## Explanation/Guide

### File Description and General Tips

This file contains a counterplan that can be read against any of the affirmatives in the novice packet.

A counterplan is a type of negative argument that proposes a different policy than the plan. It is introduced as an off-case position in the 1NC. The 1NC shell for the counterplan is included in this file. To extend the counterplan in the negative block, the negative should prepare blocks to each affirmative response. When doing so, the negative can make use of the backline evidence contained in this file. Students should carefully choose which extension evidence to read; it is very unlikely that students will be able to read *all* extension cards in any 2NC or 1NR.

When answering this counterplan, the affirmative should use the materials in this file to construct a 2AC. For some of the 2AC arguments, the affirmative is provided with additional extension cards that could be useful for the 1AR. Due to the intense time constraints of that speech, students should carefully choose which (if any) extension evidence to read.

### Explanation of the Negative

The counterplan argues that the affirmative plan should only be done if China takes measures to improve its human rights. According to the negative, pressuring China by refusing to engage them unless they improve human rights will lead to an increase in human rights protections in China.

The net benefit is that improving human rights in China leads to global human rights promotion. Without being able to point to China as a place that has improved human rights, the US has much worse credibility to persuade other countries to do the same. The impact is that global human rights protections develop an understanding of our shared humanity worldwide, which prevents war.

### Explanation of the Affirmative

The affirmative has a number of responses to the counterplan:

* They argue that the counterplan does not compete. They have a permutation to do both the plan and the counterplan and a permutation to do the counterplan.
* They also have substantive responses to the counterplan, arguing that China says no, that pressure is unsuccessful and may even backfire by reducing human rights protections, and that China won’t comply with the counterplan.
* Finally, the affirmative can make theoretical objections to the counterplan — arguing that plan contingent counterplans or conditional counterplans are unfair to the affirmative.

### Explanation of Plan-Contingent Counterplans

A “plan-contingent counterplan” competes with the affirmative based on the fact that the affirmative is certain. In this debate, the negative will argue that the counterplan competes because the plan is done in all cases, whereas the counterplan may not be done (because China has the option to say no). Even if China will say yes in the vast majority of cases, the possibility of the plan not being done means the counterplan is an opportunity cost of the affirmative.

The affirmative will argue that these counterplans are generic (can be read against every affirmative), discouraging research and preventing education. They will also argue that they distort debates by moving the debate away from whether the plan is a good idea to whether an entirely separate policy is a good idea.

The negative will respond that these types of counterplans are essential for debates about engagement — whether the plan should be done in all circumstances or only done if China does something in response is an essential part of crafting foreign policy strategies. They will also argue that the size of the topic necessitates these types of negative strategies.

This type of argument is called a “theory” argument.

### Explanation of Conditionality

Conditionality refers to the “status” or “disposition” of the counterplan: is the negative defending only the counterplan or can they “kick” the counterplan at any time and revert to defending the status quo? When the negative defends a counterplan but reserves the right to revert to defending the status quo, they are defending the counterplan conditionally. In response, the affirmative can argue that conditionality should not be allowed. When the affirmative makes this argument, the negative must respond by defending the desirability of conditionality. This is called a theory argument.

## 1NC

### 1NC Human Rights Conditions CP (vs. Space)

#### THE [FIRST/NEXT] OFF-CASE IS THE HUMAN RIGHTS CONDITIONS COUNTERPLAN.

#### Text: The United States federal government should substantially expand its engagement over civil space cooperation, including over joint space debris removal, with the People’s Republic of China only if the People’s Republic of China:

#### harmonizes counterterrorism and foreign non-governmental management laws with international law,

#### reduces restrictions on the rights to freedom of expression and religion, and

#### releases individuals detained under those restrictions.

#### First, US pressure creates meaningful human rights reforms in China if we assign it top priority by integrating human rights demands into the relationship.

HRW 16 (Human Rights Watch is a nonprofit, nongovernmental human rights organization (6/5, US: Show Breadth of Rights Commitment at China Dialogue, https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/06/05/us-show-breadth-rights-commitment-china-dialogue)

The United States should make the need for progress on key human rights issues in China a top priority in the final US-China Strategic & Economic Dialogue (S&ED) for the Obama administration, Human Rights Watch said today. The talks, involving more than a dozen agencies from each government, will be held in Beijing from June 6-8, 2016. “This is the Obama administration’s last best chance to show it incorporates human rights across the scope of the bilateral relationship and demands change, from law enforcement cooperation to surveillance on ethnic minority regions, to Beijing’s ferocious assault on civil society,” said Sophie Richardson, China director at Human Rights Watch. “US human rights advocacy with China can succeed when it is unapologetic, public, and argued by diverse interests.” In a joint letter Human Rights Watch and nine other organizations - Amnesty International, China Aid, Freedom House, Human Rights in China, Initiatives for China, International Campaign for Tibet, Reporters without Borders, Uyghur Human Rights Project, and World Uygur Congress - urged the US to: Meet with representatives of civil society in China during or immediately after the meeting; Press Chinese counterparts to repeal or bring into line with international law new national security laws, including the Counterterrorism and the Foreign Non-Governmental Management laws; Publicly call for the release of specific individuals detained for peacefully exercising their rights; and Publicly discuss US concerns about growing restrictions on the rights to freedom of expression and religion, among others. The talks create an opportunity for the US to take unequivocal steps towards integrating human rights into its wider strategic goals and to make clear the priority it assigns to these issues, Human Rights Watch said. Since the June 2015 strategic dialogue, the US has issued statements expressing concern about a range of human rights abuses in China, including the July-September 2015 sweep of lawyers and activists across the country, 25 of whom remain detained. The US has also publicly called on Beijing to repeal or not adopt abusive laws, including the Foreign NGO Management Law. In March, it spearheaded an unprecedented statement at the United Nations Human Rights Council, calling on China to end its arbitrary detention of lawyers and activists, and its extraterritorial abuses. At the same time, Chinese authorities have committed or tolerated gross human rights violations. Few members of the police or other security forces are held accountable for torture or other abuses, and there is no political or legal impulse for fundamental reforms necessary to curb their power. Peaceful prominent activists, including Guo Feixiong and Tang Jingling, have been given harsh sentences, some on vague charges of “disturbing public order.” Nor is there any progress towards accountability for the June 3-4, 1989, Tiananmen Massacre, the 27th anniversary of which came just two days before the opening of the strategic talks. Human Rights Watch has long encouraged the US and other governments to take a broader approach to human rights in China, particularly as the number of government agencies and officials interacting with Chinese counterparts has grown exponentially over the last decade. Greater human rights protections in China are in the US interest, and raising these concerns outside the normal channels, through diverse and coordinated actors, is more likely to produce results. US officials have described their strategy as a “whole of government” approach. Yet there is little evidence that officials, other than those from the State Department or the White House, are raising such concerns. “President Xi and his government have sadly left the US spoiled for choice on which human rights issues to raise,” Richardson said. “The question is: will the US use its whole weight at the S&ED talks with China to push back effectively?”

#### Second, the advancement of human rights in China is key to global human rights promotion.

Neier 13 (President emeritus of the Open Society Foundations (Aryah, Can the U.S. Help Advance Human Rights in China?, www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/06/can-the-us-help-advance-human-rights-in-china/276841/)

I think it is important to recognize the urgency of attempting to advance human rights in the U.S.-China relationship. First and foremost, it is urgent because such a vast number of persons in China itself are deeply affected. Second, it is urgent because it is impossible to promote human rights globally if there is no advance in human rights in China. One of the reasons that the United States and some of its Western allies succeeded a quarter of a century ago in promoting human rights in Soviet bloc countries is that they persuaded many in those countries that human rights and economic success went hand in hand. In recent years, however, China's economic success during a period of economic trouble in the West has conveyed an opposite message. The difficulty of promoting human rights globally in these circumstances is exacerbated by the way that China uses its economic clout in its relations with other countries. Western pressures to promote rights often are defeated by China's assertiveness in making clear that its trade and aid are not subject to human rights conditions. This has become an important factor in countering pressures for human rights in Africa, in Central Asia and in other parts of the world.

#### Finally, human rights promotion develops the recognition of a common humanity. That prevents extinction.

Annas 2 (Prof. and Chair Health Law at Boston U. School of Public Health, George, Lori Andrews, (Distinguished Prof. Law at Chicago-Kent College of Law and Dir. Institute for Science, Law, and Technology at Illinois Institute Tech, and Rosario M. Isasa, (Health Law and Biotethics Fellow at Health Law Dept. of Boston U. School of Public Health), American Journal of Law & Medicine, “THE GENETICS REVOLUTION: CONFLICTS, CHALLENGES AND CONUNDRA: ARTICLE: Protecting the Endangered Human: Toward an International Treaty Prohibiting Cloning and Inheritable Alterations”)

The development of the atomic bomb not only presented to the world for the first time the prospect of total annihilation, but also, paradoxically, led to a renewed emphasis on the "nuclear family," complete with its personal bomb shelter. The conclusion of World War II (with the dropping of the only two atomic bombs ever used in war) led to the recognition that world wars were now suicidal to the entire species and to the formation of the United Nations with the primary goal of preventing such wars. n2 Prevention, of course, must be based on the recognition that all humans are fundamentally the same, rather than on an emphasis on our differences. In the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis, the closest the world has ever come to nuclear war, President John F. Kennedy, in an address to the former Soviet Union, underscored the necessity for recognizing similarities for our survival: [L]et us not be blind to our differences, but let us also direct attention to our common interests and the means by which those differences can be resolved . . . . For, in the final analysis, our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children's future. And we are all mortal. n3 That we are all fundamentally the same, all human, all with the same dignity and rights, is at the core of the most important document to come out of World War II, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the two treaties that followed it (together known as the "International Bill of Rights"). n4 The recognition of universal human rights, based on human dignity and equality as well as the principle of nondiscrimination, is fundamental to the development of a species consciousness. As Daniel Lev of Human Rights Watch/Asia said in 1993, shortly before the Vienna Human Rights Conference: Whatever else may separate them, human beings belong to a single biological species, the simplest and most fundamental commonality before which the significance of human differences quickly fades. . . . We are all capable, in exactly the same ways, of feeling pain, hunger, [\*153] and a hundred kinds of deprivation. Consequently, people nowhere routinely concede that those with enough power to do so ought to be able to kill, torture, imprison, and generally abuse others. . . . The idea of universal human rights shares the recognition of one common humanity, and provides a minimum solution to deal with its miseries. n5 Membership in the human species is central to the meaning and enforcement of human rights, and respect for basic human rights is essential for the survival of the human species. The development of the concept of "crimes against humanity" was a milestone for universalizing human rights in that it recognized that there were certain actions, such as slavery and genocide, that implicated the welfare of the entire species and therefore merited universal condemnation. n6 Nuclear weapons were immediately seen as a technology that required international control, as extreme genetic manipulations like cloning and inheritable genetic alterations have come to be seen today. In fact, cloning and inheritable genetic alterations can be seen as crimes against humanity of a unique sort: they are techniques that can alter the essence of humanity itself (and thus threaten to change the foundation of human rights) by taking human evolution into our own hands and directing it toward the development of a new species, sometimes termed the "posthuman." n7 It may be that species-altering techniques, like cloning and inheritable genetic modifications, could provide benefits to the human species in extraordinary circumstances. For example, asexual genetic replication could potentially save humans from extinction if all humans were rendered sterile by some catastrophic event. But no such necessity currently exists or is on the horizon.

### 1NC Human Rights Conditions CP (vs. TPP)

#### THE [FIRST/NEXT] OFF-CASE IS THE HUMAN RIGHTS CONDITIONS COUNTERPLAN.

#### Text: The United States federal government should increase diplomatic and economic engagement with The People’s Republic of China that invites them to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership making clear to the Chinese government that they are not excluded, can meet standards, and are encouraged to apply for membership only if the People’s Republic of China:

#### harmonizes counterterrorism and foreign non-governmental management laws with international law,

#### reduces restrictions on the rights to freedom of expression and religion, and

#### releases individuals detained under those restrictions.

#### First, US pressure creates meaningful human rights reforms in China if we assign it top priority by integrating human rights demands into the relationship.

HRW 16 (Human Rights Watch is a nonprofit, nongovernmental human rights organization (6/5, US: Show Breadth of Rights Commitment at China Dialogue, https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/06/05/us-show-breadth-rights-commitment-china-dialogue)

The United States should make the need for progress on key human rights issues in China a top priority in the final US-China Strategic & Economic Dialogue (S&ED) for the Obama administration, Human Rights Watch said today. The talks, involving more than a dozen agencies from each government, will be held in Beijing from June 6-8, 2016. “This is the Obama administration’s last best chance to show it incorporates human rights across the scope of the bilateral relationship and demands change, from law enforcement cooperation to surveillance on ethnic minority regions, to Beijing’s ferocious assault on civil society,” said Sophie Richardson, China director at Human Rights Watch. “US human rights advocacy with China can succeed when it is unapologetic, public, and argued by diverse interests.” In a joint letter Human Rights Watch and nine other organizations - Amnesty International, China Aid, Freedom House, Human Rights in China, Initiatives for China, International Campaign for Tibet, Reporters without Borders, Uyghur Human Rights Project, and World Uygur Congress - urged the US to: Meet with representatives of civil society in China during or immediately after the meeting; Press Chinese counterparts to repeal or bring into line with international law new national security laws, including the Counterterrorism and the Foreign Non-Governmental Management laws; Publicly call for the release of specific individuals detained for peacefully exercising their rights; and Publicly discuss US concerns about growing restrictions on the rights to freedom of expression and religion, among others. The talks create an opportunity for the US to take unequivocal steps towards integrating human rights into its wider strategic goals and to make clear the priority it assigns to these issues, Human Rights Watch said. Since the June 2015 strategic dialogue, the US has issued statements expressing concern about a range of human rights abuses in China, including the July-September 2015 sweep of lawyers and activists across the country, 25 of whom remain detained. The US has also publicly called on Beijing to repeal or not adopt abusive laws, including the Foreign NGO Management Law. In March, it spearheaded an unprecedented statement at the United Nations Human Rights Council, calling on China to end its arbitrary detention of lawyers and activists, and its extraterritorial abuses. At the same time, Chinese authorities have committed or tolerated gross human rights violations. Few members of the police or other security forces are held accountable for torture or other abuses, and there is no political or legal impulse for fundamental reforms necessary to curb their power. Peaceful prominent activists, including Guo Feixiong and Tang Jingling, have been given harsh sentences, some on vague charges of “disturbing public order.” Nor is there any progress towards accountability for the June 3-4, 1989, Tiananmen Massacre, the 27th anniversary of which came just two days before the opening of the strategic talks. Human Rights Watch has long encouraged the US and other governments to take a broader approach to human rights in China, particularly as the number of government agencies and officials interacting with Chinese counterparts has grown exponentially over the last decade. Greater human rights protections in China are in the US interest, and raising these concerns outside the normal channels, through diverse and coordinated actors, is more likely to produce results. US officials have described their strategy as a “whole of government” approach. Yet there is little evidence that officials, other than those from the State Department or the White House, are raising such concerns. “President Xi and his government have sadly left the US spoiled for choice on which human rights issues to raise,” Richardson said. “The question is: will the US use its whole weight at the S&ED talks with China to push back effectively?”

