure is counterproductive.

Putten 8 (Dr. Frans-Paul van der Putten (born 1970) joined Clingendael in 2007, where he is a Senior Research Fellow. His research focuses on international security issues and on the consequences of the rise of China as a major power. [“China's fear of instability” Clingandel: Netherlands Institute of International Relations, Letter to the Editor in the International Herald Tribune March 7th, 2008 URL: https://www.clingendael.nl/publication/chinas-fear-instability)

An editorial in the International Herald Tribune "Speaking out against repression in Tibet" (March 25) called for the West to put pressure on the Chinese government to improve its human rights record. From a human rights perspective, the Chinese state is excessively strong. Put differently, individual citizens have very limited political freedom. China's political system is aimed at preventing political instability at all costs, and is founded on a national consciousness in which political instability is the worst possible disaster. In order to understand why today the state is overly strong we should look to the period before 1949, when the current political system came into being. In the century before 1949 China suffered severely from political instability. The weakness of the central government led to widespread violence and famine. After 1916, when it collapsed altogether, the disasters to which the population was exposed became even greater. The lack of an effective central government resulted in many millions of deaths. The erosion and collapse of the Chinese state was the result of internal conditions, but also from interventions by the leading Western powers. From the second part of the nineteenth century, these countries - joined by Japan and Russia - disregarded Chinese sovereignty in order to attain economic and strategic benefits. Consequently, the Chinese central government lost what it needed most for its survival: political legitimacy among its own population. Thus the political instability that produced China's current political system was itself partly caused by the West. The lesson from history for China's leaders is that foreign interference leads to political instability. There are two ways to prevent this: having influence in foreign affairs and making sure there is no domestic opposition. The leading Western governments openly pressuring Beijing would not only be futile but counterproductive. It would sooner cause the Chinese government to further limit political freedom, than grant more of it.

#### Human rights pressure fails — only cooperation creates long-term change.

Dalpino 99 (Catharin, fellow @ Brookings Inst., 6/1, “Human Rights in China”, https://www.brookings.edu/research/human-rights-in-china/)

The American debate on human rights in China confuses form with substance, and focuses on means with little attention to ends. For example, the question has seldom been raised of whether the gains that sanctions might optimally produce would contribute to lasting political change in China. President Clinton’s 1993 executive order, which formally linked renewal of China’s MFN to human rights improvements, imposed conditions which focused mainly on individual political prisoners: accounting for imprisoned dissidents, refraining from their use in prison labor, and allowing the International Committee of the Red Cross to evaluate their condition. These were admirable humanitarian objectives, but it is doubtful whether they would have improved even the short-term political environment. Because sanctions are rarely effective in promoting internal political change, even the threat of human rights sanctions should be downplayed. To do so, the annual debate over MFN should be abandoned in favor of permanent status for China once it institutes reforms necessary for it to join the WTO. Such economic reforms will support greater political openness, although they are not sufficient in themselves to bring it about. Conversely, many human rights groups and policymakers view assistance to China, even for reform efforts, as capitulation to Beijing. Administration initiatives on rule of law and civil society programs for China have consistently failed to gain congressional support. But at this stage of China’s political development, when U.S. policy should focus on building the scaffolding for a better rights regime, a more calibrated and constructive approach is essential.

### Extend: “Pressure Causes Nationalism”

#### Pressure causes nationalist backlash.

Yang & Zhu 14. Jiangnan Zhu is an Assistant Professor of Department of Politics and Public Administration at the University of Hong Kong and Tianzhao Yang is a student of the Department of Politics and Public Administration at the University of Hong Kong (HKU). [“Collective apathy: nationalism and human rights in China” openDemocracy Free Thinking for the World March 19th 2014 URL: https://www.opendemocracy.net/openglobalrights/tianzhao-yang-jiangnan-zhu/collective-apathy-nationalism-and-human-rights-in-china]

Recently on openGlobalRights, several authors discussed China’s potential for becoming a global human rights player. The basic problem, in our view, is that Chinese citizens are still uninterested in a domestic or international human rights agenda, largely as a result of nationalistic propaganda. Without much domestic interest, in turn, the Chinese government is unlikely to start behaving as an international “normative power” concerned with the human rights of people living in other countries. For a recent example of ardent Chinese nationalism, consider this. In December 2013, the Japanese Prime Minister visited a Shinto war memorial in Tokyo, triggering intense Chinese criticism. Chinese officials accused the Japanese leader of brazen disrespect towards all those who had suffered from his country’s historic aggression, and many members of the public supported those views. In the ensuring months, Chinese print and electronic media were awash in harsh criticism of the Japanese actions. These views were reminiscent of the anti-Japan protests in many of China’s cities in 2012, when nationalist mobs, sometimes termed “patriotic thieves” (aiguo zei 爱国贼), smashed stores selling Japanese products. This kind of nationalist mob violence is not surprising, given that Chinese officials and opinion leaders regularly promote altruism and collectivism as a way of protecting collective rights. In the past few months, for example, an article named Without the Motherland, You Are Good for Nothing (没有了祖国你将什么都不是), has circulated widely on major Chinese social media sites, including those directly controlled by the government. It argues for the importance of keeping China unified and stable under the party-state’s leadership, citing instability and strife in the Middle East. The article defines nationalism as the need to “cherish oneself so as to prevent one’s country from falling into chaos” (知爱自己，不让自己的国家乱), and paints China’s international relations as a life-or-death struggle with the west. Aided by the provocative and resounding anti-Japanese demonstrations, this piece quickly spread online. Unfortunately, arguments of this sort are all too common in Chinese public debates. Though fewer people today speak up publicly for collective interests than they did in Mao’s time, many still believe that “collective interests naturally come first.” For instance, the 2008 Asian Barometer Survey showed that 77.5 percent of the respondents agreed or strongly agreed that, “In a group, we should sacrifice our individual interest for the sake of the group’s collective interest.” Also, 82.4 percent agreed or strongly agreed that, “For the sake of national interest, individual interest could be sacrificed.” Notably, while proponents of this perspective do not directly attack the notion of individual rights, their intense interest in the collective inevitably undermine concern with the needs and rights of individual people. To some extent, this approach is understandable. China is still a developing country, despite its formidable growth, and most of the country’s attention is still focused on domestic issues. Engagement with international human rights issues, under these conditions, seems like a second order priority. Yet the Chinese government also faces increasing challenges to its authority because of corruption, social injustice, and domestic violations of human rights. Indeed, a handful of public voices have begun to deviate from state-mandated political correctness. Although economic prosperity was once sufficient to bolster the public’s support for the government, Chinese officials seems increasingly keen to find new ways of boosting their domestic legitimacy. How, then, do we speed up the human rights process in China? As José-Manuel Barreto has argued elsewhere on openGlobalRights, the international human rights discourse needs a fundamental rethink. Chinese nationalism has resisted human rights language because it regards the term as a neo-colonial and western-centered concept. Contextualizing human rights and embedding it in Chinese history, by contrast, could be a big help. As Kerry Brown suggests, moreover, concern with the efficient “administration of justice,” rather than “human rights,” per se, could help the Chinese public find common ground with rights activists living elsewhere.

#### Even human rights supporters in China are radicalized by US pressure.

Dalpino 99 (Catharin, fellow @ Brookings Inst., 6/1, “Human Rights in China”, https://www.brookings.edu/research/human-rights-in-china/)

Suspicions about the underlying motives of U.S. human rights policy are not confined to old-guard ideologues who waged anti-Western campaigns decades ago. They are evidence of a wide vein in the Chinese psyche which has been ambivalent about close relations with the West since the Opium Wars of the 1840s. Many Americans were startled when Peking University students, who had been the standard bearers in Tiananmen Square, probed for the “hidden agenda” behind U.S. human rights policy during President Clinton’s address there last year. More significantly, the anti-American demonstrations in the wake of the Belgrade embassy bombing were based in the Chinese university population. Because of the Tiananmen Square movement and the replica of the Statue of Liberty brandished at that time, the American public had been inclined–incorrectly–to view Chinese students as uniformly pro-American.