#### Second, the advancement of human rights in China is key to global human rights promotion.

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I think it is important to recognize the urgency of attempting to advance human rights in the U.S.-China relationship. First and foremost, it is urgent because such a vast number of persons in China itself are deeply affected. Second, it is urgent because it is impossible to promote human rights globally if there is no advance in human rights in China. One of the reasons that the United States and some of its Western allies succeeded a quarter of a century ago in promoting human rights in Soviet bloc countries is that they persuaded many in those countries that human rights and economic success went hand in hand. In recent years, however, China's economic success during a period of economic trouble in the West has conveyed an opposite message. The difficulty of promoting human rights globally in these circumstances is exacerbated by the way that China uses its economic clout in its relations with other countries. Western pressures to promote rights often are defeated by China's assertiveness in making clear that its trade and aid are not subject to human rights conditions. This has become an important factor in countering pressures for human rights in Africa, in Central Asia and in other parts of the world.

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The development of the atomic bomb not only presented to the world for the first time the prospect of total annihilation, but also, paradoxically, led to a renewed emphasis on the "nuclear family," complete with its personal bomb shelter. The conclusion of World War II (with the dropping of the only two atomic bombs ever used in war) led to the recognition that world wars were now suicidal to the entire species and to the formation of the United Nations with the primary goal of preventing such wars. n2 Prevention, of course, must be based on the recognition that all humans are fundamentally the same, rather than on an emphasis on our differences. In the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis, the closest the world has ever come to nuclear war, President John F. Kennedy, in an address to the former Soviet Union, underscored the necessity for recognizing similarities for our survival: [L]et us not be blind to our differences, but let us also direct attention to our common interests and the means by which those differences can be resolved . . . . For, in the final analysis, our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children's future. And we are all mortal. n3 That we are all fundamentally the same, all human, all with the same dignity and rights, is at the core of the most important document to come out of World War II, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the two treaties that followed it (together known as the "International Bill of Rights"). n4 The recognition of universal human rights, based on human dignity and equality as well as the principle of nondiscrimination, is fundamental to the development of a species consciousness. As Daniel Lev of Human Rights Watch/Asia said in 1993, shortly before the Vienna Human Rights Conference: Whatever else may separate them, human beings belong to a single biological species, the simplest and most fundamental commonality before which the significance of human differences quickly fades. . . . We are all capable, in exactly the same ways, of feeling pain, hunger, [\*153] and a hundred kinds of deprivation. Consequently, people nowhere routinely concede that those with enough power to do so ought to be able to kill, torture, imprison, and generally abuse others. . . . The idea of universal human rights shares the recognition of one common humanity, and provides a minimum solution to deal with its miseries. n5 Membership in the human species is central to the meaning and enforcement of human rights, and respect for basic human rights is essential for the survival of the human species. The development of the concept of "crimes against humanity" was a milestone for universalizing human rights in that it recognized that there were certain actions, such as slavery and genocide, that implicated the welfare of the entire species and therefore merited universal condemnation. n6 Nuclear weapons were immediately seen as a technology that required international control, as extreme genetic manipulations like cloning and inheritable genetic alterations have come to be seen today. In fact, cloning and inheritable genetic alterations can be seen as crimes against humanity of a unique sort: they are techniques that can alter the essence of humanity itself (and thus threaten to change the foundation of human rights) by taking human evolution into our own hands and directing it toward the development of a new species, sometimes termed the "posthuman." n7 It may be that species-altering techniques, like cloning and inheritable genetic modifications, could provide benefits to the human species in extraordinary circumstances. For example, asexual genetic replication could potentially save humans from extinction if all humans were rendered sterile by some catastrophic event. But no such necessity currently exists or is on the horizon.

### 1NC Human Rights Conditions CP (vs. Containment)

#### THE [FIRST/NEXT] OFF-CASE IS THE HUMAN RIGHTS CONDITIONS COUNTERPLAN.

#### Text: The United States federal government should substantially increase its diplomatic communicative engagement with the People’s Republic of China only if the People’s Republic of China:

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#### releases individuals detained under those restrictions.

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The development of the atomic bomb not only presented to the world for the first time the prospect of total annihilation, but also, paradoxically, led to a renewed emphasis on the "nuclear family," complete with its personal bomb shelter. The conclusion of World War II (with the dropping of the only two atomic bombs ever used in war) led to the recognition that world wars were now suicidal to the entire species and to the formation of the United Nations with the primary goal of preventing such wars. n2 Prevention, of course, must be based on the recognition that all humans are fundamentally the same, rather than on an emphasis on our differences. In the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis, the closest the world has ever come to nuclear war, President John F. Kennedy, in an address to the former Soviet Union, underscored the necessity for recognizing similarities for our survival: [L]et us not be blind to our differences, but let us also direct attention to our common interests and the means by which those differences can be resolved . . . . For, in the final analysis, our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children's future. And we are all mortal. n3 That we are all fundamentally the same, all human, all with the same dignity and rights, is at the core of the most important document to come out of World War II, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the two treaties that followed it (together known as the "International Bill of Rights"). n4 The recognition of universal human rights, based on human dignity and equality as well as the principle of nondiscrimination, is fundamental to the development of a species consciousness. As Daniel Lev of Human Rights Watch/Asia said in 1993, shortly before the Vienna Human Rights Conference: Whatever else may separate them, human beings belong to a single biological species, the simplest and most fundamental commonality before which the significance of human differences quickly fades. . . . We are all capable, in exactly the same ways, of feeling pain, hunger, [\*153] and a hundred kinds of deprivation. Consequently, people nowhere routinely concede that those with enough power to do so ought to be able to kill, torture, imprison, and generally abuse others. . . . The idea of universal human rights shares the recognition of one common humanity, and provides a minimum solution to deal with its miseries. n5 Membership in the human species is central to the meaning and enforcement of human rights, and respect for basic human rights is essential for the survival of the human species. The development of the concept of "crimes against humanity" was a milestone for universalizing human rights in that it recognized that there were certain actions, such as slavery and genocide, that implicated the welfare of the entire species and therefore merited universal condemnation. n6 Nuclear weapons were immediately seen as a technology that required international control, as extreme genetic manipulations like cloning and inheritable genetic alterations have come to be seen today. In fact, cloning and inheritable genetic alterations can be seen as crimes against humanity of a unique sort: they are techniques that can alter the essence of humanity itself (and thus threaten to change the foundation of human rights) by taking human evolution into our own hands and directing it toward the development of a new species, sometimes termed the "posthuman." n7 It may be that species-altering techniques, like cloning and inheritable genetic modifications, could provide benefits to the human species in extraordinary circumstances. For example, asexual genetic replication could potentially save humans from extinction if all humans were rendered sterile by some catastrophic event. But no such necessity currently exists or is on the horizon.

## 2NC/1NR

### They Say: “Perm — Do Both”

#### Doing the plan and conditioning the plan sends conflicting messages that eliminates incentives for reform.

Bequelin 13 (East Asia Director at Amnesty International (Nicholas, Can the U.S. Help Advance Human Rights in China?, www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/06/can-the-us-help-advance-human-rights-in-china/276841/)

But such progress comes at a high price, especially for activists, and the question that U.S. policy makers face is whether the U.S. should stand by Chinese people who are pushing their government to pay more respect to fundamental rights and freedoms, or whether it should ignore them. It seems to me, irrespective of the issue of moral imperatives, that it is clearly in the U.S. national interest that China inches towards a more open and less repressive system of government than it has at present. The other approach, a form of engagement that mutes human rights, clearly has failed to yield any results in the past two and a half decades. While this approach styled itself as being "realist" (as opposed to the supposed "idealism" of human rights proponents) it is fairly clear today that the actual realists were those who predicted that such a low level of human rights engagement would yield nothing and even encourage the Chinese government in its repressive ways. The keys to effective promotion of the human rights agenda in the U.S.-China relationship are relatively straightforward: First, what is most important is for the United States to set the best possible example. The past few years have been problematic in this respect, with issues ranging from the legality of the Iraq war to Abu Ghraib to the C.I.A. renditions. Second, the U.S. government needs to be consistent in the way it raises its concerns on human rights, and not be shy to use vocal diplomacy when private diplomacy yields no result. Too often, the U.S. is sending conflicting messages, one day stressing its attachment to universal human rights norms, and the next stating that the U.S. and China "agree to disagree" on a range of issues, including human rights. This undermines the universality of human rights. Third, the U.S. must mainstream human rights perspectives across the full spectrum of its engagement with China. The compartmentalization of human rights as a minor rubric of diplomacy is bound to fail, because the Chinese side knows human rights have no bearings on other aspects of the bilateral relationship. The business environment for U.S. companies operating in China is directly linked to issues intimately connected to human rights, such as the elastic character of China's state secrecy laws or the introduction of provisions in the criminal law that allows for secret detention by the police.

#### Consistency and clarity are key to pressure.

HRF 12 (Human Rights First is a nonprofit, nonpartisan human rights organization (HOW TO INTEGRATE HUMAN RIGHTS INTO U.S. – CHINA RELATIONS—A HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST BLUEPRINT, https://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/24330/uploads)

Under the Obama Administration, human rights have remained a contentious issue on the U.S. agenda with China. Administration officials, including the president, have pressed Chinese officials publicly and privately on a variety of issues, including free speech, Internet freedoms, and policies toward the Tibetan people, as well as raising cases of specific activists and human rights defenders. The annual Human Rights Dialogue with China, which was suspended by the Chinese for nearly four years during the Bush Administration, has restarted. While the State Department maintains the lead on human rights issues, other agencies such as the Departments of Labor and Justice have been brought into the dialogue. At the grassroots level, the administration has continued to fund a broad array of programs in the areas of democracy, rule of law, civil society development, sustainable development, environmental protection, cultural preservation in Tibet, and health. Notwithstanding these efforts, the administration has struggled to define the place of human rights on the larger agenda with China. It came into office determined to have, as Secretary Clinton put it, a “positive and cooperative relationship with China” in order to elicit Chinese cooperation on a panoply of global and bilateral issues. To this end, the administration signaled throughout its first year that cooperation with China would take precedence over human rights. However, it gradually stepped back from this careful approach when it became clear by the end of 2010 that Chinese cooperation on other issues was not forthcoming. The policy reversal was manifest in President Obama’s meeting with the Dalai Lama, which had been previously postponed; the administration’s outspokenness on the detention of human rights activist Liu Xiaobo; the president’s remarks in his state summit in 2011 with Chinese President Hu Jintao; and in the Chen Guangcheng case. In so doing, the administration sent a clear signal to Chinese leaders of the importance the United States places on human rights and those in China who are risking their lives and that of their families to advocate for them Human Rights First applauds this elevation of the human rights issue. Now the Obama Administration should strive for consistency and clarity on this issue, and move forward with an unequivocal commitment to preserving and advancing human rights on the larger U.S.-China agenda. The tools already exist; what lies ahead requires resolve to push forward with the promotion of human rights even as the strategic calculus may change.

#### Doing the plan while we condition makes the US look like it’s backing down.

Eisendrath 97 (Craig, Senior Fellow at the Center for International Policy in Washington, D.C. [“Can U.S. foreign policy afford morality? It must! Horror: The human abuse policies of China and other totalitarian states are susceptible to pressure - if it's tough and consistent.” Baltimore Sun February 02, 1997 URL: http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1997-02-02/news/1997033025\_1\_cultural-revolution-mao-chinese-history/2)

When one looks today for democracy and human rights in North or South Korea or in Indonesia, however, it is difficult to take much comfort. Nor can one blandly contemplate millions rotting in Chinese jails, massive slave labor, the brutal occupation of Tibet and the suppression of free speech, labor unions and political representation, for one or two generations. Even if Congress and the Clinton administration, balancing human rights concerns with economic and corporate interests, refuse to use withdrawal of Most Favored Nation status as a credible threat, they must greatly increase pressure on the Chinese on human rights. The United States has backed down '' consistently, erratically dropped issues, and sometimes not even bothered to monitor compliance when the Chinese have made human rights concessions. We have become so weak on human rights that the Chinese seem to delight in humiliating us. One example is their harsh sentencing of dissidents during United States Secretary of State Warren Christopher's visit. Consistent pressure But we are far from powerless. When the United States threatened China with higher tariffs and stuck to its guns in negotiations over intellectual property and textiles, it won economic concessions. This bargaining power can and should be used to maintain consistent pressure on the Chinese on human rights issues as well. The United States also has political leverage, despite its need for cooperation with China in the Far East and in the United Nations. A current bargaining chip is a proposed U.S.-China summit, which the Chinese deeply desire. What U.S. negotiators cannot do is continue to target particular individual rights abuses and then drop them, as this exposes the individuals involved to dangerous recriminations.