### They Say: “Must Promote Human Rights”

#### HR promotion fails — US has no influence.

Weisbrot 9 (Mark, co-director of the Center for Economic and Policy Research, in Washington, D.C. He received his Ph.D. in economics from the University of Michigan. He is co-author, with Dean Baker, of Social Security: The Phony Crisis (University of Chicago Press, 2000), and has written numerous research papers on economic policy. He is also president of [Just Foreign Policy](http://www.justforeignpolicy.org/), “Washington's Lost Credibility on Human Rights”, Center of Economic and Policy Research, <http://cepr.net/publications/op-eds-columns/washingtons-lost-credibility-on-human-rights>)

The U.S. State Department's annual human rights report got an unusual amount of criticism this year. This time the center-left coalition government of Chile was notable in joining other countries such as Bolivia, Venezuela, and China – who have had more rocky relations with Washington – in questioning the "moral authority" of the U.S. government's judging other countries' human rights practices. It's a reasonable question, and the fact that more democratic governments are asking it may signal a tipping point. Clearly a state that is responsible for such high-profile torture and abuses as took place at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo, the regular killing of civilians in Afghanistan and Iraq, and has reserved for itself the right to kidnap people and send them to prisons in other countries to be tortured ("extraordinary rendition") has a credibility problem on human rights issues. Although President Obama has pledged to close down the prison at Guantanamo and outlaw torture by U.S. officials, he has so far decided not to abolish the practice of "extraordinary rendition," and is escalating the war in Afghanistan. But this tipping point may go beyond any differences – and they are quite significant – between the current administration and its predecessor. In the past, Washington was able to position itself as an important judge of human rights practices despite being complicit or directly participating in some of the worst, large-scale human rights atrocities of the post-World War II era – in Vietnam, Indonesia, Central America, and other places. This makes no sense from a strictly logical point of view, but it could persist primarily because the United States was judged not on how it treated persons outside its borders but within them. Internally, the United States has had a relatively well-developed system of the rule of law, trial by jury, an independent judiciary, and other constitutional guarantees (although these did not extend to African-Americans in most of the Southern United States prior to the 1960s civil rights reforms). Washington was able to contrast these conditions with those of its main adversary during the Cold War – the Soviet Union. The powerful influence of the United States over the international media helped ensure that this was the primary framework under which human rights were presented to most of the world. The Bush Administration's "shredding of the Constitution" at home and overt support for human rights abuses abroad has fostered not only a change in image but perhaps the standards by which "the judge" will henceforth be judged. One example may help illustrate the point: China has for several years responded to the State Department's human rights report by publishing its own report on the United States. It includes a catalogue of social ills in the United States, including crime, prison and police abuse, racial and gender discrimination, poverty and inequality. But the last section is entitled "On the violation of human rights in other nations." The argument is that the abuse of people in other countries – including the more than one million people who have been killed as a result of the United States' illegal invasion and occupation of Iraq – must now be taken into account when evaluating the human rights record of the United States. With this criterion included, a country such as China – which does not have a free press, democratic elections, or other guarantees that western democracies treasure – can claim that it is as qualified to judge the United States on human rights as vice versa. U.S.-based human rights organizations will undoubtedly see the erosion of Washington's credibility on these issues as a loss – and understandably so, since the United States is still a powerful country, and they hope to use this power to pressure other countries on human rights issues.

#### HR diplomacy fails — structural issues prevent change.

Bell 96 (Daniel A., Department of Philosophy at the University of Hong Kong, political philosophy. “The East Asian Challenge to Human Rights: Reflections on an East West Dialogue”, <http://faculty.smcm.edu/jwschroeder/Web/ETHR1002/Global_Jutice_Readings_files/13.BellEastAsianChallenge.pdf>)

Second, it is a widespread belief within the United States--currently the dominant voice on the world diplomatic stage--that exporting US political practices and institutions is necessary for the promotion of human rights abroad. As Stephen Young, former Assistant Dean at the Harvard Law School puts it, Many Americans seem to believe that the constitutional pattern of governance in the United States today--as formalized in the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and the Bill of Rights--is a necessary prerequisite for protecting human rights. Thus, they evaluate the performance of other countries in the field of human rights by comparing their conduct with the standards of American politics. It may well have been feasible to act on this belief in the post World War II era, when the United States was powerful enough to insist upon human rights norms. The US capacity to dictate appropriate forms of government to Japan in the immediate post World War II period is a classic example. Today, however, the relative economic and military strength of [End Page 653] East Asia means that the United States must now rely primarily on moral authority to promote human rights in Asia. However, several factors undermine US moral authority in this respect. Widely publicized domestic social problems in the United States such as high rates of drug use, collapsing families, rampant crime, growing economic inequality, and alienation from the political process no longer make the United States the attractive political model that it may once have been. The widespread sentiment that such domestic ills are at least partly attributable to the excessive pursuit of individual rights at the cost of common social goods further undermines the attractiveness of the particular human rights regime (the priority of civil and political rights over social and economic rights) often promoted by US human rights activists

### They Say: “Democracy Prevents Conflict”

#### Democracy doesn’t prevent conflict.

Layne 7 (Chair of Intelligence and National Security @ Texas A&M (Christopher, fellow @ Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, J.D. from South Carolina, PhD in PoliSci from UC Berkeley, “American Empire: A Debate”, pg. 94)

Wilsonian ideology drives the American Empire because its proponents posit that the United States must use its military power to extend democracy abroad. Here, the ideology of Empire rests on assumptions that are not supported by the facts. One reason the architects of Empire champion democracy promotion is because they believe in the so-called democratic peace theory, which holds that democratic states do not fight other democracies. Or as President George W. Bush put it with his customary eloquence, "democracies don't war; democracies are peaceful."136 The democratic peace theory is the probably the most overhyped and undersupported "theory" ever to be concocted by American academics. In fact, it is not a theory at all. Rather it is a theology that suits the conceits of Wilsonian true believers-especially the neoconservatives who have been advocating American Empire since the early 1990s. As serious scholars have shown, however, the historical record does not support the democratic peace theory.131 On the contrary, it shows that democracies do not act differently toward other democracies than they do toward nondemocratic states. When important national interests are at stake, democracies not only have threatened to use force against other democracies, but, in fact, democracies have gone to war with other democracies.

#### Democratic peace theory is wrong — no trust or respect.

Rosato 3 (Professor of PoliSci @ Notre Dame (Sebastian Rosato, PhD in PoliSci from UChicago, Director of the Notre Dame International Security Program, Fellow @ Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, Research Fellow @ Belfer Center for Science & International Affairs, “The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory”, American Political Science Review Vol. 97, No. 4 November 2003, http://www.metu.edu.tr/~utuba/Rosato.pdf)