### They Say: “Perm — Do The CP”

#### 1. Severance permutations should be rejected because if the permutation doesn’t include all of the plan then it can’t disprove the opportunity costs to the plan that the counterplan demonstrates. The permutation is severance in three ways:

#### a. Engagement — Quid pro quo is the *opposite* of engagement.

Celik 11 (poli sci and ir ma at Uppsala University Sweden (Arda Can, Economic sanctions and engagement policies, http://www.grin.com/en/e-book/175204/economic-sanctions-and-engagement-policies)

Economic engagement policies are strategic integration behaviour which involves with the target state. Engagement policies differ from other tools in Economic Diplomacy. They target to deepen the economic relations to create economic intersection, interconnectness, and mutual dependence and finally seeks economic interdependence. This interdependence serves the sender state to change the political behaviour of target state. However they cannot be counted as carrots or inducement tools, they focus on long term strategic goals and they are not restricted with short term policy changes.(Kahler&Kastner,2006) They can be unconditional and focus on creating greater economic benefits for both parties. Economic engagement targets to seek deeper economic linkages via promoting institutionalized mutual trade thus mentioned interdependence creates two major concepts. Firstly it builds strong trade partnership to avoid possible militarized and non militarized conflicts. Secondly it gives a leeway to perceive the international political atmosphere from the same and harmonized perspective. Kahler and Kastner define the engagement policies as follows “’It is a policy of deliberate expanding economic ties with and adversary in order to change the behaviour of target state and improve bilateral relations’’.(p523-abstact).It is an intentional economic strategy that expects bigger benefits such as long term economic gains and more importantly; political gains. The main idea behind the engagement motivation is stated by Rosecrance(1977)in a way that ‘’the direct and positive linkage of interests of states where a change in the position of one state affects the position of others in the same direction’’ Although, much of the literature focuses on the effectiveness of economic sanctions, economic engagement strategies have rapidly gained momentum and gathers more and more attention(Kahler&Kastner,2006). Kirshner(2002) states that handful of studies examine the Hirchmanesque effects of economic relations and engagement policies therefore engagement policies are newly emerging alternative strategies against the economic sanctions. This literature is a composition of liberal and realist approaches. Liberals underline that Effectiveness of engagement policies are valid and ascending. On the other hand, Realists criticise the potential of engagement policies and does not give credits to the arguments of engagement strategies. Liberal Approach Literature of liberal school points out that economic engagement policies are significantly effective tools for sender and target countries. The effectiveness leans on mutual economic and political benefits for both parties.(Garzke et al,2001). Economic engagement operates with trade mechanisms where sender and target country establish intensified trade thus increase the economic interaction over time. This strategy decreases the potential hostilities and provides mutual gains. Paulson Jr (2008) states that this mechanism is highly different from carrots (inducements). Carrots work quid pro quo in short terms and for narrow goals. Economic engagement intends to develop the target country and wants her to be aware of the long term benefits of shared economic goals. Sender does not want to contain nor prevent the target country with different policies. Conversely; sender works deliberately to improve the target countries’ Gdp, trade potential, export-import ratios and national income. Sender acts in purpose to reach important goals. First it establishes strong economic ties because economic integration has the capacity to change the political choices and behaviour of target country. Sender state believes in that economic linkages have political transformation potential.(Kroll,1993)

#### b. Certainty — The CP introduces the possibility the plan will not happen.

Nieto 9 (Judge Henry, Appellate Judge Colorado Court of Appeals, 8-20-2009 People v. Munoz, 240 P.3d 311 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009), http://www.scribd.com/doc/19076662/People-v-Munoz)

“Should” is “used . . . to express duty, obligation, propriety, or expediency.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2104 (2002).Courts interpreting the word in various contexts have drawn conflicting conclusions, although the weight of authority appears to favor interpreting “should” in an imperative, obligatory sense. A number of courts, confronted with the question of whether using the word “should” in jury instructions conforms with the Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections governing the reasonable doubt standard, have upheld instructions using the word. In the courts of other states in which a defendant has argued that the word “should” in the reasonable doubt instruction does not sufficiently inform the jury that it is bound to find the defendant not guilty if insufficient proof is submitted at trial, the courts have squarely rejected the argument. They reasoned that the word “conveys a sense of duty and obligation and could not be misunderstood by a jury.” See State v. McCloud, 891 P.2d 324, 335 (Kan. 1995);se e also Tyson v. State, 457 S.E.2d 690, 691-92 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (finding argument that “should” is directional but not instructional to be without merit); Commonwealth v. Hammond, 504 A.2d 940, 941-42 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986). Notably, courts interpreting the word “should” in other types of jury instructions have also found that the word conveys to the jury a sense of duty or obligation and not discretion. In Little v. State, 554 S.W.2d 312, 324 (Ark. 1977), the Arkansas Supreme Court interpreted the word “should” in an instruction on circumstantial evidence as synonymous with the word “must” and rejected the defendant’s argument that the jury may have been misled by the court’s use of the word in the instruction. Similarly, the Missouri Supreme Court rejected a defendant’s argument that the court erred by not using the word “should” in an instruction on witness credibility which used the word “must” because the two words have the same meaning. State v. Rack, 318 S.W.2d 211, 215 (Mo. 1958). In applying a child support statute, the Arizona Court of Appeals concluded that a legislature’s or commission’s use of the word “should” is meant to convey duty or obligation.McNutt v. McNutt, 49 P.3d 300, 306 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002) (finding a statute stating that child support expenditures “should” be allocated for the purpose of parents’ federal tax exemption to be mandatory.

#### c. Immediacy — The plan sequences the offer before the demand relinquishing leverage.

Summer 94 (Justice, Oklahoma Supreme Court, “Kelsey v. Dollarsaver Food Warehouse of Durant”, http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn14)

The legal question to be resolved by the court is whether the word "should" in the May 18 order connotes futurity or may be deemed a ruling in praesenti. The answer to this query is not to be divined from rules of grammar; it must be governed by the age-old practice culture of legal professionals and its immemorial language usage. To determine if the omission (from the critical May 18 entry) of the turgid phrase, "and the same hereby is", (1) makes it an in futuro ruling - i.e., an expression of what the judge will or would do at a later stage - or (2) constitutes an in in praesenti resolution of a disputed law issue, the trial judge's intent must be garnered from the four corners of the entire record.16 ¶5 Nisi prius orders should be so construed as to give effect to every words and every part of the text, with a view to carrying out the evident intent of the judge's direction.17 The order's language ought not to be considered abstractly. The actual meaning intended by the document's signatory should be derived from the context in which the phrase to be interpreted is used.18 When applied to the May 18 memorial, these told canons impel my conclusion that the judge doubtless intended his ruling as an in praesenti resolution of Dollarsaver's quest for judgment n.o.v. Approval of all counsel plainly appears on the face of the critical May 18 entry which is [885 P.2d 1358] signed by the judge.19 True minutes20 of a court neither call for nor bear the approval of the parties' counsel nor the judge's signature. To reject out of hand the view that in this context "should" is impliedly followed by the customary, "and the same hereby is", makes the court once again revert to medieval notions of ritualistic formalism now so thoroughly condemned in national jurisprudence and long abandoned by the statutory policy of this State. [Continues – To Footnote] 14 In praesenti means literally "at the present time." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 792 (6th Ed. 1990). In legal parlance the phrase denotes that which in law is presently or immediately effective, as opposed to something that will or would become effective in the future [in futurol]. See Van Wyck v. Knevals, 106 U.S. 360, 365, 1 S.Ct. 336, 337, 27 L.Ed. 201 (1882).

#### 2. Leaks undermine the permutation’s leverage because they know we’ll do it regardless.

Washington Post 9 (Michael Gerson- November 20, 2009, Obama the undecider, lexisnexis)

Gates said he is "appalled by the amount of leaking that has been going on," which would be, if the culprits are discovered, "a career-ender." Obama recently added, "I think I am angrier than Bob Gates about it." They should be appalled and angry at the process they created -- as should the rest of the country. Sometimes government leaks are self-serving, reflecting the powerful passion of midlevel functionaries to appear in the know. But leaks in this process have been attempts to rig the outcome of a national security decision. This summer, nameless White House officials began leaking their skepticism of plans for troop increases. Then Gen. Stanley McChrystal's assessment, calling for a more troop-intensive counterinsurgency strategy, was leaked. Then a leak of internal government reviews on the poor state of the Afghan military and police forces. Then a leak from "informed sources" that Obama had settled on a troop increase of 34,000. Then the leak that Obama had rejected all the military options on the table and was insisting on refinements. Then the leak of two classified cables from Ambassador Karl Eikenberry, which cautioned against troop increases, leaving McChrystal, according to another nameless source, feeling "stabbed in the back." The Afghan policy process has resulted in more leaks than Oktoberfest. Leaks are a form of disloyalty -- an attempt to box in the president of the United States, a mini-coup in which unelected officials attempt to substitute their judgment for the president's. Leaks increase tension and anger, then leave the losing side in a debate publicly humiliated and perhaps alienated from the outcome. Depending on that outcome, Obama will be vulnerable to charges of buckling to military pressure or disregarding the advice of his commanders.

### They Say: “China Says No”

#### China caves in the face of international human rights pressure.

Denyer 15 (Simon, The Post’s bureau chief in China, “Release of reporter’s brothers shows China does heed foreign pressure” Washington Post December 31st, 2015 URL: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/china-unexpectedly-frees-two-brothers-of-us-reporter-after-long-detention/2015/12/30/cfaefbcf-0165-4288-adc1-88a8947a4e01\_story.html)

Sometimes the government in Beijing surprises people, by responding to international pressure over human rights. This week, China unexpectedly released from detention two of three brothers of a reporter for Radio Free Asia (RFA) who is based in Washington. All three brothers had been held since the summer of 2014, and their case had attracted significant attention abroad, especially in the United States. It is the fourth time this year that China has appeared to respond to an international outcry and pulled back from exacting the harshest possible punishments on prominent dissidents. In April, Beijing released five women’s rights activists who had been detained for planning to distribute leaflets against sexual violence. In November, China freed 71-year-old journalist Gao Yu early on medical parole, with Germany among the countries that had express concerns about her health. This month, a prominent lawyer named Pu Zhiqiang received a suspended sentence — rather than the expected jail term — for sending several tweets mocking the government. Now comes the release of two of the brothers of Shohret Hoshur, an ethnic Uighur journalist. Their detention in 2014 was widely seen as an attempt by the Chinese government to intimidate one of the few sources of independent reporting into events in its troubled western region of Xinjiang. The third brother, Tudaxun, was sentenced to a five-year term for endangering state security and remains in prison. [China expels French journalist for terrorism coverage] “The United States welcomes the release of Radio Free Asia journalist Shohret Hoshur’s brothers, Shawket and Rexim Hoshur, from detention,” said Anna Richey-Allen, a spokeswoman for the State Department’s Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs. “The two brothers were detained from August 2014 on vague charges of ‘endangering state security’ and ‘leaking state secrets.’ We have consistently expressed our concern over their confinement.” The United States, she said, also urges China to release Tudaxun Hoshur. Shohret Hoshur left China in 1994, having displeased the authorities with his journalism. He has since become a U.S. citizen, and he leads RFA’s coverage of Xinjiang issues, often highlighting human rights abuses there. RFA is financed by the U.S. Congress. [China pressures U.S. reporter from a distance over Xinjiang coverage] The brothers who have been released, Shawket and Rexim, were detained in August 2014, shortly after holding a telephone conversation with Shohret Hoshur in which they complained about the injustice of Tudaxun’s arrest two months earlier. They were tried separately in August, although no verdict was issued. Both were abruptly released to their families in the town of Horgos on Wednesday, said an RFA spokesman, Rohit Mahajan. There were no details about the terms of their release, he said, adding that both men are understood to have lost weight during their detention. Hoshur insists his brothers are all upstanding members of the community, farmers and merchants with little or no interest in politics. He says that relatives have been harassed by Chinese officials in Xinjiang and that some have even phoned him in the past urging him to leave his job at RFA. The U.S. government has repeatedly urged China to release all of Hoshur’s brothers. He has met several State Department officials and was among a group of dissidents and their relatives who met Secretary of State John F. Kerry ahead of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to the United States in September. That month, he also testified before the Congressional-Executive Commission on China. Hoshur went on Facebook “to share the great news that my older and youngest brother have been released in the early morning of December 30 from a detention center in Urumqi.” He thanked the State Department, Sen. Mark R. Warner (D-Va.), the Committee to Protect Journalists, the U.S. government’s Broadcasting Board of Governors and “fellow journalists” who have continuously followed the case. “Also I want to thank my colleagues at RFA for their support and my friends who stood with me during some very difficult times,” he said. The release notwithstanding, China is in the midst of its harshest crackdown on free speech and dissent in decades. For each case in which it appears to respond to international pressure, there are other examples in which it does not. This week, a French reporter was expelled from China for her coverage of events in Xinjiang. Prominent dissidents such as Nobel Peace Prize winner Liu Xiaobo continue to languish in jail, as does moderate Uighur academic Ilham Tohti, sentenced to life in prison last year. [China gives moderate Uighur scholar life in prison] Pu was detained for 19 months before being freed, and he still received a three-year suspended sentence, which prevents him from practicing law for three years. The women’s rights activists still faced police harassment after their release. The cases against all of the Hoshur brothers were so thin as to be almost nonexistent, human rights and legal experts say. In Beijing, some argue that global pressure on China can be counterproductive, forcing Beijing to dig in its heels and allowing it to label dissidents as stooges of Western powers intent on blocking China’s rise. However, these examples appear to show that international pressure about individual cases can occasionally bear fruit. “For all the abuses visited upon human rights defenders in China this [past] year, in a handful of cases about which there was considerable domestic and international outrage we saw a somewhat less awful outcome,” said Sophie Richardson, China director at Human Rights Watch. Richardson said that all were cases in which no detention or charge or trial was merited, but she added that the Chinese leadership does not like being confronted — vocally and unambiguously — on such “baseless, absurd” charges. “The point is simply that domestic and international pressure matters in these cases,” she said, “and should in turn inspire courageous, creative and consistent diplomatic efforts in other circumstances, such as those of the Hoshur brothers — and so many others.”

#### The US leverage advances human rights in China — the Chinese might not like it but they will give in to avoid harm to the overall relationship. Chen case proves.

HRF 12 (Human Rights First is a nonprofit, nonpartisan human rights organization (HOW TO INTEGRATE HUMAN RIGHTS INTO U.S. – CHINA RELATIONS—A HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST BLUEPRINT, https://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/24330/uploads)

With China’s power rising and the scope of the U.S. relationship with China broadening, two assumptions have taken root among American policymakers. The first is that of a zero sum game—that progress on human rights comes at the expense of other issues that are often viewed as more critical. The Obama Administration’s experiences with China and the Chen case suggest otherwise. The administration’s efforts in the first two years to avoid antagonizing Chinese leaders did not result in progress on critical issues. Secretary Clinton’s tough approach in the Chen case no doubt irritated Chinese leaders. They retaliated by withholding written responses to the case list submitted in the previous Human Rights Dialogue. But they did not walk out. They permitted Chen to leave the country. Chinese leaders calculated the totality of their interests in the overall relationship. The second assumption is that U.S. leverage over China has decreased. To a certain extent this is true. The United States needs China more than in the past and China is in a stronger position to control the relationship. However, the United States is not without leverage. The U.S. economy and military remain stronger. Reassertion of American power and presence in Asia can affect China’s interests and desire for dominance in the region. China wants U.S. trade and investment, technological know-how, and a stable relationship because they advance Chinese interests and China’s legitimacy as a member of the international community. The relationship, in and of itself, is leverage which can be used to advance all American interests, and should be used to do so on human rights, too.

### They Say: “Strategic Compliance”

#### Human rights conditions work.

Cardenas 9 (Sonia, associate professor of political science and director of the Human Rights Program at Trinity College, 12/4, “Demoting human rights”, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/24/opinion/24iht-edcardenas.1.20395821.html?\_r=0)

Further evidence suggests that human rights pressure - not just dialogue - is essential for eventual reform. In fact, some research indicates that the consistency of applying human rights pressure, even at the level of rhetoric, is more important than the intensity of pressure applied. Such pressures lead governments to make concessions, which in turn can empower groups to mobilize and demand further change, occasionally setting in motion a longer term dynamic of gradual reform. All told, there are both principled and pragmatic reasons to promote human rights seriously in foreign policy.

#### AIDS response proves the best mechanism for securing Chinese human rights reform is integrating human rights onto other issues.

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The Chinese response to the AIDS crisis offers an interesting illustration. Ten years ago, China faced three health threats in a row. The first involved sales of contaminated blood, primarily in rural areas, which led to deaths and violence by rural farmers who were the most affected population. The government’s response—to suppress information and deny the problem—was a failure. When the second threat, SARS, hit shortly thereafter, the government publicized death tolls, but continued to suppress information on the extent of the outbreak--a response that only worsened the situation. When confronted subsequently with the AIDS problem, the government, recognizing its mismanagement of the previous health crises, reversed course. It publicly acknowledged the extent of the problem; sought assistance from the Global Fund for AIDS, TB, and Malaria; and accepted its funding requirements including the development of a network of civil society organizations. In this case, the fear that inaction would lead to instability and the need to obtain the international community’s assistance led Chinese leaders to take liberalizing steps. In the process, they legitimized the existence of civil society organizations (CSOs) and allowed information to flow more freely. Integrating human rights into other issues on the U.S. agenda with China has numerous benefits. It allows the United States to reach out directly to the Chinese people and give voice to their needs, as well as to the needs of human rights activists and defenders. It prevents China’s leaders from sidelining the human rights issue. It allows U.S. officials to present a consistent message across the entire spectrum of issues on the agenda, to pursue the human rights issue more aggressively, and to reduce the risks to the relationship that administrations often associate with promoting human rights. The Obama Administration has broadened the way the U.S. government thinks and talks about human rights by expanding the human rights agenda to include the international community’s Millennium Development Goals. Speaking at Georgetown University three years ago, Secretary Clinton emphasized that “supporting democracy and fostering development” were cornerstones of the administration’s human rights agenda. The integrated human rights strategy builds on these cornerstones by proposing solutions to development problems that give the Chinese people more rights

### They Say: “Not Reverse Causal”

#### Human rights pressure on China is key to galvanize global movements.

Roth 11 (Kenneth, executive director at the Human Rights Watch, "World Report 2011: A Facade of Action", http://www.hrw.org/world-report-2011/world-report-2011-facade-action)

There is often a degree of rationality in a government's decision to violate human rights. The government might fear that permitting greater freedom would encourage people to join together in voicing discontent and thus jeopardize its grip on power. Or abusive leaders might worry that devoting resources to the impoverished would compromise their ability to enrich themselves and their cronies. International pressure can change that calculus. Whether exposing or condemning abuses, conditioning access to military aid or budgetary support on ending them, imposing targeted sanctions on individual abusers, or even calling for prosecution and punishment of those responsible, public pressure raises the cost of violating human rights. It discourages further oppression, signaling that violations cannot continue cost-free. All governments have a duty to exert such pressure. A commitment to human rights requires not only upholding them at home but also using available and appropriate tools to convince other governments to respect them as well. No repressive government likes facing such pressure. Today many are fighting back, hoping to dissuade others from adopting or continuing such measures. That reaction is hardly surprising. What is disappointing is the number of governments that, in the face of that reaction, are abandoning public pressure. With disturbing frequency, governments that might have been counted on to generate such pressure for human rights are accepting the rationalizations and subterfuges of repressive governments and giving up. In place of a commitment to exerting public pressure for human rights, they profess a preference for softer approaches such as private "dialogue" and "cooperation." There is nothing inherently wrong with dialogue and cooperation to promote human rights. Persuading a government through dialogue to genuinely cooperate with efforts to improve its human rights record is a key goal of human rights advocacy. A cooperative approach makes sense for a government that demonstrably wants to respect human rights but lacks the resources or technical know-how to implement its commitment. It can also be useful for face-saving reasons-if a government is willing to end violations but wants to appear to act on its own initiative. Indeed, Human Rights Watch often engages quietly with governments for such reasons. But when the problem is a lack of political will to respect rights, public pressure is needed to change the cost-benefit analysis that leads to the choice of repression over rights. In such cases, the quest for dialogue and cooperation becomes a charade designed more to appease critics of complacency than to secure change, a calculated diversion from the fact that nothing of consequence is being done. Moreover, the refusal to use pressure makes dialogue and cooperation less effective because governments know there is nothing to fear from simply feigning serious participation. Recent illustrations of this misguided approach include ASEAN's tepid response to Burmese repression, the United Nations' deferential attitude toward Sri Lankan atrocities, the European Union's obsequious approach to Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, the soft Western reaction to certain favored repressive African leaders such as Paul Kagame of Rwanda and Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia, the weak United States policy toward Saudi Arabia, India's pliant posture toward Burma and Sri Lanka, and the near-universal cowardice in confronting China's deepening crackdown on basic liberties. In all of these cases, governments, by abandoning public pressure, effectively close their eyes to repression. Even those that shy away from using pressure in most cases are sometimes willing to apply it toward pariah governments, such as North Korea, Iran, Sudan, and Zimbabwe, whose behavior, whether on human rights or other matters, is so outrageous that it overshadows other interests. But in too many cases, governments these days are disappointingly disinclined to use public pressure to alter the calculus of repression. When governments stop exerting public pressure to address human rights violations, they leave domestic advocates-rights activists, sympathetic parliamentarians, concerned journalists-without crucial support. Pressure from abroad can help create the political space for local actors to push their government to respect rights. It also can let domestic advocates know that they are not alone, that others stand with them. But when there is little or no such pressure, repressive governments have a freer hand to restrict domestic advocates, as has occurred in recent years in Russia, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Cambodia, and elsewhere. And because dialogue and cooperation look too much like acquiescence and acceptance, domestic advocates sense indifference rather than solidarity

#### China human rights reforms key to global human rights. Prevents conflict.

Nathan 13 (Poli Sci Prof at Columbia (Andrew, Can the U.S. Help Advance Human Rights in China?, www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/06/can-the-us-help-advance-human-rights-in-china/276841/)

We should remind our politicians that promoting China's adherence to universal human rights norms is not just a matter of moral idealism, but also a matter of sound strategy. First, everyone will feel safer as businesspeople, scholars, and tourists when China has rule of law, and this includes not only Americans but other foreigners and Chinese as well. Second, China's strategic intentions will be more transparent if they are shaped in an open political process, and this will reduce suspicion of China by all of China's neighbors and the U.S., which also will be good for China itself. Third, China will be more stable politically once the regime is grounded in the consent of the people, and a stable and prosperous China is in the interests of the rest of the world. Finally, a world with a robust set of international norms and institutions that regulate fields such as trade, investment, the environment, arms control, and human rights will be a more predictable and peaceful world, where conflicts of interest can be sorted out and common interests advanced in reliable ways. Such a world cannot be built without the full participation of a rising great power like China.

#### Inaction against China undermines global human rights promotion.

Genser & Kuperminc 15 (Jared, founder of Freedom Now, which serves as pro bono counsel to Liu Xiaobo and Liu Xia, Julia, legal intern at Freedom Now, “The Other Empty Chairs”, http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2015/12/10/its-time-for-world-leaders-to-stand-up-to-chinas-human-rights-abuses)

So why should the world care about these two people in a country of over 1.3 billion? We must care because their cases demonstrate the way China now humiliates us all. Liu Xiaobo is the world's only imprisoned Nobel Peace Prize laureate, and his wife is detained merely for being married to her husband. If leaders of the most powerful countries on Earth refuse to take meaningful action to secure their freedom, the unequivocal message sent to courageous Chinese dissidents and others considering the same path is clear and it is stark – you will face down the Chinese government alone. And if there is no consequence for the Chinese government in detaining the two most visible political prisoners in the world, then it can easily ignore its own constitution and laws, let alone its obligations under international law, whenever and wherever it wants. The cases of Liu Xiaobo and Liu Xia are indeed uniquely difficult. But they are equally singularly important. With the slightest political courage, even the simplest collective action could dramatically transform China's considerations. As a start, imagine if the ambassadors of the United States, United Kingdom and European Union to China privately informed the government that unless Liu Xia is able to travel abroad for medical treatment, the new policies of these governments would be relentless private and public confrontation with China over her case. At every bilateral meeting on any subject, each government would urge Liu Xia's freedom as an opening comment. And these three ambassadors would invite all foreign ambassadors based in Beijing to join them to try and visit Liu Xia under house arrest; if turned away they would hold a joint press conference to challenge China's claim that she is not imprisoned.

### They Say: “Pressure Backfires”

#### Human rights pressure succeeds without threatening cooperation.

Chen 12 (Assistant Research Fellow at the Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University, Taiwan (Titus,China’s Response to International Normative Pressure: The Case of Human Rightshttps://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/21049/uploads)

Nevertheless, Beijing is not completely immune to human rights pressure. The PRC has signed international human rights agreements, released individual prisoners, and adhered to at least procedural compliance with UN human rights monitoring. To summarize, normative pressure has increased China’s sensitivity to its international human rights image, and has resulted in its deepening enmeshment and entrapment in the UN human rights regime. Moreover, China’s principled opposition to international human rights pressure is not equivalent to a complete rejection of the whole notion of human rights. Far from being mutually exclusive, opposition and cooperation have co-existed in China’s human rights diplomacy. The defining feature of the Chinese response to human rights pressure hence lies not in its defiant behaviour, but in its insistence on the domination of the party-state in making human rights policy. The international community’s effort to socialise China into accepting human rights norms has not completely failed. A more realistic conclusion is that socialisation has worked more effectively in areas of governance where the power of the Chinese party-state is acknowledged, not curtailed.

#### The counterplan’s integrated approach is key – Advancing human rights through other issues ensures success without endangering cooperation

HRF 12 (Human Rights First is a nonprofit, nonpartisan human rights organization (HOW TO INTEGRATE HUMAN RIGHTS INTO U.S. – CHINA RELATIONS—A HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST BLUEPRINT, https://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/24330/uploads)

When to press China’s leadership on human rights, how hard, and with what tools has been an ever-changing calculation, as successive U.S. administrations have tried to balance America’s strategic and economic interests in the expanding U.S.-China relationship with America’s leadership as an advocate for and protector of universal rights and freedoms. Today, China is not only an Asian power, but an emerging global power with the capacity to help or hinder U.S. policy on a broad range of issues. As a result, the imperative for the United States to have a cooperative, productive, stable relationship with China grows. And as it grows, so does the temptation for the U.S. government to place human rights further down the priority list on the agenda. Human Rights First recommends that the Obama Administration elevate the priority placed on the promotion of human rights in China, and maximize the potential for progress by developing a comprehensive, integrated approach built on a strategy that advances human rights through other issues on the U.S.-China agenda. The record of progress, still woefully inadequate, demands an aggressive approach that treats human rights as a mainstream issue rather than as an obstacle to the relationship. ELEVATING THE PRIORITY: THE CASE OF CHEN GUANGCHENG In April 2012, Chen Guangcheng, a self-taught, blind Chinese legal activist who had been confined to house arrest after four years of imprisonment, escaped from local authorities in his home province of Shandong. In need of medical treatment by the time he arrived in Beijing, Chen asked the U.S. Embassy for assistance.. The timing of Chen’s request was critical: just days before the start of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S & ED) and some six months before a leadership change in China scheduled for November 2012. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton took the bold and unexpected step of ordering embassy officials to go out, get Chen, and bring him into the embassy compound, as Chinese agents followed. That decision propelled Chen’s case to the forefront of the U.S.-China agenda. Secretary Clinton’s decision to give Chen refuge in the embassy could have backfired. China’s leaders could have blasted the United States, refused to negotiate a solution to the case, and walked away from the upcoming dialogue, leaving a set of issues important to the United States on the table. But they did not. To the surprise of many, high-level talks continued even as the two sides negotiated a resolution to Chen’s case. Chen’s case offers important lessons for the Obama Administration as it pursues the human rights agenda with China. First, the imperative to have a working relationship exists for both sides, suggesting that the U.S.-China relationship is stronger than the differences between the two countries imply. Chinese officials dislike the American focus on human rights issues, and they come to the relationship with a fair amount of mistrust of American intentions. But they understand that, just as China is in a position to affect U.S. interests, the United States is in a position to affect theirs. And both sides recognize that maintaining a constructive relationship requires continual engagement across a host of issues, even when disagreement in one area challenges the relationship. Second, the case demonstrates that human rights issues can be pursued vigorously and simultaneously with other issues on the American agenda with China. They do not have to be sidelined, or compartmentalized, or minimized. Indeed, the Chen case illustrates the impracticality of trying to quarantine human rights from the larger relationship. Human rights cannot be ignored, but the issue does have to be argued with recognition of Chinese interests as well as those of the United States.