The available evidence suggests that democracies do not have a powerful inclination to treat each other with trust and respect when their interests clash. Instead, they tend to act like any other pair of states, bargaining hard, issuing threats, and, if they believe it is warranted, using military force. Cold War Interventions. American interventions to destabilize fellow democracies in the developing world provide good evidence that democracies do not always treat each other with trust and respect when they have a conﬂict of interest. In each case, Washington’s commitment to containing the spread of communism overwhelmed any respect for fellow democracies. Although none of the target states had turned to communism or joined the communist bloc, and were led by what were at most left-leaning democratically elected governments, American ofﬁcials chose neither to trust nor to respect them, preferring to destabilize them by force and replace them with autocratic (but anticommunist) regimes rather than negotiate with them in good faith or secure their support by diplomatic means (Table 2). Three features of these cases deserve emphasis. First, all the regimes that the United States sought to undermine were democratic. In the cases of Guatemala, British Guyana, Brazil, and Chile democratic processes were fairly well established. Iran, Indonesia, and Nicaragua were ﬂedgling democracies but Mossadeq, Sukarno, and the Sandinistas could legitimately claim to be the ﬁrst proponents of democracy in their respective countries. Every government with the exception of the Sandinistas was replaced by a succession of American-backed dictatorial regimes. Second, in each case the clash of interests between Washington and the target governments was not particularly severe. These should, then, be easy cases for democratic peace theory since trust and respect are most likely to be determinative when the dispute is minor. None of the target governments were communist, and although some of them pursued leftist policies there was no indication that they intended to impose a communist model or that they were actively courting the Soviet Union. In spite of the limited scope of disagreement, respect for democratic forms of government was consistently subordinated to an expanded conception of national security. Third, there is good evidence that support for democracy was often sacriﬁced in the name of American economic interests. At least some of the impetus for intervention in Iran came in response to the nationalization of the oil industry, the United Fruit Company pressed for action in Guatemala, International Telephone and Telegraph urged successive administrations to intervene in Brazil and Chile, and Allende’s efforts to nationalize the copper industry fueled demands that the Nixon administration destabilize his government. In sum, the record of American interventions in the developing world suggests that democratic trust and respect has often been subordinated to security and economic interests. Democratic peace theorists generally agree that these interventions are examples of a democracy using force against other democracies, but they offer two reasons why covert interventions should not count against the normative logic. The ﬁrst reason is that the target states were not democratic enough to be trusted and respected (Forsythe 1992; Russett 1993, 120–24). This claim is not entirely convincing. Although the target states may not have been fully democratic, they were more democratic than the regimes that preceded and succeeded them and were democratizing further. Indeed, in every case American action brought more autocratic regimes to power. The second reason is that these interventions were covert, a fact believed by democratic peace theorists to reveal the strength of their normative argument. It was precisely because these states were democratic that successive administrations had to act covertly rather than openly initiate military operations. Knowing that their actions were illegitimate, and fearing a public backlash, American ofﬁcials decided on covert action (Forsythe 1992; Russett 1993, 120–24). This defense fails to address some important issues. To begin with, it ignores the fact that American public ofﬁcials, that is, the individuals that democratic peace theory claims are most likely to abide by liberal norms, showed no respect for fellow democracies. Democratic peace theorists will respond that the logic holds, however, because these ofﬁcials were restrained from using open and massive force by the liberal attitudes of the mass public. This is a debatable assertion; after all, ofﬁcials may have opted for covert and limited force for a variety of reasons other than public opinion, such as operational costs and the expected international reaction. Simply because the use of force was covert and limited, this does not mean that its nature was determined by public opinion. But even if it is true that ofﬁcials adopted a covert policy to shield themselves from a potential public backlash, the logic still has a crucial weakness: The fact remains that the United States did not treat fellow democracies with trust or respect. Ultimately, the logic stands or falls by its predictive power, that is, whether democracies treat each other with respect. If they do, it is powerful; if they do not, it is weakened. It does not matter why they do not treat each other with respect, nor does it matter if some or all of the population wants to treat the other state with respect; all that matters is whether respect is extended. To put it another way, we can come up with several reasons to explain why respect is not extended, and we can always ﬁnd social groups that oppose the use of military force against another democracy, but whenever we ﬁnd several examples of a democracy using military force against other democracies, the trust and respect mechanism, and therefore the normative logic, fails an important test.6 Great Powers. Layne (1994) and Rock (1997) have found further evidence that democracies do not treat each other with trust and respect in their analyses of diplomatic crises involving Britain, France, Germany, and the United States. Layne examines four prominent cases in which rival democracies almost went to war with one another and asks whether the crises were resolved because of mutual trust and respect. His conclusion offers scant support for the normative logic: “In each of these crises, at least one of the democratic states involved was prepared to go to war. ... In each of the four crises, war was avoided not because of the ‘live and let live’spirit of peaceful dispute resolution at democratic peace theory’s core, but because of realist factors” (Layne 1994, 38).7 Similarly, Rock ﬁnds little evidence that shared liberal values helped resolve any of the crises between Britain and the United States in the nineteenth century. In addition, his analyses of the turn-of-the-century “great rapprochement” and naval arms control during the 1920s show that even in cases where liberal states resolved potentially divisive issues in a spirit of accommodation, shared liberal values had only a limited effect. In both cases peace was overdetermined and “liberal values and democratic institutions were not the only factors inclining Britain and the United States toward peace, and perhaps not even the dominant ones”(Rock 1997, 146).8 In sum, the trust and respect mechanism does not appear to work as speciﬁed. Shared democratic values provide no guarantee that states will both trust and respect one another. Instead, and contrary to the normative logic’s claims, when serious conﬂicts of interest arise between democracies there is little evidence that they will be inclined to accommodate each other’s demands or refrain from engaging in hard line policies.