### They Say: “Pressure Causes Nationalism”

#### Pressure solves in spite of nationalism.

Jianli 8 (Yang, founder of Initiatives for China, 5/5, “The Facets Of Chinese Nationalism”, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/05/04/AR2008050401599.html?utm\_term=.0f6cf425501c)

Frequently the past few months, I have been asked about the wisdom of using the Olympics as an opportunity to push China to improve its human rights record. Underlying these questions is a sense that international pressure may have played into the hands of the Chinese Communist Party by triggering nationalist emotions and rallying indignant Chinese people behind the regime. This concern is understandable. It is critical, however, that people distinguish among the four types of nationalism in China today to determine how best to pressure the regime to make improvements. First there is pragmatic nationalism. In everything but name, communism is dead in China. The Communist Party's pragmatic nationalism is one of the two lifelines to which it clings; the other is rapid economic growth. China's leaders understand that continued prosperity is the key to their continued rule. They have engaged in a delicate balancing act of fanning nationalist emotion to promote loyalty among the populace while at the same time tightly controlling this emotion to limit its potential damage to China's standing in the global economy. This pragmatic nationalism is a doctrine driven by national interest, not ideology. The same is true of "vassal nationalism." The majority of vassal nationalists are China's elites, and they move in lock step with pragmatic nationalism as dictated by the government. They become angry and indignant at the right time and place, when and where the party thinks they should. But this fury can pass like the weather; vassal nationalists seem to overcome their emotions the moment the party hints that they ought to. For example, many Chinese who don't normally feel uneasy about the country's state-controlled media, or the regime's tireless policing of the Internet, vehemently protested some "unsatisfactory" reports on Tibet by Western media outlets in recent weeks. This inconsistency is the hallmark of vassal nationalism. The third type is popular nationalism, which pursues China's unity, strength, prosperity and dignity. This type of nationalism sometimes, but not always, values human rights and democracy at its core. These Chinese nationalists can be quite reasonable, accurate, righteous and pro-democracy when it comes to local politics; their judgment is based on their own experiences. But they can be illogical, inconsistent or emotional regarding foreign relations -- especially on Taiwan -- or minorities, because they rely on state-run media for information about these issues. The fourth kind of nationalism in China could be called human rights patriotism. People who espouse this type of nationalism include the recently sentenced human rights activist Hu Jia, land rights advocate Yang Chunlin and the blind Chinese rights activist Chen Guangcheng. This type of patriotism holds human rights as its core value and democracy as its goal; pursues Chinese glory by seeking to gain dignity for each compatriot; promotes strength and prosperity by striving to liberate people's minds, ideas and potential; and aims to safeguard the country's integrity through recognition of the integrity of each individual and ethnic group. The Dalai Lama, having long taken the middle-road approach through nonviolent means, is a human rights patriot even from the perspective of the greater China. So is Taiwan's elected president, Ma Yingjeou. So how does this influence what we should do before the Summer Games? The worst option would be to fall silent; this would only embolden the regime. More than that, popular nationalists, with strength and prosperity foremost in their minds, might well align more closely with the Communist Party. Given China's strengthened dictatorship, rapid economic growth and ever-expanding military forces, they do not really have a choice. Since I left prison last year, I have advocated conditional participation in the Olympics. Participation must be predicated on some minimum standard of human rights. Applying this pressure will help enlarge the public space for discourse for human rights patriots in China. The international community should help by forming a broad coalition of human rights patriots to support the concerted peaceful protest activities inside and outside of China. Continued pressure on the regime to renounce its strategy of violent repression and to instead enter into a dialogue with the coalition of human rights patriots should be applied. If all of this were to happen, the pragmatic nationalists would probably cede some ground -- they understand the language of pressure -- and then we could support the Beijing Olympics as a great celebration of the beginning of a real democratic transition in China. Far from being impossible, this goal is attainable. Its success depends upon our persistent efforts.

### They Say: “Plan Contingent CPs Bad”

#### They say “reject CP” —

#### 1. *Topic* burden — engagement debates necessitate QPQ discussion. Conditional and unconditional are mutually exclusive options.

Kim and Kang 9 — Sung Chull Kim, Professor of Northeast Asian Studies at the Hiroshima Peace Institute, and David C. Kang, Professor of International Relations and Business at the University of Southern California, 2009 (“Introduction: Engagement as a Viable Alternative to Coercion,” *Engagement with North Korea: A Viable Alternative*, Edited by Sung Chull Kim, Published by SUNY Press, ISBN 1438427867, p. 9)

The five states, anchored by the Six-Party Talks, have had a common goal, the nuclear disarmament of North Korea. However, this goal is not the first priority of each state; each state has its own additional—sometimes more important—goals for engagement with North Korea. Accordingly, the type and the logic of each state's engagement strategy differ from those of every other state (see Table 1.1). In bilateral relations with North Korea, there are specific and important differences within these two types of engagement: conditional and unconditional. Japan takes a mostly coercive approach, and the United States maintains conditional engagement; China and Russia (and South Korea of the Roh administration) maintain unconditional engagement. The point is that all of these different types of engagement are in tension with one another. The five states' effort to remain in concert as they try to end North Korea's nuclear ambitions constitute a challenging issue.

#### 2. Functional limits — topic is too broad without credible threat of QPQ. Protect neg ground — preparation already stretched thin because of broad definitions of “engagement” and the diversity of issues in US-China relations.

#### 3. Disads *not* sufficient — impacts don’t outweigh case. Only counterplans effectively telescope debates onto core question of conditional vs. unconditional engagement.

#### 4. Race to the *top* — *solvency advocates* limit QPQ potential and force aff innovation on “*unconditional key*” advantages. Neg not responsible for all plan-contingent counterplans — narrow exception for QPQ is best middle ground.

### They Say: “Conditionality Bad”

#### Conditionality is good —

#### ( ) Most Logical — the judge should never be forced to choose between a bad plan and a bad counterplan when the status quo is a logical third option. Logic is an objective and fair standard that teaches valuable decision-making skills.

#### ( ) Argument Innovation — because debaters are risk-averse, they won’t introduce new positions unless they retain a reliable fallback option. Innovation keeps the topic interesting and encourages research and preparation.

#### ( ) Gear-Switching — being able to change gears and defend different positions over the course of a debate teaches valuable negotiation skills and improves critical thinking. Deciding what to go for is a useful skill.

#### ( ) No Infinite Regression — each additional position has diminishing marginal utility. We’ve only read one counterplan. This is reciprocal: they get the plan and permutation and we get the counterplan and status quo.

#### ( ) Strongly Err Neg — the judge should be a referee, not a norm-setter. Unless we made the debate totally unproductive, don’t vote on conditionality — doing so gives too much incentive for the aff to abandon substantive issues in pursuit of an easy theory ballot.

### They Say: “Pressure Hurts Relations”

#### Relations collapse is inevitable without progress on human rights – ignoring the issue only ensures great conflict.

Schell 15 (Duncan Innes-Ker, Regional editor, Asia. Elizabeth C. Economy, C.V. Starr Senior Fellow and Director for Asia Studies, Council on Foreign Relations. Shen Dingli, Prof and Associate Dean, Institute of International Studies. Adam Segal, Maurice R. Greenberg Senior Fellow for China Studies and Director of the Digital and Cyberspace Policy Program. Orville H. Schell, Director, Center on U.S.-China Relations, Asia Society, 9-22, "How to Improve U.S.-China Relations," Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/china/improve-us-china-relations/p37044)

As U.S. and Chinese heads of state gather for another summit, the vexing question of human rights looms larger than ever. The issue plagues the overall health of the bilateral relationship like a low-grade infection. U.S. displeasure with China’s rights record is only matched by Beijing’s displeasure with Washington’s judgmental attitude. This standoff has created an increasing sourness in relations that have made it difficult for leaders from both countries to feel at ease with one another. The result is that the two countries have struggled to establish the élan and comfort level required for solving problems where real common interest is shared. Disagreement over human rights grows out of a more divisive problem that sits unacknowledged like the proverbial elephant in the room. Because nobody quite knows what to do, we are hardly inclined to recognize, much less discuss it: the United States and China have fundamentally irreconcilable political systems and antagonistic value systems. If we want to get anything done, we must pretend that the elephant isn’t there. President Xi Jinping has made it abundantly clear that his China is not heading in any teleological direction congruent with Western hopes. Xi seems to suggest that China has its own model of development, one that might be described as “Leninist capitalism,” with rather limited protection of individual rights. This is a model with so-called “Chinese characteristics,” which, in the world of human rights, means that China will emphasize collective “welfare rights,” such as the right to a better standard of living, a job, and a freer lifestyle, rather than emphasizing individual rights like freedom of speech, assembly, press, and religion. But if this is the model, then the United States and China are heading in divergent historical directions. A host of new friction points now center around the abridgement of individual rights in China: arrests of human rights lawyers, growing restrictions on civil society activities, new controls on academic freedom, a more heavily censored media, more limited public dialogue, visas denied to foreign press, and domestic journalists and foreign correspondents suffering more burdensome forms of harassment. These trends grow out of differences in our systems of governance and values. Whether we should confront these differences head on or seek some artful way to set them aside so the two countries can get on with other serious issues of common interest is a question we have hardly dared even think about. The elephant is still in the room, and the fact that no one knows quite how to address it lays at the root of our human rights disagreements. These differences often gain such an antagonistic dimension that they not only inhibit our ability to make progress on the rights front, but also undermine the rest of the U.S.-China relationship.

### Extend: “Human Rights Solves Conflict”

#### Human rights stop nuclear war.

Burke-White 4 (William W., Lecturer in Public and International Affairs and Senior Special Assistant to the Dean at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University and Ph.D. at Cambridge, “Human Rights and National Security: The Strategic Correlation”, The Harvard Human Rights Journal, Spring, 17 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 249, Lexis)

This Article presents a strategic--as opposed to ideological or normative--argument that the promotion of human rights should be given a more prominent place in U.S. foreign policy. It does so by suggesting a correlation between the domestic human rights practices of states and their propensity to engage in aggressive international conduct. Among the chief threats to U.S. national security are acts of aggression by other states. Aggressive acts of war may directly endanger the United States, as did the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor in 1941, or they may require U.S. military action overseas, as in Kuwait fifty years later. Evidence from the post-Cold War period  [\*250]  indicates that states that systematically abuse their own citizens' human rights are also those most likely to engage in aggression. To the degree that improvements in various states' human rights records decrease the likelihood of aggressive war, a foreign policy informed by human rights can significantly enhance U.S. and global security. Since 1990, a state's domestic human rights policy appears to be a telling indicator of that state's propensity to engage in international aggression. A central element of U.S. foreign policy has long been the preservation of peace and the prevention of such acts of aggression. 2 If the correlation discussed herein is accurate, it provides U.S. policymakers with a powerful new tool to enhance national security through the promotion of human rights. A strategic linkage between national security and human rights would result in a number of important policy modifications. First, it changes the prioritization of those countries U.S. policymakers have identified as presenting the greatest concern. Second, it alters some of the policy prescriptions for such states. Third, it offers states a means of signaling benign international intent through the improvement of their domestic human rights records. Fourth, it provides a way for a current government to prevent future governments from aggressive international behavior through the institutionalization of human rights protections. Fifth, it addresses the particular threat of human rights abusing states obtaining weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Finally, it offers a mechanism for U.S.-U.N. cooperation on human rights issues.

#### Human rights violations cause cycles of conflict and violence.

Maiese 3 (Michelle, graduate student of Philosophy at the University of Colorado, Boulder and is a part of the research staff at the Conflict Research Consortium. [“Human Rights Violations” July Beyond Intractability URL: http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/human-rights-violations)

Many have noted the strong interdependence between human rights violations and intractable conflict. Abuse of human rights often leads to conflict, and conflict typically results in human rights violations. It is not surprising, then, that human rights abuses are often at the center of wars and that protection of human rights is central to conflict resolution.[20] Violations of political and economic rights are the root causes of many crises. When rights to adequate food, housing, employment, and cultural life are denied, and large groups of people are excluded from the society's decision-making processes, there is likely to be great social unrest. Such conditions often give rise to justice conflicts, in which parties demand that their basic needs be met. Indeed, many conflicts are sparked or spread by violations of human rights. For example, massacres or torture may inflame hatred and strengthen an adversary's determination to continue fighting. Violations may also lead to further violence from the other side and can contribute to a conflict's spiraling out of control. On the flip side, armed conflict often leads to the breakdown of infrastructure and civic institutions, which in turn undermines a broad range of rights. When hospitals and schools are closed, rights to adequate health and education are threatened. The collapse of economic infrastructure often results in pollution, food shortages, and overall poverty.[21] These various forms of economic breakdown and oppression violate rights to self-determination and often contribute to further human tragedy in the form of sickness, starvation, and lack of basic shelter. The breakdown of government institutions results in denials of civil rights, including the rights to privacy, fair trial, and freedom of movement. In many cases, the government is increasingly militarized, and police and judicial systems are corrupted. Abductions, arbitrary arrests, detentions without trial, political executions, assassinations, and torture often follow. In cases where extreme violations of human rights have occurred, reconciliation and peacebuilding become much more difficult. Unresolved human rights issues can serve as obstacles to peace negotiations.[22] This is because it is difficult for parties to move toward conflict transformation and forgiveness when memories of severe violence and atrocity are still primary in their minds.

### Extend: “Democracy Causes Peace”

#### US leadership on human rights key to democracy worldwide.

Griffey 11 (Brian, human rights consultant who has worked for the United Nations, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International USA. [“U.S. leadership on human rights essential to strengthen democracy abroad” The Hill March 18th, 2011 Congress Blog URL: http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/150667-us-leadership-on-human-rights-essential-to-strengthen-democracy-abroad)

In the midst of what many are calling the Arab world’s 1989, the United States has a chance to revisit that effort, and reaffirm President Carter’s declaration: “Human rights is the soul of our foreign policy, because human rights is the soul of our sense of nationhood.” Since helping to establish the United Nations, U.S. participation in international human rights treaties and mechanisms has been fraught with debate over the merits of involvement and perceived threats to U.S. policymaking prerogative, topics still contentious on Capitol Hill. Nonetheless, U.S. leadership on human rights offers clear opportunities to advance not only international peace and security – a fundamental purpose of the U.N. – but also conjoined US political and economic interests at home and abroad. The U.S. is presently demonstrating exactly how crucial such involvement is as an elected member of the Human Rights Council, participating in vital negotiations on how best to mitigate widespread abuses responding to ongoing unrest in the Middle East and North Africa, including by strategic US allies in global security and trade. As Secretary Clinton expressed en route to Geneva to participate in recent talks on human rights violations in Libya, joining the Council has “proven to be a good decision, because we’ve been able to influence a number of actions that we otherwise would have been on the outside looking in.” In its first submission to the body, the U.S. likewise recognized that participation in the Council’s peer-review system allows the U.S. not only to lead by example and “encourage others to strengthen their commitments to human rights,” but also to address domestic human rights shortcomings. By leading international discourse on human rights, the U.S. will be in a better position both to advance observation of human rights abroad, and to take on new treaty commitments that demonstrate adherence of our own system to the vaulting principles we identify with our democracy. While the U.S. is party to more than 12,000 treaties, it has dodged most human rights treaties drafted since World War II through the U.N., and has ratified only a dozen. Upon transmission of four core human rights treaties to the Senate in 1978, President Carter observed: “Our failure to become a party increasingly reflects upon our attainments, and prejudices United States participation in the development of the international law of human rights.” The Senate ratified two of those treaties 15 years later. The others continue to languish in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, still awaiting ratification after 32 years. It likewise took the Senate almost 40 years to approve a treaty punishing genocide, after signing it in 1948 following the Holocaust. Other human rights treaties U.S. presidents have signed – but the Senate has yet to agree to – include U.N. conventions protecting the rights of women, children, and persons with disabilities. The U.S. is the only nation in the world that hasn’t ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child, with the exception of war-torn Somalia, which lacks a functioning government and control over much of its territory. As we watch the contours and nature of power being reshaped in the Middle East and North Africa, the U.S. must have a singular message on human rights – both at home and abroad: Human rights go hand-in-hand with a healthy democracy, and demand a concerted and collective effort to be upheld, especially in times of crisis. Greater U.S. participation in U.N. human rights treaties would ensure that the country has not only a seat at the table, but also an authoritative voice on matters vital to advancing democracy abroad, and our national security. A welcome consequence would be a more prominent place for the human rights lens in our vision of U.S. democracy – and perhaps a stronger resolve to ameliorate the plights of those least well off in our own society.

#### US democracy credibility prevents global democratic backsliding.

Kagan 15 (Robert, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Project on International Order and Security, Jan, "Is Democracy in Decline? The Weight of Geopolitics" Brookings Institution, www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2015/01/democracy-in-decline-weight-of-geopolitics-kagan)

These are relevant questions again. We live in a time when democratic nations are in retreat in the realm of geopolitics, and when democracy itself is also **in retreat.** The latter phenomenon has been well documented by Freedom House, which has recorded declines in freedom in the world for nine straight years. At the level of geopolitics, the shifting tectonic plates have yet to produce a seismic rearrangement of power, but rumblings are audible. The United States has been in a state of retrenchment since President Barack Obama took office in 2009. The democratic nations of Europe, which some might have expected to pick up the slack, have instead turned inward and all but abandoned earlier dreams of reshaping the international system in their image. As for such rising democracies as Brazil, India, Turkey, and South Africa, they are neither rising as fast as once anticipated nor yet behaving as democracies in world affairs. Their focus remains narrow and regional. Their national identities remain shaped by postcolonial and nonaligned sensibilities—by old but carefully nursed resentments—which lead them, for instance, to shield rather than condemn autocratic Russia’s invasion of democratic Ukraine, or, in the case of Brazil, to prefer the company of Venezuelan dictators to that of North American democratic presidents. Meanwhile, insofar as there is energy in the international system, it comes from the great-power autocracies, **China and Russia**, and from would-be theocrats pursuing their dream of a new caliphate in the Middle East. For all their many problems and weaknesses, it is still these autocracies and these aspiring religious totalitarians that push forward while the democracies draw back, that act while the democracies react, and that seem increasingly unleashed while the democracies feel increasingly constrained. It should not be surprising that one of the side effects of these circumstances has been the weakening and in some cases **collapse of democracy** in those places where it was newest and weakest. Geopolitical shifts among the reigning great powers, often but not always the result of wars, can have significant effects on the domestic politics of the smaller and weaker nations of the world. Global democratizing trends have been stopped and reversed before. Consider the interwar years. In 1920, when the number of democracies in the world had doubled in the aftermath of the First World War, contemporaries such as the British historian James Bryce believed that they were witnessing “a natural trend, due to a general law of social progress.”[1] Yet almost immediately the new democracies in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland began to fall. Europe’s democratic great powers, France and Britain, were suffering the effects of the recent devastating war, while the one rich and healthy democratic power, the United States, had retreated to the safety of its distant shores. In the vacuum came Mussolini’s rise to power in Italy in 1922, the crumbling of Germany’s Weimar Republic, and the broader triumph of European fascism. Greek democracy fell in 1936. Spanish democracy fell to Franco that same year. Military coups overthrew democratic governments in Portugal, Brazil, Uruguay, and Argentina. Japan’s shaky democracy succumbed to military rule and then to a form of fascism. Across three continents, fragile democracies gave way to authoritarian forces exploiting the vulnerabilities of the democratic system, while other democracies fell prey to the worldwide economic depression. There was a ripple effect, too—the success of fascism in one country strengthened similar movements elsewhere, sometimes directly. Spanish fascists received military assistance from the fascist regimes in Germany and Italy. The result was that by 1939 the democratic gains of the previous forty years had been wiped out. The period after the First World War showed not only that democratic gains could be reversed, but that democracy need not always triumph even in the competition of ideas. For it was not just that democracies had been overthrown. The very idea of democracy had been “discredited,” as John A. Hobson observed.[2] Democracy’s aura of inevitability vanished as great numbers of people rejected the idea that it was a better form of government. Human beings, after all, do not yearn only for freedom, autonomy, individuality, and recognition. Especially in times of difficulty, they yearn also for comfort, security, order, and, importantly, a sense of belonging to something larger than themselves, something that submerges autonomy and individuality—all of which autocracies can sometimes provide, or at least appear to provide, better than democracies. In the 1920s and 1930s, the fascist governments looked stronger, more energetic and efficient, and more capable of providing reassurance in troubled times. They appealed effectively to nationalist, ethnic, and tribal sentiments. The many weaknesses of Germany’s Weimar democracy, inadequately supported by the democratic great powers, and of the fragile and short-lived democracies of Italy and Spain made their people susceptible to the appeals of the Nazis, Mussolini, and Franco, just as the weaknesses of Russian democracy in the 1990s made a more authoritarian government under Vladimir Putin attractive to many Russians. People tend to follow winners, and between the wars the democratic-capitalist countries looked weak and in retreat compared with the apparently vigorous fascist regimes and with Stalin’s Soviet Union. It took a second world war and another military victory by the Allied democracies (plus the Soviet Union) to reverse the trend again. The United States imposed democracy by force and through prolonged occupations in West Germany, Italy, Japan, Austria, and South Korea. With the victory of the democracies and the discrediting of fascism—chiefly on the battlefield—many other countries followed suit. Greece and Turkey both moved in a democratic direction, as did Brazil, Argentina, Peru, Ecuador, Venezuela, and Colombia. Some of the new nations born as Europe shed its colonies also experimented with democratic government, the most prominent example being India. By 1950, the number of democracies had grown to between twenty and thirty, and they governed close to 40 percent of the world’s population. Was this the victory of an idea or the victory of arms? Was it the product of an inevitable human evolution or, as Samuel P. Huntington later observed, of “historically discrete events”?[3] We would prefer to believe the former, but evidence suggests the latter, for it turned out that even the great wave of democracy following World War II was not irreversible. Another “reverse wave” hit from the late 1950s through the early 1970s. Peru, Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Uruguay, Ecuador, South Korea, the Philippines, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Greece all fell back under authoritarian rule. In Africa, Nigeria was the most prominent of the newly decolonized nations where democracy failed. By 1975, more than three-dozen governments around the world had been installed by military coups.[4] Few spoke of democracy’s inevitability in the 1970s or even in the early 1980s. As late as 1984, Huntington himself believed that “the limits of democratic development in the world” had been reached, noting the “unreceptivity to democracy of several major cultural traditions,” as well as “the substantial power of antidemocratic governments (particularly the Soviet Union).”[5] But then, unexpectedly, came the “third wave.” From the mid-1970s through the early 1990s, the number of democracies in the world rose to an astonishing 120, representing well over half the world’s population. What explained the prolonged success of democratization over the last quarter of the twentieth century? It could not have been merely the steady rise of the global economy and the general yearning for freedom, autonomy, and recognition. Neither economic growth nor human yearnings had prevented the democratic reversals of the 1960s and early 1970s. Until the third wave, many nations around the world careened back and forth between democracy and authoritarianism in a cyclical, almost predictable manner. What was most notable about the third wave was that this cyclical alternation between democracy and autocracy was interrupted. Nations moved into a democratic phase and stayed there. But why? The International Climate Improves The answer is related to the configuration of power and ideas in the world. The international climate from the mid-1970s onward was simply more hospitable to democracies and more challenging to autocratic governments than had been the case in past eras. In his study, Huntington emphasized the change, following the Second Vatican Council, in the Catholic Church’s doctrine regarding order and revolution, which tended to weaken the legitimacy of authoritarian governments in Catholic countries. The growing success and attractiveness of the European Community (EC), meanwhile, had an impact on the internal policies of nations such as Portugal, Greece, and Spain, which sought the economic benefits of membership in the EC and therefore felt pressure to conform to its democratic norms. These norms increasingly became international norms. But they did not appear out of nowhere or as the result of some natural evolution of the human species. As Huntington noted, “**The pervasiveness of democratic norms rested in large part on the commitment to those norms of the most powerful country in the world**.[6] The **U**nited **S**tates, in fact, **played a critical role** in making the explosion of democracy possible. This was not because U.S. policy makers consistently promoted democracy around the world. They did not. At various times throughout the Cold War, U.S. policy often supported dictatorships as part of the battle against communism or simply out of indifference. It even permitted or was complicit in the overthrow of democratic regimes deemed unreliable—those of Mohammad Mossadegh in Iran in 1953, Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala in 1954, and Salvador Allende in Chile in 1973. At times, U.S. foreign policy was almost hostile to democracy. President Richard Nixon regarded it as “not necessarily the best form of government for people in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.”[7] Nor, when the United States did support democracy, was it purely out of fealty to principle. Often it was for strategic reasons. Officials in President Ronald Reagan’s administration came to believe that democratic governments might actually be better than autocracies at fending off communist insurgencies, for instance. And often it was popular local demands that compelled the United States to make a choice that it would otherwise have preferred to avoid, between supporting an unpopular and possibly faltering dictatorship and “getting on the side of the people.” Reagan would have preferred to support the dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos in the 1980s had he not been confronted by the moral challenge of Filipino “people power.” Rarely if ever did the United States seek a change of regime primarily out of devotion to democratic principles. Beginning in the mid-1970s, however, the general inclination of the United States did begin to shift toward a more critical view of dictatorship. The U.S. Congress, led by human-rights advocates, began to condition or cut off U.S. aid to authoritarian allies, which weakened their hold on power. In the Helsinki Accords of 1975, a reference to human-rights issues drew greater attention to the cause of dissidents and other opponents of dictatorship in the Eastern bloc. President Jimmy Carter focused attention on the human-rights abuses of the Soviet Union as well as of right-wing governments in Latin America and elsewhere. The U.S. government’s international information services, including the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, put greater emphasis on democracy and human rights in their programming. The Reagan administration, after first trying to roll back Carter’s human-rights agenda, eventually embraced it and made the promotion of democracy part of its stated (if not always its actual) policy. Even during this period, U.S. policy was far from consistent. Many allied dictatorships, especially in the Middle East, were not only tolerated but actively supported with U.S. economic and military aid. But the net effect of the shift in U.S. policy, joined with the efforts of Europe, was significant. The third wave began in 1974 in Portugal, where the Carnation Revolution put an end to a half-century of dictatorship. As Larry Diamond notes, this revolution did not just happen. The United States and the European democracies played a key role, making a “heavy investment . . . in support of the democratic parties.”[8] Over the next decade and a half, the United States used a variety of tools, including direct military intervention, to aid democratic transitions and prevent the undermining of existing fragile democracies all across the globe. In 1978, Carter threatened military action in the Dominican Republic when long-serving president Joaquín Balaguer refused to give up power after losing an election. In 1983, Reagan’s invasion of Grenada restored a democratic government after a military coup. In 1986, the United States threatened military action to prevent Marcos from forcibly annulling an election that he had lost. In 1989, President George H.W. Bush invaded Panama to help install democracy after military strongman Manuel Noriega had annulled his nation’s elections. Throughout this period, too, the United States used its influence to block military coups in Honduras, Bolivia, El Salvador, Peru, and South Korea. Elsewhere it urged presidents not to try staying in office beyond constitutional limits. Huntington estimated that over the course of about a decade and a half, U.S. support had been “critical to democratization in the Dominican Republic, Grenada, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Uruguay, Peru, Ecuador, Panama, and the Philippines” and was “a contributing factor to democratization in Portugal, Chile, Poland, Korea, Bolivia, and Taiwan.”[9] Many developments both global and local helped to produce the democratizing trend of the late 1970s and the 1980s, and there might have been a democratic wave even if the United States had not been so influential. The question is whether the wave would have been as large and as lasting. The stable zones of democracy in Europe and Japan proved to be powerful magnets. The liberal free-market and free-trade system increasingly outperformed the stagnating economies of the socialist bloc, especially at the dawn of the information revolution. The greater activism of the United States, together with that of other successful democracies, helped to build a broad, if not universal, consensus that was more sympathetic to democratic forms of government and less sympathetic to authoritarian forms. Diamond and others have noted how important it was that these “global democratic norms” came to be “reflected in regional and international institutions and agreements as never before.”[10] Those norms had an impact on the internal political processes of countries, making it harder for authoritarians to weather political and economic storms and easier for democratic movements to gain legitimacy. But “norms” are transient as well. In the 1930s, the trendsetting nations were fascist dictatorships. In the 1950s and 1960s, variants of socialism were in vogue. But from the 1970s until recently, the **U**nited **S**tates and a handful of other democratic powers **set the fashion trend**. They pushed—some might even say imposed—democratic principles and embedded them in international institutions and agreements. Equally important was the role that the United States played in preventing backsliding away from democracy where it had barely taken root. Perhaps the most significant U.S. contribution was simply to prevent military coups against fledgling democratic governments. In a sense, the United States was interfering in what might have been a natural cycle, preventing nations that ordinarily would have been “due” for an authoritarian phase from following the usual pattern. It was not that the **U**nited **S**tates was exporting democracy everywhere. More often, it played the role of “catcher in the rye”—preventing young democracies **from falling off the cliff**—in places such as the Philippines, Colombia, and Panama. This helped to give the third wave unprecedented breadth and durability. Finally, there was the collapse of the Soviet Union and with it the fall of Central and Eastern Europe’s communist regimes and their replacement by democracies. What role the United States played in hastening the Soviet downfall may be in dispute, but surely it played some part, both by containing the Soviet empire militarily and by outperforming it economically and technologically. And at the heart of the struggle were the peoples of the former Warsaw Pact countries themselves. They had long yearned to achieve the liberation of their respective nations from the Soviet Union, which also meant liberation from communism. These peoples wanted to join the rest of Europe, which offered an economic and social model that was even more attractive than that of the United States. That Central and East Europeans uniformly chose democratic forms of government, however, was not simply the fruit of aspirations for freedom or comfort. It also reflected the desires of these peoples to place themselves under the U.S. security umbrella. The strategic, the economic, the political, and the ideological were thus inseparable. Those nations that wanted to be part of NATO, and later of the European Union, knew that they would stand no chance of admission without democratic credentials. These democratic transitions, which turned the third wave into a democratic tsunami, need not have occurred had the world been configured differently. That a democratic, united, and prosperous Western Europe was even there to exert a powerful magnetic pull on its eastern neighbors was due to U.S. actions after World War II. The Lost Future of 1848 Contrast the fate of democratic movements in the late twentieth century with that of the liberal revolutions that swept Europe in 1848. Beginning in France, the “Springtime of the Peoples,” as it was known, included liberal reformers and constitutionalists, nationalists, and representatives of the rising middle class as well as radical workers and socialists. In a matter of weeks, they toppled kings and princes and shook thrones in France, Poland, Austria, and Romania, as well as the Italian peninsula and the German principalities. In the end, however, the liberal movements failed, partly because they lacked cohesion, but also because the autocratic powers forcibly crushed them. The Prussian army helped to defeat liberal movements in the German lands, while the Russian czar sent his troops into Romania and Hungary. Tens of thousands of protesters were killed in the streets of Europe. The sword proved mightier than the pen. It mattered that the more liberal powers, Britain and France, adopted a neutral posture throughout the liberal ferment, even though France’s own revolution had sparked and inspired the pan-European movement. The British monarchy and aristocracy were afraid of radicalism at home. Both France and Britain were more concerned with preserving peace among the great powers than with providing assistance to fellow liberals. The preservation of the European balance among the five great powers benefited the forces of counterrevolution everywhere, and the Springtime of the Peoples was suppressed.[11] As a result, for several decades the forces of reaction in Europe were strengthened against the forces of liberalism. Scholars have speculated about how differently Europe and the world might have evolved had the liberal revolutions of 1848 succeeded: How might German history have unfolded had national unification been achieved under a liberal parliamentary system rather than under the leadership of Otto von Bismarck? The “Iron Chancellor” unified the nation not through elections and debates, but through military victories won by the great power of the conservative Prussian army under the Hohenzollern dynasty. As the historian A.J.P. Taylor observed, history reached a turning point in 1848, but Germany “failed to turn.”[12] Might Germans have learned a different lesson from the one that Bismarck taught—namely, that “the great questions of the age are not decided by speeches and majority decisions . . . but by blood and iron”?[13] Yet the international system of the day was not configured in such a way as to encourage liberal and democratic change. The European balance of power in the mid-nineteenth century did not favor democracy, and so it is not surprising that democracy failed to triumph anywhere.[14] We can also speculate about how differently today’s world might have evolved without the U.S. role in shaping an international environment favorable to democracy, and how it might evolve should the United States find itself no longer strong enough to play that role. Democratic transitions are not inevitable, even where the conditions may be ripe. Nations may enter a transition zone—economically, socially, and politically—where the probability of moving in a democratic direction increases or decreases. But foreign influences, usually exerted by the reigning great powers, often determine which direction change takes. Strong authoritarian powers willing to support conservative forces against liberal movements can undo what might otherwise have been a “natural” evolution to democracy, just as powerful democratic nations can help liberal forces that, left to their own devices, might otherwise fail. In the 1980s as in the 1840s, liberal movements arose for their own reasons in different countries, but their success or failure was influenced by the balance of power at the international level. In the era of U.S. predominance, the balance was generally favorable to democracy, which helps to explain why the liberal revolutions of that later era succeeded. Had the United States not been so powerful, there would have been fewer transitions to democracy, and those that occurred might have been short-lived. It might have meant a shallower and more easily reversed third wave.[15] Democracy, Autocracy, and Power What about today? With the democratic superpower curtailing its global influence, regional powers are setting the tone in their respective regions. Not surprisingly, dictatorships are more common in the environs of Russia, along the borders of China (North Korea, Burma, and Thailand), and in the Middle East, where long dictatorial traditions have so far mostly withstood the challenge of popular uprisings. But even in regions where democracies remain strong, authoritarians have been able to make a determined stand while their democratic neighbors passively stand by. Thus Hungary’s leaders, in the heart of an indifferent Europe, proclaim their love of illiberalism and crack down on press and political freedoms while the rest of the European Union, supposedly a club for democracies only, looks away. In South America, democracy is engaged in a contest with dictatorship, but an indifferent Brazil looks on, thinking only of trade and of North American imperialism. Meanwhile in Central America, next door to an indifferent Mexico, democracy collapses under the weight of drugs and crime and the resurgence of the caudillos. Yet it may be unfair to blame regional powers for not doing what they have never done. Insofar as the shift in the geopolitical equation has affected the fate of democracies worldwide, it is probably the change in the democratic superpower’s behavior that bears most of the responsibility. If that superpower does not change its course, we are likely to see democracy around the world **rolled back further**. **There is nothing inevitable about democracy**. The liberal world order we have been living in these past decades was not bequeathed by “the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God.” It is not the endpoint of human progress. There are those who would prefer a world order different from the liberal one. Until now, however, they have not been able to have their way, but not because their ideas of governance are impossible to enact. Who is to say that Putinism in Russia or China’s particular brand of authoritarianism will not survive as far into the future as European democracy, which, after all, is less than a century old on most of the continent? Autocracy in Russia and China has certainly been around longer than any Western democracy. Indeed, it is autocracy, not democracy, that has been the norm in human history—only in recent decades have the democracies, led by the United States, had the power to shape the world. Skeptics of U.S. “democracy promotion” have long argued that many of the places where the democratic experiment has been tried over the past few decades are not a natural fit for that form of government, and that the United States has tried to plant democracy in some very infertile soils. Given that democratic governments have taken deep root in widely varying circumstances, from impoverished India to “Confucian” East Asia to Islamic Indonesia, we ought to have some modesty about asserting where the soil is right or not right for democracy. Yet it should be clear that the prospects for democracy have been much better under the protection of a liberal world order, supported and defended by a democratic superpower or by a collection of democratic great powers. Today, as always, democracy is a fragile flower. It requires constant support, constant tending, and the plucking of weeds and fencing-off of the jungle that threaten it both from within and without. In the absence of such efforts, the jungle and the weeds may sooner or later come back to reclaim the land.

**Democracy solves nuclear war.**

Muravchick 1 (Resident Scholar – American Enterprise Institute [Joshua, “Democracy and Nuclear Peace,” 7-11-01, Presented before the NPEC/IGCC Summer Faculty Seminar, UC-San Diego, www.npec-web.org/syllabi/muravchik.htm)

**The greatest impetus for world peace -- and perforce of nuclear peace -- is the spread of democracy**. In a famous article, and subsequent book, Francis Fukuyama argued that democracy's extension was leading to "the end of history." By this he meant the conclusion of man's quest for the right social order, but he also meant the "diminution of the likelihood of large-scale conflict between states."1Fukuyama's phrase was intentionally provocative, even tongue-in-cheek, but he was pointing to two down-to-earth historical observations: that democracies are more peaceful than other kinds of government and that the world is growing more democratic. Neither point has gone unchallenged. Only a few decades ago, as distinguished an observer of international relations as George Kennan made a claim quite contrary to the first of these assertions. Democracies, he said, were slow to anger, but once aroused "a democracy ... fights in anger ... to the bitter end."2 Kennan's view was strongly influenced by the policy of "unconditional surrender" pursued in World War II. But subsequent experience, such as the negotiated settlements America sought in Korea and Vietnam proved him wrong. **Democracies are not only slow to anger but also quick to compromise**. And to forgive. Notwithstanding the insistence on unconditional surrender, America treated Japan and that part of Germany that it occupied with extraordinary generosity. In recent years a burgeoning literature has discussed the peacefulness of democracies. Indeed **the proposition that democracies do not go to war with one another has been described by one political scientist as being "as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations**."3Some of those who find enthusiasm for democracy off- putting have challenged this proposition, but their challenges have only served as empirical tests that have confirmed its robustness**.** For example, the academic Paul Gottfried and the columnist-turned-politician Patrick J. Buchanan have both instanced democratic England's declaration of war against democratic Finland during World War II.4 In fact, after much procrastination, England did accede to the pressure of its Soviet ally to declare war against Finland which was allied with Germany. But the declaration was purely formal: no fighting ensued between England and Finland. Surely this is an exception that proves the rule. The strongest exception I can think of is the war between the nascent state of Israel and the Arabs in 1948. Israel was an embryonic democracy and Lebanon, one of the Arab belligerents, was also democratic within the confines of its peculiar confessional division of power. Lebanon, however, was a reluctant party to the fight. Within the councils of the Arab League, it opposed the war but went along with its larger confreres when they opted to attack. Even so, Lebanon did little fighting and soon sued for peace. Thus, in the case of Lebanon against Israel, as in the case of England against Finland, democracies nominally went to war against democracies when they were dragged into conflicts by authoritarian allies. The political scientist Bruce Russett offers a different challenge to the notion that democracies are more peaceful. "That democracies are in general, in dealing with all kinds of states, more peaceful than are authoritarian or other non- democratically constituted states ... is a much more controversial proposition than 'merely' that democracies are peaceful in their dealings with each other, and one for which there is little systematic evidence," he says.5Russett cites his own and other statistical explorations which show that while democracies rarely fight one another they often fight against others. The trouble with such studies, however, is that they rarely examine the question of who started or caused a war. To reduce the data to a form that is quantitatively measurable, it is easier to determine whether a conflict has occurred between two states than whose fault it was. But the latter question is all important. Democracies may often go to war against dictatorships because the dictators see them as prey or underestimate their resolve. Indeed, such examples abound. Germany might have behaved more cautiously in the summer of 1914 had it realized that England would fight to vindicate Belgian neutrality and to support France. Later, Hitler was emboldened by his notorious contempt for the flabbiness of the democracies. North Korea almost surely discounted the likelihood of an American military response to its invasion of the South after Secretary of State Dean Acheson publicly defined America's defense perimeter to exclude the Korean peninsula (a declaration which merely confirmed existing U.S. policy). In 1990, Saddam Hussein's decision to swallow Kuwait was probably encouraged by the inference he must have taken from the statements and actions of American officials that Washington would offer no forceful resistance. Russett says that those who claim democracies are in general more peaceful "would have us believe that the United States was regularly on the defensive, rarely on the offensive, during the Cold War."6 But that is not quite right: the word "regularly" distorts the issue. A victim can sometimes turn the tables on an aggressor, but that does not make the victim equally bellicose. None would dispute that Napoleon was responsible for the Napoleonic wars or Hitler for World War II in Europe, but after a time their victims seized the offensive. So in the Cold War, the United States may have initiated some skirmishes (although in fact it rarely did), but the struggle as a whole was driven one-sidedly. The Soviet policy was "class warfare"; the American policy was "containment." The so-called revisionist historians argued that America bore an equal or larger share of responsibility for the conflict. But Mikhail Gorbachev made nonsense of their theories when, in the name of glasnost and perestroika, he turned the Soviet Union away from its historic course. The Cold War ended almost instantly--as he no doubt knew it would. "We would have been able to avoid many ... difficulties if the democratic process had developed normally in our country," he wrote.7 To render judgment about the relative peacefulness of states or systems, we must ask not only who started a war but why. In particular we should consider what in Catholic Just War doctrine is called "right intention," which means roughly: what did they hope to get out of it? In the few cases in recent times in which wars were initiated by democracies, there were often motives other than aggrandizement, for example, when America invaded Grenada. To be sure, Washington was impelled by self-interest more than altruism, primarily its concern for the well-being of American nationals and its desire to remove a chip, however tiny, from the Soviet game board. But America had no designs upon Grenada, and the invaders were greeted with joy by the Grenadan citizenry. After organizing an election, America pulled out. In other cases, democracies have turned to war in the face of provocation, such as Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982 to root out an enemy sworn to its destruction or Turkey's invasion of Cyprus to rebuff a power-grab by Greek nationalists. In contrast, the wars launched by dictators, such as Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, North Korea's of South Korea, the Soviet Union's of Hungary and Afghanistan, often have aimed at conquest or subjugation. The big exception to this rule is colonialism. The European powers conquered most of Africa and Asia, and continued to hold their prizes as Europe democratized. No doubt many of the instances of democracies at war that enter into the statistical calculations of researchers like Russett stem from the colonial era. But colonialism was a legacy of Europe's pre-democratic times, and it was abandoned after World War II. Since then, I know of no case where a democracy has initiated warfare without significant provocation or for reasons of sheer aggrandizement, but there are several cases where dictators have done so. One interesting piece of Russett's research should help to point him away from his doubts that democracies are more peaceful in general. He aimed to explain why democracies are more peaceful toward each other. Immanuel Kant was the first to observe, or rather to forecast, the pacific inclination of democracies. He reasoned that "citizens ... will have a great hesitation in ...calling down on themselves all the miseries of war."8But this valid insight is incomplete. There is a deeper explanation. Democracy is not just a mechanism; it entails a spirit of compromise and self-restraint. At bottom, democracy is the willingness to resolve civil disputes without recourse to violence**. Nations that embrace this ethos in the conduct of their domestic affairs are naturally more predisposed to embrace it in their dealings with other nations**. Russett aimed to explain why democracies are more peaceful toward one another. To do this, he constructed two models. One hypothesized that the cause lay in the mechanics of democratic decision-making (the "structural/institutional model"), the other that it lay in the democratic ethos (the "cultural/normative model"). His statistical assessments led him to conclude that: "almost always the cultural/normative model shows a consistent effect on conflict occurrence and war. The structural/institutional model sometimes provides a significant relationship but often does not."9 If it is the ethos that makes democratic states more peaceful toward each other, would not that ethos also make them more peaceful in general? Russett implies that the answer is no, because to his mind a critical element in the peaceful behavior of democracies toward other democracies is their anticipation of a conciliatory attitude by their counterpart. But this is too pat. The attitude of live-and-let-live cannot be turned on and off like a spigot. The citizens and officials of democracies recognize that other states, however governed, have legitimate interests, and they are disposed to try to accommodate those interests except when the other party's behavior seems threatening or outrageous. A different kind of challenge to the thesis that democracies are more peaceful has been posed by the political scientists Edward G. Mansfield and Jack Snyder. They claim statistical support for the proposition that while fully fledged democracies may be pacific, in th[e] transitional phase of democratization, countries become more aggressive and war- prone, not less."10However, like others, they measure a state's likelihood of becoming involved in a war but do not report attempting to determine the cause or fault. Moreover, they acknowledge that their research revealed not only an increased likelihood for a state to become involved in a war when it was growing more democratic, but an almost equal increase for states growing less democratic. This raises the possibility that the effects they were observing were caused simply by political change per se, rather than by democratization. Finally, they implicitly acknowledge that the relationship of democratization and peacefulness may change over historical periods. There is no reason to suppose that any such relationship is governed by an immutable law. Since their empirical base reaches back to 1811, any effect they report, even if accurately interpreted, may not hold in the contemporary world. They note that "in [some] recent cases, in contrast to some of our historical results, the rule seems to be: go fully democratic, or don't go at all." But according to Freedom House, some 62.5 percent of extant governments were chosen in legitimate elections.11 (This is a much larger proportion than are adjudged by Freedom House to be "free states," a more demanding criterion, and it includes many weakly democratic states.) Of the remaining 37.5 percent, a large number are experiencing some degree of democratization or heavy pressure in that direction. So the choice "don't go at all"12 is rarely realistic in the contemporary world. These statistics also contain the answer to those who doubt the second proposition behind Fukuyama's forecast, namely, that the world is growing more democratic. Skeptics have drawn upon Samuel Huntington's fine book, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Huntington says that the democratization trend that began in the mid- 1970s in Portugal, Greece and Spain is the third such episode. The first "wave" of democratization began with the American Revolution and lasted through the aftermath of World War I, coming to an end in the interwar years when much of Europe regressed back to fascist or military dictatorship. The second wave, in this telling, followed World War II when wholesale decolonization gave rise to a raft of new democracies. Most of these, notably in Africa, collapsed into dictatorship by the 1960s, bringing the second wave to its end. Those who follow Huntington's argument may take the failure of democracy in several of the former Soviet republics and some other instances of backsliding since 1989 to signal the end of the third wave. Such an impression, however, would be misleading. One unsatisfying thing about Huntington's "waves" is their unevenness. The first lasted about 150 years, the second about 20. How long should we expect the third to endure? If it is like the second, it will ebb any day now, but if it is like the first, it will run until the around the year 2125. And by then--who knows?--perhaps mankind will have incinerated itself, moved to another planet, or even devised a better political system. Further, Huntington's metaphor implies a lack of overall progress or direction. Waves rise and fall. But each of the reverses that followed Huntington's two waves was brief, and each new wave raised the number of democracies higher than before. Huntington does, however, present a statistic that seems to weigh heavily against any unidirectional interpretation of democratic progress. The proportion of states that were democratic in 1990 (45%), he says, was identical to the proportion in 1922.13 But there are two answers to this. In 1922 there were only 64 states; in 1990 there were 165. But the number of peoples had not grown appreciably. The difference was that in 1922 most peoples lived in colonies, and they were not counted as states. The 64 states of that time were mostly the advanced countries. Of those, two thirds had become democratic by 1990, which was a significant gain. The additional 101 states counted in 1990 were mostly former colonies. Only a minority, albeit a substantial one, were democratic in 1990, but since virtually none of those were democratic in 1922, that was also a significant gain. In short, there was progress all around, but this was obscured by asking what percentage of states were democratic. Asking the question this way means that a people who were subjected to a domestic dictator counted as a non-democracy, but a people who were subjected to a foreign dictator did not count at all. Moreover, while the criteria for judging a state democratic vary, the statistic that 45 percent of states were democratic in 1990 corresponds with Freedom House's count of "democratic" polities (as opposed to its smaller count of "free" countries, a more demanding criterion). But by this same count, Freedom House now says that the proportion of democracies has grown to 62.5 percent. In other words, the "third wave" has not abated. The fall of Communism not only ended the Cold War; it also ended the only universalist ideological challenge to democracy. Radical Islam may still offer an alternative to democracy in parts of the world, but it appeals by definition only to Moslems and has not even won the assent of a majority of these. And Iranian President Khatami's second landslide election victory in 2001 suggests that even in the cradle of radical Islam the yearning for democracy is waxing. That Freedom House could count 120 freely elected governments by early 2001 (out of a total of 192 independent states) bespeaks a vast transformation in human governance within the span of 225 years. In 1775, the number of democracies was zero. In 1776, the birth of the United States of America brought the total up to one. Since then, democracy has spread at an accelerating pace, most of the growth having occurred within the twentieth century, with greatest momentum since 1974. That this momentum has slackened somewhat since its pinnacle in 1989, destined to be remembered as one of the most revolutionary years in all history, was inevitable. So many peoples were swept up in the democratic tide that there was certain to be some backsliding. Most countries' democratic evolution has included some fits and starts rather than a smooth progression. So it must be for the world as a whole. Nonetheless, the overall trend remains powerful and clear. Despite the backsliding, the number and proportion of democracies stands higher today than ever before. **This progress offers a source of hope for enduring nuclear peace. The danger of nuclear war was radically reduced almost overnight when Russia abandoned Communism and turned to democracy.** For other ominous corners of the world, **we may be in a kind of race between the emergence or growth of nuclear arsenals and the advent of democratization.**

#### Existential threats are inevitable — only democracy solves.

Peiser 7 (social anthropologist @ Liverpool John Moores University, Existential Risk and Democratic Peace, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/7081804.stm)

In recent years, humankind has become aware of a number of global and existential risks that potentially threaten our survival. These natural and man-made risks comprise cosmic disasters, volcanic super-eruptions and climatic disruption on the one hand, and nuclear warfare, technological catastrophes and fully-fledged bioterrorism on the other. In order to secure the future of civilisation, we are challenged to recognise and ward off these low-probability, but potentially destructive hazards. A new debate is gaining momentum about how best to achieve a secure future for our planetary civilisation. The rise of neo-catastrophism The perception that disorder rather than harmony held sway in the solar system gradually began to emerge during the 20th Century. The traditional concept of an essentially benign universe was replaced by that of an unpredictable cosmos punctuated by global catastrophes. The emergence of scientific neo-catastrophism surfaced as a corollary of the space age. Artist's impression of asteroid impact. Image: AFP/Getty There can be little doubt that we are living in an age of apocalyptic angst and alarm Images of impact craters sent back by space missions in the 1960s and 1970s exposed the pock-marked, impact-covered surface of many planets. At the same time, the identification of hyper-velocity impact craters on the Earth and empirical evidence of half a dozen mass extinction events generated a new view of our planet as a fundamentally hazardous and catastrophic place in space. More recently, predictions of large-scale disasters and societal upheaval as a result of catastrophic climate change, as well as growing apprehension about impending bioterrorism and nuclear warfare, have become almost routine issues of international concern. There can be little doubt that we are living in an age of apocalyptic angst and alarm. The existential risk paradox At the core of today's collective anxieties lies what I call the existential risk paradox. As advances in science, medical research, genetics and technology are accelerating, human vulnerability to global hazards such as cosmic impacts, natural disasters, famine and pandemics has significantly decreased. Simultaneously, the proliferation of democratic liberalism and free market economies around the world has **dramatically curtailed** the death toll associated with natural disasters and diseases. A recent study confirms that the annual percentage of people killed by natural disasters has decreased tenfold in the last 40 years, in spite of the fact that the average annual number of recorded disasters increased fivefold. Evidently, open and technological societies are becoming **increasingly resilient** to the effects of natural disasters. Kari Marie Norgaard Read a view of the psychology of climate scepticism from US scholar Kari Norgaard Inside the climate ostrich Yet the very same technologies that are serving us to analyse, predict and prevent potential disasters have reached such a level of sophistication and potency that their misuse can transform vital survival tools into destructive forces, thus becoming existential risks in their own right. The nuclear device that may protect us from a devastating asteroid impact can also be employed for belligerent purposes. Genetic engineering that offers the prospect of infinite food supplies for the world's growing population can be turned into weapons of bioterrorism. And without the global utilisation of fossil fuels we would lack all trappings of modern civilisation and social progress. Yet, fossil fuels are regarded as dangerous resources that are widely blamed for economic tensions, wars and catastrophic climate change. Existential risk perception There seems to be some correlation between media exposure and existential risk perception. The more people see, hear or read about the risks of Near Earth Object (NEO) impacts, nuclear terrorism or global climate catastrophes, the more concerned they have become. The mere mention of catastrophic risks, regardless of its low probability, is enough to make the danger more urgent, thus increasing public estimates of danger. Scientists who evaluate risks are often torn between employing level-headed risk communication and the temptation to overstate potential danger. Sunbather (BBC) Media called on 'climate porn' Chaotic world of climate truth The inclination to amplify a possible risk is only too understandable. Personal biases, as well as grants and funding pressures, are considerable motivating factors to hype a probable hazard; ;n many cases, funding is allocated on the basis of intense lobbying. This, in turn, can tempt researchers to aggressively promote their specific "danger warning" via the mass media. Behind many alarms lurk vested interests of research institutions, campaign groups, political parties, charities, businesses or the news media, all of whom vie for attention, influence and funding in a relentless war of words. Professional risk analysts disapprove of such scare tactics, and point out that the detrimental affects of apocalyptic-sounding alarms and the rise of collective anxieties are much costlier than generally presumed. Whether individuals regard existential risks as a serious and pressing threat, or a remote and long-term risk, often depends on their psychological traits. Nobody has appreciated this conundrum perhaps better than Sir Winston Churchill who famously said: "An optimist sees an opportunity in every calamity; a pessimist sees a calamity in every opportunity." Doomsday argument In recent years, leading scientists in the UK, such as Brandon Carter, Stephen Hawking and Sir Martin Rees, have advanced the so-called Doomsday Argument, a cosmological theory in which global catastrophes due to low-probability mega-disasters play a considerable role. This speculative theory maintains that scientific risk assessments have systematically underestimated existential hazards. Hence the probability is growing that humankind will be wiped out in the near future. I believe that the prophets of doom, including those predicting climate doom, are wrong Nevertheless, there are many good and compelling reasons why human extinction is not predetermined or unavoidable. According to a more optimistic view of the future, all existential risks can be tackled, eliminated or significantly reduced through the application of human ingenuity, hyper-technologies and global democratisation. From this confident perspective of emergent risk reduction, the resilience of civilisation is no longer restricted by the constraints of human biology. Instead, it is progressively shielded against natural and man-made disasters by hyper-complex devices and information-crunching technologies that potentially comprise boundless technological solutions to existential risks. Current advances in developing an effective planetary defence system, for example, will eventually lead to a protective shield that can safeguard life on the Earth from disastrous NEO impacts. The societal response to the cosmic impact hazard is a prime example of how technology can ultimately eliminate an existential risk from the list of contemporary concerns. A technology-based response to climate change impacts is equally feasible, and equally capable of solving the problem. Global democracy as a solution But while most natural extinction risks can be entirely eliminated by technological fixes, no such clean-cut solutions are available for the **inherent** potential **threats** posed by **super-technologies.** After all, the principal threat to our long-term survival is the destabilising and destructive violence committed by extremist groups and authoritarian regimes. Here, **the solution can only be political and cultural**. Enola Gay. Image: Getty Effective democracy may prevent man-made catastrophes Fortunately, there is compelling evidence that the global ascent of **democratic liberalism** is directly correlated with a steep reduction of **armed conflicts.** A recent UN report found that the total number of wars and civil conflicts has declined by 40% since the end of the Cold War, while the average number of deaths per conflict has dropped dramatically, from 37,000 in 1950 to 600 in 2002. According to the field of democratic peace research, the growing number of democracies is the foremost reason for the pacification of many international conflicts. Democracies have never gone to war against each other, as democratic states adopt compromise solutions to both internal and external problems. As Rudolph J Rummel, one of the world's most eminent peace researchers, has stated: "In democracy we have **a cure for war** and a way of minimising political violence, genocide, and mass murder." On balance, therefore, I believe that the prophets of doom, including those predicting climate doom, are wrong. Admittedly, there is no guarantee that we can avoid major mayhem and disruption during our risky transition to become a hyper-technological, type 1 civilisation. Even so, societal evolution has now reached a level of complexity that renders the probability of human survival much higher than at any hitherto stage of history.

**They Say: “Democratic Peace Theory Wrong”**

#### Democratic peace theory is empirically verified.

Dafoe & Russett 13 (Allen Dafoe and Bruce Russett, October 2013, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale and Dean Acheson Research Professor of International Relations and Political Science at Yale, Assessing the Capitalist Peace, p.110)

**The democratic peace**—the **empirical association between democracy and peace—is** an **extremely robust** finding. More generally, many liberal factors are associated with peace and many explanations have been offered for these associations, including the effects of: liberal norms, democratic signaling, credible commitments, the free press, economic interdependence, declining benefits of conquest, signaling via capital markets, constraints on the state, constraints on leaders, and others. **Scholars are still mapping the contours of the liberal peace, and we remain a long way from fully understanding the respective influence of these different candidate causal mechanisms. All this being said, the robustness of the democratic peace, as one interrelated empirical aspect of the liberal peace, is impressive**. **The democratic peace has been interrogated for over two decades and no one has been able to identify an alternative factor that accounts for it in cross-national statistical analyses**. **Democracy in any two countries** (joint democracy) **has been shown to be robustly negatively associated with militarized interstate disputes** (MIDs**), fatal MIDs, crises, escalation, and wars. The democratic peace is for good reason widely cited and regarded as one of the most productive research programs**.